


ROMANIA
NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY "CAROL I"
CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES



STRATEGIC IMPACT

No. 1[30]/2009

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NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY "CAROL I" PRINTING HOUSE
BUCHAREST, ROMANIA



The Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies' scientific quarterly magazine acknowledged by the National University Research Council as a B+ magazine

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ISSN 1842-9904 (online edition)



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EASTERN PARTNERSHIP – A TOOL TO CONSOLIDATE THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

Florian RÂPAN, PhD

The consolidated method to expand the EU neighborhood policy, The Eastern Partnership, launching this spring in Prague, focuses the EU cooperation concerns towards the Black Sea and the Caucasian expanded area. Thus the close political and economic cooperation with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine will develop the stability and security in the Eastern space dominated by numerous challenges and threats of the former Soviet republics. The former achievements in the field of European neighborhood policy represent a guarantee of the states' positive evolution due to the EU active and multilateral involvement in the Eastern neighborhood problems.

The new multilateral cooperation regional forum is a priority for the EU and aspires to develop the dimension of the Eastern neighborhood policy completing thus the existent tools such as the Black Sea Synergy, a Romanian initiative opening the road to solving the Pontic-Caspian problems. This initiative promises a closer cooperation with the respective states which hope to gain a real support for a possible adhesion. In our approach of the Eastern Partnership, we will discuss about the initiative estimated impact on the respective states and its effect on the EU stability and security.

Keywords: EU, stability, development, Eastern partnership.

1. Opening a new chapter in the relationship with the Eastern neighbours

The analysis of all the elements forming the substance of the Eastern Partnership emphasizes a double determination: on one hand, the wish of the former Soviet states in the Black Sea and Caspian area to join the EU and on the other hand, the EU vital interest to contribute to the development of stability, improving and supporting the economic development on its Eastern borders.

The European Committee states that the Eastern Partnership will represent a new phase in the EU relationships with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The partnership's ambition is to develop the level of political engagement, including the transition to a new generation of association agreements, to achieve an expanded integration in the EU economy, to facilitate the citizens' travels to the EU on the condition of achieving certain security requirements, establish more concrete ways to ensure the energy security advantageous for all the parties involved, to increase the level of financial assistance. The EU wants to support more its partners' reform efforts through a new global program of institutional development and a new multilateral dimension which will permit a solidary response to the common challenges within the partnership. The future partnership embodies new measures to support the social and economic development of the respective six states and also five emblematic initiatives which will demonstrate the EU support.

The current initiative has an obvious continuity character deriving from the well-known European neighborhood policy (ENP). Thus, in 2003, in its effort to become a global actor, the EU suggested a change management strategy which allows it to address the problems in a "together" way. Among the key-elements, the EU proposed the development of the partnership with its European neighbors in a neighborhood policy of prosperity and stability as the organization boundaries expand.

The process would ensure a larger security for the European citizens and also an increased EU authority, coherence and influence in the international arena. The neighborhood policy gave important advantages to the south eastern states. In order to avoid a new fragmentation of Europe, the Union created a "free trade area" which could generate a complete economic integration for

Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The neighborhood policy has a very important role in the regional stability which is closely linked to the domestic and international restraints of the less developed countries who aspires to the EU membership: lack of natural resources, demographic, economic, social problems, the competition on the global international markets, uncontrolled migration, terrorism and organized crime etc. Launched before the enlargement by 10 states, ENP wanted to create within PESC, an area with a high level of economic cooperation and political integration which promotes the stability, security and mutual prosperity within the EU and at its borders, making its neighbors “true allies”. The action plans concluded with the neighbors aimed the political dialog of the fight against terrorism and the ADM terror, cooperation on migration, human being traffic, economic and social issues and also energy, transport and environment issues. The initiative suggested to the neighbors the global objective of an identical level with that of the member states except from the financial obligations and participation in the institutions.

In just a few years, the EU concluded partnership and cooperation agreements with the Eastern neighbors and association agreements with the Southern neighbors. Currently the following states are part of the initiative: Algeria, Armenia, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. Russia is not associated to ENC yet but it has concluded a specific strategic partnership with the EU, renegotiated in the form of a strengthened partnership agreement following the Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008.

In 2007, the EU German presidency initiated and launched a new and improved ENP, called ENP Plus where the German options make the distinction between “Europe’s neighbors” – which include the Eastern and also Southern states – and “European neighbors” which refer only at the former Soviet states. The German initiative was mostly focused on the Caucasians emphasizing the necessity that the states here and also Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus benefit from a more tangible integration in the European structures¹.

The analysts² stated that ENP must generate a partnership of modernization between the EU and the Eastern and Caucasian countries,

partnership which ensures funds for a real in-depth transformation. The organization expanded the cooperation and the security area from the outskirts of Europe to the Caucasian and Asian East, motivated by the existence of real threats of the conflicts in the region and the market potential provided by the expansion of the European economy. The EU wants to tackle the domestic problems of these countries, such as the high level of corruption, the democracy difficulties, insufficient development and at the same time the conflicts in the area and the inability of the governments to solve the unexpected crisis. In this context, the EU was concerned about the low-intensity threats to security and also about stopping the expansion of terrorism, preventing dissemination and using nuclear weapons in the region, diminishing the international delinquency and the illegal traffic of weapons and drugs and also the access to the hydrocarbon resources necessary to provide the member states with energy.

Subsequently, the relationship between the Eastern Europe and the EU regarding Europe’s energy security finalized in a coherent strategy called Strategy for Central Asia which provided a clear perspective of commercial and economic EU integration starting with the free trade of goods and services to the problem of non-tariff barriers and a total convergence on the plan. This relationship consolidated the regional closeness in the East based on the existent cooperation in the Black Sea region, strengthened the political cooperation and had a more active role in the efforts to settle the efforts in the region.³

A chapter attached to this Strategy was that regarding “The Black Sea Synergy”, a Romanian contribution to focus the EU interest to the Black Sea enlarged space, “a developing market with a high development potential” and “a turntable for the energy and transport fluxes”. Now the EU is more aware of problems like its energy security and projects of gas and transport supplies in the Caspian Sea via the Black Sea, in particular by creating a new energy corridor, together with promoting the human rights, democracy and good government, stopping the illegal immigration, human traffic and smuggling, developing the transport on the Danube and the trade.

The Eastern partnership must complete the previous forms of ENP, ENP Plus, Strategy for Central Asia and the Black Sea Synergy.

Member states hope that its impact on the EU Eastern neighbors will effectively develop the stability, security and prosperity of the respective spaces. The European officials⁴ consider the two initiatives regarding the Black Sea enlarged space as a perfect unity. They state that there is enough space for the two initiatives – the Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy – to develop complementarily and support each other. The Czech diplomacy states that the Eastern Partnership represents a more expanded regional initiative than the regional initiative of the Black Sea Synergy. While within the Synergy, the focus is on the free circulation, the Oriental Partnership will prepare the respective states for a future adherence to the EU. On the other hand, the Partnership is considered to benefit from a larger variety of tools. The EU increased interest toward the Eastern space derives also from the issue of Europe's energy independence. Thus, the Czech Republic will organize a second summit with the key countries for the "Southern corridor" project to transport gas from the Caspian Sea to Europe. Among the countries invited to participate, will be Georgia, Turkey and Kazakhstan. The problem of the "Southern corridor" – via Nabucco project – wants to connect the Caspian Sea to Austria through Turkey. This fact is a priority again with the recent crisis of the Russian-Ukrainian gas which strengthened the European will to reduce its dependence towards Moscow by diversifying the supplies.

2. The Eastern Partnership and the problems of the six states

Which will be the impact of the new initiative on the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine,

Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan? First of all, the "key" the Eastern Partnership wants to place at the disposal of the six Eastern states revives their hopes to join the EU. When the waiting in front of the organization's "door" is very long and probably useless for some states and when to get the approval of all the 27 regarding the enlargement is a very difficult enterprise, the "Northern" concept to cooperate with the EU, considered as a transition to a new generation of association agreements, with a certain characteristic for the states within the Black Sea and the Caspian enlarged space, seems to be a tool of economic,

political, social and security development which should trigger a revival and relaunch of the candidacy for the European community. Without bearing any grudge against the states within former Soviet Union which suppressed the "spring in Prague" in 1968, the Czech Republic is determined to offer the six former Soviet states another "spring in Prague" with the possibility to get them closer to the Western economic and security system in order to face the current and future challenges.

The new initiative is closely linked to the fact that the EU Eastern borders have shifted following the successive enlargements, making Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus the new Eastern neighbors of the EU. As Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the commissioner for external affairs and European neighborhood policy, stated⁵, this initiative provides new opportunities and also responsibilities such as the conflict in Georgia. The European member states have a lot of problems to tackle and a close cooperation with the EU may be a good solution. That is why, all these states expressed their interest to join EU. Now, the organization has decided to support these aspirations, to grant them the democratic support and know-how in order to be able to join the EU.

We can find details of this support in the European official's message who states that the Eastern Partnership, flexible and adapted in accordance with each partner's necessity and ability, will determine the EU to provide a maximum assistance taking into account the current political realities. The organization proposes a more profound political engagement, it wants to offer a more active help to the democratic and economic reforms. In order to ensure the administrative ability of each of these countries to benefit from the advantages resulting from the EU offers, the organization wants to develop the institutional framework which should permit the development of the resources where needed. A very important political signal of the EU commitment is its decision to sign association agreements with those complying with the elections' international standards.

On the other hand, there will be vast "free trade areas" which on long term will be able to join the Economic Neighborhood Community. The cooperation of the community citizens with those in the Eastern states will be achieved by creating larger opportunities for the young persons to study

in the EU, by streamlining the travel procedures to the EU. The citizens will travel free and safe and Mobility and Security Pacts will be concluded in order to determine the visas progressive liberalization and also a better administration of the community borders. The EU wants to have a more active role in reducing the economic and social differences in these states, knowing that they would strengthen the society's stability.

The Eastern Partnership will help the respective countries to respond promptly to the new risks and challenges. Thus, there will be a larger cooperation regarding the energy leading to an increased energy security on both sides. Among the proposals addressed to the European leaders, was also the idea of a new multilateral framework for this partnership, including an annual meeting of the foreign affairs ministers in order to ensure the exchange of experience and practice among themselves and with the EU member states. This thing will lead to the development of the initiatives in domains like small and medium enterprises, energy security and natural disasters. With an appropriate financing ensured by the member states, the Eastern Partnership will bring to the Eastern neighbors "a lasting message of political solidarity, with real benefits for the citizens", thus being a profound, vast and true cooperation partnership for the 21st century.

Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the European Commissioner⁶, states that now is the right time to open this chapter in the relationship with the Eastern neighbors. The progresses achieved are a good starting point in this enterprise which is an ambitious and balanced offer. The fact that the EU security and stability are affected by the events in the Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus proved that the EU policy towards these countries must be firm, pro-active and clear. As Leonard Orban⁷, the European Commissioner for multilingualism stated, this new initiative will lead to the necessity of doubling the community's cooperation efforts at the Black Sea, necessity which resulted from the recent Russian-Georgian conflict. The Russian press criticized the new initiative saying that it is perceived as a program whose objectives will upset Moscow's plans to achieve a unique economic space with the former Soviet republics especially that, till 2020, the EU wants to allot 1.5 billion euros to the six states.

Doubling the cooperation efforts at the Black Sea isn't meant to remove the respective states

from Russia's influence and the creation of influence areas and demarcation lines in Europe as Jose Manuel Barroso emphasized. In this stage, the organization can't provide adherence perspectives. The process can lead to an association status, an association relationship being the most advanced possibility. Through the Eastern Partnership, the six states will be drawn closer to the EU through the free trade and visa elimination agreements. The Summit of the 27 plus 6 will clarify many of these misunderstandings. The Eastern Partnership will be considered simultaneously with the EU strategic partnership with Russia. However, president Barroso emphasizes the EU ambition to turn the post-communist countries into Western democracies with a market economy. He stresses that prosperity and stability in the 21st century will be produced by the economic policy and not by missiles; by the political dialog and not by demonstrations of force.

Conclusions

The multilateral program the EU promises to launch in the Eastern neighbors will increase EU contribution to the world's prosperity, stability and security. The future will confirm or not the optimistic expectations of the six states towards the new initiative. In our opinion, the Black Sea Synergy is more important by the fact that Romanian initiative includes the main two regional powers – Russian Federation and Turkey – whose connection with the Eastern space issue and that of the Black Sea space is beyond any doubt.

For the six states, the cooperation with the EU is more important than remaining under Russia's influence. The pro-Western option is advantageous from the economic and security point of view and the six states declare that they wish to be strong links between the East and West. However some of these are more European before the elections and afterwards they forget about Europe and turning to Moscow. Maybe because during winter time, Moscow cut the energy supplies reminding Europe and its neighbors that gas comes from Russia.

The 6 states together with the 27 others could find viable solutions to the current world crisis. Faced with the long and strong recession generated by the world financial crisis, they can hope that the common financial support and cooperation lead to an improved economy and crisis management.



NOTES:

¹ Lili di PUPPO, *La nouvelle initiative de l'Allemagne repondra-t-elle aux aspirations de ses „voisins europeens“?*, On <http://www.caucaz.com/home/breve-contenu.php?id=385&PHPSES SID=6ba7228b08e66d41a2a3046767499bf9>

² Dr. Mircea MUREȘAN, *Dimensiuni actuale și viitoare ale politicii europene de vecinătate*, Impact strategic, nr. 3/2007, p.9, on http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_publicatii/is24.pdf

³ Ibidem, p.10.

⁴ See the statement made by the EU Commissioner for Multilingualism, Leonard Orban, during the Black Sea NGOs Forum, 01.11.2008, on <http://stiri.rol.ro/content/view/157870/2/>

⁵ The message of Mrs. Benita FERRERO-WALDNER, EU Commissioner in charge of

External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, *Parteneriatul Estic: solidaritate politică durabilă cu beneficii reale pentru cetățeni*, Bruxelles, December, 12, 2008, on http://www.delmda.ec.europa.eu/whatsnew/press_releases_ro.html, accesat la 18.02.2009.

⁶ See her statement made on the collection *Parteneriatul estic – un nou capitol în relațiile UE cu partenerii săi răsăriteni*, on http://ec.europa.eu/romania/news/parteneriatul_estic_ro.htm, accesat la 18.02.2009.

⁷ Comment made by the EU Commissioner for Multilingualism, Leonard Orban, during the Black Sea NGOs Forum, 01.11.2008, on <http://stiri.rol.ro/content/view/157870/2/>

⁸ Diana ILIESCU, Mediafax: *UE asigură Rusia că Parteneriatul Estic nu va crea zone de influență*, 05.12.2008.

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LIMITED NEGOTIATIONS BUT UNLIMITED WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Constantin-Gheorghe BALABAN, PhD

Gaza – controlled by Hamas¹ since June 2007 – is a nightmare for Israelis for more than half of century. The Israeli offensive launched December, 27, 2008, after Hamas forcefully took control in that territory, in June 2007, renewed a six month truce expired on December, 19, 2008. Hamas leaders promised again the Israel's deletion from the map², but Israeli officials excluded any truce in the next days.

Israel, as the Israeli president Shimon Peres declared, wants to reach to a “terrorism cessation”, “not to a truce” with Hamas in Gaza. During the three weeks’ offensive at least 1.203 Palestinians were killed, 410 children and 108 women, more than 5.300 people were injured and the damages to the Gaza infrastructure – as the Palestinian Central Bureau for Statistics states – 476 million dollars.

On December, 25, 2008, Russia expressed its support for the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, contested by the Islamist movement Hamas and also for the peace process with Israel which Moscow wanted to accelerate hosting an international conference for the Middle East, in 2009.

The area's actual conjecture may bring back into the agenda Fatah forces, a lesser radicalized group than Hamas and even to officialise the position of the main Palestinian opposition party for Hamas.

Keywords: Middle East, Gaza, Hamas, Israel.

1. Gaza – scene of a new war between the Israeli army and Hamas Islamists. The recent conflict from Gaza was launched by Israel, in order to cease the Hamas missile attacks. Previously, the Israeli army warned the Palestinian population from Gaza about its intentions to expand the military operations³.

The Israeli offensive⁴, codified “Lead Rain” operation, was launched on December, 27, 2008 after the Islamist Hamas movement didn't renew

the six month truce expired on December, 19.

But for Hamas, “the real reason” that Israel attacked Gaza is a “political one”: overthrowing Hamas government from Gaza, and not the missile attacks.

Since January 2006, when Hamas won the elections – Abu Marzouq, the Hamas political bureau leader sustains that “Israel has tried to break the Hamas support by economic embargo, has tried to convince Fatah to fight against us but has not succeeded it and now they act alone”⁵. Seemingly, a real motivation confirmed by the empowered Kadima centre party's leader himself, the foreign affairs minister Tzipi Livni, pledging to remove the Hamas control over Gaza: “Israel should overthrow Hamas and a government led by me will do it”.

Gaza, a 362 sq. meters little territory, but overpopulated⁶ and poor, under Hamas control since June 2007, becomes the scene of a war between the Israeli army and the Hamas islamists, that is a territory devastated by bombardments and violent confrontations for the next three weeks and the Palestinian groups enarmed with artisanal missiles⁷ over the israelian territory hinder the international diplomatic efforts to cease the fire.

The concerns are also felt more acutely in the occidental offices because the Israel's military actions don't lead to a stable peace into the region but the civilians' deaths and injuries at this scale⁸ only strengthen Hamas and “push away people from Israel and the Palestinians to extremism”⁹. Moreover, the conflict provoked a humanitarian drama, because thousands of Palestinians left without houses and the damages caused to the Gaza infrastructure increased to half a billion of dollars.

The European Union Czech presidency which initially stated the land operation launched by Israel in Gaza seems defensive, not offensive, afterwards, tainted its declaration recognizing one state's right to self-protect but criticized “actions

affecting the civilians". Even UN suspended the Gaza humanitarian aid because its personnel were targeted by some Israeli attacks and the abeyance will continue "until the Israeli authorities can guarantee their security and safety. Of course, it was a much regretted decision but normal in that context"¹⁰.

The European Union tried to play along a more actively role and slowly seems to detach from Israel. This is proved by the presence of the French president Nicolas Sarkozy into the region, in order to intermediate the cease-fire and also a European delegation led by the Czech foreign minister Karel Schwarzenberg, whose country overtook, on the 1st of January 2009, the EU presidency from France.

Meanwhile, France, by its foreign minister voice, "condemns the Israeli land offensive against Gaza" and appreciates this dangerous military escalation complicates the efforts engaged by the international community" to obtain a truce"¹¹. In return, Spain expressed its support and solidarity with the Palestinians from Gaza.

The British prime-minister Gordon Brown recommended, into an interview for BBC, that "we should do more efforts for an immediate truce", considering the Israeli land offensive as a "very dangerous moment" into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, too"¹². There is a good point, we may say, while "the Arabian world is on fire" – Gaza situation pushed hundreds of people into the streets. Big movements are taking place especially in Egypt, but also in Lebanon, Morocco, Yemen, Syria and Libya and the Hamas military wing threatens Israel with its thousands of militants ready to fight against the Israelian army in Gaza"¹³.

A similar position was adopted the European Parliament whose president, Hans-Gert Pöttering, asked both parties to cease fire immediately and to rebuild dialogue and calm relations and to promote new strategies for peace in Middle East, elaborated by the new American administration with the European union. "A Palestinian life, the European Parliament president stated, has the same value as an Israelian one". Even if "Hamas was wrong" reopening the conflict with Israel, Hans-Gert Pöttering criticized the Israel massive reaction considered "totally disproportioned"¹⁴.

Therefore, the European Parliament will actively contribute to these efforts and the European Union delegation as mentioned by the vice-chairman of the Delegation for Relations with the Palestinian

Legislative Council, Proinsias de Rossa (The Socialist Group from the European Parliament, Ireland) insisted over the both parties' cease-fire, the Israelian forces withdrawal from Gaza and the raise of the blockade for Gaza's citizens lives to come back to a sort of normality"¹⁵. A similar position had the neighbouring country Egypt, whose President Hosni Mubarak asked also Israel to cease "immediately" and "unconditioned" fights and to withdraw its troops from Gaza. Moreover, the International Committee of the Red Cross "accused" the Israelian army of "unacceptable behaviour" and "infringement of international laws"¹⁶.

Also, it must be mentioned that Moscow, even before the offensive launched into Gaza, expressed its support for the peace process with Israel which wants to accelerate by hosting an international conference for the Middle East, in 2009.

2. Israel initially rejects the international proposals for signing a truce with Hamas. The international proposals regarding this issue initially were rejected"¹⁷ by the Israelian security office, the Israelian president Shimon Peres stating, even in December, 30, 2008 that Israel wants to come to "a terrorism end" and "not to a truce" with Hamas in Gaza"¹⁸. This was a confirmed and strengthened position by the Israelian foreign minister Tzipi Livni, who rejected the European diplomats' appeals, during their visit to Jerusalem, regarding an immediate truce in Gaza.

Israel decided "to change the data into region". It fights against terrorism, as the officials from Tel Aviv sustain, and won't sign an agreement with the terrorism.

As regards the Israelian foreign minister Tzipi Livni, "Israel acted to change the existent data before the military operation, when Hamas fired against Israel whenever wanted and Israel forborne", or, now, the Israeli official underlined, "if data changed, Israel will riposte when it will be aimed".

This is accountable if we regard the Israeli president's statement, Ehud Olmert, to the ministers' Council opening: "I was encouraged by the American president's position, George W. Bush, who has tolod me we shouldn't just make sure Hamas ceases the missile attack, but also won't be able to restart into the future"¹⁹. Does it confirm the hypothesis stated by the Canadian economist

Michel Chossudovsky, author of book **War on terrorism**, regarding the “defensive” attack of the Israeli army over Gaza has been preparing for six months? The information published in the Israeli newspaper *Haaretz* clearly affirm that, at 27th December 2008, the defence minister, Ehud Barak, “prepared the attack over Gaza six months ago, when Israel was negotiating the truce with Hamas militants”²⁰. Moreover, sources from Israeli Defence Force and Mossad, quoted by Shamus Cooke, into an article published in December 2008 on www.GlobalResearch.ca, sustain these actions are part of a plan elaborated by the actual chief of Mossad, General Meir Dagan, to destroy the Gaza region’s infrastructure and economy, to make Palestinians’ life “unbearable”. The plan won’t aim only Hamas targets but also the “deliberate” destruction of some civil objectives²¹. Officially, the stated goal of the offensive launched by the Israeli army in Gaza, on the 27th of December 2007, remains the same: to end the Palestinian missile attacks against Israel²².

The United States, devoted ally of Israel, support this country from the beginning of the military operations, the Gaza offensive strengthening, as prime-minister Olmert stated, “the Israel’s capacity to assert against those ones threatening”²³. According to the former state secretary Condoleezza Rice, the United States preferred to wait the Egypt led-negotiations results before reacting²⁴.

Also, the new USA president Barack Obama was criticized repeatedly because he “didn’t criticize the Israeli offensive from Gaza”²⁵.

3. The civilians’ situation from Gaza continues to remain desperate. A sustainable and fully respected truce is needed, determining the complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Gaza. Almost two weeks after Israel launched the offensive against Hamas Palestinian movement, ending with over 780 dead people, the UN Security Council adopted, on the 8th of January 2009, at the evening, a resolution²⁶ asking an immediate ceasefire in Gaza. The resolution was adopted with the vote of 14th from the 15th permanent members, the only abstention being from United States²⁷.

Initially, Israel and Hamas²⁸ rejected the UNSC Resolution, asking for the immediate ceasefire in Gaza²⁹. So, the Israeli offensive in Gaza continued, according to the declared goal for

accomplishing all their objectives³⁰. So did the missile attacks launched by Hamas over the Israeli state, entitling the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas³¹, preferred by the Occident and whose party, Fatah, controls the other part of the Palestinian territory, West Bank, to launch together with the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, other leaders of the Arabian countries, and also UN ambassadors an appeal to Hamas to make a new truce with Israel.

Consequently, the civilians’ situation in Gaza continues to remain desperate. Even if the premier Olmert stated, not once, that only Hamas must be blamed for the situation, “taking hostage” the civilian population from Gaza, “by its terrorist actions, without taking into account the hardships”, while the Israeli army made “more than any other state, in order to protect civilians”, remembering the army authorized periodically the humanitarian aid transfer toward Gaza³².

On the other side, exiled Hamas leaders ask, at their turn, not only a fire-cessation from Israel, but also the Israeli troops’ withdrawal, rising the blockade and opening all the cross-borders over the Palestinian territory controlled by Islamists.

4. For the first time in history, Israel decreed a unilateral truce for one of its conflicts. On 17th January 2009, the Israeli premier israelian Ehud Olmert announced, during a press conference organized in Tel Aviv, “an unilateral truce in Gaza”³³.

According to him, the truce had to be started “at fortnight” of January, 17-18, but with the condition very clearly expressed, “if our enemies will decide to attack us, the Israeli army will feel free to retort”³⁴.

We must remember the resolution for this “truce” was adopted in the Israeli security office and this is “the first time in history” when Israel decides a unilateral truce for one of its conflicts. Moreover, if Hamas will cease all its attacks, there will be analysed also the moment when Israel leaves Gaza³⁵.

Hamas rejected immediately the Israel unilateral truce and – as Fawzi Barhoum, a Hamas spokesman declared –, they “under no circumstances will accept the presence of soldiers into Gaza’s land, by all means. Hamas is still present, its resistance brave, and its leadership strong”. The unilateral truce announced by the Tel Aviv government comes

after 23 days of air bombardments and land fights between the Israeli soldiers and Hamas militants.

At his turn, the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, has proposed to the Hamas Islamist movement to form a national unity government, which should organize simultaneously the parliamentary and presidential elections.

5. The Israeli soldiers' withdrawal from Gaza ended. Israel's decision to decree an unilateral truce in Gaza, saluted, of course, must be followed by an "official peace agreement" and a complete troops' withdrawal", opinion clearly expressed also by the spokesman of the president of the Palestinian Authority³⁶. Moreover, Israel reached all its goals in its 23 days military offensive in Gaza. Fire ceases but will there be a guarantee that Hamas will do the same?

The truce, in force since January, 18, 2009, was followed by the withdrawal of the Israeli soldiers from Gaza and the process ended on January, 21st, when the last Israeli soldier left Gaza. Still, the army remained deployed to the border, "just in case"³⁷, and is ready to regain the offensive in Gaza "when necessary", as stated by the Israeli minister of defence, Ehud Barak.

Meanwhile, in Gaza, Hamas security forces reappeared.

6. After ten quiet days, violence re-bursts in Gaza. Despite the truce, there are many infringements of the cease-fire agreement which, seemingly, will continue on both sides. On one hand, the missile launched from Gaza³⁸ and shootings against some Israeli tanks taking a "limited foray" in Gaza. On the other hand, the bombardment³⁹ by the Israeli air force of the tunnels⁴⁰ used for smuggling, that ties the southern part of Gaza with Egypt, which, despite the hundreds of bombs and missiles aiming them during the recent Israeli offensive, are operational again and used by the Hamas militants to introduce smuggled ammunition⁴¹.

Justifiable or not, ending the smuggling and Hamas' missile attacks blockade toward the south of Israel were "key-objectives" of the Israeli state for the Tsahal offensive. Or, as recently stated by the foreign affairs minister Tzipi Livni, the Israeli state "is ready to react anytime", if the bombardments proved insufficient to end up the guns' smuggling⁴².

7. The terms' definitivation regarding the fire cessation and inter-Palestinian relations' normalization. The efforts to solve out the conflict continue. Hamas has assured it will respect the truce for a week. Then, Hamas' spokesman, Ayman Taha, member of the Islamic delegation negotiating with the Egyptian government, announced "the ceasefire with Israel was prolonged until the 5th of February when will be signed an agreement in this regard"⁴³. Hamas organization "opposes" the agreement to refer to as "Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit liberation"⁴⁴, too, captured by the Palestinian group in June 2006, as in his exchange, Hamas leaders ask⁴⁵ the liberation for many hundred of Palestinians imprisoned in Israel. Consequently, this issue won't be discussed related to the cross-border toward Gaza opening even if Hamas insisted during the Cairo negotiations⁴⁶ with the Egyptian mediator that the ceasefire should be limited to a year⁴⁷. Perhaps, here, in Cairo, where other Palestinian factions' representatives participated, it is taken seriously the menace of the Hamas political leader, Khaled Mechal, for an Intifada in the West Bank against the Palestinian Authority whose president is Mahmoud Abbas⁴⁸.

8. The damages balance sheet. What does the different statistics state about the damages suffered after the Israeli offensive in Gaza? In three weeks of offensive, at least 1.203 Palestinians were killed, out of which 410 children, 108 women and about 5.300 persons were injured⁴⁹. Also, according to the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, 65% of the dead people were civilians. On the Israeli part, there were ten soldiers and three civilians killed in the same period of time.

According to the Palestinian central office for statistics, the cost of damages provoked to the Gaza infrastructures rises to 476 million dollars.

Instead of a conclusion. Can a truce, obtained with the support of Egyptian mediation, between Israel and Hamas, expired in December 2008, be the main and only motivation or just a pretext for all the following events after six months of relative calm in and around Gaza? Some analysts consider Hamas movement has all the interest in renewing the truce with Israel – Israel needing Hamas to be able to hinder a Palestinian state creation.

Fatah leader from Gaza, Mohammed Dahlan - the former responsible with al Fatah security in

Gaza and an active politician on the Middle East scene -, told, during an interview for the German *Der Spiegel*, not only about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Hamas opponents but also about the “dirty” games of Israel⁵⁰.

Could the actual situation from the area bring back in the main-frame Fatah forces, a lesser radicalized group than Hamas and even to institutionalize the position of the main Palestinian party in opposition with Hamas? Hamas leaders, elected to fight for the Islamic resistance and enemies of corruption through the election victory from 2006, lost their credibility and their single strategy, as Dahlan sustained, is “destruction and chaos”.

The reality is the end of 2008 marked “the debut of a bloody conflict, imminent into a territory considered one of the world’s hot spots”⁵¹, and the ones suffering by the armed action aren’t Hamas leaders - Hamas missiles offering Israel just “the perfect pretext to start the war”.

NOTES:

¹ Hamas organization was constituted in 1987, after the conflicts initiated by the Arabs living in the territories occupied by Israel, so-called the First Intifada. Hamas detached from Mujama movement, a political party without military ambitions, <http://www.ziare.com/articole/atentate+sinucigase>

² Newsin related the most influential Hamas leader from Gaza, Mahmoud al-Zahar, promised the victory of the Islamist movement against Israel and the “elimination” of the Israeli state. Mahmoud al-Zahar stated that “ with this aggression, the enemy self-condemned, showing the world reasons to eliminate this temporary entity from Palestine /.../ They legitimated their own sons’ suicide by killing Palestine’s children. They legitimated their synagogues’ and schools’ destruction, attacking our mosques and schools”, <http://www.frontnews.ro/externe/eveniment/israelul-continua-ofensiva-in-fasia-gaza-cosmarul-de-500-de-ani-18973>

³ Israel warned the Palestinians they will “intensify the operations” in Gaza. According to Rador, the text, edited in Arabian, sustains the army “will intensify the operations unfolded against the tunnels, ammunition warehouses of the terrorists from Gaza” and advices civilians to stay away from the terrorists and the targeted objectives, <http://www.ziua.ro/news.php?id=19022&data=2009-01-10>

⁴ According to Newsin, this was the wider offensive launched by Israel in Gaza, devastated by bombings and confrontations.

⁵ Abu Marzouq, the leader of Hamas political bureau, <http://www.ziare.com/articole/atentate+sinucigase>

⁶ In Gaza, 1,5 million of Palestinians live in misery, including 1.000 Romanians. Most of them are refugees or their descendants coming in Gaza after they left or were banished from their houses during the war between Israeli and Arabs in 1948. Half of the population lives in poverty and at least 45 percent from the ones able to work are unemployed. <http://www.ziua.ro/news.php?id=19022&data=2009-01-10>

⁷ According to some statistics, Hamas’ “missile” attacks, artisan devices filled with nails and splinters produced in seven years 17 victims among the Israeli population, the punishing raids of the Israeli army committing, according to the Red Cross, tens of thousand of victims in the same time. Widely, *Atacul asupra Fâșiei Gaza pregătit de Israel în urmă cu 6 luni!*, published on the 5th of January 2009, available at <http://www.napocanews.ro/2009/01/atacul-asupra-fasiei-gaza-pregatit-de-israel-in-urma-cu-6-luni.html>

⁸ According to the emergency services from Gaza, during those three weeks of offensive, at least 1.203 Palestinians were killed, out of which 410 children, 108 women and about 5.300 persons injured and the damages cost caused to the Gaza infrastructure rises, as Palestinian central office for statistics stated, to 476 million of dollars.

⁹ The President of the European Parliament, Hans-Gert Pöttering, also the president of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Meeting.

¹⁰ According to the UN prescriptions, quoted by Realitatea TV, “the units were hit, workers killed despite the Israeli authorities have the coordinates for these units and all the movements are coordinated with the Israeli army”. The answer received from Israel: they will examine how a UN convoy was attacked at Erez whilst its deployment has been already communicated to the army.

¹¹ <http://www.6am.ro/international/franta-condamna-ofensiva-israeliana-din-fasia-gaza>; <http://www.ziarullumina.ro/articole;773;1;17993;0;Razboi-in-Fasia-Gaza.html>

¹² http://www.financiarul.com/articol_19396/politica-din-fasia-gaza-incurajata-de-bush.html

¹³ See Israelul și Hamas își jură reciproc război total, iar granițele blochează mii sub focul rachetelor, <http://www.frontnews.ro/externe/eveniment/israelul-continua-ofensiva-in-fasia-gaza-cosmarul-de-500-de-ani-18973>

¹⁴ Foreign affairs - 08-01-2009 - 09:25 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/public/story_page/030-45480-005-01-02-903-20090106STO45479-2009-05-01-2009/default_ro.htm

¹⁵ Foreign affairs - 08-01-2009 - 09:25 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/public/story_page/030-45480-005-01-02-903-20090106STO45479-2009-05-01-2009/default_ro.htm

¹⁶ An ICRC press release, mentioned by Realitatea TV, stated this organization asked for an immediate access to the bombarded areas after discovering many dead and injured civilians, also children, in many locations, very weakened and unable to stand up.

¹⁷ For example, France's proposal to sign a truce for 48 hours with the Hamas Islamists, in order to be able to bring humanitarian aids to Gaza. This proposal was considered by Tel Aviv officials as "unrealistic", as it did not guarantee the ceasefire with Palestinians missile over Israel.

¹⁸ <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-5295514-conflictul-din-fasia-gaza-israelul-respinge-armistitiul-hamas.htm>

¹⁹ http://www.financiarul.com/articol_19396/politica-din-fasia-gaza-incurajata-de-bush.html

²⁰ According to the information published in the Israeli newspaper *Haaretz*, the ones infringing the truce were also the Israelis, IDF attacking Hamas on November, 4, 2008, with the pretext of some tunnels destroyed and used by the Arabic militants to provide guns. Or, in November, 4th, there was the election day in the United States, <http://www.napocanews.ro/2009/01/atacul-asupra-fasiei-gaza-pregatit-de-israel-in-urma-cu-6-luni.html>

²¹ <http://www.napocanews.ro/2009/01/atacul-asupra-fasiei-gaza-pregatit-de-israel-in-urma-cu-6-luni.html>

²² According to Newsin, the spokesman Thomas Steg declared, at a press conference, that in a phone conversation during the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the Israeli premier Ehud Olmert, they "agreed that the responsibility for the situation evolution in the region is owned clearly and exclusively" by the Palestinian group, <http://www.9am.ro/stiri-revista-presei/International/115657/Angela-Merkel-Hamas-singurul-responsabil-pentru-violentele-din-Fasia-Gaza.html>

²³ <http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/premierul-israelian-anunta-un-armistitiu-unilateral-in-fasia-gaza.html?3614;3764299>

²⁴ During the negotiations, Israel asked the missile attacks cessation in the south of the country and the guns' trafficking stop in Gaza through Egypt, whilst Hamas wanted the ceasefire agreement to include also a stipulation for Israel to cease blocking Gaza.

²⁵ Abou Obeida, the spokesman of the Ezzedin al-Qassam brigades, the armed wing of Hamas, stated the armed wing "trained thousands of brave militants ready to wait the enemy with fire and swords at every

corner". See Războiul din Gaza, „cadoul” lui Obama către palestinieni, <http://www.evzvest.ro/articole/detalii-articol/834721/Al-Qaida-ameninta-cu-atacare-Israelului-si-a-SUA/>

²⁶ Almost two weeks after Israel launched an offensive against the Palestinian movement Hamas, ended with almost 780 dead people, the UN Security Council asked, by Resolution 1860, adopted with 5 votes "for" and 14 "against", an immediate ceasefire in Gaza. In this text, result of three days of negotiations between the West and Arabic foreign ministers, the Council "underlines the emergency and asks for an immediate ceasefire, durable and totally respected, aiming the withdrawal of the Israeli force from Gaza".

²⁷ The decision surprised, to a certain extent, because the diplomats convened before the meeting for a unanimously vote.

²⁸ Hamas rejects the UN Security Council resolution, where an immediate ceasefire is asked, because it doesn't serve to the Palestinian people's interests, a responsible of the Islamist movement declared, from Lebanon. Previously, Hamas announced it doesn't feel aimed by the UNSC resolution.

²⁹ The air raids continued also in the night from Thursday to Friday (8-9 January), and the entire figure of victims overpasses 770 dead (TVR, Foreign affairs news, 8 January 2009, 10:28).

³⁰ The Israeli defence minister, Ehud Barak, stated the Gaza offensive will continue until three more objectives will be accomplished: to stop the Palestinian attacks over Israel, to stop arming Hamas from Gaza and the international supervision of a potential truce.

³¹ <http://www.jurnalul.ro/articole/141650/razboi-%C3%8En-gazaarme-s-au-dezlantuit>

³² <http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/premierul-israelian-anunta-un-armistitiu-unilateral-in-fasia-gaza.html?3614;3764299>

³³ The resolution favouring an unilateral truce in Gaza was adopted by the Israeli security office with an overwhelming majority.

³⁴ <http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/premierul-israelian-anunta-un-armistitiu-unilateral-in-fasia-gaza.html?3614;3764299>

³⁵ According to the declaration of the Israeli premier Ehud Olmert, <http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/israelul-trebuie-sa-si-retraga-trupele-din-gaza.html?3614;3764500>

³⁶ The spokesman of the president of the Palestinian National Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, <http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/israelul-trebuie-sa-si-retraga-trupele-din-gaza.html?3614;3764500>

³⁷ <http://www.frontnews.ro/externe/eveniment/ultimul-soldat-israelian-a-parasit-fasia-gaza-pe-21-ianuarie-200601>, <http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/armata-israeliana-s-a-retras-din-fasia-gaza.html?3614;3778964>

³⁸ The missile attack performed by the Palestinians toward Ofakim was afterwards assumed into a press communiqué released in the name of the Al-Aqsa Brigades, Fatah's military section, the president of the Palestinian National Authority's party, Mahmoud Abbas. See <http://www.adevarul.ro/rss/articol/bombardament-israelian-la-frontiera-intre-fasia-gaza-si-egipt.html>

³⁹ According to the information provided by the spokesman of the Israeli army, Micky Rosenfeld, quoted by AFP, Israel bombarded January, 28/29, 2009, fortnight, <http://www.hotnews.ro/tags/armistitiu>; http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-ultima_ora-5369590-israelul-lanseaza-nou-atac-fasia-gaza.htm

⁴⁰ The Israeli authorities estimated, before the offensive, that about 300 tunnels were functional and after the attacks 60-70% were destroyed. Otherwise, in Rafah, the border city in the area where most of the tunnels are digged, the smugglers sustained, before the bombardments, there were used about 1.000 tunnels and 90% out of them were destroyed.

⁴¹ According to AFP, the fact that the tunnels connecting Gaza Strip with Egypt may would have been repaired that fast, the "difficulty" to stop the smuggling, may "feed Israeli fears" that Hamas may use this network, in order to re-arm, <http://www.adevarul.ro/rss/articol/tunelurile-contrabandistilor-din-fasia-gaza-din-nou-operationale.html>

⁴² <http://www.adevarul.ro/rss/articol/tunelurile-contrabandistilor-din-fasia-gaza-din-nou-operationale.html>

⁴³ <http://stiri.itbox.ro/stiri-online/externe/incetareafocului-in-fasia-gaza-ar-putea-intra-in-vigoare-in-februarie.html>

⁴⁴ Israel conditions the Gaza border's opening with the liberation of the soldier Gilad Shalit. In a press communiqué released by the Israeli foreign affairs minister, quoted by AFP, Tzipi Livni mentioned "both things are connected and can't be separated. There can't be any progress in regard with the cross-borders opening before advancing on the soldier's Gilad Shalit liberation", <http://www.ziua.ro/news.php?id=19595&data=2009-01-20>

⁴⁵ For now, the negotiations' attempts for this exchange failed.

⁴⁶ The Cairo negotiations, where participated also the representatives of the Palestinian faction, are dedicated to finalise "the terms" of the ceasefire but also the inter-Palestinian relations "normalising".

⁴⁷ Radio România Actualități, the 25th of January 2009.

⁴⁸ Previously, during a meeting with the members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, president Abbas declared that at a reunion of the Arab countries from Kuwait he rejected a private meeting with Hamas political leader.

⁴⁹ According to the emergency services from Gaza.

⁵⁰ Oana Dobre, correspondence from Ashkelon, Israel.

⁵¹ <http://www.evzvest.ro/articole/detalii-articol/834888/Drama-in-Orientul-Mijlociu/>

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ROMANIA – MODERATING THE POWER EQUILIBRIUM IN THE WIDER BLACK SEA REGION

Marius PRICOPI

A guiding principle in international relations for the past three centuries, the balance of power has become today a sub-systemic concept. Based on the analysis of the interests and the relations of power established in the Black Sea area, this study argues that, in such a difficult and complex space, stability can be achieved only through a realistic adjustment of the different interest belonging to the involved actors.

Attempting to transform this region into a stable and prosperous one, Romania must first balance these interests, thus acting like an authentic moderator of the power equilibrium in the Wider Black Sea Region.

Keywords: equilibrium of power, Romania, the Wider Black Sea region.

Introduction

The Black Sea geopolitical region is a major transit route for energetic resources and, at the same time, an important space of display for asymmetric risks and conflict hot spots, with a substantial impact on Euro-Atlantic security.

This study represents a qualitative research of the power equilibrium moderating role which Romania can and must assume in the Wider Black Sea Region. The novelty of this article lies in the original theoretical perspective, based on the contemporaneity of the equilibrium of power and on a realistic vision on the international relations system, perspective from which are analyzed both the relations of power and the initiatives of the Romanian state in this region.

The qualitative nature of the study implied the use of a “small numbers” approach as a scientific technique. Thus, I analyzed a limited number of actors belonging to the international system: the states considered part of the Wider Black Sea Region (Bulgaria, Turkey, Georgia, Armenia,

Azerbaijan, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Romania), the United States of America and the two main international organizations that define the Euro-Atlantic space (the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance).

Also, the research has been accomplished at the second level of analysis of the international relations – the state level¹. The *independent variables* taken into consideration were: the national interests, the type of regime (from non-democratic to democratic, with different degrees of strengthening), the society's characteristics (history, traditions, values relevant for the state's international presence), the resources (especially the energetic and military ones) and the population (homogenous or ethnically, religiously or culturally fragmented). All of them contributed directly at the analysis of the state's international behaviour (its foreign policy), as a *dependent variable*.

The research is based on the following two assumptions:

1. The *theoretical hypothesis* (with a maximum level of generality): In the Wider Black Sea Region, the ambitions and interests of international actors are extremely complex, varying from full communion to total opposition.

2. The *working hypothesis* (inferred from the theoretical hypothesis and with a lower level of generality): Attempting to rehash the Black Sea on the European map and transform the region into a stable and prosperous one, Romania must first unify and balance the national interests of the states involved, avoiding at the same time to create new separating lines between East and West.

The testing of these two assumptions implied the gathering and the use of numerous empirical sources: case studies, historical texts, present-day publications, visual materials and other scientific papers published in different journals.

Power Equilibrium in the Theory and the Practice of International Relations

Until the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the European states' system was confronting the medieval aspirations for universality of the Roman Empire and the Catholic Church, embodied in the Holy Roman-German Emperor. But the Thirty Years War, held inside the Empire between Catholics and Protestants (later joined by the French), determined the fall of the Empire and the instauration of a new order in the international system.

The new nation-states guided their foreign policy on the base of a concept first put into practice and only afterwards theorized: the power equilibrium. According to this principle, every time a state maximized its power and became threatening, the other states confederated, creating alliances of counterbalance and undermining the hegemonic ambitions of the powerful state. The equilibrium, which meant peace, was being realized through different means, from war to diplomacy, while a lack of balance degenerated almost surely into crisis and conflicts.

In this international system, two major actors assumed the task of moderating the power equilibrium: Great Britain and the United States of America. For England, protecting the power equilibrium meant upholding the weak against the strong. England could freely choose its challenges, since its only European interest was equilibrium; its different ad-hoc allies had their own objectives, but when they passed further from what England thought was proper, the powerful state switched sides and organized coalitions against yesterday's allies². But this meant a foreign policy without long term objectives or an official and predictable strategy, a fact ascertained with accuracy by Sir Edward Grey (foreign secretary between 1892-1895 and 1905-1916), when he asserted that "British foreign secretaries have been guided by what they thought was their countries' immediate interest, without doing any laborious calculus regarding the future"³.

On the other side, the United States of America got beyond their isolationist policy confirmed through the Monroe doctrine (1823) and intervened in Europe in critical moments (the two World Wars), when Great Britain could no longer avoid the instauration of hegemony on the continent

and the European equilibrium seemed irrevocably compromised. Unlike England, the United States engaged into war not to defend a national interest, but in order to impose a new world order, built on American values, and because it perceived security as being collective. In its vision, the international system had to rely on principles, not on power, on law, not on interest.

The Cold War period manages to transform in a considerable measure the nature of the balance of power, which now becomes a fierce arming race between two systemic poles, doubled by an expansionist foreign policy. The purpose of this balance does not remain the same, meaning to preserve the equilibrium between the relative capacities of the two great poles; the purpose actually becomes winning an advantage on the opponent, and thus enhance the security and the chances to survive through a nuclear conflict.

The last phase in the evolution of the power equilibrium is in full display, starting with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold War. In the actual international system, the main feature of the balance of power is that the balance isn't one of systems anymore, but one of subsystems instead. Nowadays, the power equilibrium is practiced in the subsystems of international relations, one of the most quoted examples being that of Asia⁴.

With the shaping of the international relations discipline as a distinct field of scientific research, the power equilibrium has been theorized and intensively debated by both the (neo) realists and the (neo) liberalists.

Thus, for realists, the supreme principle of international relations is power and each state pursues its maximization. Through the balance of power, international politics become a zero sum game, in which a personal gain means a loss for the adversary. For liberalists, international security is a consequence of peace, and in maintaining peace the equilibrium is not a viable solution, compared with the international law. Instead of alliances specific to the balance of power, idealists bet on the efficiency and the virtues of international organizations for cooperation and integration.

A development of the realist trend, neorealism argues that, in the current international system, power is not an end in itself, but a means in achieving peace and security. But because neither human nature, nor the international system has



passed through essential changes, the balance of power remains the major objective for the states' foreign policies. Considering the harsh critics received by liberalism and the concrete evolutions on the international stage, neoliberalists outdistance in a way from their forerunners. For them, the state is indeed a rational actor, but one which tries to maximize its' benefits in all the areas of international politics. Thus, the international system is an anarchic one, in which states cooperate only when they notice a common interest. Also, neoliberalists drop out their moral criteria for judging the actions of the state, considered selfish and trying to maximize its utility⁵. In their vision, the balance of power takes the shape of international security regimes, described as orderly forms of international activity, based on principles, norms and procedures and from which each state has something to win⁶.

Today, in a world in which terms like collective security, international law, cooperation and dialogue win popularity, the concept of power equilibrium seems to be gotten out of use.

Yet, how can we explain the presence in security strategies or in the statesmen's speeches of notions like: national interest, geopolitical reason, influence, power? Far from being a lost cause, *the power equilibrium remains a major objective* pursued by the vast majority of the actors in the international system.

The Balance of Power in the Wider Black Sea Region

Recent developments in the international system claim an increased focus on the Wider Black Sea Region. Among these evolutions, we recall: NATO and EU enlargements towards East; the awareness of Europe's growing energy dependence towards Russia; the increasing strategic importance of the Caucasus and Central Asia, due to the involvement of the North-Atlantic Alliance into Afghanistan; the European aspirations of Turkey; the "colour revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine.

Today, with few exceptions (China, Brazil, India), all major actors of the international system set out interests, more or less declared, in the Black Sea area. Far from being an easy task, an analysis of power in the Wider Black Sea Region portrays *complex and dynamic relations, materialized in a balance of power in a permanent equalization*, in

which the interests of different institutional actors vary from full communion to a total opposition.

Thus, the European Union's interests in the region can be defined along four key areas⁷:

1. Long term regional stability and conflict management. Many states in the Wider Black Sea Region continue to face serious threats to their own security, most of these challenges dating back from the immediate period of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, the most dramatic threats are the territorial conflicts, like the ones in Transnistria (Moldova), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia) or the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

2. Promotion of democratic institutions and the rule of law. If some countries made notable progress (Romania, Turkey), others seem to advance more difficult on the road towards democracy (Moldova, Armenia).

3. Securing a stable European energy supply. In the wake of a more and more assertive Russia, which does not restrain itself from using its energy resources as tools of foreign policy, the Black Sea (transit route for the oil and natural gases coming from the Caspian Sea) becomes essential for Europe's energy security.

4. Preventing the spread of organized crime and terrorism. These asymmetric threats remain an important European priority, due to the ill-fated consequences they can have on regional security.

Although the Black Sea has bordered NATO since 1952 (the year in which Turkey became a member), this region benefited from an increased importance from the Alliance once the War on Terror started. For the transport of troops and the logistics support of the Afghan war zone, military cooperation with the Black Sea countries remains a high priority for NATO. Also, through the enlargement towards East and the Partnership for Peace, the Alliance managed to significantly reduce Russia's influence in the region.

The American interests in the Wider Black Sea Region reflect the principles of collective security and thus benefit from the widest support on part of all the countries. These interests are based on the premise that the United States have only to win if peace, democracy and prosperity are extended into this difficult region. Therefore, the three sets of American strategic interests in the Black Sea region are⁸:

- Democratic and market economic reform
- expanding political freedom through free and

fair elections, the rule of law, respect for human (including minority) rights and expanding economic freedom through transparent market economies.

- Energy and commerce – expanding networks of multiple oil and gas pipelines to bolster competition with European energy markets for the benefit of consumers and increasing trade and economic development through transportation and communications infrastructure, science and technology.

- Security – combating terrorism, organized crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Yet, the US influence in the Black Sea is considerably restrained through the Montreux Convention (1936), which limits in great measure the access of military vessels belonging to non-bordering states and also the length of their presence, which must not exceed 21 consecutive days.

For Russia, the focus on the West displayed by the countries from Central and Eastern Europe (obvious immediately after the end of the Cold War) meant an unfavourable change of the European power equilibrium. The loss of hopes for a global leadership called on Russia for a concentration of efforts on the regions located in its near proximity, and especially on the Black Sea area. In this space Russia insisted on maintaining its influence, using, on certain occasions, frozen conflicts as leverages to restrain the European and transatlantic aspirations of the states involved.

Today, Russia's major geopolitical interest in the Black Sea space is maintaining the status-quo, even though this interest burdens the process of finding solutions in the negotiations in which Russia is involved as a mediator or in the peacekeeping operations in which Russia pretends to be a neutral side.

If the interests of the big institutional actors in the Wider Black Sea Region are defined in general terms and are, seemingly, easier to unify, *the interests of each and every state are more specific and are thus a lot more difficult to unify and balance.*

A member of NATO (2004) and the European Union (2007), Bulgaria's transition towards democracy and a functional market economy was not an easy one. The country still faces serious problems regarding its judicial system and

deficiencies in the fight against corruption and organized crime.

A traditional power in the Black Sea region, Turkey was the country which played, during the Cold War, the role of moderator of the power equilibrium in the Wider Black Sea Region. This privilege was due to its accession in NATO, in 1952 and to its position of geostrategic importance, Turkey being the vanguard in the ideological fight against communism and the most powerful ally of the United States in the vicinity of the Middle East.

But the collapse of the Soviet Union diminished, in time, the attention granted to Turkey. The state faces today political instability, recurrent interventions of the military factor in the political process, a deficit regarding the human rights record and problems related to the Kurd minority. Also, the interest that Turkey was benefiting from inside NATO seems to decline in the EU also. Officially launched in December 2004, the negotiations for Turkey's accession to EU are nowadays in a major deadlock, especially because of the commercial links between Turkey and Cyprus and the problems regarding the freedom of speech and the Kurd minority rights.

Inferring a rebalancing of the power equilibrium, the Turkish state launched a series of initiatives meant to preserve its influence among the states surrounding the Black Sea. Therefore, at the beginning of the 1990s, Turkey institutionalized the cooperation around the Black Sea within the framework of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). From this point on, Turkey extended the definition of the Black Sea space beyond the bordering states, into the Balkans and the Caucasus. Thus, Greece, Albania, Serbia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova were welcomed in the BSEC. Also, in April 2001, Turkey launched the Black Sea Force, an initiative planned since 1998 and meant to diversify the peacekeeping efforts in the region. Alongside Turkey, the other signatory parties are: Ukraine, Georgia, Russia, Bulgaria and Romania.

Remaining, after Russia, the state near the Black Sea with the most developed naval capacity, Turkey does not pursue the militarization of the Black Sea, its essential interest being the maintenance of the status-quo in the region.

For Armenia, a good relation with Russia remains a major interest. Benefiting from political

pluralism and a relatively free media, Armenia tries today to remake the "sovereign democracy" model, advanced by the Russian political elite. Although it has a constant economic growth, the progresses in this area are shadowed by the commercial blockade imposed by the neighbouring states Turkey and Azerbaijan, following the dispute over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Because the actual standing of Azerbaijan is almost entirely guaranteed by energy resources, this state remains vulnerable at the fluctuations of the price of oil. Seeming more dedicated to EU than to NATO, Azerbaijan puts a great deal on bilateral relations with Russia, relations in which energy cooperation remains a key domain.

The Georgian state has been through some welcomed progresses since 2003, the year of the Rose Revolution, a moment that also marked the declared orientation towards the Euro-Atlantic space. Although a brave move, the Tbilisi's government attempt to re-establish control over the break-away regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia remains a strategic blunder. The Georgian interests and foreign policy are focused on maintaining a permanent conflict with Russia, in order to attract attention and obtain western support⁹.

Europe's second state as size, Ukraine tries to counterbalance traditional ties with Russia with Euro-Atlantic aspirations. The misunderstandings and the divisions existing in the Ukrainian leadership burden the efforts to establish consensus over important geopolitical rationales and to define and follow the national interest. With a highly centralized political system and incoherent governmental actions, Ukraine even managed to unleash an energy crisis in Europe, in January 2006 and in 2009.

An independent state only since 1991, Moldova is today the poorest country in Europe. With a limited institutional capacity, rampant corruption and governmental control over mass-media, the state is strongly supported in the European forums by Romania. Moldova is also the host of a frozen conflict in Transnistria, whose eventual solutions are skilfully speculated by the Russian diplomacy.

Interesting, in the case of Moldova and Ukraine, is the fact that, although their European ambitions are officially declared and assumed, they do not seem committed to same sacrifices and progresses as the countries from Central Europe. In the existing power equilibrium and in pursuing their

national interests, Moldova and Ukraine still use the option of getting close to Russia in order to strengthen their negotiation positions with EU and thus obtain more advantages¹⁰.

Regarding Romania, its fundamental strategic interest is a stable, democratic and prosperous Black Sea region, highly connected to the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Following this interest, the strategic objective becomes that one of stimulating a powerful and more productive European and Euro-Atlantic involvement in this region¹¹. As a border state of the European Union and member of the North-Atlantic Alliance, Romania wishes to neighbour with stable, democratic and prosperous states, because only they are capable to maintain peace in the relations between them and to have a predictable behaviour in the field of security.

In such a complex network of national interests, the balance of power remains the most efficient mechanism for reducing the possibility of crisis and conflicts and for securing stability in the Wider Black Sea Region.

Romania and the New Power Equilibrium

Following this analysis, it becomes clear that Romania remains the most proper state for moderating the power equilibrium in the Wider Black Sea Region. The geostrategic position, the constant economic and social progress, the consolidated membership in EU and NATO, the political stability and the keeping of commitments – all these are arguments for which Romania should take the lead in this region.

The new power equilibrium moderated by Romania must not be one hedged in realpolitik – the politics freed of moral grounds, in which relations between states are determined by sheer force and the ability to exploit all the possible options, without any kind of constraints. Also, this equilibrium must not be built simply on geopolitical calculus and on the unscrupulously pursue of the national interest, but on the principles and values of the European and Euro-Atlantic space. In the Wider Black Sea Region, Romania has to act like a bridge between East and West and has to unify the interests and ambitions of the states that bend towards Russia with the interests and ambitions of the states that bend towards the western democracies.

Preserving its initiative and acting like a security provider, Romania should adapt its foreign

policy at the region's changing realities. Also, all the objectives of Romania's foreign policy in the Black Sea area must be part of the wide vision to transform this space in a geography of cooperation, security and stability, to enhance the visibility of the Black Sea issue on the agendas of international organizations (OSCE, EU, NATO, Council of Europe) and to consolidate the interest of EU and the western countries in the region.

Romania's endeavours in moderating the power equilibrium in the Black Sea space materialized, along time, in numerous projects and initiatives.

Thus, during the period in which it held the presidency of BSEC (November 1, 2005 – April 30, 2006), Romania pursued: the development of a partnership between BSEC and the EU; launching of a reflection process on the feature of the BSEC, including the restructuring of the organization; strengthening security and the stability dimension; the endorsement of efforts for the countries in Eastern Europe and Caucasus and strengthening the democratic processes and economic reforms; drafting and implementing the regional developments projects; the development of commercial exchanges between the Black Sea states and the broadening of the BSEC cooperation with other regional and international organizations.

The approval, in 2006, of the *National Strategy for the Wider Black Sea Region* represents another important step. The materialization of this strategy has been directed towards six components¹²:

1. enhanced implication of the EU in the Black Sea Region;
2. a more efficient BSEC;
3. creation of the Black Sea Euroregion;
4. strengthening the bilateral dialogue with other states;
5. initiating the Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership;
6. launching, in Romania, the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation.

Furthermore, Romania continues to plead for a European and Euro-Atlantic strategy in the Wider Black Sea Region, which should expand the responsibilities of EU and NATO in the stabilization and reconstruction processes in the region and should promote democracy, peace and security. The establishment of the *Black Sea Euroregion* has been initiated on the occasion of

the International Conference for Interregional Cooperation in the Black Sea Space, an event set up in March 2006, at Constanța, by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Congress of Local and Regional Powers in Europe (a consultative body of the Council of Europe). The Final declaration regarding the creation of the Black Sea Euroregion was adopted by almost all the participant states (Bulgaria, Greece, Moldova, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine), except Russia and Bulgaria, which preferred to undertake the statute of observers. The launching of the Black Sea Euroregion took place two years later, on September 26, 2008, at Varna (Bulgaria). Having its Headquarters in Constanța, the organization sets itself to strengthening cooperation at the level of local authorities.

Launched on June 5, 2006, again, at Romania's initiative, the *Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership* is meant to offer a non-institutionalized framework for dialogue and cooperation in the region. At the event the presidents of Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova and high officials from Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey took part. Russia summed up its contribution at the statute of observer and was represented by its ambassador, motivating that the existing frameworks for cooperation in the Black Sea region are sufficient. Actually, Russia's act can be explained by its refusal to allow other states to act as a leader in the Black Sea process of cooperation. Nevertheless, the events continued to be organized within the Forum, generating a wide process of reflection on the region and identifying new ideas and solutions for existing problems.

Romania also took part in the efforts for launching the *Black Sea Synergy* (Kiev, February 14, 2008), substantially contributing, during the German EU Presidency in the first half of 2007, at the European's Commission statement regarding the Black Sea Synergy. The visionary document thus produced is meant to involve all the types of EU relations with countries from the Black Sea space. The direct involvement of Romania in preparing this document constitutes its first major contribution, as a EU member, at the Common Foreign and Security Policy. After launching the Synergy, Romania became one of its major promoters. Among the projects put forward by Romania within the Synergy, the *Black Sea Forum for Nongovernmental Organizations* (October 31

– November 2, 2008) received appreciations both from the EU and from the Romanian and foreign nongovernmental organizations.

Elaborated at Romania's appeal, the first specific EU program for the Black Sea, the *Operational Program for Black Sea Cross-Border Cooperation* (2007-2013) is set on stimulating cooperation on different areas, such as economic and social development or the promotion of cultural integration. Furthermore, Romania fully backs up the EU project regarding the creation of a Black Sea Cooperation Platform in the areas of migration and development.

Although a consistent part of the challenges on these cooperation instruments' agenda still remain unsolved, Romania has to ensure, through them, at least an efficient dialogue, that should concert the member states regarding the essential issues, thus avoiding the clash of interests otherwise perceived as irreconcilable.

Regarding the bilateral relations with the states from the Black Sea Region, it is necessary for Romania to focus on obtaining support for the proposed regional projects, promoting at the same time a renewal of the trilateral Romania – Bulgaria – Greece.

Conclusions

The security in the Black Sea space remains a widely debated issue, both at a national and a regional scale. The validation of the two assumptions formulated in the introduction reveal more than what was known until now about this topic. Thus, the crisis and frozen conflicts in the Wider Black Sea Region are not determined by the incapacity of states to make terms with each other, but they are the result of conflicting interests. The inefficiency of some of the mechanisms used until now to solve the differences underline the fact that the balance of power remains the only viable instrument for stabilizing this region.

Attempting to transform the Black Sea space into a democratic and prosperous one, Romania must take on the responsibility of moderating the power equilibrium in the Wider Black Sea Region. The influence thus won will surely enhance the prestige and the influence of the Romanian state in the European and Trans-Atlantic forums.

Although a preserver of the status-quo in the Black Sea region, Russia must also be involved

in the Romanian projects. Yet Romania must accomplish this on the basis of the experience accumulated along the historical relations with the Russian state. Without a minimum involvement of Russia, the power equilibrium might become an artificial one and, consequently, challenged (or even undermined) with each occasion.

The new equilibrium therefore created must not rely itself only on geopolitical calculus, but on international law and European and Euro-Atlantic principles and values. Moderating such an equilibrium, Romania will act as a true provider of security and stability, enhancing its influence in the Wider Black Sea Region.

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GEOSTRATEGIC GAMES IN THE EAST PART OF THE BLACK SEA

Grigore ALEXANDRESCU, PhD

The end of the Russo-Georgian war, in August 2008, did not offer peace and calm hoped by the people around the Black Sea. A strange phenomenon has appeared in the region's geopolitics. If, till then, an overwhelming majority of the debates underlined that the multitude and the diversity of the frozen conflicts are the main reasons for the region's instability, the beginning of 2009 has proved something else.

Now, military bases are the stake of geostrategical games. The globalisation hasn't put up only the echoes of world's recession on the politico-economical space, but the ambitions of great power to dominate such a rich area in resources, a possible way to solve the crises.

Keywords: Wider Region of Black Sea, NATO, Russia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, military bases, geostrategy.

In Crimea, the juridical status of Russian Naval Forces didn't change at all. Kiev wants the last warship under Russian flag to leave Sevastopol by 2017. Until then, Moscow's admirals swing between inventing new missions in order to justify the presence of to big and to expensive naval bulk into such a small sea and to find out an advantageous strategically position for redeploying the naval bases.

In the of summer 2008, during the Caucasus conflict, the Russian Fleet from the Black Sea provided the support from the sea of expeditionary task force which unleashed the war against Georgia, generating Kiev's disapproval. Then, Viktor Yushchenko, the Ukrainian president, gave two decrees limiting the area of liberty for the Russian warship based in Sevastopol. Concretely, Yushchenko requested Russian warships to ask for permission to leave the harbour prior 72 hours. In case the warships' commanders don't agree to respect this norm, the Ukrainian Foreigner Ministry had the right to ban the warships to accost on the

Ukrainian territory.

At the very beginning of February 2009, there was raised the level of readiness of Russian Naval Force from the Black Sea¹. The sailors' landing was forbidden, the ships crew was obliged to be permanently ready for fight. Despite the absence of official comments, we can assert that Moscow tries to give a hit of image, by showing its forces. By this, Kremlin pursues its plan to prevent the reaction on behalf of the countries surrounding the Black Sea or further, when they see Russian soldiers on the Georgian territory in more military bases, as it follows:

1. The naval base at the Abkhaz port of Ochamchire². This country side is situated at 60 kilometres southeast of the capital of Georgian province Abkhazia, near the ceasefire line between Russia and Georgia, with an international recognition. The standing of naval base in this unknown harbour isn't an off-hand solution just to react at the Kiev's request to withdraw the Russian warship from the Ukrainian territory, on the contrary it is a well-made geostrategic calculation. Therefore, if a naval force will be permanently shift in this place, Kremlin can control both oil and gas pipelines under the Black Sea and the territorial waters of Ukraine, Georgia and Turkey. The Russian admirals can easy pursue any activity in the Georgian harbours Poti and Batumi. The blockade is just a matter of time. This is how Russia takes a great strategic advantage in any future conflict.

2. Land forces base – on the hills surrounding the Kodori valley, well-known as Kodori Gorge. This base hosts land forces including alpine special forces. Taking into account the configuration of mountain terrain, going down from 3984 meters to the capital city, mostly covered with forests, deep valleys and parallel crests, the forces dislocated here can penetrate the Georgian territory from the directions hard to block, so, the operational surprise can easy ensured.

3. Air force base in Bombora, Gudauta district, Abkhazia. This is the best military airfield in the Caucasus area because it has a 4 kilometres runway long³. Its main advantage is the fact that it ends less than 100 meters from the sea, allowing military planes to take off at very low altitudes over the sea, without the possibility to be detected by radars in the initial phases of flight.

This base isn't new. In the USSR it was known as Bombora airfield. It permitted to land and take off all scale of military aircraft, from fighters to heavy transport planes. In the international media, Kremlin stated that intends to deploy there roughly 20 aircraft, including a wing of attack aircraft: Su-27s (NATO designation Flanker), Su-25 (NATO – Frog foot) and a squadron of transport aircraft An-26 (NATO – Curl)⁴. The same sources identified as the main mission for these air forces “the deterrence of the neighbours, generally speaking, and Georgia in particular”, but not “provide proper security for 2014 Sochi Olympics” as Moscow says.

International media show that in the next few months the Abkhaz separatist leadership expects to sign a treaty with Russia, agreeing to host these three bases. This confirms the fact that the Russo-Georgian war wasn't the result of “the aggression” of the Tbilisi government, but a thought war plan, the instrumentation of Kremlin's generals and admirals. Regaining the regional supremacy can't be achieved without branding their weapons. The recognition of Abkhazia's independence is a compulsory part of this scenario. Moscow can't obtain the right of using some of the border terrains only with the approval of an international subject, even if it is less acknowledged by the international community.

The deployment of Russian military power in Abkhazia affects the Georgian sovereignty and will worsen the relations between Moscow and Tbilisi. The violation of international agreement for ceasing the fire in Georgia, whereby Kremlin has taken the pledge to cut the military presence in Abkhazia after August 2008, brought new and serious threats for security and stability in the Black Sea region.

Changing the balance of forces in area, by the emplacement of new Russian basis, can conduct to re-take the arms race and the accumulation of adverse military powers which develop the competition out of their national borders. This

certainly will open a new Pandora Box that the small states around the Black Sea will pay.

Simultaneously with setting up the new military bases in Abkhazia, Russia, deeply suspicious of NATO's presence on former Soviet territory, is in full development of shutting off the bases sponsored by US on the region. They are useful for the transit of supplies for International Coalition forces in Afghanistan.

After a period of parallel negotiations between Bishkek- Washington and Bishkek – Moscow, with the purpose of gaining as much as possible money, Kyrgyzstan's Parliament decided to nullify the agreement with US, dated 2001, regarding renting the terrain necessary for having an air base, in Manas, 20 kilometres away from Bishkek.

Manas, from the strategic point of view, was a intermediary point for supplying troops from the Afghanistan theatre, used by US and NATO forces. There were about 1000 troops: Americans, French and Spanish. Repeated request of Kyrgyzstan's governors for increasing the US rent of 17.4 million dollars hasn't wished echo. The US economy can't afford supplementary efforts. Concomitantly with financing the fight against Talibans in Afghanistan, “US has contributed more than \$850 million to support democracy, economic development, aid and security in Kyrgyzstan”⁵.

Washington's delay was rapidly exploited by Moscow. Russia offered Kyrgyzstan financial assistance composed by: \$2 billion loan and non-refundable credit worth \$150 million “to cushion the country against economic shortages caused by the global crisis”, along with writing off Kyrgyzstan's \$180 million debt to Russia⁶.

Kyrgyzstan's governors well appreciated the Moscow's fiscal generosity, so, they offered, in compensation, the annulment of Agreement signed with US government, in 2001.

It is difficult to predict what will happen after NATO forces' withdrawal from Manas base. If the Russians will occupy it, this base can articulate together with another Russian base, Kant (close to Bishkek), in a solid bridge head launched to China. From this perspective, in the near future it is possible the Beijing's strategists to come to the conclusion that it have started a new area, where China's encirclement isn't Euro-Atlantic⁷, but a Russian one.

After all, the arguments can be the same with those ones Beijing used in 2005, when it exerted



pressure on US to dissolve Karshi-Khanabad base, from Uzbekistan⁸.

The prospective of replacing the lodgers in Middle Asia's bases and, implicitly, the strategic rates of forces, that tend to balance, give rise to echoes in all over media. Now in Kyrgyzstan there are heard more and more virulent comments made by civil society and political life personalities wondering if "to play between great powers like Russia and US" is useful "for such a small country as Kyrgyzstan"⁹.

The prospective of a massive Russian presence at Kazakhstan borders determine Asana government to offer accommodation for NATO's logistical base¹⁰, in Almaty, not so far from Manas and Kant¹¹. At its turn, Tajikistan, the south neighbour of Kyrgyzstan, is ready to offer to the International Coalition conditions for supplying with water, building materials, fuels, water and other goods.

Russia considers, in nowadays' geopolitical situation, "it does not look well" to stay outside by the NATO's demands for a new base for logistical support to the International Coalition's operations. Signals from Kremlin conduct to the idea that Moscow's availability for cooperation with the new US administration, offering a transport route to Afghanistan, for non-military materials.

The speakers from the main press agencies stressed out the fact that the diplomats look for easy to reach convergence topics, for the first meeting between Medvedev and Obama. The calling of US president for diminishing the number of nuclear warhead till to 1000 warhead for each party awakes the enthusiasm of Kremlin. But the Russian General Staff adviced politicians to react carefully, waving the risk to destroy Russia in case

of disarmament.

Concluding, the decrease of the rhetoric tonalities about the Black Sea's frozen conflicts doesn't cancel its warfare freight. It will be just a breake for storing new knowledge with the main goal to make them more virulent. The frozen conflicts contain the spark which can unleash an explosion in a area so full of history and mineral oil products.

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PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

Cristina BOGZEANU

European Council meeting at Köln in 1999 marked the beginning of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) crystallization. The development of such a dimension at European scale carries many implications in what concerns the democratic legitimacy of the actions taken within this framework.

Our approach argues that EU's democratic deficit is amplified by the way in which ESDP is adopted and put into practice. This policy's legitimacy degree has been the theme of numerous debates.

European Defence and Security Policy needs to find a democratic legislative frame to function within, because ESDP actually refers to "command, obedience and secrecy and the military logic is very different from the public and deliberative decision/making that characterizes the democracies"¹.

Keywords: Parliament, democratic control, European Security and Defence Policy, security.

Moreover, the progresses of the enforcement of the cooperation in European security and defence matters are even harder to get, as this act implies quitting a part of the national sovereignty, and, in time, its complete devolution to the EU organisms.

On the other hand, after having drawn the premises of the European security and defence policy, it was raised the issue of the democratic control on the decisions taken under this domain. This happened because the political control on ESDP is wielded by the heads of states and governments of member states and the financial one, by the national parliaments.

However, the most rightful political control is wielded by the parliament. Hereby, within EU framework, under the conditions of an institutionalized European citizenship and elected parliament, the control on the area of security and defence should be assured by this institution.

1. Preliminary considerations

European Security and Defence Policy presumes the development of an autonomous decision capacity, launching and coordinating military operations under EU command as a response to crisis situations; the engagement of the resources in these operations represents a decision made by member states under the conditions of sovereignty. Its initialization and development represent the first steps taken by the EU towards the occurrence of a form of common defence, thus, consolidating its political dimension, too.

Nevertheless, one should not omit the fact that ESDP hasn't reached yet its final form. It is still in a process of evolution, which aims at the elaboration of a continuous and structured cooperation in what concerns the security and defence dimension at European level.

2. ESDP legislative framework

ESDP, a voluntary construction of EU member states, has had an evolution in time, being characterized, in its judicial aspect, by an adequate settlement of common and national interests. As an instance, there are several treaties which make broad references to this policy of security and defence.

Maastricht Treaty defined the three pillar structure of the European Union. *Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)* is the second pillar and was thought to replace the former European Political Cooperation.

The three pillars are put under the umbrella of the European Council, which has the role to solve the arisen issues, but which doesn't have a notably clear and transparent relation with the institutions functioning within the three pillar construction.

Afterwards, at Amsterdam, in 1997, the position of the High Representative of CFSP has been created, who, together with the President and the European Commissioner for External Relations (assembly also known as “Troika”), assures the implementation of the foreign policy of the European Union, its unity and coherence. In what concerns the parliamentary involvement in decision-making, the Treaty institutes, at the 21st Article, that: “The Presidency shall consult the European Parliament (EP) on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The European Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission of the development of the development of the Union’s common foreign and security policy. The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it. It shall hold an annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy”²².

The concept of European Security and Defence Policy was defined during the European Council meeting in Köln (1990), subsequently continuing its development within the framework of this forum.

Nice Treaty (2001) marks the formation of the Security and Political Committee, of the European Union General Staff and of the European Union Military Committee as permanent political and military institutions of the organization, but it doesn’t bring forth many changes regarding the possibility of exerting the parliamentary control on ESDP. As ESDP is defined as an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the decisions in ESDP will be made as the ones within CFSP. The European Parliament keeps a marginal role; it has to be informed about the cases of enforced cooperation between the member states, and CFSP and ESDP continue to be approached out of the forms of structured cooperation.

Lisbon Treaty (2007), also known as the Reform Treaty, was created to replace the Project for a European Constitution, which failed when it had to be ratified by the French and Dutch citizens. The treaty maintains the tendency to grow the visibility and the efficiency in what concerns the working of the European Union, especially, in the area of the foreign and security policy. However, ESDP

continues to be governed by specific decisional procedures. In defence, the member states which have the will and the capabilities, may lay the basis of a structured cooperation which may lead, eventually, to a common defence system. Thus, ESDP is a field that continues to be under the jurisdiction of the member states, the European Parliament keeping its marginal share. The treaty provides, at Title V, Chapter 2, Article 1, that “The specific role of the European Parliament and of the Commission in this area is defined by the treaties”²³, implying that the Parliaments keeps a limited contribution in ESDP. Still, the European Parliament’s contribution to ESDP is improved through the ordinary revision procedure, which infers that “The Government of any Member State, the European Parliament or the Commission may submit to the Council proposals for the amendment of the Treaties. These proposals may, *inter alia*, serve either to increase or to reduce the competencies conferred on the Union in the Treaties”²⁴.

On this line, the role of the European Parliament has, actually, the tendency to develop by gradually extending its attributions. Thereby, at the beginning of 2009, the EP enacted a directive which sets the measures to the procedures of attribution of some public acquisitions contracts in the field of security and defence. Not only does this directive create the conditions for an adequate promotion of ESDP, but it also marks a crucial aspect of this sector, the armament industry is hence put under an European parliamentary control, by these efforts to bring into being a single European armament market.

Decision-making in ESDP is put, essentially, under the aegis of the member states, as the decisions are not put under European parliamentary control (under the classic meaning). Democratic control on ESDP refers to the norms and standards that rule the relation between the decision-making actors of ESDP and society, where, the first factors are subordinated to the authorities democratically elected by the society.

3. Decision-making in ESDP

European Security and Defence Policy expresses the vision of the European Council (composed of the heads of state and government of the EU member states) on the European security and on the ways in which it will be carried out.

The European Council defines the guidelines for the resolutions adopted in the area of security at European level. As these decisions influence the internal and external security of the organizations and of the European citizens, a democratic control on security and defence is necessary.

Decision-making in ESDP has an *intergovernmental* nature. The most important decision-making factors usually belong to the member states. Their representatives get together in the EU Council reunited as the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), the Permanent Representatives Committee, the Political and Security Council (PSC), the Military Committee (EUMC), consisted in chiefs of defence, represented by military representatives, the Military Staff (EUMS), composed of seconded experts from the member states. EUMS is the connection between the national military forces of the member states and the EU Council. The European Parliament has only a consultative role in this process (see figure no. 1).

The European Council establishes ESDP guidelines and European common strategies. This forum takes decisions unanimously, and the EU Council takes the decisions referring to ESDP definition and implementation, according

to the guidelines established by the European Council. PSC, consisted in ambassadors, has the role to monitor the international state in ESDP interest areas and to contribute to the definition of the policies by proving opinion to the Council, at its request or voluntary. Moreover, this is the institution which has the political control and the strategic lead in crisis management operations.

Another specific aspect of the security and defence policy is that “The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded”⁵ (Title V, Chapter 1, Article 54/ Treaty of Lisbon). Decisions in ESDP are made by an institution which doesn’t have the right to adopt laws. The concept of common strategy appears for the first time in the Treaty of Amsterdam and refers to the areas in which member states have important common interests in which they establish objectives and instruments that will be implemented in EU, as well as in the member states. The political aspects of these strategies are examined in PSC, then in the Permanent Representatives Committee and, finally, in the EU Council. The final decision is made by the European Council. On the basis of this strategy, the EU Council elaborates and votes decisions to bring it into force.




Figure 1. Decision-making in ESDP

As far as the European Parliament role in decision-making is concerned, the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) establishes at the Article 21 that the Presidency is obliged to consult the EP in the “main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration”⁶. ESDP isn’t explicitly mentioned, which may leave the opportunity to the member states to elude even the consulting with the representatives of the European citizens. In spite that, Javier Solana, as President of the European Union Council and as CFSP High Representative, chose to regularly consult the EP on security and defence issue, thus, ensuring, at least at an informal level, the congruence between ESDP decision actors and the ones affected by these decisions – the European citizens. The statements of the former members of parliament bear witness to this – Armit Laschet, for instance, affirms that “As far as the European Parliament’s right to be informed and consulted is concerned, which is one of the most classical parliamentary rights, I can say, as a former member of a national parliament, that Mr. Solana and Mr. Patten [the Commissionaire for Foreign Relations] account to the European Parliament and/or Foreign Affairs Committee much more often and more detailed than many of the national foreign or defence ministers actually do”⁷. These enhanced consultations represent, on the one hand, examples of good practices in democratic control, and on the other, they are clear indications of the necessity of an increased implication of the European Parliament in security and defence decision-making. Parliament’s control on ESDP isn’t thorough as it isn’t practically included in the process of decision-making, as the national parliaments are. The parliament merely has information about the European Security and Defence Policy. Parliamentary control on ESDP is limited by factors coming from the specific of this area and by factors emerging from the conjuncture in which this domain came into being at the European scale.

4. Factors which influence the parliamentary control on ESDP

Democratic control proves to be difficult in all the domains falling under the European Union jurisdiction, and it is even more obvious when it

comes about security. First, *the issues regarding the defence policy are characterized by the need of secrecy* and classification. These matters are less transparent than other governmental activities as there is a necessity to protect vital information in order to ensure security.

Second, *the executive has a more pregnant involvement in this field*. Even at a national level, governments have the tendency to work directly, bilaterally or internationally as far as cooperation is concerned and to give a marginal role to the parliament. As for the European construction, the function of the parliament in decision-making process is even more restricted. This situation is influenced by some factors as the predominance of European Council’s views (representative of the member states’ interests) over the ones of the Parliament (representative of the European citizens’ interests), as ESDP is a part of the second pillar of the European construction – the intergovernmental one.

The poor involvement of the civil society in security issues represents the third impediment. In many countries, there aren’t nongovernmental organizations having security included in their sphere of action, and the public often has scarce information or it is just not interested. Citizens gave a poor interest in foreign policy and they do not consider that it has a substantial impact on their day-to-day lives. As far as ESDP as project is concerned, European citizens show an attitude which was defined as *permissive consensus*⁸, regarded as a good feeling towards the project of European integration, without being in the possession of adequate information before adopting this kind of attitude or without having the intention to reach the needed information. But, permissive consensus characterizes only the way citizens regard ESDP as project. If the involvement of a member state in a conflict was necessary, citizens’ interest in ESDP would surely grow. The poor involvement of civil society in security in defence is also due to extreme decrease, during the last half of century, of the chances that an armed conflict would break out in Europe, those chances being actually void. Paradoxically, the sense of security gives birth to a sort of apathy for the citizens in relation to the activities associated to the assurance of security.

The defective citizens’ involvement originates in the features of the European construction, too.

The European Union appeared as a technocratic mechanism with very little democratic legitimacy (European Commission, for example, whose members are not democratically elected, but named by the governments of the member states), a mechanism inaccessible for the citizens because its complex way of working and the difficulties in understanding the acts emitted by this construction.

In ESDP, EU faces a *double democratic deficit*⁹, implying that the decision-making process isn't either put under the control of the national parliaments, or under the European Parliament's one. Another cause of this phenomenon is the fact that the EU's democratic deficit in security and defence is amplified by the features of this domain.

Nevertheless, the best form of democratic control on ESDP under these conditions is the one achieved by the European Parliament.

Thereby, the European Union sets itself "to develop and consolidate democracy"¹⁰, and the Treaty of Reform stipulates at Title I, Article 10 that the "Functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy"¹¹. The statement is based on the fact that European citizens are directly represented in the EU by the European Parliament, the member states are represented in the European Council by the heads of state or government and the EU Council consists in members of governments who are under the control of national parliaments.

On security and defence area, the main problem is the decision-making process, in which the European Parliament only has a consultative function. Moreover, there are governments which don't embrace the idea of giving the European Parliament more competencies in ESDP than the ones mentioned by the 21st Article from the Treaty of Amsterdam. There are voices who sustain that EU functions, as far as CFSP/ ESDP is concerned, according to the will of a "Collusive Delegation"¹².

This theory emphasizes the executive's tendency to act without a previously consulting the parliamentary opinion, when it comes about international affairs. Thus, executive's transparency is minimum, as everything is justified by the need of secrecy. This is amplified by another European reality – although one of the main conditions that a state must accomplish in order to adhere to the EU is to be a mature representative democracy,

EU member states developed *various traditions of democracy*. These traditions are even more different when security and defence is regarded. For instance, in a study published in 2008, there are identified at least five types of EU powers which differ especially in the attribution given to the parliament in security domain¹³:

- o First type refers to the situation in which the government needs the approval of the Parliament before making a decision referring to the use of force (Austria, Germany, Hungary). The parliament may investigate and debate upon the use of force.

- o The second type refers to the countries in which, before making a decision related to the use of force, the government must obtain the parliament approval, but with some exceptions (foreign troops invading the national territory, for example). The parliament may investigate and debate upon the use of force (Denmark, Ireland, Holland).

- o The third type of tradition is the one in which the government needs the approval of the parliament only after having made the decision. The parliament may investigate and debate upon the use of force (Czechoslovakia).

- o The forth type regards the states in which the government doesn't need the parliament's approval to make a decision associated to security but, it must let the parliament know when a force deployment is necessary. The parliament may investigate and debate upon the use of force (Spain, Portugal, Poland).

- o The fifth type consists in the countries in which the parliament doesn't have any competence in decision-making in the area of the use of force. These parliaments don't have any control function in security and do not debate upon the use of force (France, UK, Greece, Cyprus).

Thus, there are a series of national parliaments that don't have any information or have little information in foreign policy. Their possibility to take part in the democratic control upon the security and defence policy at European level is, hereby, very scarce.

National democratic deficit cannot be compensated at European scale, as the EU hasn't the proper means for that.

5. European Parliament means of exercising democratic control on ESDP

There are several means of exercising the parliamentary control on the European Security and Defence Policy. The control may be put into practice by the participation of the Parliament in the legislative procedure, by influencing the budget, by monitoring the executive, by its communicational role or by controlling the armed forces deployment.

a) The control on decision-making procedure. As we have previously argued, European Parliament hasn't the legislative initiative right in ESDP. The decisions are made at an intergovernmental level by the representatives of member states, reunited in the European Council formula or in the one of the EU Council. The legislative initiative also belongs to these organisms. The parliament has the right to be informed on the adopted measures, but it hasn't the juridical power to oppose to them or to change the course of events. However, a certain control on this procedure may be exercised by the national parliaments, as the heads of state and government must account to them. Under these circumstances, at present, one can not talk about a parliamentary control on ESDP.

b) The control on ESDP budget. The European Parliament exercises the budgetary function in collaboration with the EU Council. Each EU institution must design a situation of the estimative budgets necessary for the following year. The propositions are centralized by the Commission which forwards them to the Parliament. If EP members amend those budget projects, they will be revised. The final decision is made by co-decision procedure, where the Parliament has a sufficiently powerful authority. There are CFSP/ ESDP expenses which come under this rule, after the 28th Article from the Treaty on European Union, but the costs implied by military or defence operations are excluded. Afterwards, Council's Presidency must consult annually the EP in basic ESDP decisions, including the ones having repercussions on the communitarian budget. And even more, when the Council makes decisions in ESDP which involve expenditures, it must immediately consult the EP.

But, as far as the budgetary implications of the military operations are concerned, the political control shall be exercised by the national parliaments. ESDP doesn't have in its view to

create a European army, thus, the control on the military forces cannot be the task of the European Parliament. Military capabilities are established by the individual contributions of each member state. But, as long as ESDP continues to function as a form of intergovernmental cooperation, military costs and the deployment of military forces will fall under the exclusive control of national parliaments, while the European Parliament, as the sole European body directly elected by the European citizens, keeps playing its role as supervisor. But the parliamentary control in this domain varies from state to state, depending on the means that this forum has at its disposal in order to control the military forces, because, as we have already seen, there are in Europe many democratic traditions which offer to the member of parliaments different chances to interfere in the area of security and defence. France, United Kingdom, Greece, Cyprus represent just four examples of the states in which the parliaments cannot debate on the issue of the use of force.

c) Monitoring. This is the main way EP interferes in ESDP. The members of the European Parliament are permanently kept informed on the evolutions of ESDP and they are consulted. Moreover, there are consultations at informal level, too, meaning that the few parliamentary rights in ESDP are respected. One should omit that the European Parliamentary hasn't any possibility to sanction the institutions in case they would adopt decisions contrary to its position. EP's control in this area loses its efficiency, as there are no means of applying sanctions and producing effects. The responsibility of monitoring ESDP is equally divided between the European Parliament and the national parliaments, on the ground of the legitimate rights given by the Constitutions and the Treaties. So, for an efficient monitoring, the European Parliament, the national parliaments and the special commissions for security shall have the authority (which is given to them by law, in what concerns their right to be informed and to take actions when a decision doesn't comply with their position) and have the capacity (the resources) to do this thing. But, neither the European Parliament, nor the national parliaments have all these instruments. EP's capacity to exercise control in security and defence is thus limited by the very nature of this domain – the need of secrecy. And, as neither EP, nor the national parliaments have enough tools of

making an efficient monitoring, one couldn't speak about a compensation of the marginal role of the national parliaments by a stronger participation at European level or yet inversely.

d) *Communication* is also an instrument for exercising democratic control in security and defence and a token for the existence of a sufficiently well-developed democratic dimension. As far as our theme is concerned, we can sustain that EP has means of communication. It can set up debates on security and emit opinions. Even more, it has this right at a larger extent that some national parliaments.

Conclusions

The mere fact that the representatives of the European citizens may debate upon these matters, may ask questions, may emit opinions is of great importance for the democratic nature of the security and defence management. The citizens can interfere in this area at a smaller or greater extent even if we analyze it from the perspective of the members' of parliament right to express their position towards a certain measure, or from the one of the obligation of the member states representatives to respond in front of their national parliaments.

We should also take into consideration that European defence is still a process and that there are many steps to be undertaken until we will be talking about a genuine common defence system in European Union. There should be done a harmonization of all interests and action lines of the member states and, as we speak about entities with a long tradition of sovereignty, these measures aren't simply to be taken. Such integration is possible, as a common enemy for all the European states is emerging – international terrorism. If the possibility that an ample European war is almost null, the danger represented by international terrorism determines member states to band in security and defence.

The democratic control on this area may be also justified by the way in which decision are made by the executive. The democracy of an entity is determined by the degree in which its citizens' rights are guaranteed. Thus, one may speak about a government by the citizens or about a government for the citizens. ESDP isn't yet an example of the first type of government, and such management is, at present, out of discussion, given the characteristics of the policy of security and defence

– the need to keep some aspects under secret, the need of the increased executive's involvement in order to urge decision-making in case of emergency, etc. But, as far as the second type of government is concerned, the government for the citizens, we can consider ESDP is democratic. Its objectives (protecting the human rights, promoting and developing the democracy in the world, international cooperation), its missions (Petersberg missions – humanitarian and evacuation missions, peacekeeping missions, armed forces missions for crisis management – and the missions added by the Constitution – disarmament, counselling and military missions, conflict prevention missions and post-conflict stabilization operations) have as a consequence the increase of European citizens' security degree. Beyond EU's need to assert as a strong political actor on the international scene, these objectives and missions are meant to assure a stable international environment, and, implicitly, an environment in which European citizens shall benefit of security.

The importance of this control on ESDP rests in the need of making it more efficient and in the mere need to make it more democratic. From this point of view, European Union functions paradoxically: it requires to the states wishing to get the membership to be representative democracies, but the European Union itself isn't an organization embodying the features of modern democracy. The increase of the ways in which EP exercises the democratic control on ESDP would confer it more legitimacy. Such control is an index of good government, and, for the EU, which set its goal to become more transparent and easier to be understood by its citizens, it is important that the development of ESDP culture to be made as much as possible within the European Parliament, too.

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⁴ Ibidem.

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⁷ Armit LASCHER, *Parlamentarisation of European Defence and Security Policy*, Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, August 2002, p. 4.

⁸ Wolfgang WAGNER, *The democratic legitimacy of European Security and Defence Policy*, Occasional Papers, Nr. 57, April 2005, European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, Paris, p. 11.

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¹⁰ <http://www.eurotreaties.com/amsterdamtreaty.pdf>

¹¹ <http://www.reformtreaty.ie/eutreaty/Consolidated-EUTreaties-English-amended-by-ReformTreaty.pdf>

¹² Mathias KOENIG-ARCHIBUGI, *The Democratic Deficit of EU Foreign and Security Policy*, The International Spectator, 4/2002, p. 62.

¹³ Ibidem, p. 11.

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CONSONANCES ET RESONANCES STRATEGIQUES EN CONDITIONS DE NORMALITÉ, DE CRISE ET DE RISQUE EXTREME

Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD

*La stratégie militaire devient, jour par jour, l'un des domaines qui supportent et supporteront des débats, des opinions, des ouvertures de toute sorte et toute sorte de connexions, interprétations, interceptations, commentaires et même des immixtions. Comme on se passe toujours avec le fruit interdit. Bien sur, il s'agit bien de la partie visible d'Isbergues. Dans les abîmes, c'est autre chose, il ya une autre logique, un autre sorte de dialectique. Une logique du mystère et une dialectique de ce qui ne se voit pas, une dialectique des abîmes. Et, croyons-nous, la réalité, déjà constaté et confirmé, en conformité de laquelle, la parte visible de la stratégie (de la stratégie militaire, évidemment) se trouve dans les rayons de toutes sortes d'analyses et de débats, n'est ni trop mauvaise, ni trop bonne. Le fait que tout le bon monde discute de stratégie militaire (même si on n'utilise pas ce nom) représente, jusqu'à un certain point, une chose remarquable. Nous vivons dans les yeux du monde et, comme on dit, **homo sum, et nihil humani a me alienum puto**, il faut savoir tout ce qu'on peut le savoir, il faut penser a tout ce qu'en nous intéresse et refléter a tout ce que subit des échanges, des transformations, des devenir. Ce n'est pas mal, parce que, en ce qui concerne l'habitude de faire stratégie et stratégies, on n'a pas changé grand-chose au fil des siècles. La stratégie militaire peut être même bénéficiaire de ces débats, en dépit du fait qu'elle s'en moque. Elle suite imperturbable son chemin et, selon nos connaissances, ne renonce jamais a sa raison d'être, même-si, dans les dernières décennies du siècle qui vient de passer, elle s'est sortie massivement par les portes du domaine militaire est s'est plantée avec succès partout ou il y a des conflits, y compris dans l'économie, dans les finances, dans les relations internationales*

*etc., en y donnant des résultats remarquables. Parce que la stratégie arrache l'actionne du lit de Procuste, lui donnant de la flexibilité, l'habileté, la consistance, l'intelligence et la capacité de s'adapter à la dialectique ou à la dynamique riche et créative des volontés qui se confrontent pour résoudre le différend d'entre elles. La stratégie militaire ne tient seulement de l'art de la guerre, même-si elle justifie, expertise et met en œuvre ce précepte de tous les temps du monde qui dit : **vivere militare est** (vivre c'est combattre).*

Mots-clés: stratégie, décision, expertise, conflit, opérationnel, tactique.

Besoin de connexion

La stratégie militaire n'est pas quelque chose d'inintelligible, donnée seulement à ceux qui sont très capables de réaliser des constructions complexes et, parfois, bizarres, cachées, camouflées, avec des significations et implications multiples et connexes, quelquefois extrêmement rigides, quelquefois extrêmement flexibles, fluides et même chaotiques, même-si elle en semble comme ça. La stratégie militaire est une branche significative de la composante militaire de la vie des gens, une manière compliquée de penser, planifier et organiser et, évidemment, d'agir en situation de guerre ou de conflit militaire, dans un processus de contrôler/gérer (par les moyens militaires aussi) une crise ou dans une situation-limite.

La stratégie militaire reste, en son essence, la science, la pratique, l'habileté, l'expérience, l'art et la méthode de mettre en œuvre une décision de grande envergure (notamment une décision politique majeure), en conditions d'un milieu international et régional complexe conditionné, difficile, conflictuel, avec de nombreuses

restrictions, défis, périls, menaces et vulnérabilités, qui demande une philosophie d'identifications, de calculs et d'acceptation du risque implicite, y compris du risque extrême, d'élaboration, sur cette base, d'un comportement adéquat et, en même temps, d'assurer d'une expertise conformément aux systèmes est processus de générer la décision politique.

La stratégie militaire a été comprise, à son origine, comme habileté des hommes très intelligents, des grands chefs militaires et du commandement militaire de devancer et dépasser l'adversaire, c'est à dire l'ennemi, dans la guerre et pendant la préparation de guerre, en utilisant d'une manière intelligente, les forces, les moyens et les ressources établies par le décideur politique et, en même temps, de créer les conditions nécessaires pour remporter la victoire dans une bataille ou dans une guerre, de réaliser les buts et les objectifs fixés ou proposés. Et, si nous y pensons bien, c'est toujours comme ça. Rien n'y est changé. Elle tient de l'expérience, de préparation et de l'art du commandement militaire, du chef militaire, du manager militaire de concevoir, planifier, organiser,

relier, opérationnaliser, et actualiser, d'une manière réaliste, intelligente et courageuse, les systèmes et les processus actionnels, et les méthodologies aussi, qui mettent en œuvre une décision politique, optimiser bien sûr, par le filtre synergique d'une stratégie de sécurité nationale, d'alliance ou de coalition.

Donc, la stratégie militaire suppose l'existence de quatre éléments majeures au moins qui demande une interconnexion en systèmes et processus structuraux et actionnels, sur un support de haut risque, voir de risque extrême, en conditions des déterminations complexes, avec des évolutions imprévisibles et même chaotiques: une *décision politique* élaborée par ceux qui sont en droit de le faire; un *milieu stratégique conflictuel*; un *concept stratégique de forces, moyens, actions et ressources*; un *support d'engagement légal et légitime*. Toutes les quatre composantes se conditionnent réciproquement et, selon notre opinion, l'un ne peut pas exister sans l'autre en configuration stratégique.

Les inter-conditions (consonances et résonances) d'entre tous les quatre éléments sont suggérées dans la *Schéma nr. 1*, comme suit:




Schéma nr. 1 Consonances et résonances stratégiques politiques et militaires décisionnelles et actionnelles

Comme on voit, les conditionnements sont très étroits, mais très flexibles aussi, ainsi que la capacité d'action (a tout niveau de risque) et de réaction-réponse (a tout niveau des provocations, défis, périls et menaces) peuvent être adaptés rapidement aux exigences de la situation concrète. Bien sur, la stratégie militaire n'est seulement une stratégie d'action (opérationnelle), même aussi une stratégie de mettre en œuvre une décision politique pour n'importe quelle sorte de situation conflictuelle, de celles qui tiennent de solutionner, par les moyens militaires aussi, des crises, aux celles de soutiens de la population, en cas d'urgences civiles et militaires, des calamites et désastres.

Mais, avant tout, la stratégie militaire doit répondre a un commandement très important, sans lequel aucune autre action ou réaction, en situations normales, de crise ou de risque extrême, ne peut être possible. Il s'agit de générer les forces et les moyens nécessaires pour l'action préventive, préemptive, de réponse ou de riposte. De telles actions sont, de règle, complexes, variables, planifiées et, en fonction de situations concrètes, modelables et en adaptables, c'est-à-dire, surprenantes, et même intempestives, distribuées sur une plage très large, dans des conditions des situations complexes, de la franchise du seuil critique d'entre normalité et anormalité, jusqu'au risque extrême et guerre.

Générer des forces, des moyens et des actions ce n'est pas facile, bien fixé dans des politiques et stratégies immuables, même si, a première vue, cela devrait l'être. Les forces, les moyens et les ressources nécessaires pour l'action militaire sont et seront toujours d'ordre spécial, avec une philosophie spéciale, de règle, inaccessible pour le sens commun ou pour la compréhension commune. Elles se seront toujours situées dans des coordonnées mouvantes, toujours les mêmes, et toujours les autres, entre des paradoxes compliqués et des constructions achevées et laborieuses. Ce sera très difficile à expliquer pourquoi il est besoin d'une chose pareille, pourquoi une armée a besoin de telles ressources, pour quoi on doit lui accorder ces ressources, dans un monde ou la violence armée a été, est et sera toujours condamnée, jetée au dehors de la loi, répugnée et non-acceptée. L'affirmation simple que la guerre fait partie de l'ordre du monde, de la vocation et de réalité de la société humaine ne peut convaincre et n'impressionne personne. Ce n'est qu'un «mal», comme les autres, nous le connaissons, l'oublierons tout de suite et

allons plus loin, parce que la vie passe trop vite et nous ne comprenions moins combien de bonnes choses, planifiées ou non, comprises ou non, sont et resteront non-faites.

Une armée se prépare toujours pour la guerre. Non semaines ou mois, mais dizaines d'années, même siècles, parce qu'aucun Etat de ce monde, grand ou petit, puissant ou faible, ne se permet de ne se préparer pour faire face aux risques majeurs et notamment aux risques extrêmes, comme la guerre. Les déclarations de toute sorte, les politiques d'harmonisations des intérêts du monde, le respect de la vie, les valeurs qui se sont accumulées au fil des millénaires, les nombreux accords internationaux n'ont réussi jamais ni à prévenir, ni à limiter ou tempérer les recherches dans le domaine des armements, des systèmes perfectionnés d'armes, des armes nucléaires, des armes basées sur les ondes, lasers, nanotechnologies, sur des technologies modernes, certaines inconnues même par le monde scientifique évolué. Jamais, le monde n'a renoncé à ses armes, mais celles qu'elle a supposées aux traités de non-prolifération ou de diminution sont, généralement, dépassées ou incontrôlables d'une manière efficace.

Le monde est, donc, dans son essence, conflictuel. Mais l'essence dynamique du monde n'est pas représentée par les valeurs, mais par l'intérêt. Les valeurs sont seulement la base, le support de la civilisation du monde, ses temples et ses monuments. Les dynamiques, c'est-à-dire, le mouvement et la conflictualité, ont, comme support, les intérêts, et non pas les valeurs. Il y a de la conflictualité politique, économique, sociale, informationnelle et militaire. Les uns essayent d'accréditer l'idée d'une conflictualité culturelle, donc le monde serait conflictuel par ses systèmes de valeurs aussi, que les valeurs d'Islam, par exemple, sont opposées aux valeurs de la civilisation démocratique, ou même en rapports de conflictualité avec celles-ci etc. En réalité, les valeurs du monde ne sont pas et ne peuvent pas être conflictuelles, parce qu'elles ne représentent autre chose que les accumulations et les résultats des actions qui se sont prouvées comme bénéfiques est durables. S'il existe une unité de ce monde, celle-ci existe sur le support axiologique de ce monde, sur son architecture axiologique et patrimoniale, sur et dans ses systèmes de valeurs. Seulement les intérêts sont conflictuels. C'est-à-dire, il y a de la conflictualité dans ces buts et objectifs, dans

ces projections actionnelles qui constituent des mobiles et de moteurs des actions de toute sorte, de celles financières, marchés, infrastructures au celles qui partagent la terre, génèrent les causes, assimilent les résultats et les effets convenables.

Les politiques, les stratégies (y compris la stratégie militaire) et les actions n'opèrent seulement dans les espaces des intérêts, mais aussi en celui des supports axiologique et de civilisation de ce monde, c'est-à-dire, dans la sphère de valeurs, par l'intermédiaire des composants scientifiques et artistiques. Ainsi, quand on parle des niveaux de l'action militaire, par exemple, nous avons en vue non seulement des intérêts qui génèrent l'action, mais aussi le support de valeurs, structurel et organisationnel de l'action. C'est vrai, l'action suppose un système d'activités et d'événements qui visent un but qu'on réalise en atteignant un certains nombre d'objectifs. Mais l'action n'est pas seulement intérêt, même si l'intérêt continue à être son principal moteur. Au delà de ce moteur, il y a un support de sagesse, un système de valeurs auxquelles on rapporte chaque résultat, chaque produit, chaque effet.

La stratégie militaire (et non-seulement militaire) est, dans ce cadre, non seulement la science, l'expérience, la modalité et l'art

de réaliser une décision politique, mais aussi la science, l'expérience, l'habileté, l'art et la modalité de consober l'effet prévisible d'une action ou d'un complexe d'actions avec les coordonnées axiologiques militaires et civiles-militaires de celui-ci. Autrement dit, la stratégie militaire met en relation les supports, les mobiles et les niveaux prévisibles de l'action militaire dans une architecture à géométrie variable et capacité d'adaptation aux échanges désirées, planifiées ou seulement doutées, mais possibles, mais non pas n'importe comment, mais dans un contexte de valeurs, de légalité et de légitimité. Parfois, le niveau stratégique est en mesure de configurer le niveau opérationnel et le niveau tactique – sur des coordonnées stratégiques consonantes ou dissonantes – et même en offrir expertise stratégique pour le niveau politique, sur les mêmes coordonnées, autrefois, il signale seulement une possible dialectique aléatoire des consonances ou des dissonances.

Cette chose est très importante, parce que, d'une part, il faut attentionner le décideur politique sur les responsabilités qu'il en doit assumer et, d'autre part, il contourne mieux le niveau de risque de l'action en plan opérationnel et en plan tactique. On présente une possible manière de mettre en relation ces niveaux dans *Schéma nr. 2*.

NIVEAU	INTERCONEXIONNES		
	Intérêt (motif de l'action)	Support axiologique (support de valeurs de connexion)	Effet de interconnexion (attendu, espéré, planifié, réalisé)
Politique	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Justification de la composante politique militaire (de sécurité et défense) de la structure militaire (architecture, construction, transformation militaire); Allocation des ressources; Le but de l'intervention (action) militaire; Limites et configuration politique de l'engagement. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Systèmes de valeurs des parties qui se trouvent en conflit; Sphère d'intersection de l'entité des éléments de décision politique en matière de sécurité-défense et l'entité des valeurs qui définissent le support réel et durable de la sécurité-défense. Modalité dans laquelle la décision politique vise les systèmes des valeurs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> L'expertise stratégique offerte par le niveau stratégique (et acceptée par le niveau politique) basée sur l'analyse stratégique des interconnexions et exprimée dans la qualité et dans le réalisme des arguments qui soutiennent ou pondèrent (modèrent) la décision politique; Développement de l'expérience en plan de la politique de sécurité et de défense; Assimilation de résultats qui peuvent enrichir le patrimoine politique-militaire de valeurs de sécurité-défense.
Stratégique	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> But et l'objectif stratégique; Niveau stratégique d'engagement, en fonction de ressources et de limites fixées par le décideur politique; Manœuvre stratégique. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Culture stratégique; Expérience de guerre avouée dans les œuvres importantes, en monuments, musées, mais dans la conscience collective de la nation et de l'armée aussi; Culture organisationnelle; Respect de l'institution militaire; Qualité du commandement stratégique; Confiance etc. etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacité de combiner l'intérêt avec les coordonnées axiologiques, d'élaborer un support d'expertise stratégique pour la décision politique et un support de culture stratégique pour une décision stratégique réaliste et complète qu'on transmettra au niveau opérationnel; Développement d'une culture stratégique nécessaire pour le commandement stratégique, pour le stratège et pour l'état major.
Opérationnel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> But et l'objectif de l'opération; Manœuvre opérationnelle; Réalisation des dispositifs demandés; Projection de la Force. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Culture opérationnelle; L'esprit de vainqueur (ou de sacrifice); Culture organisationnelle; Expérience; Qualité du commandement opérationnel. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Connaissance des supports axiologiques de la décision; Formation (développement, sur cette base aussi) d'une culture organisationnelle opérationnelle, très nécessaire en management des opérations.
Tactique	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> But et objectifs tactiques du combat; Succès tactique; Sécurité et protection de la Force; Sécurité et protection de l'environnement etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Expérience de guerre des combattants et de l'unité; Traditions de l'unité combattante; Cohésion; Culture organisationnelle; Respect de valeurs de l'unité; Qualité des combattants etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Formation (développement) d'une culture organisationnelle du niveau tactique et d'un action tactique; Motivation supérieure des combattants; Effets motivations supérieurs; Maximisation de l'horizon attendu.

Schéma nr. 2 Des supports des connexions axiologiques en dynamique décisionnelle politique, stratégique, opérationnelle et tactique

Consonance stratégique sur support de risque militaire extrême

La stratégie militaire n'opère pas seulement avec des théories, expériences, habiletés et capacités créatives pour mettre en œuvre une décision politique majeure en ce qui concerne utilisation de la force, des moyens, des ressources et des actions militaires pour imposer la volonté de la sienne à l'adversaire et la réalisation des buts et des objectifs du domaine de la sécurité-défense. Les forces, les moyens, les ressources et les actions militaires sont et seront utilisés pour les autres buts qui tiennent du phénomène « guerre ».

Ce sont des forces et des moyens d'action et de réaction militaire dans n'importe quelle situation que le décideur politique considère susceptibles d'être traités comme ça, à condition que l'intervention militaire soit légale et légitime et les règles et les principes établis par le droit international soient respectés en totalité.

Aucun Etat du monde ne peut se permettre d'entretenir des forces armées seulement pour faire face à une guerre possible, même-si une telle raison ne disparaîtra jamais de la philosophie et de la physiologie de l'institution militaire. Une armée doit être capable de répondre rapidement à un commandement stratégique national ou international, d'alliance ou de coalition, dans des limites des responsabilités fixées par la Constitution et par les lois organiques. Aujourd'hui, on ne défend pas le pays seulement à ses frontières, quiconque doit sécuriser et défendre les frontières d'un pays, même a ce temps ou elles deviendront symboliques. Tant qu'un pays a parlement, gouvernement, souveraineté sur son territoire et responsabilité de son passé, de son présent et de son avenir, quelque soient les conditions internationales, existera aussi l'impératif catégorique, exprès et vital de garder l'identité nationale, de sécuriser et défendre ses frontières et celles des allies et des partenaires. Mais, aujourd'hui, on ne sécurise et ne défend les frontières d'un pays en concentrant des divisions à la frontière, en y bâtissant des fortifications et en développent une philosophie hostile des frontières-lignes qui séparent et opposent. Le temps de ces frontières est passé. Aujourd'hui, les frontières des nombreuses pays – notamment de ceux qui font partie de l'Union Européenne – séparent, identifient et unissent. Elles sont des expressions de la construction et du développement des

identités fortes qui réaliseront vraiment la grande identité européenne. La métaidentité européenne sera, en effet, au moins dans sa première phase – celle de l'édification et de la consolidation –, une identité des identités. Mais, cela suppose le respect des frontières, leur sécurisation, la réponse aux périls, défis et menaces et vise la réduction des vulnérabilités aussi. En même temps, la sécurité de chaque pays dépend de la sécurité des autres pays, du contrôle et de la gestion de la conflictualité, y compris par les moyens militaires parce que, dans les nouvelles conditions, quand il y a dans le monde 12.000 de ogives nucléaires actives, des systèmes d'armes performants, réseaux transfrontaliers, terroristes et mafieux, chaque Etat devient responsable de la gestion de la conflictualité, de la solution, y compris par les moyens militaires, des crises et des conflits. Aujourd'hui, la dimension morale de l'acte militaire – qui, on le sait, a, depuis toujours, valeur stratégique – a beaucoup évolué, s'est beaucoup transformée. Aujourd'hui, c'est moral de participer à l'effort militaire et civil-militaire collectif de contrôle de la conflictualité, de gestion des crises et des conflits armes, et non de ne pas participer. Non-participer ne signifie pas ne pas te mêler dans les affaires internes d'un Etat – comme le demande le droit international –, mais ne pas aider cet Etat (qui se trouve en crise ou en danger), d'écarter ce danger, de sortir d'anormalité et de continuer sa vie et mettre en application des projets de développement économique et social. Immoral c'est de rester l'arme à pied, en motivant qu'il n'y a pas de menaces pour toi, et attendre que les autres résolvent les crises et les conflits qui se produisent loin de ton territoire, de ta maison et de ta manière de vivre. Les défis, les dangers et les menaces sont loin de toi et, dans une vision simpliste, elles ne te dérangent pas, ne t'engagent pas, ne représentent pour toi aucun motif pour t'assumer un risque et, plus le moins pour être obligé de considérer que tu pourrais t'assumer un risque extrême, le risque de ce pays qui se trouve dans une crise politique-militaire profonde.

Autrefois, l'intervention militaire était considérée non pas comme une aide nécessaire, mais comme une agression contre cet Etat, même si elle était effectuée à la sollicitation des structures légitimes de puissance de ce pays. Même cette sollicitation était posée sous un signe d'interrogation, en ce qui concerne sa légalité et sa légitimité. Bien sur, en certains cas, ce signe

d'interrogation était justifié, dans d'autres cas non. Certainement, à l'heure actuelle, en condition de la globalisation et de l'inter-condition des défis, des périls et des menaces, les vulnérabilités s'inter-conditionnent et, d'ici, les risques aussi.

L'évolution du risque militaire (calculé, imposé, aléatoire ou assumé) connaît un mouvement significatif vers la limite de haut, vers le risque militaire extrême.

Et cette configuration du risque, plus exacte, des modalités d'évaluer le risque, fait partie de la stratégie.

En notre opinion, la compétence, l'habileté, la capacité et la responsabilité de la gestion du risque militaire – de celui qui est très bas à celui qui s'appelle risque extrême – revient au domaine stratégique, c'est-à-dire, au stratège et au stratégiste, au commandement stratégique et aux structures d'études et de recherches stratégiques de défense et de sécurité.

Le risque militaire est, évidemment, le risque de guerre. Mais, le risque militaire extrême est aussi celui de s'assumer les actions militaires et civiles-militaires des théâtres d'opérations des zones ardentes du monde, c'est-à-dire, le risque de la gestion des composantes acutes de la conflictualité militaire du monde.

Toute la stratégie militaire – de celle des forces à celle des moyens, des actions et des ressources, de la théorie stratégique à la pratique stratégique et même à l'art stratégique – c'est une stratégie de risque, et le plus, une stratégie de risque extrême, c'est-à-dire, une stratégie de guerre ou de conflit armé, d'intervention militaire en situation-limite. Chaque militaire participant, en chaque moment de l'intervention – de risque bas au risque extrême – risque toujours sa vie.

Pour un militaire, presque en toutes conditions, n'importe degré de faveur qu'elles en offrent – même pendent l'instruction habituelle – le risque tend vers sa limite supérieure, c'est un risque extrême. Il y a une dialectique du risque militaire dont, d'après notre opinion, il faudrait tenir compte, quand on prend des décisions ou quand on expertise des décisions, y compris les décisions politiques.

En *Schéma nr. 3* nous suggérons une possible grille d'évaluation du risque militaire.

Le niveau (degré) de risque Rc (Risque calculé) devrait être déterminé, d'après notre opinion, sur l'intersection de l'entité des défis, des périls et de menaces {DPM} avec l'entité des vulnérabilités {V}, de manière suivante:

MISSIONS	EFFECTUEURS	Niveau du risque										
		Bas				Moyen			Levé		Extrême	
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Préparation, instruction	Politique											
	Stratégique											
	Opérationnel											
	Tactique											
	Individuel											
Intervention aux calamités et désastres	Politique											
	Stratégique											
	Opérationnel											
	Tactique											
	Individuel											
Missions de maintenance de la paix	Politique											
	Stratégique											
	Opérationnel											
	Tactique											
	Individuel											
Missions d'imposition de la paix	Politique											
	Opérationnel											
	Opératigue											
	Tactique											
	Individuel											
Mission de gestion des crises et des conflits	Politique											
	Stratégique											
	Opérationnel											
	Tactique											
	Individuel											
Combat du terrorisme	Politique											
	Stratégique											
	Opérationnel											
	Tactique											
	Individuel											
Guerre	Politique											
	Stratégique											
	Opérationnel											
	Tactique											
	Individuel											

Schéma nr. 3 Niveau de risque des missions

$$R = \{DPM\} \cap \{V\}$$

Evidemment, l'entité $\{DPM\}$ se constitue sur réunion des entités des défis $\{D\}$, des périls $\{P\}$ et des menaces $\{M\}$.

Chacun des éléments qui composent l'entité $\{DPM\}$ (l'identification concrète du défi, du péril et de la menace) peut être évaluée, par exemple, sur une échelle de 1 à 10. En calculant le nombre moyen, on arrive à une évaluation du risque (sur une échelle de 1 à 10 aussi), et on note le résultat

dans une échelle comme celle du schéma ci-dessus. Une présentation du risque calculé Rc est suggérée dans Schéma nr.4.

Le calcul du risque aide à une élaboration réaliste de la stratégie des forces, des moyens et des actions et non seulement à une stratégie opérationnelle efficiente, à la corrélation juste de toutes les déterminations, ce qui permet, d'une part, l'expertise consistante de la décision politique et, d'autre part, qu'elle soit correctement mise en œuvre et la possibilité de contrôler continuellement le risque.




Schéma nr. 4 Représentation du risque

On ne réalise pas cette chose d'un jour à l'autre. Il faut connaître profondément le domaine, avoir des informations en temps utile et la capacité de saisir, comprendre, évaluer, diagnostiquer et pronostiquer les connexions et les évolutions des systèmes et du processus militaires et civiles-militaires, en fonction de caractéristiques du milieu stratégique de sécurité et du nombre toujours variable des défis, périls et menaces et des vulnérabilités militaires.

On suggère, dans *Schéma nr. 5*, une possible grille des déterminations et des connexions dans le plan de la stratégie militaire.

Toute cette longue, laborieuse et responsable activité tient de la stratégie, de la compétence et de la responsabilité du niveau stratégique, de la théorie, pratique et art stratégique.

Conclusion

On caractérise la stratégie militaire par l'intensité, continuité, flexibilité et responsabilité, par l'adaptabilité constructive et intelligente aux caractéristiques du milieu de sécurité et à la dialectique du rôle et de la place du facteur

militaire dans le tas des déterminations, des actions et des règles de conduite en conditions de risque. La stratégie militaire est une stratégie de risque extrême. La manière dans laquelle la théorie, la pratique et l'art stratégique matérialisent la décision politique dans l'espace des volontés qui se confrontent, de la conflictualité de type militaire, c'est-à-dire de la conflictualité extrême, est l'une de type spécial, qui ne peut pas être élaboré que par des hommes intelligents, très bien préparés, des spécialistes de grande tenue en domaine militaire, avec culture stratégique, et par des commandements stratégiques et opérationnels ayant beaucoup d'expérience et beaucoup de courage. La stratégie militaire est une stratégie de la conflictualité militaire. Elle modèle le comportement de la Force militaire dans des conditions de risque extrême. Son horizon d'attente est et restera toujours la guerre, c'est-à-dire, le risque extrême, qu'on doit calculer, pronostiquer et assumer.

Parfois, attirés par la vitesse de transformation des armées, par les nombreuses pressions qu'on fait sur le facteur militaire, par la multitude et la diversité des missions, par les conjonctures tactique

quotidiennes ou par un tas de tant de choses sans importance, nous oublions de cette grande art du courage de situer, en même plan, toujours complexe, dynamique et perfectible, la théorie, l'expérience,

la valeur, la capacité, l'intelligence et la mesure du stratège, de chef et du commandement militaire stratégique ou opérationnel, synthétisés en ce que nous appelons la stratégie militaire.




Schéma nr. 5 Déterminations et connexions de la stratégie militaire

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LES GROUPES D'INTÉRÊTS ET LA SÉCURITÉ HUMAINE

Petre DUȚU, PhD

Dans la société démocratique, la sécurité humaine constitue l'un d'entre ses objectifs majeurs. Pour accomplir ce desiderata un rôle significatif le jouent les groupes d'intérêts, en tant qu'entités qui se proposent de défendre, par tous les moyens, les droits de l'homme, d'influencer l'activité des décideurs politiques dans la direction de satisfiera les attentes et les doléances de ceux qu'elles représentent.

La sphère d'activité des groupes d'intérêts est large, elle en incluant du secteur économique jusqu'à celui d'environnement. C'est pourquoi, son activité s'interfère consistant avec celui-la des groupes de pression et des groupes de lobby.

Les mots-clés: sécurité humaine, besoins de l'homme, groupe d'intérêt, groupe de pression, groupe de lobby.

1. La sécurité humaine et les besoins de l'homme

La sécurité est l'absence de danger, réel ou imaginaire, pour individu, groupe et communauté. Mais plus généralement, il s'agit de l'impression subjective ressentie par celui qui ne perçoit pas de danger. La sécurité – et son antonyme l'insécurité – sont donc des notions très subjectives. Le besoin de sécurité est un besoin psychologique fondamental de l'homme, qui s'il n'est pas satisfait, suscite un malaise et mobilise une part importante des ressources intellectuelles, nerveuses et physiques, qui pourraient être utilisées à d'autres fins. De nombreuses activités humaines sont ainsi perturbées voire rendues impossibles lorsque règne un climat d'insécurité.

L'être humain éprouve en général un sentiment d'insécurité lorsqu'il estime – à tort ou à raison – qu'un élément extérieur et imprévisible peut modifier, perturber ou anéantir ses attentes légitimes¹.

Cet élément extérieur peut être de diverses natures: le hasard, une catastrophe naturelle,

un élément imprévu, la malveillance d'autres humains.

L'attente légitime est la conséquence qui l'on prévoit en fonction des lois de la nature et des règles de la société. L'homme pour satisfaire surtout son besoin de sécurité a cherché à connaître les lois de la nature et à déterminer des règles stables – et donc prévisibles- de vie en société.

Selon de la théorie de A.H. Maslow, l'homme a les suivantes besoins: physiologiques (chaleur, nourriture, sexualité); de sécurité (l'équilibre émotionnel dans les activités de travail, de vie); sociales (d'affiliation et d'appartenance au différents groupes sociaux); psychosociales (l'estime de soi, le pouvoir, le prestige, la responsabilité); d'autoréalisation personnel dans les activités créatives; cognitives; esthétiques².

Pratiquement, la réalisation de soi correspondre au fait que l'homme doit devenir sincère avec sa propre nature. Mais pour y parvenir, il y a des conditions préalables de liberté d'expression, de justice sociale et de manifeste à chaque personne sans peurs d'une menace ou du jour de demain. Ceux-ci sont assurées et garantis par les quatre piliers de la sécurité humaine et à savoir: la démocratie, l'Etat de droit, la bonne gouvernance et le développement durable.

L'homme peut agir volontairement et consciemment seulement s'il connaît son milieu social et naturel, fait qui mène à réduire l'incertitude, à diminuer les risques et à augmenter son degré de sécurité. En fait, il n'y a pas l'exercice réel des libertés si certains besoins fondamentaux restent insatisfaits. Il est évident qu'il n'a pas de sens de parler de liberté ou de dignité de celui qui mûrit de faim ou celui qui souffre du froid. Aussi, personne ne peut pas exercer son droit de faire ce qu'il désire, bien sur par le respect des normes sociales, s'il se trouve sous la menace ou vit avec la peur pour le jour de demain. En conséquence, on peut affirmer qu'il y a une étroite liaison entre satisfaction des besoins de l'homme et sa sécurité.

La sécurité humaine, de règle, dans la perception et la représentation sociale apparent sous les formes suivantes: *la sécurité comme état de confiance, calme, sérénité et tranquillité*. Ces états sont la résultante de l'interaction et de l'interdépendance entre les droits généraux de l'homme, comme prémisses, et leurs exercices, comme fait de vie en société; *la sécurité comme sentiment*. Dans cette qualité, elle peut être influencée par une multitude des situations et des éléments extérieurs de l'être humain. En sein de ceux derniers, on peut inclure les vulnérabilités du milieu social et naturel, les risques, les dangers et les menaces de sécurité. N'importe quel d'entre elles peut affecter significativement le sentiment de sécurité indispensable à une action humaine cohérente, pour exercer des libertés démocratiques et de l'efficacité économique; *la sécurité comme produit de l'activité humaine consciente, volontaire et responsable*. L'homme, en tant qu'être social, peut et doit créer et perfectionner continuellement son milieu psychosocial dans lequel il vit et agit. Dans ce contexte, il peut construire son propre milieu de sécurité, en agissant sur le plan physique, psychique, psychosocial, matériel et économique. C'est pourquoi, la sécurité est conçue par les nombreux plans. La sécurité des citoyens d'un pays est traditionnellement la première justification de l'existence de l'Etat, c'est-à-dire pour assurer la sécurité des citoyens en ce qui concerne l'extérieur et, puis, sur le plan interne. Afin de réduire les risques de sécurité externe, l'Etat dispose de diplomatie et d'une armée propre. Sur le plan interne, l'Etat a la tâche d'assurer la sécurité de ses citoyens et de leurs biens. Dans ce but, l'Etat a besoin d'une police et d'une justice efficaces. Leur entrée complète dans le rôle prescrite de loi peut aussi être l'effet de la pression exercée par les groupes d'intérêts; *la sécurité comme résultante* de l'interaction entre les conditions internes et internationales propices à la vie et l'activité humaine. Pratiquement, la sécurité est le produit aux interactions des conditions internes et internationales, dont l'homme vit et agit, en respectant les lois de la nature et les normes imposées par la société, d'un part, et en mettant en valeur son potentiel, d'autre part. Donc, on peut dire qu'une politique de sécurité efficace ne se peut concevoir que d'une manière globale, c'est-à-dire elle doit viser tous les domaines susceptibles de réduire consistant l'insécurité humaine, sous ses multiples formes de manifestations.

La sécurité ne peut jamais être absolue. L'insécurité et l'imprévisibilité font partie intégrante de la vie. Mais, elles doivent se percevoir à un niveau acceptable. A cette chose peut aussi contribuer l'activité de différents groupes d'intérêts qu'existent et se manifestent dans une société démocratique. La sécurité et l'insécurité sont des notions très subjectives. Leur niveau s'évalue par comparaison avec les expériences antérieures. Par exemple, une personne qui a connu antérieurement des grands risques estimera un risque donné comme fiable, pendant qu'une personne qui n'a jamais été exposée à un tel risque, autrefois, le ressentira comme important.

La sécurité, comme état de confiance, calme, sérénité et tranquillité, sentiment, produit de l'activité humaine consciente, volontaire et responsable, résultante des conditions internes et internationales propices à la vie et à l'activité humaine se caractérisent par le dynamisme, la souplesse et la subjectivité. De règle, ces traits dérivent des fondements représentés par l'Etat de droit, la démocratie, la bonne gouvernance et le développement durable qui, dans leur qualité de piliers de la sécurité humaine, à leur tour, se définissent par une évolution dynamique.

2. Le statut et le rôle social des groupes d'intérêt

La littérature présente largement les groupes de pressions, les groupes de lobby et les groupes d'intérêt³. Entre ces formes d'organisation sociale il y a tant de ressemblance que de différences. D'ici une certaine confusion entre ces termes lorsqu'ils sont utilisés par des personnes moins familiarisées avec ce domaine.

Ainsi, **un groupe de pression** est un ensemble de personnes physiques ou juridiques (c'est-à-dire entreprises ou associations diverses) constituée en vue de défendre les intérêts communs par les personnes et les institutions chargées de prendre des décisions (ou de élaborer des dossiers qui serviraient à prendre des décisions). En anglais, le terme usité est **lobby** et ses actions sont nommées lobbying. «Un lobby est un groupe de pression ou un groupe des intérêts ayant comme tâche d'influencer un pouvoir public ou privé afin de refléter à un point de vue»⁴. En France, ce terme a un sens très péjoratif, en signifiant un groupe de pression plus ou moins secret qui veut contraindre des décisions

politiques dans une manière non démocratique. En Roumanie, on parle des groupes d'intérêt qui agissent, par des méthodes et des techniques plus et moins légales, sur les personnes ou les institutions qui ont la compétence de prendre de décisions dans le domaine d'activité du groupe respective. Dans les Etats-Unis, les activités de lobby sont institutionnalisées et permettent l'identification à différent «factions» pendant d'un débat.

Les différends acteurs se regroupent par les moyens de pressions comme sont: les actions médiatiques; l'activité des uns membres ou des sympathisants pendant des élections; les donations dans les campagnes électorales; l'apport intellectuel (via think-tanks). Ce système de lobby est un sujet de débat en les Etats-Unis, où on cherche de limiter son aspect financier, pour prévenir certains actes de corruption.

A son tour, l'Union Européenne a reprise, dans une certaine mesure, ce système de lobby. Ainsi, au Bruxelles où sont les principaux services administratifs de l'Union Européenne il y a aussi beaucoup de groupes de pression qui agissent auprès des autorités compétentes afin de un certaine décision soit prise. On donne comme exemples l'industrie de pétrole ou de l'acier. Autres groupes de pression sont moins organisés et plus temporaires: ainsi, lorsque on prévoit de construire des autoroutes dans une région donnée, on peut que les maires des localités visées, qui désirent tous que l'autoroute passer un peu plus loin de leurs communautés, s'organisent pour défendre leurs intérêts auprès de ceux qui ont le pouvoir de décision dans le respective domaine.

Les pressions peuvent prendre tant de formes visibles (par exemple, les manifestations), que des formes occultes quand il s'agit des entreprises ou des sociétés avec des responsabilités limitées qui désirent comme une décision ou l'autre soit adopté dans leur profit. En ce sens, on peut rappeler la facilitation de gagner des licitations pour obtenir de commandes de parte de l'Etat, des autorités locales etc. par certaines personnes ou groupes.

Dans le sens large, **le groupe d'intérêt** est l'ensemble homogène des gens constitue, pour un période variable de temps, afin de satisfaire les intérêts d'un certaine entité.

Si l'entité représente les intérêts d'un secteur particulière ou d'une catégorie fonctionnelle de la société alors elle a le nome de groupe des intérêts privés.

Mais, lorsque cette entité cherche de promouvoir des causes spécifiques de l'entière population or, le moins, d'une grande partie d'elle, cela-ci are le nome de groupe d'intérêts publique.

Ainsi, les groupes d'intérêt incluent les entreprises, les associations professionnelle et patronales, les syndicats, le monde associatif (organisation gouvernementale et non gouvernementale, associations). Par la suite, on peut dire que par les groupes des intérêts on comprend tant les collectivités locales, les groupes d'appartenances, les communautés professionnelles, les associations, collectives et de réseau, ainsi que les cybercommunautés.

Autrement dite, les groupes des intérêts sont d'abord des organisations constituées. D'autre part, certaines représentent une catégorie socioprofessionnelle de la populations, tell que comme les agriculteurs, les jeunes, les cadres et d'autre part ceux qui constituent, par exemple, des réseaux d'anciens élèves /étudiants des unes institution d'enseignement reconnues sur le plan national et international⁵.

Il faut distinguer deux sortes de groupes d'intérêt⁶: a) *les groupes d'intérêt à vocation globale*. L'objectif de ces groupes est de prendre en charge les intérêts d'une catégorie particulière de la population dont l'existence sociologique est déjà identifiée: les ouvriers, les paysans, les femmes, etc.

La défense des intérêts porte sur l'ensemble des attentes de la population ciblée. D'où l'obligation pour ces organisations de procéder à un travail de synthèse des demandes afin de présenter des revendications cohérentes. On distingue les groupes socio-économiques des groupes socioculturels; b) *les groupes d'intérêt à vocation spécialisée*. Ces groupes se font les porte-parole d'une cause spécifique autour de laquelle vont se rassembler librement les sympathisants. Ceux-ci peuvent venir d'horizons sociaux et culturels divers mais ils se reconnaissent par la volonté de défendre un intérêt commun et circonscrit.

Par exemple la lutte contre le racisme et l'antisémitisme, l'environnement. Une même cause peut devenir l'objet d'intérêts divergents faisant entrer les groupes dans un système de compétition et d'affrontement.

Dans ce sens, on peut donnée l'exemple l'avortement que les uns défende et les autres condamne.

La question de la pression exercée porte soit directement sur les pouvoirs dirigeants soit indirectement auprès de l'opinion publique. Dans ce sens, on distingue:

➤ *Les pressions directes. Il s'agit de pressions plus ou moins officielles sur les élus locaux ou nationaux, les ministres ou les administrations. Elles peuvent prendre plusieurs formes: l'information (remise de rapports qui fait appel à des experts), la consultation (les pouvoirs publics organisent eux-mêmes des consultations avec les associations ou les groupes concernés), la corruption (offres de biens, de cadeaux aux fonctionnaires, aux conseillers).*

➤ *Les pressions indirectes. Elles cherchent à prendre à témoin l'opinion publique. L'appel à l'opinion sera d'autant plus efficace qu'il saura mobiliser les médias. Dans ce sens, de règle, on utilise les formes suivantes: la contrainte. Elle est exercée sur la population pour obliger le pouvoir politique à céder (exemples: grèves, manifestations); la persuasion. Le soutien de l'opinion aura d'autant plus de chance d'être obtenu que les groupes d'intérêt parviendront à présenter leurs revendications catégorielles comme relevant de l'intérêt général; les techniques spécifiques à la communication humaine. Il s'agit des campagnes de presse, les sondages d'opinion, la collecte de signatures». Ainsi, les membres des groupes d'intérêt peuvent utiliser les communiqués de presse, à travers lesquels ceux présentent leur sollicitations. L'objectif visé est de mobiliser les sympathisants, d'un part, et de préparer le terrain à des auditions, d'autre part.*

L'action des groupes d'intérêt sur les décideurs politiques on peut aussi réaliser par les procédées comme sont: l'idée de la concertation et de la participation des administrés de participer aux décisions qui les concernent; «la menace ouverte» utilisée par les groupes de pression, lorsqu'il s'agit d'un point particulier.

De règle, les parlementaires qui sont les victimes de ce type d'action; «l'action occulte» caractérisée par les relations privilégiées ayant lieu entre certains membres de groupes de pression et certains dirigeants⁷.

3. L'impact de l'activité des groupes d'intérêt sur la sécurité humaine

Les groupes d'intérêt, par leur rôle active,

responsable et volontaire dans une société démocratique, agissent directement et significatif sur la sécurité humaine. L'impact de leur activité est direct parce que sont concernes tous les composantes de la sécurité humaine, de composante économique jusqu'à la composante personnel. En fait, l'activité des groupes d'intérêt a comme finalité de satisfaire les besoins fondamentaux de l'être humaine.

D'autre part, l'impact exercé sur la sécurité humaine est l'un significatif parce que l'influence des groupes d'intérêt concerne les décideurs politiques, c'est-à-dire les personnes publiques et les structures institutionnelles étatiques et politiques qui peuvent prendre des décisions dans un domaine ou l'autre d'activité mais qui ont aussi la capacité de les mettre en œuvre.

De règle, dans une société démocratique, le groupe d'intérêts sert d'interface entre le citoyen et l'État parce que ces organisations sociales représentent, par leur manière de constituer, d'organiser et de fonctionner un lieu:

- de conscientisation qui exige que ses membres participent aux processus de décisions visant le développement d'une meilleure qualité de vie;

- de participation où chacun donne un sens au groupe et confère à celui-ci le pouvoir extraordinaire d'influencer l'opinion publique;

- où la communication joue un rôle prépondérant et où les médias traditionnels et les nouvelles technologies d'information et de communication doivent être utilisés de façon complémentaire. C'est pourquoi, tout le groupe d'intérêts doit avoir une organisation durable, structurée et avec à sa tête des dirigeants capables de choisir les stratégies d'action.

Les groupes d'intérêt ont toujours existé, alors que les partis politiques n'étaient pas apparut encore dans la société.

Ces deux entités font partie intégrante du système politique. Les réalités sociales auxquelles se rattachent les groupes d'intérêt et les partis politiques sont identiques. Cependant, les particularismes de divers groupes humains s'intègrent mieux à travers les groupes d'intérêt qu'à travers les partis.

Lorsque les institutions ne semblent plus efficaces, les citoyens ont recours à divers outils leur permettant de manifester leur mécontentement, tels que la participation à une manifestation, à l'organisation et à la signature de pétition etc.

Il faut aussi souligner la relation d'interdépendance d'entre les partis politiques et les groupes d'intérêt dans un Etat de droit.

Ainsi, les groupes d'intérêt dépendent de partis politiques qui décident la manière dont ils accompliront leur double fonction pour laquelle ils existent: informer les agents du système politique des exigences et des soutiens des agents sociaux et inversement, communiquer aux agents sociaux les possibilités et les volontés des agents du système politique.

D'autre part, les partis politiques appellent aux groupes d'intérêt pour être soutenus moral et matériel dans l'exécution de certaines d'entre leur promesses électorales et/ou de certaines projets sociales, culturelles, économiques etc., plus ambitieuses et qui nécessitent un soutien quasi-national.

Pourtant, les groupes d'intérêt s'instaurent dans les sociétés contemporaines comme éléments représentatifs, acteurs de la vie sociale, culturelle, économique. Autrement dite, ils ne s'instituent pas en forces politiques organisées (à l'instar des partis ou autres groupements) et ne se donne pas comme objectif la conquête du pouvoir politique.

En fait, les groupes d'intérêt exercent une influence sur le pouvoir politique, sur les décideurs politiques, ce qui implique une gamme variée et circonstanciée de partenaires ou d'interlocuteurs. À titre de simple exemple, l'opinion publique constitue souvent un intermédiaire par lequel les groupes développent une influence, dont la cible est par préférence le gouvernement ou le titulaire d'un département ministériel⁸.

L'opinion publique est saisie par les diverses voies et les divers moyens considérés comme les plus appropriés: presse écrite et parlée, moyens audiovisuels, publicité.

Un grand rôle joue aussi dans la connaissance des doléances des groupes d'intérêt les sondages d'opinion.

Par la manière concrète dont les groupes d'intérêt établissent leurs objectifs, les buts et la nature du contenu de leurs actions, ils influencent consistamment la sécurité humaine.

Ainsi, s'on analyse ce qui ils cherchent, en essence, les groupes d'intérêt, par leur entière activité, on peut constater qu'il y a une liaison étroite entre « le cible » choisie pour être influencée et l'une ou plusieurs d'entre les composantes de la sécurité humaine.

D'habitude, ceux visés sont des personnes avec des fonctions publiques- parlementaires, ministres, employeurs publics de haut rang etc.- qui peuvent décider dans les domaines qui ont un relation direct ou non avec ceux qui appartiennent à la sécurité humaine. Ainsi, une intervention en plan économique pour adopter des mesures qui faciliteraient, par exemple, la création de petites entreprises et moyens, auraient des effets bénéfiques sur les dimensions économique et sociale de la sécurité humaine.

D'autre part, aussi importante semble être l'impact de l'activité de groupes d'intérêt sur la sécurité humaine sur la dimension de la sécurité individuelle. Celui-ci parce que l'intervention des groupes d'intérêt, auprès ceux en droit de décider dans l'Etat, renforce la confiance de gens qu'il existe quelqu'un, en dehors des institutions habilitées, qui milite pour promouvoir et défendre leurs droits en société.

Conclusions

Les groupes d'intérêt représentent une réalité dynamique dans une société démocratique. Ils ont la tâche d'agir dans la direction de défendre les intérêts des hommes, organisés ou non dans les différentes structures formelles et/ou informelles.

Par leur manière dont ils sont organisés et se manifestent dans l'Etat de droit, les groupes d'intérêt ont un statut social haut et ils accomplissent des rôles significatifs pour réaliser la sécurité humaine.

La manière des groupes d'intérêt de se manifester est une complexe, dynamique et flexible en rapport de buts et d'objectifs concernés, de bénéficiaires de l'action respective, de force humaine et matériel dont ils disposent.

Leur activité est interdépendante et interactions avec celle déroulée par les partis politiques et les institutions de l'Etat de droit.

Par leur statut et les rôles assumés, les groupes d'intérêt se peuvent considérer comme faisant partie des structures spécifiques de la société civile. En conséquence, leur espace d'action peut être locale, nationale, régionale et internationale.

Plus l'influence exercée par les groupes d'intérêt est très organisée, très intense et omniprésente plus l'impact de leur activité est plus consistant, significatif et de durée.

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¹ Cf. F.X.ROBERT, *Sécurité*, <http://www.fnb.to/FNB/Bastion.htm>, p.1.

² Cf. Pierre LOUART, *Maslow, Herzberg et les théories du contenu motivationnel*, http://www.e-rh.org/documents/wp_louart2.pdf, pp. 6-7

³ Voir: Dr. Mircea MUREȘAN, dr. Petre DUȚU, **Societatea civilă - actor nonstatal major**, București, UNAp, 2006, M. HASTINGS, **Aborder la science politique**, Paris, Seuil, 1996, M. OFFERLE, **Sociologie des groupes d'intérêt**, Paris, 1994, G. LAMARQUE, **Les groupes de pression**, Paris, PUF, 1994.

⁴ *Lobby*, en <http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lobby>

⁵ *Le rôle des groupes d'intérêts en France*, http://www.etudiants.ch/upload/documents/Admin/etufile_435_grflrd7800.pdf, p.8.

⁶ *Qu'est ce qu'un groupe d'intérêt?*, http://fdsp.univ-lyon2.fr/article.php3?id_article=476

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THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT WITHIN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE THROUGH THE SECURITY STRATEGIES OF ROMANIA, HUNGARY, THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA – COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Georgeta CHIRLEȘAN, PhD

The security strategies play an important role in shaping the foreign affairs, in defining the level of interaction between different strategic actors, in understanding the security environment and especially in forecasting certain trends and evolution. Which are the national values and interests of the states, what threats, risks and challenges could exist – with afferent levels of imminence, which objectives and tasks the countries have to deal with, what are the implementation instruments they can use – all of them are elements to be comprised within a demarche of comparative analysis of the national security strategies.

A comparative analysis of the security strategies of Romania, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia may lead to the identification of some similarities, differences and particularities regarding their structure and content - useful elements in pointing out the way in which these national strategies are framed within the context of the European Union security strategy and within the understanding of the current regional security environment in the Central and Eastern Europe. These are few aspects we have tried to identify in the next pages.

Keywords: security strategies, regional security, Central and Eastern Europe.

1. Preliminaries

Romania's Security Strategy. The document titled "The National Security Strategy of Romania. The European Romania, the Euro-Atlantic Romania: For a Better Life in a Democratic, Safer and More Prosperous Country" was adopted by The Supreme Council for National Defence at its meeting on April 17, 2006, under the Decision no.

62, and it has as precursors a series of strategic documents:

- Law no. 45/1994 regarding the national defence;
- Military Strategy of Romania, 2002, 2004;
- National Security Strategy of Romania, 2001;
- Law regarding the defence planning, no. 473/2004;
- White Paper on Defence and National Security, 2004;
- National Security Strategy of Romania, 2004.

With a considerable length¹, the strategy is considered to be "a realistic, bold, and pragmatic national project" responding to the need and obligation of protecting the human fundamental rights and freedoms, the vital national values and interests as bases of the existence of the Romanian state. The favourable position of Romania conferred by its quality of NATO and EU member is pointed out, regarding the acceleration of the economic and social development and the contribution in maintaining the regional and global security.

The document refers to the national values (democracy, freedom, equality, supremacy of the law; respect for human dignity, for the basic human rights and freedoms; national identity and civic awareness; political pluralism; guaranteed property and market economy; solidarity with the democratic nations; international cooperation and peace; dialogue and communication between civilizations) and to the national interests (promoting and protecting the values). The starting point in describing the security environment is

the characterization of the global order and the dynamics of the change within the international security environment, with reference to the new international equilibrium coagulation tendencies. The globalization, the existence of tensions and conflicts, the collapse of communism as political system in the countries from Central and Eastern Europe, the enlargement of NATO and the European Union represent factors determining the current security environment.

The presentation of risks and threats points out aspects emphasized in the majority of the security strategies: international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and organised crime.

The National Security Strategy of Romania is an extensive document, composed by 11 chapters, which starts by presenting the premises, the ways of construction and the priorities and then develops around Romania's European and Euro-Atlantic identity, the internal security and comes to an end by specifying the role and responsibilities that different actors have in building and providing the national security.

Hungary's Security Strategy². Adopted in 2002, it presents in the beginning the Hungary's current security context, the basis on which the National Security Strategy was built and the integrated context of elaborating the connected strategies (in the military field, legislation, economy, finance, human resources development, environment protection, fight against terrorism, etc.).

One may say that the Security Strategy begins with a brief "radiography" of the country's current security environment, showing that Hungary's security situation is stable and the basic guarantee of its security is the co-operation taking place in the framework of NATO and EU. Hungary is not threatened by military aggression, and the risk of any other traditional type of threat is also minimal.

Even from the preamble of the document it is stipulated that once with the regime change³, Hungary has entered into a process of Euro-Atlantic integration based on common values, democracy, protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The document specifies that the new challenges and threats can be efficiently managed only by

coordinating the national efforts at governmental level, by flexibly applying the capacities and by a cooperation extended at international level.

Based on the National Security Strategy, the sectorial strategies are elaborated for all the fields of interest, establishing thus more broadly the tasks in the field of security.

Related to the history of generating the national security strategy, in the document it is mentioned that the basis of the security and defence policy on long-term are established by the Hungarian National Assembly's Resolution No. 94/1998 on the "Basic Principles of the Hungarian Security and Defence Policy".

The current national security strategy was elaborated based on:

- The Government resolution no. 2144/2002;
- The Basic Principles of the Hungarian Security and Defence Policy;
- NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept;
- The European Security Strategy⁴.

In terms of structure, the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary is composed by the following parts: values and interests; the security environment – threats, risks, challenges; objectives and tasks; instruments to implement the National Security Strategy; sectorial strategies.

Slovakia's Security Strategy. Also, in Slovakia's case, the document has a similar title with the Hungarian one, namely "*The Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic*"⁵. Slovakia's National Security Strategy was adopted by the National Council of the Slovak Republic in 2001. The current strategy has as source "The Military Doctrine" (1994) and the document titled "*Basic principles and aims of the national security*", adopted in 1996.

The observance of the principles of the Organization of the United Nations Charter is stated in the introduction of the document and the concept of security in the view of the Slovak Republic is defined: preserving the internal security and order, the sovereignty and integrity, the democratic foundations of the country and also protecting the environment.

The security environment of the Slovak Republic depends on the global and regional (Central Europe) security environment in which the globalization brings permanent changes of the threats and risks, thus influencing accordingly the

security strategies. The role and importance of the transfer of stability through the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and through the Partnership for Peace is also underlined. To be noticed the issue referring to the creation of the defence policies of the European Union, which the Slovak Republic understands as “*a complementary process to the system of collective defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*”⁶. The Slovak Republic still has not sufficient external international institutional security guarantees based on a contractual foundation of common defence. In the view of consolidating the European integration, Slovakia aims at deepening the cooperation within the Visegrad group and the Central-European Free Trade Association.

The National Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic has in its structure: introduction; the security environment; interest; security challenges, risks and threats; security policy; conclusion.

Czech Republic’s Security Strategy. The document to which we refer to has the title “*Security Strategy of the Czech Republic*”⁷ and has been adopted in 1999.

This represents the third version of the national security strategy elaborated since the obtaining of the independence of the Czech Republic, being “*fundamental policy document defining security threats and ways and means of countering them*”⁸. The Czech Republic’s Government has decided to update the previous security strategy in the light of significant changes in the security environment and the Czech Republic’s position on the international scene, in particular its upcoming full membership of the European Union.

The current security strategy had as forerunner the “*Report on the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic 1998-1999*”.

The basic framework for formulating and implementing the Security Strategy is provided by the Constitution of the Czech Republic and Constitutional Act No. 110/1998 concerning the security of the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic’s membership of NATO, EU, UN, and OSCE is part of its international commitments.

In the context of the Czech Republic’s Security Strategy, the term security means a desirable state of affairs where all risks are reduced to a minimum. The principles of the Security Policy of the Czech Republic are:

- security of the individual, the protection of life, health and property;
- the protection of institutions of the state (including their operational capability);
- indivisibility of security (the Czech Republic’s security is inseparable from security in the Euro-Atlantic area and from global security);
- the observance of the principles of rule of law in all the fields, of the Constitution and of UN Charter.

The Security Strategy of the Czech Republic is structured in five chapters: introduction; principles of the security policy; the security interests; the security environment; strategy for promoting the security interests; conclusions.

2. Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic: about convergence in the national security strategies

Starting from the previous presentations of the national security strategies of Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, we performed a comparative analysis of them, following some characteristic elements, namely:

- (a) the strategies’ evolution in time;
- (b) their structure;
- (c) the content.

We have also tried to see how these strategies are correlated with the European Union’s security strategy.

(a) The strategies’ evolution in time

We noticed the existence of some *differences of duration until the appearance of the first* national security strategy. Thus, Hungary had the slowest evolution: it obtains total sovereignty in 1990 and needs three years to adopt relevant security documents. Slovakia becomes independent in 1993 and one year later adopts the defence doctrine. Having become independent in the same time with Slovakia, the Czech Republic although adopts its first security strategy only in 1999, it develops documents referring to the national security even from an early stage⁹. Less than two years after the revolution in December 1989, the Romanian Parliament adopts the Law regarding the National Safety of Romania, in 1994 adopts the Law on National Defence¹⁰ and in 2001 the first National Security Strategy.

We may also speak about *differences of the adoption moments* of the national security strategy in relation to the invitation to join NATO (previously and subsequently to the invitation of joining NATO):

- Hungary and the Czech Republic are both invited in 1997. Subsequently, Hungary adopts the Basic Principles of the Security and Defence Policy (1998), and Czech Republic adopts the National Security Strategy (1999);

- Slovakia adopts the military and defence strategies a year before receiving the NATO invitation (2001) and it does not renew them even one year after it obtained the NATO membership.

- Romania receives the invitation and becomes NATO member in 2004¹¹. When it joined NATO, it had already had the first national security strategy for three years (adopted in 2001), renewed then in 2004 and 2007.

In the table below we rendered a synthesis of these chronologies.

Table 1. Temporal landmarks of the adoption of the national security strategy for Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic

<i>Romania</i>	<i>Hungary</i>	<i>Slovakia</i>	<i>Czech Republic</i>
Romania's Law on National Defence (1994)	The Basic Principles of the Hungarian Security and Defence Policy (1998) –more abstract than the majority of the international documents of national security	Defence doctrine (1994)	Defence strategy (1997)
Security strategy (2001, 2004, 2007)	It has not had a national security strategy until in 2002	Basic principles and aims of the national security (1996) Security strategy (adopted in 2001)	Security strategy (1999)
White Paper on Defence and National Security (2004)		Defence strategy (2001)	
Military Strategy (2002, 2004)	It has not adopted a military strategy yet	Military strategy (2001) (confusion regarding the name in relation to the defence one)	Military strategy (2002, 2004, 2008)

Going further with the identified differentiations, we can also focus on the *differences of the adoption mechanisms* of the documents referring to security.

It is easy to notice from the table below, that while in Hungary and Romania both the legislative

and the executive have had at a certain moment a role in adopting the security documents, depending on their type, in the case of the other two countries, the task of adopting these reference documents belonged strictly either to the legislative or to the executive:

Table 2. The adopting mechanisms of the security strategy in Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic

<i>Hungary</i>	The Basic Principles of the Hungarian Security and Defence Policy (1998) - adopted by the Parliament National Security Strategy 2002 – adopted by the Government National Security Strategy 2004 – adopted by the Government
<i>Romania</i>	Law on National Defence – adopted by the Parliament Military Strategy – adopted by the Government White Paper on Defence and National Security – adopted by the Parliament National Security Strategy – adopted by the Parliament
<i>Slovakia</i>	All documents adopted by the legislative
<i>Czech Republic</i>	All documents adopted by the executive

(b) Comparing the structure of the security strategy

The comparison of the security strategies' structure represented the second level of the

analysis which we performed.

We summarised in the table below the result of the structures' comparison.

Table 3: The structure of the security strategy for Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and Czech Republic

<i>Romania</i>	<i>Hungary</i>	<i>Slovakia</i>	<i>Czech Republic</i>
Introduction	Introduction	Introduction	Introduction
Principles and ways of actions (in chapter II titled "A safe and prosperous future...")	---	---	Principles of the security policy
National values and interests (in chapter I titled "The premise...")	Values and interests	Security interests	Security interests
Security environment (in chapter I titled "The premise...")	Security environment	Security environment	Security environment
Priorities	Objectives and tasks	---	---
Building the new European and Euro-Atlantic identity	Implementation instruments	Security policy	Strategy for Promoting the Security Interests
Accomplishing regional security and stability based on a new political paradigm	---	---	---
Romania – a dynamic vector of security and prosperity in the Black Sea Region	---	---	---
Homeland security	---	---	Security system
Landmarks of good governance	Sectorial strategies	---	---
Increasing the competitiveness and high-performing character of socio-economic activity	---	---	---
Modernizing institutions with responsibilities in the area of national security	---	---	---
Developing the infrastructure	---	---	---
Resources and responsibilities	---	Conclusions	Conclusions

Therefore, common elements to the four analyzed countries are noticed, such as security interests and security environment (the countries define these interests even from the beginning of the document, so we may say that the interests represent a major common element for all the analyzed countries). But there is a different manner of subsequent development of the document in the four cases: Hungary presents objectives and tasks and defines sectorial strategies (this structure element does not exist in the other three documents); but reciprocally, neither the security system presented within the strategy of the Czech Republic has a

correspondent in the documents of the other three countries (only in the case of Romania there is a chapter for the homeland security). We may state that the greatest deviation from a "traditional" structure of such a document appears in the security strategy of Romania, which covers 11 chapters, having atypical titles in comparison with those ones in the structure of the other analyzed countries: one speaks about the new paradigm of security and stability, about Romania's role in providing security in the Black Sea region, about responsibilities and resources. We may notice not only the discrepancy in structuring the document

in relation with the other strategies, but also the relatively mixed way in which certain aspects are approached, with takeovers, interferences and overlappings which sometimes make the analysis difficult.

(c) Comparing the content of the security strategy

As we have seen, there is an identical named part in all the four documents – the security environment. The content's similarity goes here very deep, almost reaching identification, because all documents speak about threats and risks in this part. Thus, we may identify a common approach of

the threats, being detailed presented and explained in the document, in the case of each of the four countries:

- the terrorism;
- the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction;
- the regional conflicts;
- the failed states or the non-democratic regimes (except Romania, where there is no reference to them);
- organised crime (except Hungary).

We synthesized the threats in the table below, the way they are identified in the respective documents, emphasizing two categories, namely: global threats and national threats.

Table 4. The presentation of the threats in the security strategies of Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic

	Romania	Hungary	Slovakia	Czech Republic
GLOBAL	Terrorism	Terrorism	Terrorism	Terrorism/extremism
	Proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction	Proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction	Proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction	Proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction
	Regional conflicts	Unstable regions	Regional conflicts in unstable regions	Regional conflicts
	---	Failed states	Failed states	Failed states
	Cross-border organised crime	---	Organised crime	Organised crime
	Illegal migration	Illegal migration	Uncontrolled migration	(Waves of) massive migration
	---	---	Foreign special services	Non-state actors (extremist groups, terrorists, etc.)
	Asymmetric threats (military or non-military), psychological, information or intelligence threats)	Challenges of the information society	Violation or failure of information systems	Major leaks of strategic data or intrusions into the information systems
	Gradual exhaustion of vital resources; serious dependence on vital resources that are hard to access	---	Unstable vital resources (energy, raw materials)	---
	Economic-financial crimes	Economic instability	---	---
	Increasing possibility of pandemics	Global sources of danger: natural, man-made and medical	Industrial and natural disasters	Infectious diseases (pandemics – strategic threat)
	Natural and ecological catastrophes	---	---	Climate change (with potential risk of an environmental disasters)
	Industrial catastrophes			Industrial accidents

NATIONAL (internal)	Romania	Hungary	Slovakia	Czech Republic
	--	Organised crime	The criminalization of social relations (including xenophobia and racism)	Organised crime
	---	Illegal economy	Economic crime	---
	Social insecurity, chronic poverty, social gaps	--	--	--
	Institutional endemic corruption	Corruption	Corruption	Corruption
	---	---	--	Imbalance between the North and South (economic and social)
	Massive migration	---	---	Illegal migration towards the Northern countries
	---	Drugs	---	---
	---	Political and religious extremism	---	Extremism, radicalism
	Democratic deficit	Political and religious extremism	Demographic development	---
	---	---	The decrease of food security	---
	Ineffective governance	---	---	---

Referring to the content analysis of the four security strategies, there are, obviously, both similarities and differences.

We may add to *the similarities* pointed out in the beginning of this paragraph that one referring to the fact that in all four cases terrorism is considered as a major threat, even as a “strategic threat” (Hungary).

In each of the analyzed security strategies arguments to support this aspect are rendered:

- Romania considers that “international terrorism structured in cross-border networks, in particular, poses the most serious threat to human lives and freedom, democracy, civilization, way of life and the other fundamental basic values that make the foundations of the democratic community of the Euro-Atlantic states”.

- Within the Hungary’s strategy it is specified that the terrorism threatens the security in the Euro-

Atlantic region and contributes to the emergence of other global – political, economic, commercial, migration- and health-related - crises.

- Slovakia considers terrorism as a major threat due to its wide scope and consequences upon the vital interests of the state.

- The Czech Republic appreciates terrorism as a major threat by referring to the asymmetric strategy practiced by the terrorist attack (avoiding direct attack and attacking the territories of their chosen adversaries, usually civilian populations) and to the combination with strategies which use weapons of mass destruction.

Moreover, as Hungary mentions within the global challenges that it considers terrorism and proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction as the two strategic threats, these are also mentioned on the first two places in terms of importance by Romania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic.

It is also to be noticed the fact that all the four analyzed countries have placed the issue of the *regional conflicts / unstable regions* on the third position in their top of threats (after terrorism and proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction). This aspect proves a community of views but also similar concerns generated by the common fear upon the de-stabilizing long-term effects which these conflicts could generate.

Regarding *the weapons of mass destruction*, Romania includes them in the category of severe threats, based on some factors which, in the current context, are made more and more evident: increased accessibility to such means, improving the delivery means of the weapons of mass destructions, the presence of regimes driven by extremist political or religious ideologies exhibiting irresponsible behaviours, the existence of regions that evade the state control favouring the development of the black market for weapons of mass destruction. Hungary extends the threat given by the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction at the level of Europe's security and of the Euro-Atlantic region based on the non-conventional ways of using the weapons of mass destruction and insists on the cooperation with other states. This idea appears also in the security strategy of the Czech Republic, being even more precisely delimited by the identification of the high-risk regions – Middle East and South and East Asia. If Hungary speaks about "non-conventional ways", the Czech Republic uses the expression "various means of use of the weapons of mass destruction" to refer to this aspect. Slovakia refers too at the weapons of mass destruction in the framework of the security environment presentation (at point 4 of the strategy), even if this seems not to have the same importance within the threats and risks hierarchy as for the other three countries.

All the four security strategies speak about the "collective defence" concept which they see it as the unique possibility for managing the current security context and they agree that none of them can face alone the actual global threats of the international security environment (first of all, terrorism and the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction)¹³. Romania recognizes NATO as the most solid security guarantee in its history and considers the Alliance as the main collective defence structure able to guarantee security in the Euro-Atlantic region. Romania shows that

"in the contemporary security environment, no state can isolate itself or stay neutral, no state is protected and none should stay outside the global processes"¹⁴.

Regarding the identified *differences*, we will render in the next lines few of them.

If in the case of Hungary the threats are split in global and internal, in the case of Slovakia they are presented in the framework of the same chapter (sometimes in the same paragraph the *threats and risks* are combined, of *international and national level...*).

In the framework of the Hungary's security strategy, there is a consistent chapter about *regional* threats, risks and challenges which cannot be found in the case of Slovakia and Czech Republic (they only present global and national threats). Romania refers to the fact that the lines between global and regional threats and between foreign and domestic ones tend to become more blurred but it writes an entire chapter (chapter V) to the regional security and stability, in which the regional threats are pointed out together with the security objectives envisaged by Romania in the region and the afferent ways of solving them.

The Slovak Republic mentions that it refers within the presentation of its security environment to the present risks and threats with which it confronts, and which, although they have different levels of danger (i.e. *risks* and *threats*), if they are not taken into account, could generate crisis situations which implicitly will jeopardize the vital interests of the Czech Republic. This delimitation of the risks and threats is not that clear within the security strategy of the Czech Republic.

The Czech Republic's security strategy defines its concepts of *risk* and *threat*:

- *threat* = any phenomenon potentially harmful to the Czech Republic's interests (takes into account only the threats arising from deliberate actions that can harm the Czech Republic's interests and values).

- *risk* = a certain likelihood of an event that is deemed undesirable for security reasons (risks have different degrees of risk, based on the risk analysis which takes into account the country's readiness to face the threat).

Clear definitions of these concepts do not appear in the case of Hungary and Slovak Republic. Neither Romania does define the concept of threat, although it makes an enumeration of the threats

(and in the beginning of the strategy it defines the national security).

Only the Czech Republic explicitly speaks in its strategy (at the section about the security policy) about improving the military capacity and the demarches of building a modern army, while Hungary and Slovakia make references to the Military Strategies, and Romania does not directly approach the subject, by mentioning it indirectly in only two places: engagement in anti-terror campaign with military participation and achievement of the security objectives by measures of (including) military nature.

As a last difference, which distinguishes Romania in comparison with the other three analyzed countries, we remind here the content structure totally different of its national security document. Besides the common elements presented in the case of the other countries (values and interests, security environment, threats and risks), the document contains also parts which do not exist in the other strategies.

Even if they cannot be named as differences, we still wish to emphasize here some aspects which we would rather call *particularities*, namely the references to the issue of the own citizens living in other countries and the ways of managing the situation. We identified more dominantly these particularities in the case of Hungary and Slovakia.

Thus, there are at least two references to the Hungarians living in neighbouring countries. One of them is made within the context of the illegal migration (as global threat), where it is shown that the particular emphasis in the migration policy relates to the sizeable Hungarian minorities living in the neighbouring countries. Hungary supports the concept according to which “*Hungarians living in neighbouring countries must enjoy forms of self-government and autonomy that best fit their particular situation and the rights deriving from them (...) as a community and remaining in their native lands*”. A hidden issue, speaking about their intentions of preserving the nation-state, even if the idea is not anymore actual. Some 3 million Hungarians live in neighbouring countries: 2 million in Transylvania, 600,000 in Slovakia, 350-400,000 in Vojvodina, Serbia, and 160-200,000 in Ukraine¹⁵. Hungary has even issued an Act on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries (Act LXII of 2001)¹⁶.

The second identified particularity refers to the attitude towards NATO (the pro-Atlanticist attitude).

Hungary refers even from the first line of its strategy to the process of Euro-Atlantic integration, fact that, from our point of view, gives to it a major importance in the strategic vision and can be interpreted as a pro statement for the integration within the Atlantic structures¹⁷.

In Romania's Security Strategy there is an entire chapter (chapter IV) dedicated to the issue of new Euro-Atlantic identity, considered an essential requirement for the country's security. For Romania, NATO also represents the pillar of security, the document clearly expressing the Romanian state decision to support the Alliance, to take an active part in the decision-making process and to fulfil its obligations.

For Slovak Republic, the European Union is on second place after NATO within the context of ensuring and developing the security environment and in providing long-term stability. The Czech Republic explicitly states that NATO is the pillar of collective defence.

It is worth mentioning another particularity - the existence of *strategic opportunities* in the case of Romania: the collapse of communism as a political system and the establishment of democracy, the enlargement of NATO and the European Union, opening the borders, intensifying the flows of persons, goods, services, and capital, the technological development – opportunities to which Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic do not refer in their strategies as factors of prosperity and integration in the Euro-Atlantic region.

A last particularity which we wish to point out is related to the affiliation of three out of four analyzed countries – Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic - to the Visegrad Group: in presenting the objectives and tasks, Hungary shows that it has to play an active role within the regional cooperation forums and initiatives, by mentioning the Visegrad Cooperation, Central European Initiative, the Quadrilateral. Explicit references to Visegrad Group appear in the strategies of the other two countries.

The activities of the Visegrad Group (composed by Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) envisage strengthening the stability in the region of Central Europe. The countries of the group perceive the cooperation among them

as a challenge and its success as the best proof of their abilities in integrating themselves in different structures, like UE, etc.¹⁸ In 1991, when the Group formed, Romania has missed the joining, due to the event from 1990 (the mineriads and the inter-ethnic conflict from Târgu Mureş). Subsequently, its image was repaired, although the joining promised for 2007 and 2008 was not accomplished. In June 2008, at the meeting of the Regional Development and Local Administration Ministers of the states members of the Visegrad Group and of Bulgaria and Romania, meeting which was held in Prague, the participating countries engaged to elaborate a common document on territorial development of the Visegrad Group member states which to include Romania and Bulgaria and which could be extended in the future to the neighbour countries of these states.

3. The correlation with the European Security Strategy

There is a strong correlation of the threats. In fact, the threats identifiable in the European strategy document are to be found identically within the other analyzed strategies, even if they have different degrees of importance.

The correlation regarding the way of responding to threats in the case of Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic it is also remarkable. We may say that these three analyzed states have answers which are coherent with the European strategy. However, it is noticeable to see the nuances regarding the conflicts in the immediate vicinity (the Balkans, Afghanistan, etc.). There are also some obvious nuances in approaching the threats (considered as such within NATO) to which the three analysed states respond in a different slightly way in comparison with the EU manner of answering (see the case of Iran, North Korea, etc.).

Last but not least, the coherence is expressed at the level of the approaches in relation to the new world order (which in the case of Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic is based on efficient multilateralism).

Having strategic objectives synergic with those ones of the EU, the four analyzed states are involved (weakly or strongly) in designing some international policies starting from the fundamental concept of global order based on a strong international society, with functional

international institutions and with states in which the law is governing¹⁹. To be noticed here the sustained dynamism of the Hungarian foreign policy in the sphere of relations inside EU, but especially when it is about the relations with USA, EU and Canada.

We may conclude that the strategies of Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic are profoundly coherent with the EU one, the nuances existing only to those components which do not contradict the basic ideas of EU security.

Yet, Romania's National Security Strategy seems to be a controversial document through the opinions already expressed by experts or groups of analysis, some of them sustaining the value of the strategy²⁰ and its coherence with the European Security Strategy²¹, others rendering obvious elements of closeness rather to the USA security strategy than to the European strategy and having a conception which requires at least to be adjusted if not even to be re-written.²² We consider that in the text of the National Security Strategy of Romania these tendencies of closeness to USA are indirect and appear only in subsidiary.

However, a direct analysis, on the text, like the one we performed, without searching for hidden or indirect interpretations, makes obvious elements which do not counterpoint Romania's National Security Strategy (RNSS) to the European security context of the European Security Strategy (ESS). Both agree upon the following aspects:

- no state can approach the security issue into an individual manner;
- the terrorism, the weapons of mass destruction, the regional conflicts, the failed states and the organized crime constitute key threats;
- none of the threats is purely military; a combination of instruments and solving ways represents the best solution;
- the regional security and stability are thought to be complementary, in the context of a new paradigm, the policies of good policy of good neighbourliness playing a primordial role in providing them.

4. Conclusions

The four states analysed in the present study have security strategy with common and also divergent elements. The common denominator conferring them the characteristic of a distinct

group is given by their vision upon the preferred international order.

This common vision upon the international order may be described as it follows:

- the international legislation must reflect the changes in the character of the threats to security, to be adapted to the new changes;

- the role of the UN Security Council is seen as important but not as primordial or major (Hungary: “the UN Security Council will continue to bear primary, but not exclusive responsibility..”, Slovakia and Romania do not mention the UN Security Council, and the Czech Republic sees it as an organism “whose mandate should be reached in case of coercive actions”);

- NATO is considered the most important security guarantor in all the four strategies.

Although we have seen there are also differences in the four strategies, one cannot say these are radical, they being in a way linked to the hierarchy of the elements contained in the document and to their stating form.

In conclusion, by taking into account both the common points and also those in which the four strategies are divergent, we may appreciate that basically the four documents reflect the same general vision on the concept of security, with “soft” and “hard” accents, depending on the regional context elements.

NOTES:

¹ The National Security Strategy of Romania, 2007, (MERLN (the Military Education Research Library Network), <http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers.html>, contains 39 pages in A4 format, larger from this point of view than the American Security Strategy (33 A4 pages), the European Security Strategy (15 A4 pages) or the Russian Security Concept (18 A4 pages), according to the report of political analysis on the National Security Strategy of Romania prepared by the “Ovidiu Șincai” Institute, Bucharest, in March 2006.

² *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary 2004*, MERLN (the Military Education Research Library Network), <http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers.html>

³ By mentioning “*the regime change*”, the document refers to the collapse of the communism.

⁴ *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy - 2003*, MERLN (the Military Education Research Library Network), <http://www.mzv.cz/wwwo/mzv/default.asp?id=24118&ido=7567&idj=2>, adopted in 2003.

⁵ *Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic 2001*, MERLN (the Military Education Research Library Network), <http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers.html>

⁶ We shall come back on the significance of this issue in the part of comparative analysis.

⁷ *Security Strategy of the Czech Republic*, <http://www.mzv.cz/wwwo/mzv/default.asp?id=24118&ido=7567&idj=2>.

⁸ As the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic shows in the introduction made on the occasion of presenting the security strategy.

⁹ The first report on the situation of the Czech Republic’s security appears in 1994.

¹⁰ Law no. 51/1991 regarding the National Security of Romania; Law no. 45/1994 regarding national defence.

¹¹ On 1st of March 2004 the NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, transmits the official letter containing the invitation for Romania to join NATO, and on 29th of March Romania becomes a NATO member.

¹² A clear differentiation between threats and challenges was not always possible, because even in the analysed documents often both terms were used for the same context.

¹³ For example, the strategy of the Czech Republic, at the chapter security policy, speaks about “an approach based on the unquestionable value of collective defence and cooperative security provided by international organizations and multilateral arrangements”.

¹⁴ *Strategia de securitate a României* (2007), p. 11.

¹⁵ Hans BINNENDIJK, Jeffrey SIMON, *Hungary’s ‘Near Abroad’*, Minorities Policy and Bilateral Treaties, November 1996.

¹⁶ The document may be found at the Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad, <http://www.hhrf.org/htm/en/?menuid=03>.

¹⁷ The idea that the United States is the leading nation of the global fight against terrorism and of the North Atlantic Alliance.

¹⁸ The Visegrad Group, <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=858>.

¹⁹ Romania shows, for example, in its security



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strategy, at p. 11: “*International security tends, more and more to show its indivisible character and the international community is ever more aware of the responsibilities incumbent upon it*”.

²⁰ Constantin Degeratu, State Counsellor at the Romanian Presidency and member of the team which worked in conceiving the Strategy, has stated during an interview titled “Security Strategy. Way of use” delivered on 11th of August 2006 to “Revista 22”: “I do not believe it is about a bulky document, but about an elaborated, comprehensive one, maybe a bit didacticist, but – for sure – rigorous and coherent, under the aspect of both options and the terminology”.

²¹ Ibidem, p. 20, “The Security Strategy of the European Union (December 2003) was one of our

main sources of external inspiration”.

²² Institutul „Ovidiu Șincai”, Raport de analiză politică „*Analiza Strategiei de Securitate Națională a României*”, Bucharest, March, 9th: “...from a comparative perspective, the security strategy proposed by the Presidential Administration is strongly influenced by the American strategy, from which it took over the theme of anti-terrorist fight and the way of approaching it, and also (probably via European channel) the speculation of substituting the democracy by the concept of “good governance”. The loans from the EU strategy are superficial and do not affect the document’s substance (The lack of correlation between RNSS and the EU conception would create problems to Romania within the process of its European integration)”.

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APPROACHES OF THE SECURITY-IDENTITY MUTUAL RELATION

Mirela ATANASIU

Security and identity constitutes intrinsic rights acquired in time by individuals and, implicitly, by communities of individuals with common representations. The security right and identity right are comprised in all the international documents and legislation and emanate from culture and civilization. The „nation” and „citizenship” concepts are evolving continuously extending human rights horizontally and vertically and getting bigger driving force but only by the power emanated from state as international law subject with legitimate juridical statute. Therefore, identities can be individual or groups of individuals socially organized under the umbrella of ethnical identity, religious identity, sexual identity, political identity, social identity etc.

Keywords: security, identity, nation, identity right, security right, identity security, societal security.

1. Connotations of identity concept and its relations with security

The identity notion comes from Latin with the forms of *identitas(-atis)*, and French - *identité*, regarding to the fact of being likewise with himself, as assembling and perfect similitude. The term, at individual level bears a set of data needed to identify a person. „Identity” is a multidisciplinary concept with connotations in different areas: principle of identity specific to logics; in Mathematics, constitutes an equity relation with variable elements, true for every value of these elements. The antonym of identity in Romanian is considered the term of diversity¹. So, in conclusion: identity is realized by the identification of the elements giving oneness to that entity and diversity is accomplished by the discovery of all the elements determining those entities-identities to differ some of others.

In the social sciences, identity has a more complex representation. So, in psychology, we have the individual representation over him as a mentally self-imagined pattern, self-esteem or individualization, specialists using as basic notion personal identity - meaning the elements establishing its oneness. In sociology, identity is understood as negotiation between individual and the society in regard with its role and representation, so-called social identity.

There is also more evolved concept concerning the identity as: national identity, political identity, social identity, economic identity etc. Identity has a causality relation with security. To assure the individual, national or international security is also accomplished by the preservation of individual, national or international identity types. Another mutual relation among the two concepts is the one from „whole” – security to „part” – identity if we regard to security as an framework to harmonise different identities into a peaceful communion and also from „whole” – identity to „part” – security when the membership to a certain identity (for example, the EU membership) offers to the nation-identity and also to the individual from those community a security framework.

Nation represents „a wide community, united by tides neither by obedience to the same sovereign, neither the membership to the same religion or social class”². To be part of a nation means to share the same *national identity*. The idea „nothing is more international than the national identity formation”³ is perfectly available and strengthened by specialists⁴ considering the result of the collective creation of national identities doesn’t represent a unique matrix once it was done by imitation⁵. Still, every nation has a unique matrix as regards its way of junction and content for its specific elements: historical background; culture; common: language, habits, folklore; perception; official signs, etc. Barry Buzan said *societal security*

regards the sustainability, in acceptable evolving conditions, traditional patterns of language, culture and religion and also habits and national identity. Samuel Huntington goes further in his speech, stating that the national interests derives from the national identity, his motivation is the thing we should know who we are, to establish our interests, this seeming an realistic and plausible approach. You need to know who you are, your meanings, what you need to secure to be able to remain who you are and to improve what you already have eliminating major risks which can damage your existence as person or nation.

The relation between security and identity is accomplished by subject at least on three levels: individual, group of individuals with common identity, can overpass states' national borders (nation, religion, age, sex etc.) or national level, where the membership to the same state gave us an identity determining us to be called Romanian or otherwise.

In regard with person's identity elements, they can be shared by different criteria:

a) Importance: core elements (place of birth and birthday, biometric characteristics, nation, religion, sex, etc.) or peripheral (residence, relatives etc.).

b) Duration: permanent (place of birth and birthday, biometric characteristics, fingerprints etc.) and conjectural (age).

c) Elements of identifying subjects: biological (fingerprints, retina); psychological (type of reasoning, conception); sociological (behaviour, personality); cultural (foreign languages acknowledged, general knowledge); educational, economic (living resources), etc.

2. The right to security – the right to identity

The right to security and the right to identity are intrinsic rights established to the higher legislative level, presently, in the Universal Declaration of Human⁶, prescriptions prevailing to all the subsidiary communitarian and national legislations. In the public and private international law, to respect identity means undiscriminating, equality of treatment for different nations (or representatives of them) in similar situations, this being also a basic principle of the European community, the indiscrimination principle for nationality, this being the basic foundation of the communitarian juridical order.

The legislative indiscrimination field framework in Romania prescribes equality for all the citizens no matter their race; nationality, ethnical origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political affiliation, wealth or social origin⁷, and also the penalization of the discrimination acts⁸. In regard with Article 6, line (1) from Constitution „The state recognizes and guarantees to the persons, part of the national minorities, the right to keep, develop and express their ethnical, cultural, language and religious identity”. Also, the state supports the strengthening of the links with Romanian Diasporas abroad our country and acts in keeping, developing and expressing their ethnical, cultural, linguistic and religious identity with the respect of the states' law where they have citizenship.

*The citizen isn't a concrete person*⁹, he is a subject of law and this statute he disposes of civil and political rights. He benefits by individual liberties, the freedom of conscience and expression, liberty of movement, to marry, assumption of innocence, if he is detained by police, to have a solicitor to defend him, to be treated by justice in regard with the equality principle for all against the law. All these elements contribute to his right to security and identity conditioned by the obligations stipulated in the social contract where the citizen is part in: to respect laws, to pay taxes after the revenue obtained and to defend if is needed the society he is part in. The citizen is also the holder of a part from the political sovereignty.

One identity's legitimacy consists in legacy preservation. The national identity is a protective instance, considered superior to solidarity, a result from other identities: generation, sex, religion or social statute because nation expresses a collective interest and perennial in time under to evolution action of the social and economic reports.

In Europe, „nation” term is used with many meanings. So, nation is seen as a community of citizens, individual related to a state by a juridical link and others considers nation as an ethnical and cultural collective created through the organic evolution of some common traditions of language, religion and spiritual creation resulting a specific type of living the present and of establishing the future agenda. Nowadays, this is the source for identity problems: the difference how the pure-nationally state percept, where the state comprises the nation itself and by nationality is understood citizenship and, for the others, „national state”

represents the result of international auto-determination of one people, „the ethnical nation”. Nation can exist without state but can’t accomplish its destiny if the state doesn’t exist. “Nationality” means „ethnical group” and could differ by “citizenship”.

3. Identity security – compound of societal security

The identity heterogeneity issue is sold but identity affirmation can’t be interpreted as a refusal to coexistence but rather a reflection of the social and cultural distances¹⁰.

Consequently, the way differences are organized doesn’t necessarily suppose the practices homogenising into a collective form but also an agreement as accomplishment of an acceptable life framework for all the peoples involved where everybody feels no major threats. A way to council is to constitute specific territories some social or ethnical groups to dispose of in co-habitation situation (ex., wealthy districts – poor districts).

This can be a practical example to assure „security by diversity”, where the proximate territoriality of identity „cantons” (usually, ethnical and religious diversity) plays a role of linkage in the neighbours inter-relation which under the diversity pedagogy is made by education (information, understanding and tolerance). While, by some relations accomplishment, in first, may be just economic relations with the other identity groups is created the basis for the next level, identity mixture leading to the further changes to those identities.

The demarche will be easier if the mitigation in this territory is done by some unknown immigrants rather than the situation of the regions/states where there exist an historical conflict between the identity populations (See the map of the nowadays conflicts in the world)¹¹. These are under the incidence of the cyclic pattern of the crises coming of latent and unsolved conflicts perpetuated because of bad management of existing crises situations or those crises secondary effects of decisions taken for crises resolution. Option is given by the demarches goals, the one to discuss exclusively the predictable conflicts we can intervene over and not the happen, unpredicted ones needed anyway to be managed.

The identity conflicts are the most acute from the conflicts because of the profound symbolical charge coming from the simple existence to strictly elements hierarchical. On this scale, the strongest conflicts are registered in the low part of it, where is discussed actor’s existence, its identity, the legitimacy of its existence or the motivation to claim a disputable thing and prestige, status characteristics, hierarchically type, established *erga omnes* generating with the interests the capacity to mobilise the extern support for the position in conflict¹². Peculiar cases are: interethnic, inter-religious and inter-cultural conflicts.

There are two different types of identity conflicts: *extern*, when two actors dispute one’s identity recognition or potentate and try to change something in the other’s identity changing the identity’s indicators and, *intern* when the community components claim different identities.

To assure identity security into a common social environment must be followed the axiom: power – authority – status. So, in the conflict and disputable elements space among two or more actors, the first step is represented by single power replacement with an authority compounded by representatives of all the identity groups creating the legitimacy and mediation identity framework. The identity conflicts have as motives: *property*, the one referring to resources, where dispute is pure relational and consumes over one element supposing exclusive property and the solution is to share that thing between parties; *authority*, when the both parties try to maximize its own authority and try to minimize the adversary one over one community; *status*, referring to recognition by the other of a status, position into an hierarchy, certain importance associated to a certain status.

Conclusions


A correct approach of the mutual relation between security and identity starts from the causality relation which identity has with security that makes the preservation of different types of identities to contribute decisively to assure security.

Derived of the national identity as the specialists appreciate, the national interests are closely related with security: to know what you need to secure starts from knowing what identity you have and what you want to keep or to improve, relieving

from the risks your individual or national existence is put to.

In this globalised world, full of major risks and

threats, keeping the identity is essential because its affirmation and safeguardation have fundamental role for security.



Source: http://www.didyouknow.org/romania/story/conflicts_ro.html

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5 As soon a national group discovered a new issue to express its national identity, the others approached the same symbolic elements (as were: arm, flag, national sport etc.) but expressed differently.

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RECRUDESCENCE OF TERRORIST PHENOMENON NOWADAYS - THE PROLIFERATION OF ECONOMIC TERRORISM

Ilie PENTILESCU

In the 21st century many of the phenomena that affect international security have changed radically. Factors such as economic globalization, transparency of borders, information technology have contributed to this process.

The phenomenon of terrorism has also adapted at the international environment changes, after 2001 knowing an unprecedented diversification of the ways of manifestation. Evolution of the terrorist phenomenon at the beginning of this millennium, among other things, was due to strategy review and tactics of the main terrorist groups, and to division and specialization emphasis, orientation of the activities on the objectives of infrastructure, proliferation of acts of suicide terrorism and to logistical diversification of the sources. International terrorism is one of the main threats to human society and the state of national security of nations, continuing to represent a very serious danger, both for structure and social cohesion and also for the security of humans and states.¹

This scourge has become so present in contemporary society, that practically there is no day in which the media does not present a terrorist act. The phenomenon has become such a spread that included the whole world, targeting both rich and poor countries, modern democracies and countries in the Third World. By his unpredictability, contempt of the modern rules of civilized life and of any reason, the assailant, who is hiding under a thousand faces, is a particularly dangerous foe. Although the whole society is marked by the cruelty of the terrorist acts and their consequences, the phenomenon is in continuous progression, his proliferation emphasizing even in the condition of the anti terrorism – war triggering.

Keywords: terrorism, economic terrorism, financing the terrorism.

The world after the cold war and economic globalization has undergone a profound change in international relations of forces, change that reflected on the nature of universal institutions such as the United Nations, that knowing (and recognizing) a real proliferation of new state entities that assume sovereignty and declare adherence to international public law.

Moreover, in some of these new countries conflicts broke out, regions are occupied by armed movements and human rights are often trampled.

These territories or parts of territories, few or no controlled, are shelters for the leaders of main terrorist groups, which tend to install their bases where the rule of law and freedoms of citizens no longer exists.

Recourse to classic war left to see a certain inefficiency of fight against diffuse, multiform threat, with dispersed structures, handling organizations and informal groups which are prepared to use political violence and to adhere to antidemocratic and integrative political ideologies.

Also, the lack of a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian conflict and of other situations of armed conflict worldwide is a favourable politically aspect of the extremist ideas and of the terrorism acts at international level, but it should be noted that the large majority of terrorist actions are committed in the context of internal conflicts².

The primary objective of terrorism, which is the most dangerous phenomenon of transnational organized crime, is to intimidate the population or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to refrain from making any action.

Generally, terrorism is an action of an organized group of ethnic or religious grounds in what it does and rarely consists in the desperate action of isolated individuals.

Taking profits is generally the target of other types of organized crime. While the difference between the final goals of each of these activities can reach a certain limit, terrorist organizations need financial support to achieve goals. A successful terrorist group, like a criminal organization should be able to build and maintain an effective financial infrastructure.

Generally, the financing of terrorism has two main sources³:

- the first source is the financial support granted by countries or organizations with a sufficiently large infrastructure to collect and make available funds to a terrorist organization. So-called state sponsors of terrorism have come in decline in recent years and have been gradually replaced by other means of support. A person with enough financial resources can also provide substantial funds for terrorist groups, Osama bin Laden, for example, ownership of factories, contributed with significant amounts of wealth to the establishment and support of terrorist network Al - Qaeda;

- the second major source of funds for terrorist organizations is the indirect gain from activities that generate income.

As with criminal organizations, the income of terrorist groups can be obtained from the crime or other illegal activities.

After the terrorist attacks in New York, it has established the need to combine efforts and experience in the war against terrorist financing. It enables more accurate observation of mosaic created by the financing of terrorism and the movement of suspected terrorist funds. Terrorist groups differ from other criminal organizations in terms of motivation and purpose. In fact, unlike the organized crime groups that aim, firstly, to obtain income and much discretion, usually terrorist groups “do not have financial goals”, but imposing by a range of advertising their ideology using violence, threat and intimidation.

Financing of terrorism is different from classic money laundering. In the case of money laundering, illicit activity revenues are washed or layered in ways that make them appear legal, and the ultimate goal is usually to gain greater quantities of money. To finance terrorism, the source of funds or finance is often the “legitimate” and the ultimate goal is not necessarily the attraction of more funds.

Calls to the community to request and collect funds for different declarative but false purposes

are very effective methods for raising funds that support terrorism. Often such fundraising is carried out on behalf of organizations with charitable status that can address the community, particularly through raising patriotic, human, national, historical etc feeling. Community members are convinced that they give money for a good cause. In most cases, charity is apparently legal for the community that deliver those funds.

From a technical perspective, the methods used by terrorists and their associations to collect funds from illegal sources differ slightly from those used by traditional criminal organizations. Although it might seem logical that the funds from legal sources do not require laundering, there is still a need for terrorist groups to hide or disguise the links between the group and sources of legitimate funds. Thus, terrorist groups must similarly find ways to launder these funds in order to be used later without attracting the attention of authorities. From the examination of financial activity relating to terrorism, it appears that the terrorists and their support organizations use in general the same methods as criminal groups for laundering funds. Some detected methods to be more intensively used by terrorist groups concerns: cash smuggling (both by courier and cash cargo), structured deposits or withdrawals from bank accounts, purchase of various types of monetary instruments (travel checks, bank checks, payment orders), usage of debit or credit cards or transfers through swift.

The difference between legal and illegal income raises an important legal issue in terms of applying the same measures against money laundering for terrorism finance. Generally, money laundering was defined as a process in which funds derived or generated by criminal activity are disguised or transferred to conceal the link between the crime committed and the funds obtained. On the other hand, the ultimate aim of terrorism, as mentioned above, is not to obtain profits from fund-raising.

When terrorists or terrorist organizations obtain financial support from legal sources (donations, sales of publications etc.), detection and tracking of these funds is more difficult.

Other important issues related to terrorism financing that make detection more difficult relate to the size and nature of the transaction involved. The necessary financing to trigger terrorist attacks is not made with large sums of money and associated transactions are not usually complex. For example,

an examination of the financial connections of the air attacks of September 11 led to the fact that most individual transactions were small sums of money below the reporting of cash transactions and operations concerned only transfers through swift. Individuals who have emerged as beneficiaries were foreign students who receive money from their parents or in the form of scholarships, grants for studies, so that the transactions were not identified as requiring a further examination of the financial institutions involved.

However, there are similarities in how organized crime and international terrorist organizations are transferring money or how they are trying to hide the origin of funds. International terrorist groups need money to attract, support and retain the people around the world who adhere to these groups, such as to ensure the loyalty of other groups that have common goals. Thus, there is a need to create schemes to attract, collect and distribute money for operational forces prepared for terrorist attacks. In this way it appears the necessity of money movement, which makes terrorist funds vulnerable to detection and financial investigation.

In order to have an overview of the main sources of funding and over the means used in the capital movements that terrorist organizations use to support its networks, we may emphasize that persons being investigated for committing terrorist activities carried out operations of money transfer through alternative systems spread worldwide. Often the funds were transferred abroad through those alternative money transfer networks (SAT), being collected by foreigners of various nationalities, residing in several countries involved in the fight against terrorism. In other cases, individuals have made cash payments in various countries, involving large sums of money which were directed to the same account. Collected funds were transferred then to the U.S. or Asia.

The most common method used in particular by Al-Qaeda organization to support terrorist cells is the "information system for movement of money", so called "Hawala". Hawala is a traditional method used in southern Asia for several hundred years, now used in almost all the Middle East. The system is based on trust and assurance of anonymity because all the transfer is not done on paper or in financial instruments. Users of such a system transmit money abroad, over borders, without the physical transfer, the main feature of the system being the

compensation, persons involved are assured and convinced that in their account or in a specified account will be a cash deposit or valuables, which can then be returned through a future reversible transaction. The person who ultimately receives the money uses a password to demonstrate that is entitled to receive them, so there is no written record of this operation.

From data collected during 2000 - 2007 by the debts collection agency Urban and Associates Romania, they came to very dissuasive conclusions⁴. There were also added to the data various reports and conclusions presented by the Romanian Information Service, SIE, DIICOT, data from the Registry of Trade, Ministry of Justice and Public Ministry.

Since 1990 when in Romania it came the first post-communist firms law, one of the main obsession of the business men in Romania was linked by the deception taken from businesses registered and controlled by Iraqis, Iranians, Turks, Lebanese and Syrians. And they had reasons to be obsessed because only between 1995-2006, over 4000 companies were recorded in Romania that had members/ shareholders and directors citizens of Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Turkey or Syria.

Of these over 88% does not exist at this time, being dissolved or being in bankruptcy and what is worse is that in over 96% of cases, the creditors have not received the debts that had to be collected.

In about 27% of the cases investigated by Urban and Associates Romania, firms entered into the payment incidents in less than 12 months from their establishment, accruing money with exceeded maturing.

However, it is absolutely amazing that in the proportion of 100% firms mentioned above were involved in lawsuits or in criminal investigations and against 22% of shareholders/ directors and their associates have been convictions for economic crimes.

However, among all those convicted finally, only 9% are in prisons in Romania, over 91% being convicted by default, being internationally pursued and criminal judgments having never been implemented.

According to officials of the Romanian Ministry of Justice it is very difficult to be identified, for example, a Syrian convicted in Romania because the response of the Syrian authorities is always the same: "We seek and when he will be identified,

will certainly be imprisoned.” The results so far: almost zero!

Media is much smaller if we report to EU citizens who are registered as shareholders or directors, being located at a maximum 3% of their total.

Also, the estimated damage calculated as the product of companies with shareholders Iraqis, Iranians, Lebanese, Syrians and Turkish is only in 2000-2006 over 250 million Euros. What is the worst is that after non-collection of claims from companies in question, in turn, other 12300 companies in Romania have had serious financial problems between 1995-2005, were involved in processes with their creditors, some of them reached bankruptcy and about 25000 Romanians lost their jobs. There have been recorded cases of extreme personal drama, people who had bank loans for which guaranteed with personal goods and even homes and they have been on the roads because they were enforced by the banks that have not received the money, money which in turn the banks never received from the bankrupts.

The common method of fraud was committed by emitting instruments without coverage (order tickets/ cheques), voluntary dissolution of the company or bankruptcy of companies that had no assets; it follows money laundering, failure to pay taxes to the Romanian state, tax evasion, money transfer from Romanian accounts to abroad or liquidation by raising the cash from accounts in Romania.

Considering the negative effects of terrorism over developed countries, Romania can be especially vulnerable to this type of threat, given that developing economies are more susceptible to terrorist attacks, due to greater dependence of foreign trade, foreign investments, combined with a lower diversification of production, vulnerable capital market and also with pre-existing internal problems.

Economic development in recent years and especially Romanian joining to the European Union and NATO could lead to increased flows of foreign investment (by lowering the state risk and the change of the perception of foreign investors about Romania, which will not be seen as “a Balkan country”- with all the issues involved, but as a “European country”). However, joining NATO could have negative effects on investments in general and especially the foreign ones, in case

of terrorist attacks directed against Romania. The increase of the terrorist attacks risk could increase the risk premium, which would need to attract the necessity of increasing the investments efficiency and orientation towards short-term investments. Also, increased insurance costs and costs to protect property can lead, medium and long term, to the decrease of the profit margins and diversion of the investments towards other areas more secure. An example of the negative effect of intensifying the terrorist actions on annual average flows of foreign net investments have registered a decrease of 13.5%, in Greece they have decreasing by 11.9%.⁵

Another possible negative result of terrorist attacks is the effect that they would have on the national currency (in the absence of prompt and vigorous actions by the National Bank), in the meaning of depreciation due to currency investors targeting safer.

Potential terrorist attacks would have a negative influence on external trade. A study in this regard in over 200 countries during 1960-1993 found that doubling the number of terrorist incidents decreased bilateral trade between the covered countries by about 4%. The threat of terrorism is not limited only to bomb attacks, internationally lately appearing increasing concerns regarding the so-called agro-terrorism, which would damage the agriculture of a country, through contamination of crops or animals. The consequences of such an attack would have economic effects both direct and indirect. Direct costs may result in loss of production, the destruction of crops or animals affected, measures to combat the spread of the epidemic, export embargoes imposed by other countries, declining domestic sales due to consumer fears, the costs of providing government compensation for affected producers etc. Indirect costs of a terrorist attack on agriculture would result from propagation of negative effects in relation to agriculture (the providers of products and services for agriculture, transport, etc) and the need to strengthen security measures to prevent illness. Although until now there has not been such a type of attack, and the likelihood that Romania to suffer such attacks is relatively low, the risks should not be ignored, bearing in mind the large losses suffered by the economies of other countries.

A potential threat to the national economy is the possibility of increased interest of terrorist

groups to form networks in the country, both by organizing attacks and to obtain funds. The financing of terrorist networks can be achieved by various means, many of which are identified also in Romania, especially in connection with some Kurdish organizations, with the grouping of Hezbollah, but also with other organizations. Among these methods of obtaining financial resources include⁶:

- working with networks of organized crime (smuggling cigarettes, drugs, weapons, explosives, person trafficking, illegal immigration etc); in this connection the experts consider that drug trafficking is one of the main sources of terrorist financing;
- tax evasion and involvement in various degrees in the underground economy, which unfortunately still has a fairly high share in gross domestic product of Romania (between 22-24%);
- legal business, whose profit is not reinvested in productive purposes, but serves the financing of terrorist groups from abroad.

Considering the developments in international security environment, there are few countries that can be considered secure from terrorist attacks, even countries that are not directly targeted by such attacks may also be affected, indirectly, through capital markets, transport and international trade etc. In this respect Romania is quite vulnerable, given the recent liberalization of the capital and the still fragile economy, which makes it even more necessary to take measures to prevent and combat such threats, but also to stimulate durable economic development, accompanied by the reduction of vulnerabilities of the economy before the adverse effects thereof.

Given the existence and severity of the terrorism phenomenon, links and trends in the context of globalization, threats identified to security of democratic states, efforts must be ongoing to halt and eradicate this scourge by blocking and confiscation of terrorist assets, ratification and implementation of the UN methods, tracking and reporting of suspicious financial transactions, providing information and assistance to the population, authorities, the establishment of skilled

entities in this field, facilitating communication between government services and intelligence services.

It is very likely that in the near future to assist a new challenge - the convergence between terrorism and organized crime, which should be implemented into a new dimension of "evil".

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GEOPOLITICS AND GLOBALISATION: THE NATION-STATE IN THE POSTMODERN WORLD

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The main energetic source for the population both at present, and in the future, is represented by fossil fuel, to an extent of 85%. The oil and gas pipelines have caused the first dispute in the energetic field, between the EU and Russia, at the beginning of 2006. Thus, the European Union starts to elaborate a unified energetic policy in order to reduce its dependency on Russian resources. There are numerous energetic projects from both sides, and Romania is involved in two of them.

Keywords: *Geopolitics, globalisation, international relations, energetic resources*

The concept of *globalisation* has replaced, lately, the *Cold War* one, and is, currently, the most used term in the attempt to justify the fluctuant (contradictory, even) manner in which international relations are carried out. An eloquent definition of the concept of *globalisation* has been given by Joseph Eugene Stiglitz, winner of the Nobel Prize for economy in 2001. He believes that "...globalisation – the elimination of barriers to free trade and the integration of national economies – can be a factor of welfare and has the potential to bring richness to everyone, especially the poor"¹. Stiglitz believes in the importance of *globalisation* and asserts that it "has determined many developing countries to reduce their feeling of isolation"².

The tormenting period between the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st is marked by a massive systemic change in the world economy and political order. This "great disruption"³ is comparable with the transition made during the 16th-17th centuries, from the feudal era to the modern one. Eric Hobsbawm noted that at the end of the 20th century, world economy was in temporary confusion, characterised by "a curious combination of end of 20th century technology,

19th century free trade and a rebirth of interstitial centres characteristic to world trade in the Middle Ages"⁴. The world is in the middle of what Phillip G. Cerney and other authors have named "*the third industrial revolution*", characterised by the intensive use of communication and information technology, flexible production systems and organisation structures in segmented markets and *globalisation*⁵. The world economy of bordered national economies is doubled and mixes with the cross-border one. To this effect, Richard Sennett highlighted the fact that although "*in previous generations, social politics was based on the belief that nations (...) could control their richness, now a steep opens between the state and the economy*"⁶. In short, one may assert that markets are increasingly global, while authorities are predominantly national⁷.

The massive scale and the complexity of technological change as well as the rise of interconnected electronic networks globally "cleave" more and more geographical boundaries and question the states' territorial sovereignty. A critical issue raised by *globalisation* is the lack of relevance of a jurisdiction anchored in the geography of states, in an era in which markets are increasingly built in the electronic space and in which we assist to a disconnection between geographical space and cyberspace. *Globalisation* causes not only unpredictable structural changes, but also interdependencies, *feed-back* relations and creates new game rules in international relations. The identification of a new international order able to multiply this according to the interests of different states and groups of states becomes absolutely necessary.

At first sight, although contemporary geopolitics is preoccupied more with the "political management of territory, according to its organisation,

rather than with the shifting of its boundaries, the main concern of Geopolitik, vision which disappeared once with the fall of the Third Reich⁸”, used along with “globalisation”, the word “geopolitics” seems an anachronism which reminds us of the imperialism from the end of the 19th century and the nightmare of the Nazi expansionism and seems unconnected to the turbulent and complex realities of our times. A series of authors, among which Brian Blouet, have considered that the two terms – globalisation and geopolitics – are totally contrarian: “Geopolitical policies try to stabilise national or imperial control over space and resources, communication ways, industrial capacities, and population within a territory”, while globalisation implies “the opening of national space for the free movement of goods, capitals and ideas. Globalisation removes obstacles from these movements and creates the conditions under which international trade of goods and services can develop”.⁹

This paper presents a point of view which rejects the opposition between geopolitics and globalisation and the assertions according to which, in an era of globalisation, geopolitics has become irrelevant. In the opinion of the authors, globalisation does not cancel the necessity of geopolitical analysis and, moreover, the political imperatives generated by geopolitical analysis do not contradict the principles and logic of globalisation. The complex relation between geopolitics (as a tool for the study of power connections on the basis of geographical determinism) and globalisation (as profound restructuring of economic relations at a planetary level) has been plastically outlined by Joseph Nye Jr.: “*forgetting the risk of military security in an era of economic and information growth is similar to forgetting the importance of oxygen for breathing.*”¹⁰

Geopolitics has some relatively simple definitions, doubled, however, by a series of complex and controversial connotations. Rudolf Kjellen provided the first classical definition of geopolitics: “*The science in charge with the study of the interference of political organisation with the territory and the study of the political environment of the people is called geopolitics. The relations between states are the relations between their ethnic, economic, cultural geographies, between societies and governments. Subject to the laws of nature, these relations respond to the laws of fight for survival and domination. The geopolitics of*

the state must be conveyed in the governing acts of the political elites.”¹¹ Geoffrey Parker defined geopolitics as “*the study of international relations from a spatial or geographical perspective.*”¹² Classical geopolitical approaches have focused on geographical factors, with Rudolf Kjellen¹³, Friedrich Ratzel¹⁴ and Halford Mackinder¹⁵, Nicholas Spykman¹⁶, Robert Strausz-Hupe¹⁷, Colin Gray¹⁸ as promoters of geographical determinism in world politics. All these classical geopoliticians have had a common theme: to warn the emergence of a new sole hegemonic leader. During the Second World War, and later on, during the Cold War, George Kennan and other architects of the containment doctrine have reflected if not “officially” admitted the points of view previously expressed by Mackinder and Spykman¹⁹, and after the end of the Cold War, several authors, such as Saul Cohen and Mackubin Owens have continued the efforts to define geopolitics in the contemporary era²⁰. Other contemporary authors, among whom Thomas L. Friedman, the most fluent and influential “advocate” of globalisation, uses the concept in connection with the realities of power politics, state confrontation for power, wealth and influence.²¹

Modern theories of international relations tend to present a vision of a polarised world, in which nations head either towards a series of „inter-civilisation clashes” (Samuel P. Huntington²²), or towards a uniform democratic world (Francis Fukuyama²³). On the other hand, theories of globalisation present either hyper-global or state-centred scenarios.

For the supporters of hyper-globalism, globalisation is defined as a new era of human history, in which “the traditional nation-states have become unnatural business units, even impossible in a global economy.”²⁴ The promoters of hyper-globalisation assert that economic globalisation brings the “denationalisation” of economies through the institution of cross-border production commerce and finance networks. Neoliberals have their own perception on globalisation, as they agree that it celebrates the emergence of a single global market and of the principle of global competition, as forerunners of human progress. On the other hand, the same neoliberals assert that world politics must be approached from a multidimensional perspective.²⁵ In such a “borderless” economy, national governments are reduced to a little more

than transmission belts for global capital, or, eventually, to simple intermediary institutions cramped between the increasingly powerful local, regional and global governance mechanisms²⁶.

In the contemporary world, as Susan Strange believes, *"impersonal forces of world markets (...) are now more powerful than the states who should have the supreme political authority over these companies and over economy (...) the falling authority of states is reflected in an increasingly pronounced diffusion of authority towards other institutions and associations and towards local and regional organs"*²⁷. Most hyper-global authors share the conviction that economic globalisation creates new forms of social organisation which replace or will replace eventually, traditional nation-states, as the main economic and political units of world society. Thus, from a hyper-global point of view, the growth of world economy, the emergence of global governance institutions, the global spread and hybridisation of cultures are perceived as evidence of a totally new world order, in which economic power and political power are effectively denationalised, all of these prefiguring the disappearance of the nation-state, which has become more and more, a "transitory manner of organisation for the management of economic problems"²⁸.

Stephen Flanagan and Ellen Frost define globalisation as "a long term process of change. The central characteristics of globalisation are the rapid growth of cross-border flows of goods, services, people, money, technology, ideas, cultures, crime and weapons."²⁹ Moreover, Frost believes that globalisation implies a transition towards "globality", towards a world system much more interconnected, within which independent networks and flows surmount traditional borders, or, at least, make them irrelevant. The surmounting of traditional borders implies a transformation of the concept of sovereignty. Frost reached the conclusion that globalisation has radically transformed the strategic context and has suggested a "strategy of globalisation infusion", a "modelling" and a "targeting" of globalisation, for the protection and promotion of United States' interests. Frost's vision on globalisation implies the fact that this has made geopolitics irrelevant, as Frost excludes geography from the "holistic" approaches in forming policies in the field of national security. However, Frost does not believe

that globalisation has produced a peaceful world, free of conflicts, although "external threats have become more and more cross-border"³⁰.

Other authors have reached a more nuanced conclusion, asserting that in the globalised world of the 21st century, states will come back to their traditional dynamics of power politics; however, these will be carried out by untraditional actors. Although this perspective is different from the one of the classical realist school, because it does not include the central geopolitical dimension, Thomas Owens Mackubin outlined the fact that contemporary realists incorporate, in a way or another, geopolitics in the doctrines they elaborate.³¹

The belief that globalisation has made interstate conflicts very improbable is anchored in three main arguments, each with its merits and limitations: 1) economic interdependence between the states of the world has led to the growth of the cost of war; 2) cultural and interpersonal interactions have diminished the wrong perceptions which have contributed to the emergence of conflicts in the past; 3) the spread of democracy and changes incurred in the governance type necessitated by the participation of states to the global system will produce open, honest and representative governments, less likely to fight among each other.

The argument according to which trade produces peace is not a new one. Montesquieu wrote in the 18th century that *"peace is the natural effect of trade"*, under the circumstances in which two nations who share trade relations become dependant. International trade has created the international "Great Republic", which united all traders and all trading nations, exceeding the boundaries, which in a more peaceful world, would definitely fall.³² Montesquieu's argument has been repeated by Norman Angell, who observed that the great western powers feel no longer the need for wars. *"How can modern life, with its overweight of industrial activities and its underweight of military activities maintain alive the instincts associated to war face to face with the instincts that develop in times of peace?"*³³ Angell argued that, given free trade and the different commercial relations which coerced the great European powers, it would be crazy for them to drag on wars which would destroy everyone, both winners and losers. Thomas L. Friedman reasserted this argumentation

and adapted it to the era of globalisation, launching the “golden arches theory of preventing conflicts” which stipulated that “when a country has reached that level of economic development with a large enough middle class to support a network of McDonald’s restaurants, it becomes a McDonald’s nation. And the inhabitants of McDonald’s nations hate being involved in wars; they prefer to wait in queue for hamburgers”³⁴.

The hopes of Montesquieu and Angell related to the fact that economic integration and interdependency, by increasing the costs of wars both for winners and losers, will end geopolitics have proved to be false. And this, because, as Thomas L. Friedman outlined, “Montesquieu and Angell have forgotten Thucydides. In the history of the Peloponnesian war, which he wrote, he asserts that nations are driven into a war by one of the following reasons: honour, fear and interest. Globalisation, which makes the costs of wars rise cannot and does not make those instincts become obsolete, at least not as long as the world is made up of people and not images. The fight for power, the pursuit of material and strategic interests and the permanent harassment around its own olive branch continues in a world of microchips, satellite telephones and Internet... Despite globalisation, people are still attached to their culture, their language and the place they call ‘home’. They will sing this home, they will cry thinking about that home, they will fight for their home and they will die for their home. Thus, globalisation does not end geopolitics. Allow me to repeat this for all those realists reading this book: Globalisation does not end geopolitics.”³⁵

The second argument, that the intensification of cultural and interpersonal interactions will reduce false perceptions and inter-civilisation misunderstandings, seems, at least at first sight, very convincing. However, there are no historical precedents to support this type of argumentation. Between Athens and Sparta there have been neither false perceptions, nor were there any when the First World War started, when the elites of the great European powers knew each other very well. It is not the size of flows that matters, but the way they are received.³⁶ Also, Samuel Huntington reached, before the debate over globalisation occupied the central role in contemporary intellectual disputes, the conclusion that in the future, intercultural and inter-civilisation

conflicts will dominate the international agenda. Presently, many authors who reject Huntington’s radical theory interpret intercultural conflicts as anti-globalisation movements, rather than as inter-civilisation wars. Besides, opposition towards globalisation is a cross-cultural and cross-national phenomenon. Scott Macdonald uses the concept of “neo-ludites”, outlining the fact that the anti-globalisation movement is in fact an anti-modernisation reaction and not necessarily an opposition and rejection of the western culture, in general, American in particular. However, regardless of the interpretation and name, those who oppose modernisation, from the religious fundamentalists to those ones who oppose global capitalism, passing by the extremists in the field of animal rights protection and ecologists, are the main non-space threat to world order³⁷.

The last argument from the series of discussions regarding globalisation refers to the impact that it will have on the spread of democracy.

*“Democracy is our most prized possession. Maintaining it is both our job and obligation. This implies a permanent decided and fully aware confrontation, attempts to compromise and reach long lasting consensus.”*³⁸

The third argument, and the last currently, emphasises not only the role that the spread of democracy will have, but also the changes in the governance type which result from this, and which becomes more and more a necessity of state participation to the global governance system, as the wanted and expected result is the transformation of national governments into open, honest and representative governments, less likely to fight with each other.

This aspect derives directly from political globalisation which has become increasingly visible in the spread of the constitutional arrangements, in the growth of the number of states which have adopted democracy as political regime and in the development of international rules and relations.

After 1989, once with the fall of communism and of the Soviet Union, democracy has spread across approximately 70% of the globe’s surface, having not only a qualitative growth but also undergoing a quality thoroughgoing process. While in some countries, democracy, and, implicitly, globalisation have been adopted without any problems, in “other societies, such as Iran, Afghanistan and Sudan, conservative groups have strongly resisted

*globalisation, often in violent manners.*³⁹

In the 21st century, there is a great probability that anti-modern movements, similar to the Taliban one in Afghanistan or the National Islamic Front in Sudan could take over power in several important states and thus, form a space threat, although geopolitical, to democracy. On the other hand, there is the possibility that these anti-modern movements remain shadowed and act in the Al-Qaeda manner, aiming to obtain strategic advantages in the so-called failed states. Thus, Robert Kaplan speaks of the emergence of a “two-tiered world”, where the world of the sophisticated richness will be rallied in a brutal conflict with the world of absolute poverty.

NOTES:

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² Joseph STIGLITZ, **op. cit.**, p. 31.

³ See Francis FUKUYAMA, **Marea ruptură. Natura umană și refacerea ordinii sociale**, Editura Humanitas, București, 2002.

⁴ Eric HOBBSBAWM, **Nations and Nationalism Since 1780**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p.174.

⁵ Phillip G. CERNEY, Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action, in *International Organization*, no. 49, Autumn 1995, p. 607.

⁶ Richard SENNETT, *Something in the city: the spectre of uselessness and the search for a place in the world*, in *Times Literary Supplement*, 22 September 1995, p.13, quoted in Zygmunt BAUMAN, **Globalizarea și efectele ei sociale**, Editura Antet, București, 1999, p. 61.

⁷ Susan STRANGE, **State și piețe**, Institutul European, Iași, 1997, p.116.

⁸ Pierre GALLOIS, **La Geopolitique: ses définitions, în Geopolitique: les voies de la puissance**, Plon / FEDN, Paris, 1990, p.25.

⁹ Brian BLOUET, **Globalization and Geopolitics**, Reaktion Books, London, 2001, p. 1.

¹⁰ Thomas L. FRIEDMAN, **Lexus și măslinul. Cum să înțelegem globalizarea**, Editura Fundației Pro, București, 2001, pp.481-482.

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¹⁷ Robert STRAUSS-HUPE, **Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power**, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1942.

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²⁰ Saul B. COHEN, *Geopolitics in the New World Era: A New Perspective on an Old Discipline*, in George J. DEMKO, William B. WOOD, (editors), **Reordering the World: Geopolitical Perspectives on the 21st Century**, 2nd edition, Westview Press, Boulder, 1999, pp.40-68 and Thomas Owens MACKUBIN, *In Defense of Classical Geopolitics*, *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 1999, pp.59-77.

²¹ Thomas L. FRIEDMAN, **The Lexus and the Olive Tree**, Anchor Books, New York, 2000, p.250.

²² The classical paper comprising this vision belongs to Samuel P. HUNTINGTON, **Ciocnirea civilizațiilor și refacerea ordinii mondiale**, Editura Antet, București, 1997.

²³ Such a vision belongs to Francis FUKUYAMA, in **Sfârșitul istoriei și ultimul om**, Editura Paideia, București, 1992.

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²⁷ Susan STRANGE, **The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.4.

²⁸ K. OHMAE, **op. cit.**, p.149.

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IN SEARCH OF MULTIPOLARITY. DIMENSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE RUSSIAN-CHINESE PARTNERSHIP AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM*

Emanuel COPILAŞ

The international era that begun after the Cold War's end is characterized mainly by threats on security, ethnic tensions and geopolitical instability. America, the undisputed winner of the ideological confrontation with the USSR, finds its supremacy contested, especially from the new rising powers of Eurasia. For a better representation of their own interests, China and the Russian Federation initiated in the late 1990s a "strategic partnership". Its major aim consists in counterbalancing the American pre-eminence over Eurasia, and especially over Central Asia. However, the contenders have their own major differences to settle, and this aspect influences in a great extent the nature and the functionality of their partnership. As the title announces, the present paper is trying to present a general view over the dimensions and perspectives the Russian-Chinese relations have at the beginning of the 21st century.

Keywords: strategic partnership, geo-economics, American hegemony, military cooperation, geopolitical incongruences.

Introduction

If China represents, for now, an actor with minor economic relevance for Russia, in comparison with the European Union – but one which experiences a gradual improvement on this level – from a geostrategic point of view, things are looking a bit different. The Chinese rise on the international stage was not treated with indifference by Moscow, which, especially after Vladimir Putin's political power was consolidated, made some serious efforts

to consolidate and extend the ties with Beijing. To fulfil this desideratum, the Kremlin's main tenets were articulated by arguments of economical, geopolitical and geostrategical nature. So, the economic development of China necessitated a higher consumption of hydrocarbons, and the most convenient energy supplier, if we take into account the geographic proximity, the enormous resources and the compatible objectives regarding foreign policy, could only be found in Moscow. After the outbreak of the 2003 Iraq conflagration, the geopolitical approach of the two Eurasian powers had its main resort the perception of a common threat from Washington, founded on the American intrusion in the Central-Asian space, and, as a consequence, on the need to counterbalance it. Furthermore, after the dismembering of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation initiated a massive export process in the field of military technology towards the Popular Republic of China, contributing as a result to the consolidation of the more and more imposing status which Beijing holds on the scene of world politics.

From the "constructive" to the "strategic partnership"

Even though they have shared, for almost a half of century, the same ideology, Beijing and Kremlin often manifested a dissonant foreign behaviour, in which mutual hostility played a key role. The tensions between the two parts slowly begun to take shape in the beginning of 1956, when Nikita Khrushchev initiated, at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, the process of destalinization; however,

* The research needed to elaborate this study was made possible by an AMPOS DRU grant offered by Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, for the whole duration of my PhD candidature.

analysts like Henry Kissinger place the origins of the Sino-soviet dispute even earlier, in the years of the Korean War (1950-53).¹

China was not spared by the revolutionary crises which eventually led to the disintegration of the East-European and Soviet Communism, but she managed to overcome them. Being aware of its economic backwardness in comparison to the West, and, after the Tiananmen moment of 1989, the imperative demand to prevent authority crises, the Beijing leaders started an extensive program of economical reforms, doubled after 1989 by some political reforms as well.² Somehow paradoxical, one can argue that the resurgence of the Russian-Chinese relations begun after Russia's de-communization, the previous ideological affinities being less important in the consolidation of the bilateral agreements between the two states. As everywhere, after the end of the Cold War, geopolitics took its revenge over ideology.

The unipolarity of the international system, resulted from the finalization of the ideological conflict which articulated world politics between 1947 and 1989(91), facilitated the approach between Kremlin and Beijing. The new global leader, USA, was considered to have a dangerous potential for the geopolitical interests of the two countries. A re-evaluation of the international situation was called for, and also of the place and role which China, respectively Russia held inside of it. The first meeting of the president Boris Eltin with his homologous Jiang Zeming took place in 1992, an opportunity to talk about and partially resolve the territorial disputes which constituted one of the main divergences between the two states,³ and also to decide the diminishing of the military forces along the common border.⁴ The reconciliation attempts were initiated since 1986, a year in which Gorbachev proved himself highly flexible regarding the Soviet-Chinese border dilemmas, also taking into account the long term melioration of the relations with Beijing.⁵ "During the second high level reunion which took place in September 1994, the two countries declared themselves to be tied by a 'constructive partnership', decided new reductions of the frontier forces, engaged themselves not to use nuclear weapons against one another and pronounced themselves in favour of a 'multipolar world system'."⁶ Over the next two years, the relations between the two states started to be characterized

by the syntagm "strategic partnership". This designated substantial geopolitical implications, residing in Beijing's support for Moscow both in the problem of the Chechen separatists and the limitation of NATO's Eastern extension; in exchange, Russia "sustained the Chinese positions regarding Taiwan and Tibet."⁷ In the same year (1996), Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan and Tajikistan signed the treaty which laid the foundations of the "Shanghai Five", organization cantered on military collaboration in Central Asia. Trough the 2001 cooptation of Uzbekistan, the "Shanghai Cooperation Organization" was born.⁸

Beijing and Moscow made common front against NATO in 1999 as well, when the turbulences from the ex-Serbian province Kosovo occupied a central place on the international problems agenda of that year. Their interests coincided regarding the denunciation of the independent tendencies manifested by the Albanians from Kosovo because, on their turn, Russia and China were and still are confronted with similar problems of their own, the first one in Chechnya, and the last one in Tibet, and mostly in Taiwan. Within the UN, the two Eurasian powers insisted that USA should comply with the article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which agrees upon peace restoring interventions only in the case of inter-state aggressions, and not in cases of conflict between a certain ethnic group and a state, like the Kosovo case. But, in spite of the Russian and Chinese opposition, the armed forces of the international organizations intervened to settle the overgrowing ethnic differences from the ex-Serbian province, "*set(ing) the precedent that the protection of human rights is more important than (the) respect for national sovereignty.*"⁹

Geopolitical congruencies

Following Vladimir Putin's conquest of power, the collaboration between the Russian Federation and China experiences an ascending line. Beside SCO, in 2001, the Chinese president Jian Zemin and his Russian homologous signed, at Moscow, the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness and Co-operation. The main reasons that made it possible are: the animosity manifested against the expanding American hegemony in Central Asia (although Moscow initially proved to have an ambivalent position regarding USA's war against terrorism, trying to exploit it for its

own benefits, like the limitation of the Muslim agitations in the South-Western part of the country and the possibility to lessen security spending), establishing a clear delimitation of the 4300 km Russian-Chinese common border, establishing military technology and hydrocarbons commerce agreements and, nevertheless, the combat against Islamic fundamentalism, which became a pressing problem for both states. If SCO was centred mainly on economical collaboration and the attenuation of Islamic extremism, the new treaty extended the collaboration between Moscow and Beijing on many important levels, representing at the same time a proof of the geopolitical consonance between the two great powers.¹⁰

The harmony of strategic interests of Russia and China after 2000 is based, as we have observed, on the projection of their own security interests in Central Asia, as a corollary of the consistent economic and military American presence inside this area, but also on the management of advantages derived from the Russian exports of military technology, gas and oil towards Beijing. Ariel Cohen asserts that the two states developed a “symbiotic” relation: China uses the Russian energy and military technology in order to sustain and consolidate its economic ascension, respectively to discourage Taiwan’s secessionist initiatives and to intimidate Japan, both of them being strategic allies of the United States in the Far East, while the Russian Federation modernizes, through the funds obtained from arms sales, military technology and hydrocarbons, its own defensive capacities, in order to reinforce its negotiation position in comparison with Washington in Central Asia.¹¹ Furthermore, an expanding network of pipelines begun to cover this space, conceived to counterbalance the Middle East’s pre-eminence in the field of energetic resources, where the American interests started to be, especially after the initiation of the military operations in Iraq, predominant.¹²

Between 1999 and 2004, the Russian Federation exported 12.49 billion dollars worth armament and military technology in China, representing 40.7% from the total amount of Russia’s military exports for this period of time.¹³ Only in 2004, the armament sales reached two billion dollars, and it appears to be growing.¹⁴ Besides the intensification of this type of commerce, the two states developed special security arrangements which were adopted in the 1990’s. So, even from 1994, Russia and

China both engaged not to have the initiative of using the nuclear weapon against one another, and in 1998 Beijing and Moscow were connected by a direct telephone line between the presidential cabinets, the first one of this type between China and another state.¹⁵

The resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia translates itself in a common uneasiness for both the Russian and the Chinese authorities. If the Chechen problem became progressively stable after 2000, Kremlin’s fears regarding some potential rebellions caused by the Muslim population resident on its territory are very much still present, because of the memory of the brutal repressions used by the Russians in Chechnya is less likely to have melted down, and the economic and military pressures Moscow inflicts upon Central Asian states are still at high levels.¹⁶ The Islamic fundamentalists find here, because of the poverty, corruption, and the lack of legitimacy which affects Russia and the political regimes backed-up by it, a propitious space for proselytism and a potentially large nursery for recruiting new members.¹⁷

On the other hand, China is also not “spared” by the displeasures caused by the Islamic militants. The Xinjiang province, situated in the West side of the country, is inhabited by the Uyghur minority, an ethnical group which belongs to the Turkish family populations. After 1970, these natives launched an aggressive terrorist campaign in order to win their freedom, but this goal seems less feasible if one takes into account the strategic interests Beijing holds in the area. Important oil reserves are to be found here, as well as military basis – some of them containing nuclear weapons – belonging to the People’s Liberation Army, extra motives for China to try and stabilize the situation and suffocate the revolutionary manifestations which disturb this province for several decades now.¹⁸ It seems that, in order to properly deal with the long term ethnical provocations from Xinjiang, the Beijing authorities adopted the same demographic politics they practice in Tibet: the “dilution” of the autochthonous ethnic content by resorting to an intense colonization campaign with Chinese immigrants. Between 1960 and 2003, the percentage of the Chinese residents in this area grew from 10% to 40%.¹⁹

The years which followed the NATO operations in Afghanistan and the Second Gulf War witnessed

a reaffirmation of the Russian-Chinese alliance in Eurasia. In 2005, SCO issued a communiqué which emphasized the undesirability it manifested regarding the American military basis stationed in Central Asia. The antiterrorist missions of the United States in this region were successfully finalized, the communiqué argued, so the presence of their military contingences in Uzbekistan and Kirghizstan became useless.²⁰ As a consequence, the American military bases were closed, as a proof that the polycentric world desideratum of the two great powers excelled the rhetorical stage and begun to experience certain forms of reification.

Following their common geopolitical goal, multipolarity, Russian and China insist upon the necessity to guide world politics in accordance to the norms of the United Nations and “*universal recognized principles of international law*”²¹ (which they themselves do not hesitate to infringe whenever their national interests are thought to be better pursued in this manner). This is why, in 2003, they denounced the fact that the United States and their British ally unleashed the Iraq war by eluding the Security Council’s eventual position in respect to this matter.

Also, the two states insist upon the fact that difficult and sensitive subjects of the present international context like non-proliferation, the nuclear arms control and the decisions adopted regarding states which raise this type of problems should be approached exclusively within the UN framework.²²

Although Vladimir Putin paid an importance not at all insignificant to China, in the context of Russia’s foreign policy priorities, undoubtedly consolidating the geopolitical alliance between the two Eurasian powers, there are also significant cleavages which could destabilize in the future the Russian-Chinese axis. Their nature is first of all economical or demographical, but the geopolitical ones are not to be excluded.

The partnership between the two countries is circumstantiated first of all by what it is perceived to be the common American threat in Eurasia, and in the Far East, mainly for China; in the absence of this threat, the *de facto* catalyst of the new strategic proximity between Moscow and Beijing, there is no guarantee that the external interests of the two powers would not become, as it happened frequently in their history, dissonant.

The impediments of the Russian-Chinese axis

If the motives which underlie the foreign policy alignment between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China are notable, there are also strong reasons which could indicate a rivalry between the two parts. Zbigniew Brzezinski is clearly exposing in his famous work **The Grand Chessboard**, published in 1997: „For the first time since China and Russia are sharing a formal common border, China is the most economically dynamic and politically strong. The infiltration in the Russian zone of the Chinese immigrants and merchants already took significant proportions, and China is becoming more active in promoting cooperation in North-East Asia (...) In this cooperation, Russia holds now a much weaker playing card, and its extreme-oriental zone is becoming more and more economic dependent by the stronger ties with Manchuria, which belongs to China.”²³

Therefore, contemporary Russia finds itself in an economical and demographical inferior position when compared to its southern neighbour, and the discrepancies of this nature are becoming even more pronounced between the two states. It is what determined the same Brzezinski to affirm in 2004 that Moscow preferred a folding of its geopolitical objectives on the American ones, because a partnership with China, the latter holding a superior economy and demography, would have transform it into a subordinate state. Even if from that period the geopolitical visions of the Russian and Chinese authorities became highly convergent, a fact which is not omitted from one of the latest book of the American analyst,²⁴ the immense 4300 kilometres border between the two countries, “the soft underbelly of Russia”, as Winston Churchill used to call it, was progressively turned into vulnerable by the pressures exercised upon it by the massive Chinese immigration. Already in 2001, the demographical disparities between Russia and the Popular Republic of China were deeply worrying the Kremlin: 200 million Chinese inhabited the north-eastern part of China, while only 30 million Russians were populating the Asian part of Russia and only 8 millions the space between the Baikal Lake and the Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, illegal immigration of the rural Chinese population in the Russian Far East is combined with high rates of mortality of the Russian ethnics from this area,

their migration to the western, more developed part of the country, or frequent mixed marriages.²⁵

The situation is also far from favourable to the Kremlin if we take into account the compared economical situation of the two states. Some analysts ascribe a significant part of the guilt for this economic dephasation between the Russian Federation and China to the defective manner in which Moscow understood to privatize the industry inherited from the Soviet period: "If, in 1989, China's PIB represented 60% from the USSR's indicators, in 2003 the relation was inverted and with each year that passes by the economical distance between the two countries is growing, of course, against Russia. One explanation would be that the reforms which conferred the Chinese economy its market character were much more consistent and balanced than the Russia ones. For example (...), China did not mass privatized all the industrial units, private one coexisting here with state property (especially present in the strategic domains)."²⁶

The more performing and expansive economy of China²⁷, in comparison to the Russian Federation's one, diminishes the chances of an authentic partnership between the two powers. Even if it accepts it or not, Moscow's place in this asymmetric partnership is a secondary one, being "subordinated", as Brzezinski noticed, to Beijing. This is one of the main reasons for which the SCO is not turning into an economically viable organization: Russia does not respond to the Chinese initiative to create a common development fund through which different modernization and infrastructure efficientization programs could be started in the benefit of the member countries, because it fears that it would be dominated, due to a superior financial contribution and an undisputed economical advantage, by Beijing.²⁸

The vectors of global economy are also against a consistent relationship between Russia and China. The main commercial contacts these states have are with the West, and not with one another: each of them needs investments and Western capital more than they need each other. The most important economic partner of the Russian Federation is the European Union, a fact which also became valuable for China starting 2008,²⁹ although the commercial ties between Beijing and Washington are much more solid than Moscow's. Besides, there is also a strong possibility that the

highly mediatised energetic connection between the Eurasian powers would not transform into a durable binding force, because the Chinese authorities, although cooperate with the Russian ones to restrain the access of the United States on the Central-Asian energetic market, still count on Iran as one of the main import sources for hydrocarbons³⁰, in an attempt to multiply and diversify as much as possible the number of the suppliers.

Moreover, the recent global economic crises, translated through a massive investments' decline and combined with the substantial reduction of energy prices is susceptible to affect, on long term, the geopolitical partnership which constitutes the object of the present paper. Beyond the triumphalism rhetoric of the Kremlin political leaders about the inevitable emergence of an authentic multipolarity, and the ostentatious and hypertrophied manifestations of some uncertain geopolitical alliances about to be articulated with some states from South America (namely Venezuela or Brazil), Moscow is highly vulnerable to the global economical perturbations which occurred in the last months. If the estimation over the future diminishing price of hydrocarbons are valid, Russia will experience this impact in a very intense and unpleasant manner, because the energy resources constitute the backbone and, at the same time, the main propelling force of the economical, and implicitly geopolitical reconstruction of the Russian state. The feasibility of this prospective can be partially extracted from the recent attitude of Moscow towards Ukraine and other East European states regarding the gas exports: the inflexible and ultimate posture adopted by the Russian decisional factors about the necessity to rise the price of gas evinces the fact that the Russian Federation does not posses an elastic strategy to counteract the crisis effects, relying further on the force diplomacy and on a vast and highly experimented panoply of intimidations. How effective this strategy will turn out to be in an unstable and protean economic climate, which lost its propelling teleology to confusion, pessimism and disorientation – we are about to find out.

China, on the other hand, benefits from more leverages and safety valves to deal with the actual global economical cataclysm. First of all, the Chinese economy is not centred, like the Russian one, on certain products, being much

more diverse and, as a consequence, much more able to attenuate the shock some of its economic branches will experience by overbidding others as a compensatory mechanism. However, it is not hard to observe that the consumer goods exported on the American and European markets hold a considerable weight in the alimentation of the spectacular economic growth which China has been experienced for approximately two decades; a decline of the demand from this market, as a consequence of the global economic crisis, will surely entail a limitation of the Chinese economical impetus, but it is hard to anticipate with accuracy its emergency or intensity. Secondly, China's authoritarian political system will probably allow it to maintain a certain dose of immunity in respect to the fluctuations of the global market. As the American politologist Francis Fukuyama observed, in crisis situations, an authoritarian state could prove to be more performant from an economic point of view, in comparison to one based on a market economy, because it can afford coercive means which allows it to limit the consumption in favour of economic growth.³¹ Moreover, citing the famous economist Alois Schumpeter, Fukuyama suggests that, in similar situations, almost every citizen, without taking into account respected businessmen or little entrepreneurs, would be willing to temporary renounce of "the principles of market economy" in order to safeguard his own economic interests.³² Fukuyama's analysis is a pertinent one, proving its empiric relevance *on a short term* (see Nazi Germany's case). On long term, however, the liberty privation will conduct, sooner or later, and in combination with other factors, to the undermining of the regime which institutes it. China mastered this lesson very well, extracting highly useful conclusions from the Soviet experience: if, from a political standpoint, communism cannot be reformed, any contact with different liberty forces leading finally to its disintegration³³, from an economical standpoint, this fact is not only possible, it is also desirable and furthermore, necessary to ensure the conservation of an ankylosed political regime, wrapped in an ideological rhetoric adapted to the demands of the present times. The "generosity" of Marxism, calkiated as motricity and ideological adaptability on the concept of dialectics, proves to be, in this regard, inexhaustible: taking into account the lessons offered by the last century,

Beijing practices today a "market socialism", which is nothing else than a market economy, articulated in its main directions, as everywhere in the world, by the principles of capitalism.³⁴ But the ideological umbrella is indispensable for the legitimation, even if precarious and shallow, of the political leadership, despite the fact that the most consistent component of the Chinese communism's legitimacy derives, at present, from its economic lucidity: once self-proclaimed the heir and the continuer of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, a political regime is inevitable ideologized to its most intimate core³⁵, regardless its pragmatism and the doctrinary "curettages" which can transform it almost beyond recognition.

Conclusions

Briefly, it can be stated that although the itinerary of the Russian-Chinese relationships has been on an ascending line, especially after 2003, the West remains for now the most important geopolitical reference point to which Moscow and Beijing relate to in the present days, a fact recognized in a very suggestive manner by Gilbert Achcar, even from the end of the 1990s: "Each of the two countries utilizes this partnership, for the moment, as a threat, or as an exchange method, to obtain from the American government concessions or flexibilizations of its positions, or to incite it to attenuate or to stop the violation of their own positions."³⁶

NOTES:

¹ Henry Kissinger, **Diplomația**, Bic All, București, 2003, p. 423. The literature on the Sino-Soviet dispute is by far a generous one. In my opinion, the most mentionable works treating this topic (not in an exclusive manner, but in the larger frame of the socialist camp) belong to Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI, **The Soviet Bloc. Unity and conflict**, Harvard University Press, Massachussets, 1971; Adam ULAM, **Expansion and coexistence. The history of the soviet foreign policy, 1917-67**, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1968, and Joseph NAGEE, together with Robert DONALDSON, **Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II**, Pergamon Press, New York, 1988. Another very good introduction in this subject is to be found in Jean François SOULET, **Istoria comparată a statelor comuniste**, Polirom, Iași, 1998. Official documents issued by CPSU and the CCP regarding the dispute

can be found in Dan JACOBS (edit.), **From Marx to Mao and Marchais: Documents on the development of communist variations**, Longman, New York, 1979, and in Robert McNEAL (edit.), **International relations among communists**, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1967. *Problems of communism*, the prestigious American scientific magazine, dedicated in 1964 a whole issue to this problem, entitled "International communism and the Sino-Soviet dispute" (March-April, nr. XIII)

² Rana MITTER, **Calea amară a Chinei. Confruntarea cu lumea modernă**, Bic All, București, 2005, p. 224.

³ The dissensions between Russia and China regarding their common border are now "historical", being more than a century and a half long. They practically started with the expansion of the Tsarist empire in Central Asia; during the Cold War, occasional outbursts of armed confrontations opposed the two communist powers due to these territorial litigations. For this topic, Iwashita AKIHIRO's work (**A 4000 kilometer journey along the Sino-Russian border**, Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, Sapporo 2004) constitutes an excellent introductory guide.

⁴ Gilbert ACHCAR **Noul Război Rece. Lumea după Kosovo**, Corint, București, 2002, p. 54.

⁵ Peter CALVOCORESSI, **Politica mondială după 1945**, Bic All, București, 2000, pp. 133.

⁶ Gilbert ACHCAR, **op. cit.**, p. 54. A comprehensive analysis of the relations between Moscow and Beijing during the 1990s is to be found in the book edited by Sherman GARNETT, **Rapprochement or rivalry? Russia-China relations in a changing Asia**, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., 2000.

⁷ Gilbert ACHCAR, **op. cit.**, p. 54.

⁸ Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), www.globalsecurity.org. Further ahead, the reference to this organization will be made through the SCO abbreviation.

⁹ Sangtu KO, **Strategic partnership in a unipolar system: the Sino Russian relationship**, in *Issues & Studies*, nr. 3 (42), September, 2006, p. 219.

¹⁰ Ariel COHEN, *The Russia-China Friendship and Cooperation Treaty: a strategic shift in Eurasia?*, www.heritage.org, July, 2001.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹² Vladimir ALEXE, *Axa Rusia-China*, în *Ziua*, online edition, nr. 3430, September 2005. If in 2004, Russia and China occupied 9.1%, respectively 11.8% of the oil market of the world, it is estimated that until 2030 the percentage will drop in Russia's case – 8.4% - but it will reach, due to a galloping economy, to 15.5% in China's case. Pablo BUSTELO, *China and the geopolitics of oil in the Asia-Pacific region*, a document issued by *Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos*, September 2005, p. 8. The Russian-

Chinese collaboration towards maintaining the energetic independence in comparison to the resources placed under the incidence of the United States is therefore more than justified; however, the economic disparity between Russia and China, visible also at the energetic resources request level will probably constitute one of the most important impediments regarding a substantial and lasting cooperation between Moscow and Beijing.

¹³ Sangtu KO, *art. cit.*, p. 212.

¹⁴ Laurențiu CONSTANTINIU, *Rusia și adierile vântului de la răsărit*, in *Cadran Politic*, nr. 22, 2005.

¹⁵ Sangtu KO, *art. cit.*, p. 212.

¹⁶ For an evaluation of the economical and geopolitical relations existing between Moscow and the former soviet republics from central Asia, see Olivier ROY, **Noua Asie Centrală sau fabricarea națiunilor**, Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 2001, pp. 267-276.

¹⁷ Ariel COHEN, *art. cit.* The political regimes of the countries from Central Asia are nothing more than an emanation of the old soviet structures; as a consequence, they oppose too to militant Islamism, perceiving it as a force capable to contest and endanger their own positions. Cristian BARNA, *The revival of Islam in former Soviet Union states*, in *GeoPolitica*, nr. 16-17, București, 2006, p. 54.

¹⁸ Ariel COHEN, *art. cit.*

¹⁹ Georgy SITNYANSKY, *Russia, USA and China in Central Asia*, in *Russian Analitica*, vol. 6, September, 2005, pp. 45.

²⁰ Vladimir ALEXE, *art. cit.*

²¹ Harsh V. PANT, *Feasibility of the Russia-China-India „strategic triangle”: assessment of theoretical and empirical issues*, in *International Studies*, nr. 43, 2006, p. 58.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 58.

²³ Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI, **Marea tablă de șah. Supremația americană și imperativele sale geostrategice**, Univers Enciclopedic, București, 2000, p. 186.

²⁴ Idem, BRZEZINSKI, *A doua șansă. Trei președinți și criza superputerii americane*, Antet, București, 2007, pp. 135-137.

²⁵ Ariel COHEN, *art. cit.* See also Iwashita AKIHIRO (edit.), **Eager eyes fixed on Eurasia: Russia and its Eastern Edge**, Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, 2007.

²⁶ Laurențiu CONSTANTINIU, *art. cit.* One should also take into account the prevarications and the lack of equitableness which went along with these privatizations in post-communist Russia, a fact which later reverberated profoundly upon its capacity to develop a functional economy.

²⁷ China, although it experiences in the last years a spectacular economic growth, this is not homogeneous distributed. Therefore, the areas along the coast line are from far the most plentiful ones, economically, socially

and informationally speaking, as the continental part of China is very poor and predominantly rural. The “discrepancies” are evident if we look at the fact that in Beijing or Shanghai, very advanced towns when it comes to the economical dynamics, the medium wage was in 2006 250 dollars, while the “medium of wages” for “interior China” was 12 times lower. Vlad NISTOR, *O Chină contradictorie*, in *Revista de politică internațională*, an I, nr. 4, 2006, p. 24. Taking into account these aspects, and also the military superiority of Moscow, it is probable that the Russian-Chinese partnership is not so asymmetric as Brzezinski postulates it.

²⁸ Alexander LUKIN, *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: What next?*, in *Russia in global affairs*, no. 2, July – September 2007.

²⁹ Lavinia FLOREA, *Ofensiva chineză pune Europa în gardă*, in *Săptămâna clujeană*, online edition, May

2008.

³⁰ Vlad NISTOR, *art. cit.*, p. 27

³¹ Francis FUKUYAMA, *The end of History and the Last Man*, Free Press, New York, 2006, p. 124.

³² *Ibidem*, p. 123.

³³ Highly useful for the argumentation of this position is the uncompromising work of Jean-François Revel, *Revirimentul democrației*, translated by Humanitas Publishing House (București) in 1995.

³⁴ Joshua MURAVCHIK, *Raiul pe pământ. Mărirea și decăderea socialismului*, Brumar, Timișoara, 2004, cap. 10, pp. 294-338.

³⁵ Ken JOWITT, *New World Disorder. The Leninist extinction*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1992, chapter 1 (“The Leninist phenomenon” pp. 1-50), and chapter 2 (“Political culture in leninist regimes”, pp. 50-88).

³⁶ Gilbert ACHCAR, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

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THE EUROPEAN YEAR OF THE WEST BALKANS AREA

Vasile POPA

Generally speaking, the events from Kosovo and the West Balkans got a tensioned, dramatic burden, during the first quarter of 2008, and then it started to diminish, as the issue of recognizing Kosovo has been put into shade by other crisis phenomenon inflaming the world.

At present, the essence of the transformations that the region has been subdued is represented by what the Commission of the European Communities remarked last March: consolidating its European perspective. From this perspective, the West Balkans visibly get close to EU, underlining, as a matter of fact, the progresses, even unequal, made by the candidate states on fulfilling the established criteria and conditions, their successes within the regional cooperation area.

The challenges the partner states had to handle within the last year, with larger or smaller but still significant implications, in security, stability and prosperity area, refer to: maintaining peace and stability within the region, after Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence, the efforts for having the province's status confirmed and for consolidating the region's relations with EU; the continuation of the required reforms necessary for joining the Union, considering the divisions within the society, the lack of consensus and the nationalism outbursts; the difficulties met by EU on supporting the region's states for consolidating the state, the good governance, the legal and administrative reform and the development of the civil society; the different performances obtained by each state on pre-accession; the way the new Regional Cooperation Council has involved in each partner's assumption of regional cooperation, where partners have solved out their unresolved bilateral matters; the efficiency of the assistance tool for pre-accession and the process for coordinating the donors in order to modernize and develop the region by non-reimbursable finances and loans; difficulties on consolidating the region's economical and social development,

visa liberalization, granting scholarships and developing the civil society.

After Kosovo province declared its independence, on 17th of February 2008, the Union showed its intention of playing an important role on consolidating the stability within the region, on continuously supporting the European perspective for the West Balkans and on using the communautaire tools for promoting their economic and politic development. EU decided to substantially assists on Kosovo's future economical and political development, to support it by civilian international missions, led by the Union's special representative, within an ESDP mission on the state.

Therefore, on the 4th of February, the Union adopted a common action for deploying the ESDP mission (EULEX Kosovo) and named its special representative. Also, it established to grant assistance in the amount of more than 1 billion Euros, between 2007-2010, to be used for the economical and political development and for financing EU's contribution on the international presence within Kosovo.

On international level, Kosovo generated a real diplomatic storm, motivated by the idea that the secession solution may constitute as a precedent for many territorial partitions within Europe and other continents.

In August, there was the Russian-Georgian war and then the Ossetian and the Abkhaz territories have declared, on their turn, their independence, which was officially recognized by Moscow, as a retorsion measure, considering ignoring its firm opposition, expressed in international organisations, against Kosovo's independence. But Kosovo's independence, first of all, has not been recognized by Serbia, a country which has seen its sovereignty and its territorial integrity affected.

Among the EU members which did not recognize Kosovo's independence we may mention Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain. Recently,

the European Parliament recommended them to recognize Kosovo, but it is likely to undertake such a decision.

A thoughtful analysis of the regional security environment shows that the West Balkans have made constant efforts for instituting peace, stability and security in this part of Europe and for getting close to EU, by fulfilling the required conditions. The results are positive and confirmed by EU's ministries of defence. By the beginning of October, they were for the end of the military operation from Bosnia and for launching other civilian or military operation, as Eufor Althea, started in 2004, with 7000 militaries, significantly downsized its troops, due to the political improvements within this country. There has been also analysed the possibility for crating a rapid reaction force, situated outside the Bosnian territory, and which should intervene for emergency matters, after Althea would leave.

The West Balkans' states have accelerated their race to a possible accession within EU, decisively assuming the reform's and reconciliation's objectives and fulfilling the required conditions.

An essential contribution was made by the region's democratically elected leaders, trying to act as if their countries are decisively on their way to stability and a European future. However, we cannot leave aside the role played by the Slovenian EU presidency, in the first half of 2008, on the efforts for integrating the West Balkans in the European community. The program launched in January placed the region on an important place among its priorities. As a West-Balkans country, Slovenia was deeply concerned that the West Balkans will get a clear European perspective. For the region's states, the EU's accession, according to Slovenian leaders, is a final objective, the change, reform and ultimately stability's. Based on the Thessaloniki agenda and the decision undertaken at Salzburg, the Slovenian presidency continued the materialization of the region's states European perspective, as one of the objectives is finalizing the network of agreements for stabilization and association. Slovenia continued the accession negotiations with Croatia and was interested in providing the negotiations' development.

The important progresses made by Croatia determined 2008 to be the decisive year for accession negotiations, as the country had some significant successes in some key-fields for the reform and in achieving the important objectives.

It is estimated that the defining discussions on Croatia's accession within EU will be held in the first part of this year, under the Czech Presidency of the Union. According to Olli Rehn, the European commissioner responsible for the enlargement, most likely, the discussions on Croatia will be finished by the end of this year and it will join the Union in 2010.

On its turn, FYROM tried to achieve its key-priorities which have been established as important objectives and to prove that it is ready to start the accession negotiations. The next steps are developed in concordance with the Commission's recommendations, mentioned in the progress report presented in autumn.

Albania has made progresses on its way to EU, especially by satisfactory putting into practice the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, therefore, providing the observance of the international standards during the elections, but also strengthening the state, especially on combating corruption and organised crime.

Montenegro has also made new progresses, by strengthening the state, especially on combating corruption and organised crime, increasing its administrative capacity and a larger consensus on the state's construct and also by satisfactory putting into practice the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, which is considered as essential. The tourism and the investments have been strongly stimulated, by the passing to the unique European currency on its territory, together with Germany (whose Mark the Montenegrins adopted after gaining their independence).

Regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina, there had to be fulfilled some remaining conditions, in order to have the Stabilisation and Association Agreement signed, so, this country is optimistic, too, on hoping to be part of EU's political, economic and security system, one day.

As Serbia has a crucial role on providing stability, good neighbourhood relations and regional cooperation in the West Balkans, the Union tried to determine an acceleration of its progresses on its way to EU, by gaining the status of a candidate state, inclusively.

Holland was the only member state, among the 27, which states that Serbia does not fully cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and, therefore, does not perform the conditions required for signing

the European Union Association Agreement. Its intransigence did not disappear even after Serbia turned to ICTY one of the most wanted men in the world, the war criminal Radovan Karadzic, and Serbia was ready to resend to their positions the diplomats it had recalled from the European states which recognized the independence of Kosovo.

The application of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement has been blocked in April, just after being signed, up to the manifestation of a “complete cooperation” between Belgrade and ICTY.

This application has all the arguments to happen this year, under the Union’s Czech and the Swedish Presidencies, as the Czech vice-prime minister for foreign affairs asserted in October, “it is in our interest for having the West, and not the Kremlin as the Belgrade’s centre of gravity“. As a matter of fact, at present, nobody ever doubts the fact that the Serbians’ option has been for West, as they voted for the Pro-European Tadic on the last presidential elections, therefore, voting for democracy and European values, for the state’s stability in front of the new challenges, and not for the radical Nikolic.

After the negative vote expressed by the Irish people on the Lisbon Treaty, the army of Euroskeptics sounded instantly a postponement of the Union’s enlargement process.

The following large debate showed the fact that the admission of the West Balkans states in EU will not be put into danger: all the member states will approve the draft of the treaty, new European institutions may be approved, and the Union’s expansion will continue.

The discussions from the Union’s summit, from December, have actually defined the Union’s position on the enlargement and it is believed that 2009 will put a mark on the European fate of the West Balkans region.

EU strongly supported Kosovo’s political and economical development, its European perspective, as for the other countries from the West Balkans. For that matter, the Commission used all the available tools, especially in order to promote the democratic reforms, the good neighbourhood relations and the economical progresses.

In the efforts it has made last year, the Union realized that for the region’s states the main reform priorities are as it follows: the state construct, good governance, the administrative and legal reform,

the state of law, combating the corruption and the organised crime, reconciliation, social-economical development and the civil society’s development. It is worthy to mention that the full cooperation with ICTY remains, for the involved countries, one of the conditions for joining EU.

Meantime, the situation of the states from the West Balkans has improved, also due to the fact that EU has initiated more actions with a larger economical and social impact. Hence, it has started a dialogue with them in order to establish some road maps for eliminating the visas obligativity. The progresses within this process have been monitored by the Council and the Commission. It has been increased the number of scholarships granted to the students from the West Balkans, in order to study in the European Union and there have been intensified the efforts for providing a full participation of those countries to the Community’s programs and agencies.

The Commission supported the development of the civil society. Together with international financial institutions and donors, the Regional School of Public Administration launched an initiative for the West Balkans regarding the infrastructure.

Also, there has been proposed a new initiative regarding reducing the calamities risks and there have been made steps for associating the countries from the West Balkans to the Community’s mechanism and tool on civil protection.

The Union’s papers show that the additional development of the regional cooperation brings concrete benefits for the West Balkans’ people and help them coming closer to EU, as this is an integral part of the European agenda for the West Balkans. In 2008, the Commission supported the Regional Cooperation Council and other cooperation frameworks, including CEFTA, The Treaty for establishing the Energy Community and the European Common Aviation Area Agreement and proposed the negotiation of a community treaty regarding the transports in the West Balkans.

Although in August 2008, the centre of gravity for military, political and diplomatic confrontations moved in the Caucasian-Asian space, after a whole tour focused on the West Balkans, on secession and recognizing the new status of Kosovo, this year, generally speaking, was the states from the West Balkans area a serious signal on their European and Euro-Atlantic integration, increasing their



STRATEGIC EVENT

optimism and efforts made for continuing the internal reforms, democratization and fulfilling the accession conditions.

It is obvious Europe considers this complex,

tensed region as an important part. Once inserted in the community, economical and security structures, it will contribute at the continent's and the world's unity, peace and prosperity.

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A PROPOSAL CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY LAW

Mădălina Virginia ANTONESCU

*Within this article, we are trying to establish the necessary legal premises for the creation of a legal body of regulations concerning exclusively the realm of energy and the energy activities, from the perspective of the public international law. The public international law is here regarded as a general framework for the future international energy law. At present, there are some special international regulations with compulsory legal force, applicable to energy activities, especially the treaty of Energy Charter. There are also, international regulations with general incidence for the international energy law, such as the UN Charter; the Charter of the Economic Rights and Obligations of the States, the UNGA resolution no. 1803 from 1962 concerning permanent sovereignty of the state over its natural resources, the International Pacts from 1966, the 1958 Convention regarding the continental shelf, the UN Convention regarding the Sea Law, from 1982, and other international treaties, conventions or UNGA resolutions incident in this field. Therefore, it cannot be asserted that there are not legal regulations regarding international energy law. A process must be started at international legal level, in order to crystallize the specific IEL regulations, by starting with those regulations of public international law already in force. In this article, we prefer to connect fundamentally the international energy law with public international law, as a body inspiring the scholars in developing the energy regulations already in force and also, in elaborating some specific regulations regarding interstate relations as relations between sovereign entities (where states are not acting *de iure gestionis*, as a legal quality interesting the international commercial law and not IEL as a part of public international law). On the other hand, we cannot conceive a conflict between principles of public international law (applicable, in our opinion, *de iure* in the international energy*

*law case) and the principles of international commercial law, because we do not consider IEL in this article, as a domestic law, and also, due to the sovereign quality (*de iure imperii*) of the state when entering into a legal relation on the public international law field (and consequently, on the IEL field).*

Keywords: ius cogens, energy regulations, public international law, international energy law.

1. Current stage of the international legal energy regulations

1.1. PIL Documents – general background for a future IEL

The establishment of **IEL as a division of the public international law** can not elide the basic international law principles (*ius cogens*), based on the essential principle of the entire international legal order, namely the state sovereignty principle, consecrated in the important international law documents concluded by the states (mainly the UN Charter).

Thus, we consider that **the establishment of IEL should necessarily start with the provision of Art. 1, Chapter 1 of the UN Charter**, that is the **compliance** by the states, as regards their relations in the energy field and the energy related activities, **with the objectives of the United Nations**, as provided by that Article, in particular the observance of the principle on the equality of rights with all peoples and their right to dispose of themselves. At the same time, IEL should also be based on the international cooperation principle for the settlement of the international economical issues (directly concerning the activities in the energy field).

IEL should be considered by the 21st century jurists as a public law based on the **Art. 2 of the UN Charter**, that is the observance, firstly, of the principle of the sovereign equality of states.

At the same time, besides all international documents reaffirming the principles of the UN Charter (for example, the two 1966 Pacts or the various specific UNGA resolutions), **the principle of the state sovereignty over its natural resources as an essential principle for the entire IEL**, is stated by various international law documents: the 1958 Convention on the continental shelf, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the sea (UNCLOS), consecrating the sovereign rights of the coastal states over their natural resources in the continental shelf and the exclusive economical area (PIL documents that can form the basis for the future IEL).

The 1966 International Covenant on economic, social and cultural rights as well as the International Covenant on civil and political rights, issued in the same year, expressly acknowledge the right of all peoples to freely dispose, for their purposes, of their natural wealth and resources, without prejudicing any other obligations arising from the economic international cooperation, based on the mutual benefit principle and the international law. These Covenants provide that in no case may a people be deprived by its own means of subsistence.

The 1962 Resolution no. 1803 (XVII) of UNGA on the state permanent sovereignty over its natural resources clearly provides that the international states and bodies will strictly observe the peoples and nations sovereignty over their natural resources and wealth in accordance with the UN Charter and the principles stipulated by that resolution.

Chapter II, Art. 1 and 2 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of the States adopted by the UNGA Resolution no. 3281 (XXIX) as of 12 December 1974 expressly and unequivocally stipulate that the states have the sovereign and inalienable right to choose their economic system and that every state has and shall freely exercise **full permanent sovereignty, including the possession, use and disposal over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activities**. At the same time, there is a provision of great interest for elaborating the future IEL regulations in Art. 3 of the Charter: "In the exploitation of natural resources shared by two or more countries, each State must co-operate on the basis of a system of information and prior consultations in order to achieve optimum use of such resources without causing damage to the legitimate interest of others". In Chapter II, Art. 29 of the Charter, the legal

concept of "**common heritage of mankind**", of great interest for IEL, is consecrated. According to Art. 29, that concept includes the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, **beyond the limits of national jurisdiction**, as well as the resources of the area. Concerning the above mentioned, all States shall ensure that the exploration of the area and exploitation of its resources are carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes and that the benefits derived therefore **are shared equitably by all States**, taking into account the particular interest and needs of developing countries. We consider that **the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of the States, as a whole, may constitute the origin document for the elaboration of IEL regulations whereas it refers to the states as sovereign entities** in the economic field and not as private persons (*de iure gestionis*) engaged in commercial legal relations.

The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of the States should be closely correlated with the Resolution 2749 (XXV) of the UNGA adopted on 17 December 1970 concerning the Declaration of principles governing the seabed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The object of IEL, as conceived in this paper, mainly refers to such goods generating energy or that may constitute energy sources (as far as they can be effectively exploited by appropriate technologies) **mainly located in the international area** (IEL, in our opinion, should **also refer to joint projects for energy production, marine platforms of a group of countries associated for the exploitation of energetic goods, construction and joint exploitation of alternative power stations, transport through areas beyond the national jurisdiction or transnational pipes, of the energy, as well as energy related activities carried out as a result of the energetic cooperation between several states**).

The material basis for the establishment of legal regulations that can be included in the concept of "IEL" can be also found in this declaration of UNGA. At the same time, the legal concept of "common heritage of mankind" is consecrated, and it should be considered when elaborating IEL, as a concept from which the specific legal concept of "*common energetic heritage*" derives, presented below. Thus, point 2 stipulates that the area declared as "common heritage of mankind" shall not be subject to appropriation by

any means by States or persons, natural or juridical, and no State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part thereof". Point 3 of the Declaration completes that **refraining obligation** (a limit of the state sovereignty principle that can also be validly stipulated for IEL and the concept of "common energetic heritage" mainly for the benefit of the developing states). Thus, point 3 stipulates that "no State or person, natural or juridical, shall claim, exercise or acquire rights with respect to the area or its resources incompatible with the international regime to be established and the principles of this Declaration". The States should act in the area **according to the incident international law principles and rules, including the UN Charter and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States (adopted by UNGA on 24 October 1970), for the maintenance of international peace and security and promoting the international cooperation and mutual understanding between states.** The area constituting "common heritage of mankind" shall be opened to all states for exclusively using it for peaceful purposes, without discrimination between states, but the exploration of the area and the exploitation of its resources will be done **for the benefit of the entire mankind as such**, irrespectively of the geographical location of the states and by considering the interest and needs of the developing countries.

At the same time, during the elaboration of IEL, the Resolution of UNGA 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, according to the United Nations Charter, adopted on 24 October 1970, should be also taken into consideration.

In this declaration, the principle on the equality of rights with all peoples and their right to dispose of themselves, on which the principle of the sovereign equality of states relies and that should constitute the basis of the international economic cooperation (in particular that in the energetic field), is reaffirmed. The elaboration of IEL **can not elide the entire set of consecrated principles described in their legal content by that declaration.**

These principles are recognized as having a fundamental nature for the entire international law and the states should, within their international

conduct, take into consideration (including within the energy related activities) and develop the relations among them based on their accurate observance.

1.2. International and regional legal documents of a special nature for the energy field

At international level, the state sovereignty principle over its natural resources is stipulated in an international treaty in the energy field (Energy Charter)¹ providing that the contracting parties **should recognize state sovereignty and sovereign rights over energy resources.** The contracting parties reaffirm that these rights must be exercised in accordance with and subject to the rules of international law.

The Energy Charter is only **partially** a source for IEL as a PIL division, even if for the Charter there is an international treaty concluded between sovereign states. Although it is concluded by states, the Energy Charter Treaty concretely refers to **the organization of the international energy markets so, in our opinion, it is rather related to the international investment law and can also be used in the international trade law** (the field of the energy related activities), concerning also the private operators on the energy market. In our opinion, it is not a treaty that can be entirely used for the IEL regulation, whereas it does not concern activities of the states acting as sovereign entities in the field of energetic goods in the international area. This treaty has a rather liberal vision, focused on the opening of the international energy markets, the relation between state and private investors, which aspect could possibly be of interest when forming an **international investment law in the energy field** (a future development of a IEL division).

Furthermore, the Energy Charter Treaty is recognized as one of the international tools concerning the international economic cooperation, capital movements, investment liberalization and protection², while including provisions through which the interpretation or enforcement of the Charter should not prejudice in any way the rules in the Contracting Parties governing the system of property over the mineral resources, including the hydrocarbon resources. The Energy Charter is rather an international agreement also based on GATT rules concerning the trade in and transit of energy, generally establishing a set of legal regulations

covering the energy production and the generation as well as the trade in and transit of energy on the international markets. Consequently, we tend to rather include this treaty in the international transport law and also the international trade law (the Energy Charter Treaty is, by the nature of its object, a mixed legal document). According to the purpose stipulated even from its preamble, the Energy Charter is a “unique tool for promoting the international cooperation in the energy sector”, giving an important legal basis for the establishment of an **open international energy market**. The object of the treaty is an “increased focus on the multilateral cooperation concerning the **transit, trade, investments, environment protection and energy efficiency**”, as well as for promoting an **energy market** based on the opening and non-discrimination principles.

The content of the treaty firstly focuses on issues related to the **private** law (international trade, investments). Parts II and III of the treaty concerning these two issues practically form the substance of the treaty. From a systematic interpretation of the Energy Charter, we notice that the issue of trade and promoting and protecting the investments in the energy field are structured before Part IV (“Various provisions”), where Art. 18 presents the sovereignty over the energy resources (aspect considered by us to be the fundamental legal basis for the entire IEL, as a division of PIL). This structure of matters presented by the Charter indicates the main legal nature of private law of the treaty (that is of international trade law in the energy field and of international law of investments, in the same field). Only residually, the treaty has a part derived from PIL (Art. 18) presenting the sovereignty principle over the energy resources, which principle is fundamental for elaborating the entire IEL, in our opinion. Article 2 of the Treaty, presenting its purpose, stipulates that “the Treaty establishes a legal framework in order to promote long-term cooperation in the energy field, based on complementarities and mutual benefits, **in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Charter**”. We notice that this provision uses a PIL principle (the international cooperation in the economic field). Secondly, we notice that although there is a state cooperation and a treaty as a PIL document concluded between sovereign states as contracting parties³, as subjects of international law, Art.2 does not refer to the obligation of the parties

to observe the international law regulations, including the principles and purposes of UN Charter and the international documents derived therefore (while the UN Charter is the fundamental legal document expressly consecrating the state sovereignty principle, from which the permanent sovereignty of the state over its natural resources, as well as the related rights derive). On the other hand, we notice in the Preamble of the Energy Charter references to other regional documents considered as a legal basis for the establishment of this treaty: the Charter of Paris for a new Europe/1990, European Energy Charter/ adopted in the Concluding Document of the Hague Conference on the European Energy Charter on 17 December 1991); GATT rules; the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other international instruments of nuclear non-proliferation; the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on trans-boundary pollution and other international agreements concerning the environment including energy related aspects. In Art. 2 of the Energy Charter Treaty we notice an express relation between the parties of the treaties and “the objectives and the principles of the Charter”, without specifying the incidence of the UN Charter and the fundamental principles of PIL (*ius cogens*).

Despite such lacks, we consider that **an automatic incidence of PIL over this Charter** takes place, because: an international treaty is concerned (one of a special nature as compared to the classical treaties, concluded by sovereign states and/or cooperation organizations where the states do not alienate their sovereign attributes; for this treaty, besides the states, there are integration organizations relativizing the state sovereignty and leading to a type of new international treaties resulting in a **partial nature of subordinating PIL** concerning the subjects of international law, **so an alteration of its coordinating nature based on the state sovereignty**); any international treaty should be placed on a position of complying with *ius cogens* (among which, mainly, the state sovereignty principle) – otherwise it would not be validly concluded and would be affected by absolute nullity.

Moreover, the presence in Art. 18 of **the principle of sovereignty over energy resources** shows that the treaty can not regulate energy related

activities in the field of CIL and the international investment law if it does not take into consideration this PIL fundamental principle. According to this article, paragraph 1, **the Contracting Parties recognize “state sovereignty and sovereign rights over energy resources. They reaffirm that these must be exercised in accordance with and subject to the rules of international law”** (so, a necessary reference to *ius cogens*, to the fundamental principle of state sovereignty, as consecrated in the PIL fundamental documents, mainly UN Charter). At the same time, paragraph 3 of the same article provides that each state continues to hold in particular **the rights** to decide the geographical areas within its territory available for exploration and development of its energy resources; the right to charge fees or other financial payments by virtue of such exploration and exploitation; the right to regulate aspects related to the environment and safety of such exploration; the right to participate in such exploration and exploitation, either through direct participation by its government or through state enterprises. The Energy Charter Treaty, through paragraph 2 of the same article, **can not prejudice the rules of internal law of Contracting Parties concerning the regime of property over energy resources.**

For the future IEL, entirely conceived as a PIL division, so starting from the state sovereignty principle as consecrated and explained by the UN Charter and the international documents based on it, the Energy Charter treaty may represent a law source if refers to energy related activities and the **role of the states, as sovereign entities, to regulate** such activities, both domestically (regime of the foreign investments in the energy field) and internationally (international trade in the energy field, international energy transit). Moreover, Art. 1 of the Energy Charter Treaty defines the **“economic activities in the energy sector”**, a definition recommended to be used as a basis for sketching the domain of application of the future IEL. Thus, the “economic activities in the energy sector” concern, according to Art. 1 of the Energy Charter, **“an economic activity concerning the exploration, exploitation, extraction, refining, production, storage, land transport, transmission, distribution, trade, marketing, or sale of energy materials and products except those included in Annex NI, or concerning the distribution of heat to multiple premises”**. These

activities, **for the object of IEL**, should also concern this type of activities between states, as sovereign entities and their regulation according to *ius cogens* in PIL, but should also refer to goods located in the **international areas**, namely those beyond the states jurisdiction, as well as *res communes* (as regards obtaining the alternative energies) meaning a broadening of the IEL object as compared to the Energy Charter Treaty.

While the Energy Charter Treaty offers a concrete application of the principle of international cooperation in the economic field (with direct application in the energy field), IEL, as a division of public law, must lay down legal rules concerning the right of the states to perform economic activities in the energy field, **but according to the international public law, based on the state sovereignty principle**. IEL can not be either mistaken for the international trade law as regards the energy, or the international investment law in that sector (so **the Energy Charter Treaty can not be considered a IEL Treaty either but mostly a CIL Treaty by the international investment law in the energy sector**).

At the regional level, the elaboration of IEL may rely upon a series of documents **based on the reaffirmation of the sovereignty principle and the sovereign rights over natural resources**: for example, the Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the European Council as of 30th of May 1994, within the European Union, on the conditions for granting and using authorizations for the prospection, exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons.

This Directive was integrated in the Agreement on the European Economic Area as of 1st of September 1995, when the Joint Committee of EEA adopted a common declaration where the contracting parties of the EEA Agreement have sovereignty and sovereign rights over gas reserves.

However, we can not omit, when referring to the elaboration of the future IEL, international documents of a regional nature, of great significance for regulating the relations between states according to the principles of the UN Charter: The Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed on 1st of August 1975, where the Declaration on principles guiding mutual relations between participating states was adopted, where the relations between states

(including in the economic field) are organized on the basis of the principle of sovereign equality and respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty, but other principles as well, such as the equality of rights with all peoples and their right to dispose of themselves as well as the principle of cooperation between states. At the same time, there are provisions IEL is directly interested in, within the panel concerning the industrial cooperation and projects of common interest. Among them, there is the provision on participating states to consider the energy resources, firstly oil, natural gas and coal, as recommended fields for reinforcing the long-term economic cooperation and developing the trade that could result therefore.

2. General principles of public international law versus general principles of commercial international law (their incidence within IEL)

Within the contemporary international law, the principles of international law are considered by the participants in the PIL relations (and consequently they will have to be considered likewise within IEL, as a distinct division of PIL) as universal rules, with binding legal force. Such binding legal force is valid for all states and applies to all fields of interstate relations.

As regards IEL, conceived herein as an extension of PIL, in the energy field, though, the states, as main planners of the legal regulations to form IEL (and also by the international intergovernmental, regional or universal organizations involved in such process of IEL elaborating), should imperiously consider **the entire set of fundamental principles of PIL**. Such set of principles should constitute for IEL, as a distinct field of the cooperation between states, **precisely its legal basis**. Thus, we consider that within IEL each state will have to observe **all fundamental principles of international general law that will have, just as for PIL, a *ius cogens* force, and at the same time, they will have to observe a set of special principles of IEL, with limited application**, within the interstate cooperation in the energy field only (and such special legal principles will have to be elaborated, construed and applied according to the UN Charter, as well as the fundamental principles of PIL).

In other words, **within IEL, same as within PIL, the states keep their basic legal obligation of observing all general principles of international**

law and refraining from any arbitrary acts damaging other states' interest.

As regards the process of elaboration and application of IEL regulations, we consider that states may not derogate from the fundamental principles of international law, in particular **those ones consecrated by the UN Charter**, that are unanimously admitted principles, with universal, imperative and sacred force for the entire interstate contemporary community. The close relation between IEL and PIL makes impossible, in our opinion, distancing of states from the observance of the fundamental principles of general international law. We consider that **such principles of general international law are fundamental for the entire contemporary international legal order that is including for IEL, as well as for all other divisions of international right derived from the public international law.**

These principles have the nature of imperative rules of international law thus constituting *ius cogens* not only in the PIL order but also in the IEL order.

Apart from *ius cogens* belonging to PIL (we mainly refer to the principles that are consecrated in the UN Charter), IEL may also recognize an imperative and universal legal force to **principles that are specific to IEL**, that will be created either through a regulation of customary general law or a general or multilateral convention. The nature of *ius cogens* of such special legal principles within IEL is justified **by the imperative nature of the observance of the state sovereignty** and the interstate cooperation in the field of energy in ensuring the right to development of all nations and observing the sovereign equality between states.

Same as within PIL, **the freely consented and sovereign agreement of all states** participating in the elaboration of such new public international law division is the **basis of the entire legal order of IEL**. IEL can not be conceived without a legal connection of the states to the principle of sovereign equality or the interstate cooperation in the economic field and a connection to the other principles of general international law.

If we consider IEL **as a division of the public international law**, the **automatic** application of all fundamental principles of general international law consecrated in the UN Charter becomes logical, with direct incidence on the field regulated by IEL (interstate cooperation in the energy field).

Thus, the obligation of observing by states of such principles in the UN Charter will be considered within IEL (including within the elaboration of the international convention to establish IEL or in the crystallization of the regulations of customary general law concerning the state cooperation in the energy field). In other words, without a **connection of states to such principles of general international law, the entire IEL would not be valid** whereas it would oppose regulations of *ius cogens* force so it would be affected by absolute nullity.

While elaborating, construing and applying the IEL regulations, the states will have to consider, first of all, the observation of the cardinal principle for the entire contemporary international legal order, namely the **state sovereignty principle**. Such principle is inseparable from other fundamental principle of general international law that we consider as having a direct and priority incidence within the entire IEL against any other principles of law that are not *ius cogens*: the **self-determinacy principle** creating also within IEL a specific right. We include herein the right of each people to decide its own fate (consecrated in Art. 1, Art. 55 of the UN Charter). In particular, we refer herein to the legal content of such right that implies, among others, the **free exploitation by a state of its natural wealth and resources** (the **full and free** exercising of such right corresponds to the interest of each people in exploiting its natural wealth for the general development of the country as well as the capability of each state to participate in its economy development).

Moreover, within IEL the states should also consider other fundamental principles of general public international law, close related to the two above principles: the principle of **cooperation** in the energy field, the principle of observing the **national independence**, the principle of **territorial integrity**, the principle of **sovereign equality** of states. The last principle is of great significance for the entire legal structure of IEL whereas it is a legal guarantee of not allowing the establishment of unequal legal conditions between states, including as regards the cooperation of states in the energy field. The doctrine stipulated that the field of application⁴ of the principle of equality concerns not only the states and the interstate relations but also the equality of rights with all peoples (as regards the application of

such principle within IEL, equality of rights with peoples in the energy field is also concerned), as a expression of their equal right to self-determinacy and independence.

Thus, within IEL, **each state (considered also as fundamental subject of international law as regards a legal relation that is specific to IEL)** has the right to exercise under full legal equality its rights arising from its sovereignty, to participate in creating and developing IEL as a specific PIL division, to equally benefit from the legal protection of such principles and regulations of law that it freely agreed within the interstate relations in IEL.

This is not about an abstract or conventional legal equality of states but a **full** equality of rights with states, consecrated in numerous documents of international law stipulating that states have legally equal rights and obligations.

Implicitly, when elaborating, construing and applying IEL, the states will have to observe the principle of sovereign equality as a fundamental principle of general international law, that is: all states should have an equal legal situation as regards IEL and PIL, for equally contributing to the establishment of IEL as a distinct division of PIL. The second condition refers to creating equal conditions internationally so that all states could exercise their rights that are inherent to **their full sovereignty** (including as regards the permanent sovereignty over its natural resources and wealth as well as the right to free exploitation thereof by each state, including in the field of energy production). Thus, during the application within IEL of the fundamental principle of international law of states sovereign equality, any subordinations of certain states by other states in the field of energy production, exploitation, distribution as well as pressure, dictate and violence within the interstate relations in the field of energy should be forbidden.

The third aspect related to the content of the principle of sovereign equality of states transposed within IEL refers to the idea that within the IEL relations (as well as within the PIL relations), the rights of each state should be accompanied by appropriate legal obligations, equal to the obligations assumed by the other states (a condition derived from the statute of equal members of the international community for all states). Same as in PIL, we consider that IEL should constitute

a division of international law **forbidding the inequality in rights of the states in the field of energy and access to energy** (for the natural resources in areas not subjected to the jurisdiction of a state), as well as access to the technologies of exploiting the so called unconventional energy sources (water, atmospheric air, sunlight).

IEL should not allow the establishment of privileged groups of technologically advanced states that could exploit the energy sources in the international areas, such as the so called *res communes*, to their own benefit while prejudicing the principle of sovereign equality of states. Also, IEL should not allow, within the interstate relations in the energy field covered by such right, the violation of the territorial integrity and political independence of states, the initiation of legal inequality relations in this field, actually marked by the introduction of an “energetic colonialism”, all contrary to *ius cogens* as consecrated in the UN Charter, fundamental document both for PIL and IEL, as a distinct division of PIL.

The normal relations between states in the energy field, as regulated by the new IEL, will have to be developed on the basis of the **reciprocity principle** only, while creating mutual benefit as regards the nature, volume and extent of the rights and obligations of states within IEL.

The application of the principle of sovereign equality within IEL also implies forbidding the adoption by states of any discrimination measures, any acts that would limit or constitute obstacles in exercising the sovereign rights by the states in the energy field regulated by such law.

The conclusion of any international treaty within IEL should, by virtue of the above mentioned, take place under conditions of legal equality for all states, while taking into consideration the interests of all states participating in negotiations without stipulation of conditions or clauses that could affect the third states.

Likewise, the application of such master treaties for IEL will have to be done on the basis of the states free consent and to indicate cooperation in good faith of states in the energy field regulated by IEL.

Other principle of general international law of *ius cogens* force that should be observed during the entire IEL elaboration, construing and application process is **the non-aggression one in the interstate relations in the energy field regulated**

by IEL, that is refraining of the states participating in the negotiations for concluding master treaties in the field of IEL and in the relations among them concerning the energy field, from the initiation of physical **force** or the **threat** of such upon territorial integrity or political independence of any state and in any other way that is incompatible with the United Nations purposes. It is a principle of general international law, unanimously recognized by the doctrine and other documents of international law that should include, in our opinion, the protection of interests of the small and medium sized states in the IEL field, the rejection of the pressure or economic constraint forms as dangerous as the use of armed force.⁵

The principle of peaceful settlement of disputes between states, including in the energy field, should also be applied within IEL. The states have the legal obligation to settle their disputes peacefully, as consecrated furthermore in PIL⁶.

Any other means of settling interstate disputes that is not allowed by the general international law, through consequence, should not be allowed as regards the legal relations established by states in the IEL field, either. Moreover, the parties to an international dispute concerning activities related to the energy production, transport, exploitation or distribution in a broad sense (where the states participate through state companies or in case of a majority state), disputes subjected to specific mechanisms of IEL governing, should refrain from any act likely to make the situation worse so that do not jeopardize the international peace and security. At the same time, any party to a dispute related to energy and governed by IEL should act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, **whereas IEL is a division of PIL, where *ius cogens* in the general international law is automatically and firstly applied.**

Within IEL, the disputes can be settled by various peaceful means recommended by the general international law: negotiations, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judiciary regulation, use of the services of regional bodies or mechanisms offered by specific regional agreements in the energy field or through other peaceful means, at choice of the parties.

Any other means of settling a dispute between states, related to the energy field according IEL, which means would contradict the state sovereignty principle or would jeopardize the international

peace and security should be forbidden within the future IEL, as is currently forbidden within PIL.

Pacta sunt servanda, or the principle of meeting in good faith by states of the international obligations assumed, is other principle of general international law⁷, of *ius cogens* force, applying within IEL due to its close relation to the state sovereignty principle. Thus, the obligations assumed by states within the regional agreements concerning the energy field or the international conventions (master conventions or specific conventions) related to such field, as well as any other **international** legal documents that are related to IEL should be met in good faith by the states. We notice herein that it is a fundamental principle of the **general international law**, close related to the sovereignty principle (a legal relation of interaction, as affirmed in the doctrine). *Pacta sunt servanda* is a principle included in a set of fundamental principles of public international law that must construed and applied **in close relation to one another only**. It is a principle that applies only to the relations **between subjects of international law (mainly states) so it can not be invoked by non-state actors (TNCs, for example) against states, within PIL, whereas TNCs are not subjects of international law and are not legally equal to the state, within PIL (and within IEL, respectively)**.

According to such principle, the **states** (not the TNCs, whereas it is not a legal obligation applicable to the non-state actors even if they have a strong influence on the relations of public international law and could influence lately the relations between states within IEL, as well) have the obligation to assume and observe the freely consented obligations only and while meeting the full equality of rights with states. From such double condition it results that states do not have to meet obligations for which the state freedom of the will was violated, where an imperative rule of general international law was infringed (*ius cogens*). The treaties including such obligations, according to 1969 Convention concerning the treaties right, are affected by absolute nullity.

Within IEL, same as within PIL, the states have to observe, according to this principle, only treaties that are concluded in accordance with the recognized general rules of the international law (so, concluded, first of all, in accordance with the principle of states sovereign equality in the energy

field).

Finally, other principle of general international law of *ius cogens* force that, in our opinion, directly and firstly applies within IEL is the principle of **interstate cooperation**. This is a generally recognized principle, one of the most important and consecrated by the UN Charter and also by the Resolution 1815/XVII of the 1967UNGA. According to such principle, (that will also be incident within IEL, in our opinion), the states have the obligation to cooperate with each other, irrespectively of their political, economic and social system, within the various international relations, for maintaining the international peace and security, promoting the economic progress and stability and general welfare of nations.

We consider as essentially to mention, for understanding the correct appealing and application of this principle within IEL, that the fulfillment of its legal content implies, as also expressed by the doctrine⁸, **the observance of all other fundamental principles of international law and, first of all, the state sovereignty principle**.

Therefore, it is about a cooperation right of each state, indissolubly related to its right of participating in the relations with the other states as sovereign entity (*de iure imperii*) and to exercise its capacity of sovereign subject of the international law. This is also the case for IEL, as a distinct division of PIL, as conceived by us in this paper.

Thus, we should consider at all times when referring to the state capacity within IEL that it is always a sovereign entity and not a simple participant as the non-state actors in private divisions of the international law (such as in the international trade law).

The cooperation between states within IEL should take place while observing the sovereign equality of the states as well as all other fundamental principles of general international law that are, in our opinion, directly and firstly applied in the IEL order, as mentioned in this paper.

After presenting in detail the set of fundamental principles of general international law that will also be applied within IEL, we will refer to their possible correlation with **other set of principles of other division of law** (the international commercial law, as a private law) in order to see whether the latter are incident within IEL and whether there is an hierarchy between them and the fundamental principles of public international law.

Firstly, as we conceive IEL in this paper, it is a division of public law and not of private law as CIL. A **hybrid division of IEL**, referring to the **relations between states and non-state actors (foreign investors) in the energy field could develop in the future**, and possibly be called *international law of energy investments*. For the time being, we consider IEL as a set of legal regulations referring only to the relations between subjects of international law (mainly states), though.

Secondly, **we can not admit** the application of the principles of international commercial law within IEL whereas **the entire set of fundamental principles of PIL applies automatically and firstly herein** that the principles that are specific to CIL can not compete whereas they refer to a different type of legal relations where the subjects of law have different legal capacities as compared to PIL.

Although the doctrine admits that the fundamental principles of PIL also apply within CIL (mainly the legal relations of the state), the reverse is not true; thus, principles regulating relations of private law, even with foreign elements and involving states, can not be applied within PIL (and consequently, within IEL). The principles of CIL apply to legal relations where the parties are **legally equal, where the state participates *de iure gestionis*, as a subject of commercial law and not as a sovereign entity**.

The principles of PIL (also incident for IEL) apply to other types of legal relations, **where the state acts *de iure imperii*, as a subject of international, sovereign, original, main law**. According to the doctrine⁹, even when the state participates in international commercial relations by elaborating tax and custom rules, it is considered to act *de iure imperii*, so it is not a simple participant in such legal relations.

The **principles of the international trade** apply within the international commercial transactions and are as it follows: freedom of trade; fair competition; legal equality of parties; freedom of conventions; good faith. As regards **the principle of legal equality of parties**, we notice that it is incident for a **contractual** legal relation, namely in the private law and not in PIL. If the state is party to an international commercial agreement or to a dispute within CIL, it is considered as performing acts and activities of international trade; moreover,

for the legal relation to be regulated by CIL, the state's partner should be a natural or legal person of civil law (not other state). Within a legal relation regulated by CIL, the state does not act as a sovereign power while is legally equal to a participant that is not a state.

Therefore, the legal content of the principle of legal equality of parties within CIL is not identical to the legal content of the principle of equality between states (while it is close related to the principle of state sovereignty and have a *ius cogens* force for the entire PIL and, consequently, for IEL).

At the same time, we must not mistake the **principle of freedom of conventions** (CIL principle) for the **principle of cooperation between states** (PIL principle), whereas in the first case there are participants to a relation of private law (with a foreign element) where the parties have the freedom to conclude any convention, under the limits of the law governing the agreement. The observance of such condition gives the convention the force of a law between the parties. As regards PIL, it is a principle of cooperation between states, under which the states can freely and sovereignly conclude any type of international conventions provided they observe the principles that are specific to PIL and the PIL regulations. In this case, the state is a sovereign entity and not a participant in a relation of private law. **The principle *pacta sunt servanda* within CIL must not be mistaken for *pacta sunt servanda* within PIL** (only the latter will be assumed by IEL). In the first case, there is a **contractual** and private obligation between two parties (the state acts *de iure gestionis*, as a participant in a CIL relation) that have the capacity of subjects of private law and not subjects of international law. In case of the principle *pacta sunt servanda* within PIL, only the subjects of international law (mainly the states) freely and fully equally assume rights through the conclusion of **international treaties** that must accurately observe and execute. It is a legal relation of **equality between subjects of international law** (while the states act as **sovereign entities**) and not a relation of legal equality between subjects of private law (TNCs, states). ***Pacta sunt servanda* within PIL is close related to the principle of state sovereignty, thus referring to interstate relations** whereas only the states have a sovereign nature, not other actors (so much the less non-state

actors, such as TNCs). Therefore, when TNCs, as foreign investors, appeal the principle *pacta sunt servanda* against the principle of state sovereignty (mainly against the permanent sovereignty of the state over its natural resources and wealth, including in the energy field), they can not refer to the principle within CIL (whereas the state does not enter in contractual relations of private law with TNCs concerning goods within its exclusive ownership public domain such as, according to the Romanian Constitution, the wealth of public interest of the subsoil, the air space, the territorial sea, the natural resources of the economic area and continental shelf). Whereas they are goods within the public domain, they are regulated by the administrative law, as a division of public law and not private law (mainly). As regards IEL, it refers to **agreements between states concerning goods beyond the international jurisdiction of states and *res communes* with the observance by the states of the PIL principles (*ius cogens*) within the interstate relations concerning the energy field**). The principle *pacta sunt servanda* shall apply within IEL as described within PIL, namely in the relations between states as sovereign entities. TNCs can not appeal such principle against a state whereas they do not have the capacity of subjects of international law (as regards PIL and IEL, consequently). TNCs can appeal *pacta sunt servanda* within CIL against a state acting within CIL *de iure gestionis*.

TNC can not appeal *pacta sunt servanda* within CIL, in our opinion, in case of an asset of a special nature: if it is a public, exclusively state property asset (goods mentioned as examples by Art. 135, paragraph 3 of the Romanian Constitution, for example), rented or leased to a TNC. It is automatically subjected to the administrative law regime governing the state public domain and that is a constraint and public law regime where the state acts as a consequence of its sovereignty and not as a legal person of private law.

Finally, for solving the problem of the hierarchy between the PIL principles and CIL principles within the new division of IEL as well, we categorically pronounce **against the application of the CIL principles within IEL**, for all legal reasons above mentioned. **The PIL principles are principles of public law, automatically and firstly applying in the new division of IEL**. They are *ius cogens* for IEL, otherwise the entire IEL would be affected

by absolute nullity whereas it would be against the legal basis of PIL, from which IEL derives. On the other hand, the CIL principles are applicable to relations of private law with foreign elements where the state acts *de iure gestionis* and not as a sovereign entity. A **hierarchy** between these two sets of principles of law **can not be established** whereas IEL is entirely conceived as a division of public law and not a hybrid division of law (although a series of hybrid international divisions can develop in the future, depending on the states interest in the energy field).

NOTES:

¹ The Energy Charter Treaty entered in force in April 1998, giving compulsory legal rules for the **trade, transit and investments in the energy sector, including provisions concerning the disputes' settlement**. For the EU States, this is a document and a process supplying a useful tool for the **trade in energy and the investment relations with third countries**, as well as a discussions forum over the energy policies and practices.

² www.encharter.org/index.php

³ Although in Part I ("Definitions and purpose"), Art. 1 of the Treaty, we notice that the "contracting party" includes, according to the treaty, not only a state, but also a **regional organization of economic integration** that agreed to be legally bound by this treaty and for which the treaty is in force. For the sovereignty doctrine opposing to the limited sovereignty concept, considering that the state sovereignty can not be affected by cessions of sovereign attributes, it is interesting that art. 1 of the treaty defines the regional integration economic organization as "an organization established by states that has transferred its competences for certain matters, among which some are regulated by this treaty, including the authority to adopt binding decisions for them concerning such matters". This is an **innovation as regards the contemporary PIL** whereas **it recognizes the existence of the integration organizations**, namely those entities based on the transfer of sovereign attributions of the state (**an implicit consecration of the limited sovereignty theory, rejected by most of the PIL doctrine**).

⁴ Gheorghe MOCA, *Suveranitatea de stat și dreptul internațional contemporan*, Ed. Științifică, București, 1970, p. 106.

⁵ See the legal content of such PIL principle, as established by the contemporary international law, in Gh. MOCA, **op. cit.**, p. 116.

⁶ Rapport du Comité Spécial des principes du droit international touchant les relations amicales et la coopération entre les États, Doc. ONU A/6230/1966.

⁷ Such principle is expressly stipulated by the Convention concerning the treaties law, according to which “any treaty in force binds the parties and must be met in good faith”.

⁸ Gh. MOCA, **op. cit.**, p. 124.

⁹ Dumitru MAZILU, **Dreptul comerțului internațional. Partea generală**, Ed. Lumina Lex, București, 2007, p. 82.

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THE SYNTHESIS OF A TRANSFORMATION



The idea of getting down on paper a story that is dedicated to the Romanian military paratrooping has probably derived from the yearning for flying, for elevation, the feeling of belonging to an intense (yet confessed) love for this military branch.

The author – **Colonel Dr. Mircea Tănase**, the editor-in-chief of the *Gândirea Militară Românească* Journal, a military paratrooper since 1983, following a thorough, diversified and elevated study, has brought to life the work *Military Paratrooping in Romania – Tradition and Present (1941-2008)*, “a remarkable synthesis and analysis of the operations and fights of paratrooper units and large units in the years of the Second World War, and during the Cold War and post-Cold War period” (Professor Dr Ion Giurcă).

The book succinctly treats the emergence and evolution of military paratrooping worldwide, the airborne actions of German, Italian, Japanese troops during the Second World War, the airborne operations of the allies in Europe and Northern Africa, the special missions of the Soviet paratroopers, the military situation in the area of Bucharest on August 23rd, 1944, the airborne operations during and after the Cold War period. The author focuses on presenting the numerous structural transformations our paratroopers had

have had to cope with: “*Going from battalion to regiment, followed by forces cut to the level of a battalion, and then again adopting the organisation chart of a regiment, transforming from a paratrooper regiment into an air-landing regiment and back, subordinating and re-subordinating the unit to various branch, army or military regional commands were all nothing but a few of the solutions through which one thought and, we believe, managed to maintain this unit in the first line of the elite structures of the Romanian Armed Forces*”.

The end of the book is dedicated to the period between 1990 and 2008, the author pointing out the most important phases in the history of paratroopers: their conceptual and actional restructuring within the Romanian Armed Forces reform process, the place and role of paratroopers within the collective security and defence system, as well as the main conditions and responsibilities with a view to the Romanian Armed Forces, the paratroopers included, meeting the standards of the similar structures in the NATO members states armed forces.

Finally yet importantly, the book is supported by 58 annexes, which render the most important exercises carried out by the paratrooper units throughout time, the main airborne interventions after the Second World War or the action of the Paratrooper Battalion in the combat disposition of the Romanian forces for the annihilation of the enemy group in the North of Bucharest between 23 and 28 August 1944.

In the opinion of Professor Ion Giurcă, the author of the Foreword, this book is, so far, the most documented and detailed “*history of paratrooping written in Romania by an author who is definitely the pioneer of a research direction in the historiography in our country*”.

The book, published by Centrul Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, bears the following dedication: “*To all my fellow paratroopers wherever they are*”.

(A.U.)



THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES

JANUARY-MARCH 2009

During this period, researchers from the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University "Carol I" have participated at different national and international scientific events. One of the most important international reunions is the roundtable on "Security prospects in the High North: geostrategic thaw or freeze?", organised at Reykjavik, Island, in January, 28 – 31.01.2009.

On March, 2nd, the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies got CERTIND certificate, confirming that CDSSS has documented, implemented and maintained the QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, in concordance with the requirements of the standard SR EN ISO 9001:2008, in "Scientific research, consultancy and expertise in security and defence field, including on programmes for modernizing the weapons and fight techniques. Disseminating the own results of the scientific researches and providing proposals and solutions for politico-military decision-makers. The initiation and the development of some networks for forming and improving the research personnel training on security and defence". Acquiring this document gives credibility to the institutions and increases the Centre's chances in national and international scientific competitions.

Between 11 – 13.03.2009, three researchers from the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies participated at Oslo, Norway, at a workshop organised by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. During the workshop, there were presented some phenomena specific to the security environment at the Black Sea and Barents Sea. It has stressed out many similarities between these two long-distanced geographical areas. It has been agreed on elaborating a common security study at the Barents and the Black Seas by researchers from NUPI and CDSSS/NDU "Carol I".

The next quarter is full in important activities for the Centre's researchers. The session of scientific communications STRATEGIES XXI, organised by the National Defence University "Carol I" (9 – 10 April) will be about "Regional stability and security" and is organised in 14 sections. There will participate decision makers from the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Education, Research and Innovation, Ministry of Administration and Interiors, rectors from military and civilian higher education institutions, other important figures from the Romanian and international scientific community. CDSSS will be responsible for organizing and managing the section on "Security and defence".

An important activity is the international seminar on "Strategies for cooperation in the Black Sea Area", organised by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University "Carol I", on 27th of May, 2009. There are invited as guest speakers remarkable specialists, from Romania and abroad, interested in the topic.

The Centre's most important scientific activity, within this year, is the Annual International Scientific Session, organised in November, 19 – 20, on "Security and defence perspectives in Europe". More information about the enrolment will be timely posted on the Centre's website, <http://cssas.unap.ro>.

Irina CUCU

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

On selecting the articles there are taken into consideration: the area of the subjects presented in the magazine, the actuality of the topic, its novelty and originality, its scientific content and the adequacy to the editorial norms adopted by the magazine. The article should not contain any party political connotations.

The papers' scientific evaluation is done by two scientific experts that are either professors or senior fellow researchers.

The article, written in a foreign language (English, French) may have maximum 10-12 pages (6.000 – 7.000 words) and has to be sent both in print and paper, using Times New Roman font, size 12, one line, and the tables and schemes have to be printed separately. The translation into Romanian will be provided by the editor.

The text has to be preceded by an abstract which is not to exceed 250 words, both in Romanian and English and not more than 10-12 keywords. The papers have to be signed adding the authors's scientific degree, name, first name, the institution he comes from and have to end with a curriculum vitae, which should include the following elements: a short bio, a list of personal papers, birthyear, birthplace, address, city, postal code, country, telephone, fax, e-mail address, photo in jpeg format.

The footnotes are to be included by the end of the article and have to respect the international regulations. Authors can publish only one article by issue.

The text has to present an easy structure, using titles (subtitles). The abbreviations will be marked on the text only at their first mention on the text. It is likely to end the papers with some important conclusions regarding the importance of the research.

The articles will not use classified information.

As the magazine does not have a profitable purpose, the articles cannot be paid.

Our address is: National Defence University "Carol I", the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, 68-72 Panduri Street, sector 5, Bucharest, Romania, telephone: (021) 319.56.49; Fax: (021) 319.55.93, e-mail: cssas@unap.ro, web address: <http://cssas.unap.ro>, <http://impactstrategic.unap.ro>



After eight years since its first edition, STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine, edited by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University “Carol I” is a quarterly scientific magazine acknowledged locally and internationally for the wide area of topics - the political-military present, security strategy and military security, NATO and EU actions, informational society, strategic synthesis and evaluations, a special column “Strategic Event” that studies the strategic impact of the dynamics of the actions undertaken nationally, regionally and globally.

STRATEGIC IMPACT has as collaborators important researchers and personalities within the scientific research area and from the civilian and military university system, both national and international, from the Ministry of National Defence, General Staff, services’ staffs, the Ministry of Administration and Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, military units and other state’s organizations, NGOs, companies, etc.

The international acknowledgement of the magazine’s quality is confirmed by its editions presented on sites belonging to prestigious foreign institutions (The International Relations and Security Network of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich; Defence Guide, in collaboration with the Hellenic Institute of Strategic Studies – HEL. I.S.S.), The Institute for Development and Social Initiatives – IDIS from the Republic of Moldova – the virtual library for political and security studies. Also, the magazine is included in international databases: CEEOL - Central and Eastern European Online Library, Germany, IndexCopernicus International, Poland.

The magazine is accredited by the National University Research Council and acknowledged as a B+ magazine that demonstrates the potential to become an international acknowledged magazine.

STRATEGIC IMPACT is a representative forum for reflection and debates on topics related to strategy and security for the scientific, academic, national and international community.

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Issue organizer: Corina VLADU
Designer: Corina VLADU
Masterproof: Corina VLADU
The National Defence University “Carol I” Printing House
