

ROMANIA  
NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY "CAROL I"  
CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES



# STRATEGIC IMPACT

No. 1[34]/2010

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NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY "CAROL I" PRINTING HOUSE  
BUCHAREST, ROMANIA



# STRATEGIC IMPACT

*The Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies' scientific quarterly magazine acknowledged by the National University Research Council as a B+ magazine*

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# MILITARY SCIENCES IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY ACTIONS

*Teodor FRUNZETI, PhD*

*Military sciences are in a bi-univocal relationship of interdependence with the military actions in different theatres. These provide laws, principles, norms and criteria in order to conceive, organize and conduct military operations. Military actions provide data and information necessary to enrich military sciences. Thus, the learned lessons have a significant role both as a synthetic expression of putting the knowledge provided by military sciences into practice and also as feedback between the operations in the theatres and military sciences.*

*Keywords: military sciences; asymmetrical military actions; lessons learned; simulation and shaping.*

## **1. Military sciences – source of new methods and means of military actions in asymmetrical conflicts**

Military sciences, as a coherent ensemble of scientific knowledge under the form of theories, concepts, methods, techniques and means of investigating the military domain, are based on data and information referring to past armed conflicts in view of developing defence or attack strategies. Thus, they study combat strategies and tactics and the weaponry used to better address the problems the country will face in a future potential armed conflict. Also, military sciences seek to better adapt the nation's military instruments to the defence and security governmental policy.

Military sciences provide the scientific base of conceiving, establishing, organizing, conducting any military action, including those called asymmetrical actions. Military practice, in turn, which includes all the actions materialized by the military institution in order to reach all the established strategic, operational and tactical objectives, has a double role in relation with military sciences. Firstly, it's about the verification,

testing and validating the military forms and means proposed by the military science. Then, military practice has the role of feedback between itself and the military sciences, providing the information necessary for optimizing and completing the theories, strategies, tactics and also establishing new forms and means of carrying a war.

Modern combat actions provide the real dimension of the military sciences contribution to the strategic, operational and tactical success. The most recent wars, in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq (1991 and 2003), fully proved the determinant valences of the binomial relationship between military sciences and military practice. The last conflicts of great amplitude and dynamics proved that without a theoretical support, any action is doomed to fail. By putting military sciences to work – in conducting, organizing, ensuring the operation and battle, strategic or tactical maneuver in using new combat forms and means – corroborated with the remarkable valences of learned lessons, the tacticians and strategists decide the fate of asymmetrical military actions and not only those.

The modern armed battle has undergone important changes in the last decade, from the first great confrontation in the Gulf to the war in the former Yugoslavia and the war in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. This reality has imposed seeking and establishing new forms and means of action compatible with the requirements of the current theatre, defined by asymmetrical actions.

At the same time, the conflicts' physiognomy has changed significantly, its factors including: new political, economic and strategic situations of insecurity; new political and strategic goals; new objectives, specific forces and means; another concept and intensity; a different attitude towards the enemy; different deployment spaces; a very vast palette of dominant types of action and sophisticated and unexpected means of manifesting violence.



The world of these conflicts is one of asymmetrical confrontations. Their political goal aims at managing crises, terminating open conflicts and preventing new conflicts. The objectives of the conflicts raised in this paper were: freeing from foreign domination; changing the political regime; overturning some Islamic fundamentalist governments, dictators. The regular forces, the special ones in particular confronted with regular and irregular forces, guerillas, terrorists, ethnic, religious elements, etc.

The military analysts foresee a multitude of means of action specific to asymmetrical conflicts<sup>1</sup> in future armed conflicts, the strategic confrontation systems proving a major asymmetry, allowing for the air supremacy and also elements of equivalency, especially in the domains of information and electromagnetic spectrum, which will compensate the superiority gained in other battle domains. Hence, the necessity of the increasing role of military sciences of putting new forms and means of asymmetrical military actions at the disposal of the military commanders in different theatres.

Also, understanding the asymmetry's mechanisms means the military sciences should explain clearly the nature of their objectives and identifying the logic allowing for achieving them. It's well known that any enemy in any type of war builds the global strategy on three dimensions: *successful action* (overturning a regime, establishing a new power etc), *available resources* (finances, personnel, weaponry) and *the selected means to reach the objective* (by force, politics, etc)<sup>2</sup>. The asymmetrical military action occurs between different enemies. In fact, the asymmetrical warfare is the one where the enemy doesn't only use the same weapons as us but where they fight on another field than the military action.

The battle against asymmetrical strategies is fought at three levels (information, strategy and action) which aren't perceived individually but they are part of a global integrated and mostly offensive approach.<sup>3</sup>

- **information.** The goal is less about knowing people and structures and more about understanding their motivation, objectives and forces, in sort the penetration of their mental universe, which means relying less on technological resources than on people and totally integrate information in the decisional process;

- **action strategy.** A global "holistic" approach

should be adopted combining means offensive and defensive, civilian and military, counterterrorist and antiterrorist, political and also economic and social. Indeed, the purpose isn't only eliminating its action conditions thus its legitimacy toward a part of the population bringing it a political, moral and even logistic support;

- **action in itself.** It means mastering the information about decisions (knowing the battlefield and spreading it to all the operational echelons) but, at the same time, communication in itself. Apart from the US "info-dominance" at the end of the Gulf War (1991) which favoured mastering data and knowledge, both favouring the influence (the interaction institutions-human realm-infosphere) which represents the key of asymmetrical battle, an important role has the operational communication between troops involved in an action.

In this context, the military science must conceive and establish new forms and means of carrying asymmetrical military actions. Here we can find: measures to develop and active involve some psychological operations (PSYOPS) in carrying asymmetrical military actions; establishing and carrying out activities of knowing the population in the battle areas with an emphasis on respecting its traditions, habits and religion; using special forces in theatres; organizing and carrying out civilian activities supporting the population in the area (road repairs, rebuilding destroyed schools and hospitals, providing medical aid).

### 2. Simplifying staff procedures by using information and communication technologies

The staff is the main element of any commandment through which the commander conducts his subordinate forces. He conceives and organizes a multitude of activities<sup>4</sup> both *routine* (providing the commander with information, assigning tasks depending on competences and attributions, drafting documents for conducting and informing) and *creative* (assessments supporting the commander in decision-making, identifying the problems affecting the mission, identifying and calculating the risks in conducting). All these activities take time, energy and concentrating the efforts of staff personnel towards the operational achievement of all their tasks. On the other hand, the staff has the obligation to collect, compare, analyze, process, interpret and spread the information to the



higher and subordinate echelons. Also, the staff must respect a series of procedures established in normative acts. Thus, when elaborating operational documents of conducting and informing, they must take into account the work procedures ensuring the compatibility and interoperability in achieving missions both domestic and international.

Therefore, the whole ensemble of activities a staff achieves imposes efficiency, flexibility and creativity from all its persons. In this context, the information and communication technologies (TIC) are very useful and benefic and also the new information and communication technologies (NTIC)<sup>5</sup>. TIC can intervene in the coordination mechanisms increasing the possibilities to treat, transmit or accumulate the information necessary to coordinate the activity of the military unit, greater unit or the commandment.

The necessity to use TIC in staff activity is required by: ensuring the efficiency in achieving its attributions by achieving a real domestic communication; *simplifying the staff procedures regarding the collection, storing, analyzing, interpreting and spreading information to the commander and other departments; facilitating the elaboration of documents that the staff must draft in a shorter time than using the "classical" methods of processing information; increasing the quality and speed to achieve all the staff documents*; the imperative of transforming the military institution in the sense of modernizing it and flexibly adapting it both to the changes in the society and the changes in the physiognomy of the current battlefield; the dialectics of the relationship between TIC and the military structure they belong to. Practically, implementing TIC in the army doesn't mean restructuring the commandment, great unit or military unit but improving its efficiency by better processing and using the system's information.

In essence, implementing TIC in the army brings along a series of consequences. Firstly, it modifies the relative efficiency to the organizational mechanisms. For instance, TIC determines the increase of the efficiency to adopt decisions within the military structure by short circuiting several intermediate levels of collecting information or transmitting directives or orders. Then, TIC determines its structure to evolve organizationally by adopting the most efficient model. Practically, we can talk about a compatibility between TIC implementation in the army and the military

structures' organizational principles. The mechanisms guaranteeing this compatibility are the *nature of activities* (usually routine) and the *principle of authority*. The *routine character of the staff activity* means the military personnel behavior and relations and the obligation to achieve the tasks and also the attributions rigorously defined through laws, regulations and instructions. *The authority system* defines the behavior of those in the military structure through their obligation to accomplish the tasks and missions received. Therefore, respecting the engagements by the military and civilian personnel is in accordance with the routine and hierarchic authority.

Moreover, TIC is favoured by the hierarchic structure in the army. This because the flux of information between different hierarchic levels are important and frequent and are generally achieved through procedures previously defined. In fact, staff procedures are standardized and regard the manner information are collected, processed, analyzed and transmitted. Finally, using TIC can lead to feelings of fear, frustration or discontent of those affected by this modern system of collecting, processing and transmitting information.

### **3. The active role of simulation and modelling in training troops**

Reaching the interoperability standards with NATO military structures represents the objective of simulation and modelling. Achieving this means efficient training methods and techniques where training by simulation is most important. The general objective of the Ministry of National Defence, General Staff and Staffs of army forces is the achievement of a unique, integrated, unitary and operationally valid environment supporting all the military activities<sup>6</sup>.

One of the core conditions of this integrated environment represents the standardization of models, simulations, procedures, algorithms, techniques and of all the other aspects of modelling and simulation. The model is a physical, mathematical or logical representation of a system, entity, phenomenon or process. Simulation is the evolution in time of a model. The main role of the modelling and simulation instruments in the training process is to reproduce the battlefield conditions as realistically as possible and with low costs, compared to classical training procedures.



The operational aptitudes defined by the concept of the use of force must permit all the engagement frameworks and apply all the methods of action considered. These encompass mastering information, participating in the commandment of a multinational operation, establishing a force, deploying and supporting it, the commandment of national or multinational joint forces. The engagement of a Romanian military structure in a multi-allied framework is part of the concept of use. Thus, training (especially planning and training these forces) must be possible in an inter-allied and joint context.

Here, the joint operational simulation must be interoperable with the allied simulation systems mainly at operational level. This interoperability needs respecting the standards in different fields like simulation models, data, exchanges with the operational information systems.

In an environment in full change (political, legal, technological) only mastering the operational procedures is not enough anymore. Knowing all the dimensions of the theatre, mastering the political and military cultures and objectives are indispensable today in order to ensure an optimum management of these events. The information technology represents a main contribution to favour the transfer of operational knowledge and accelerate the aptitude of conducting operations especially at operational level. The simulation concept in training different Romanian military structures through simulation exercises train commanders in making decisions through the PC procedures, in coordinating the actions between different departments of the structure.

Practically, simulation has two phases:

- **stimulation**: the purpose is forming different actors as quickly as possible, skills and abilities regarding the achievement of their attributions in simulated conditions similar to the real ones in the theatres. This phase has two main activities: 1) *passive stimulation* allowing for the acceleration of the transfer process of operational knowledge (theatre, order of exercises, crisis history etc). This activity is available throughout the exercise; 2) *active stimulation* permitting learning by the participants of information about the operational work environment.

- **simulation**: its purpose is to train personnel on decision-making and conducting operations on PC. This phase starts when the PC is ready to take over

the crisis operational control. It's about conducting, via response cells, a coherent animation of the human behaviour and weapon systems depending on the political and military scenario. This phase is for the actors of the PC decision-making process who train in conditions similar to the real ones in future theatres.

In order to reach its objectives, the staff operational simulation training systems must have the following functions: *conducting the exercise* (defining the objectives, the exercise theme and organization and validation of events and incidents, ensuring the coherence of the analysis after the action and validating the results) and *training*. Achieving this imposes the existence of the following tools destined to dynamically manage the availability of the stimulation and simulation instruments of an exercise; choosing the simulation model; participating in the genesis of the scenario and associated data bases; data for the transfer of operational knowledge; scenario chosen for the stimulation phase; the complete scenario for the simulation phase; data about the environment; list of events and incidents during the exercise and *conducting*.

This necessitates tools meant to: ensure the transfer of operational knowledge by putting the documentation at the participants' disposal; allow the training; *the analysis following an exercise*.

This has three objectives: collecting pertinent data about the scenario and observations made; analysis of the actors' reactions; synthesis of the analysis results in order to learn lessons on: forming and training actors, concepts, doctrines and procedures in effect; simulation model used; operational training system and orientation on future exercises.

#### 4. Utility of lessons learned in the process of the troops' professional training

Starting with 1990, Romanian subunits and units have participated at international missions in different parts of the world – Middle East, Somalia, Angola, Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Each mission meant an accumulation of information, lessons learned and life experiences both regarding the troops' training nature, content and forms and also a series of findings which materialized in changing norms regarding the military equipments.



Practically, the experiences of the theatres both in the field of troops training and those in the area of communications and logistic operations, represent a good opportunity for Romanian troops to update the action procedures and quality of products, of equipment and weaponry used in battle.

These experiences are in the form of lessons learned with the purpose of adapting and improving the conduct and run of Romanian military structures with missions in different theatres, of training and education process, maintenance and performances of equipment, modernizing and adapting the regulations and doctrines in accordance with each new requirement identified in the evolution of the military phenomenon. The lessons learned by the Romanian troops in international missions starting with 1990 in different theatres have contributed to the enrichment of the troops' educational process by using those forms, procedures and methods of training that proved their efficiency in practical actions. The emphasis was both on improving combat skills and abilities and on conceiving, establishing and adopting new doctrines and strategies to form the army's personnel. At the same time, the lessons learned in the theatres by the Romanian structures materialized in establishing and adopting norms regarding the exploitation period of some categories of goods. As for accumulating experience in using the lessons learned in different theatres, we can mention a series of gains in improving the development of military personnel. Practically, the lessons learned represent a feedback relationship between military practice and the process of professional forming of the personnel in military education institutions.

The lessons learned are: *data sources and information* which will be transformed into knowledge and skills necessary during the future international missions; *documents* adding to a database on the participation of Romanian military structures in international missions; *fundamental elements in conceiving the exercises, training and tactical exercises* by the staffs of different units and greater units participating in missions in different NATO, EU or UN theatres.

### **5. Capitalizing in the military education of the results of the military structures in theatres**

Military education has always been in close relationship with the beneficiaries of its products.

At present, this connection is closer and closer given the new international missions the army has to accomplish on one hand and the complexity of the national, regional and international security environment on the other.

Today, the curricula, establishing the structure of each scientific discipline on lectures, seminars and practice activities is achieved in accordance with the requirements of the beneficiaries of the military education. These claim that those who welcome them in the military education institution – officers, warrant officers and NCOs – should be familiar with the forms and procedures of military actions in theatres where they may be sent in international missions.

In order to achieve this theoretical and mostly practical training, "Carol I" National Defence University is acting on the following directions:

- establishing realistic objectives regarding its graduates' professional formation;
- studying the action method of international military tactical structures by mastering NATO's procedures and standards including developing linguistic competences in accordance with the interoperability needs in order to work in multinational military structures. For this, 'lessons learned' are largely used; they are established by the teaching staff in "Carol I" National Defence University who took part in different international missions and also lessons published under different forms (articles in magazines, scientific dissertations and studies)<sup>7</sup>;
- knowing and using the IT means in order to conduct units and great tactical units in peacetime and multinational operations;
- studying the main methods in analyzing domestic, regional and international political and military phenomena;
- participation of the teaching staff, students and graduates in theatres. The teaching staff and students in "Carol I" National Defence University actively participate in international missions. The experience accumulated there is shared by the teaching staff involved in such missions, through different teaching methods both with their peers and also with students. They transmit those elements of personal experience that are clear and useful for the receivers of such information and data;
- the teaching staff in "Carol I" National Defence University took part in the process to ratify standardization agreements and also



changing some Romanian contingencies in theatres in Afghanistan and Iraq, Kosovo, Djibouti, Congo and Ivory Coast. This type of experience is also used by the teaching staff in the teaching activity.

In our opinion, a priority of the Romanian military education including that in “Carol I” National Defence University, should be the **identification of competences** which the graduates of this institutions must acquire during the learning process on one hand and **the development of these competences** at the level of content exigencies and nature of their jobs in domestic and international missions. The data and information regarding the individual and collective professional behavior of the military troops during different missions represent an indicator in order to know the professional and psycho-social competences required to the graduated of the military education institutions.

The appeal to the experience in the theatres must be made with discernment because this has strong subjective accents<sup>8</sup>. As we already know, the subjective experience have cognitive, affective and social components intertwined in an ongoing process. At the same time, many individual and/or collective actions improve through the experience gained in time. Learning through experience is subjective, concrete, interactive and complex.

### **6. Improving NATO structures and exploring new military actions**

NATO is a dynamic political and military organization in an ongoing development, which means adapting to the reality of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, it has gradually entered a process of transformation. Practically, NATO wants to transform itself from a European-American military organization into an organization of global collective security<sup>9</sup>.

In fact, NATO’s perennality is based on its rapid adaptation to the new world political, social, economic and military reality. This adaptation, perceived as a mutation in NATO’s evolution, has *three characteristics*. Firstly, *NATO enlarged* in order to reflect the geopolitical evolution in Europe. This enlargement isn’t over yet. It proves the attraction the Alliance still holds for numerous European countries, the security guarantee by belonging to the organization. Then, *NATO entered*

*the domain of concrete military action* through numerous operations revealing a wide range of missions which don’t belong to either collective defence or, for some of them, to the Treaty’s geographic space. Finally, NATO attempts to be a *catalyst of the transformation of the armies of its member states* favoring the deployment in theatres<sup>10</sup>.

In order to achieve its missions, NATO has entered a process of transformation; its main objective is to have interoperable military capabilities and joint and multinational forces anywhere and in any moment. These forces are necessary for the Alliance to be able to conduct operations, manage crisis in a geographic area beyond the borders of its member states. For this, the *Allied Command for Transformation* was appointed to define the capabilities necessary for NATO to be able to achieve its missions. Also, another significant change in NATO was the decision to create a Rapid Reaction Force, very modern with a rapid deployment ability, all these associating interoperability with the support ability.

To NATO, the transformation is a process and not a goal in itself. Managing the transformation means constantly seeking new notions, ideas and technologies and their rapid integration; here it’s about capabilities, doctrine, personnel formation and education. Within NATO, transformation means a new concept of joint and inter-allied military operations. This is a cyclic process claiming a new mentality and a new culture<sup>11</sup>. This process has a significant impact on the armies of the Alliance’s member states determining their transformation as well.

NATO’s transformation was required by the evolution of the international security context and by the desire of this organization to assume a global role in the field of security. Such an objective means an enlargement of the competence domains, a more accentuated flexibility of the activity, the adoption of a wide range of civilian and military actions and the cooperation with non-NATO partners. Thus, NATO executes its entire range of missions, from the most intense to the low-intensity ones, answering the current and future operational needs and remaining capable to execute the most exigent missions. This means that NATO should learn from the missions in different theatres. At present, the Alliance is involved in theatres where “the enemy”



is no longer a national state but a new type of enemy whose force is in ideology or religion. This new enemy is mobile and invisible. Hence the extreme difficulty to counteract it without having new forms of asymmetrical military actions. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated the fact that the exclusive use of force against an atypical enemy is not enough but a flexible adaptation of the action forms to the battle context. Starting with 2006, NATO stopped military actions in Iraq and favored the negotiations with armed opponents and launched civilian reconstruction actions<sup>12</sup>.

### Conclusions

Military sciences and the practical activity of training the troops and achieve different missions in theatres are in a close interdependence relationship. Due to data and information provided through different ways and especially by means of the lessons learned, military sciences will continue to develop by elaborating new laws, principles, paradigms and norms which will fundament strategies, concepts or doctrines required by the new realities of the modern battlefield.

The simulation and modelling, lessons learned in training the troops, the use of TIC and capitalizing the experience from the theatres in military education will lead to the increase of efficiency, flexibility and creativity of Romanian troops in achieving different international missions.

NATO's transformation will continue and will have a significant influence on both its ability to achieve international missions and also on the armies of its member states determining new mutations for its members.

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# THE AIR POWER BETWEEN LIMITED WARS AND TOTAL WARS

*Florian RÂPAN, PhD*

*A state has at its disposal more instruments/tools in order to accomplish the desired objectives: diplomacy, alliances, commerce, external assistance, scientific and cultural trades, immigration/emigration politics or other internal politics, under cover activities or army usage. The art and the science of development, application and coordination, in war and in peace, of these instruments for assuring the national objectives, using the tangible or intangible sources of the countries' power, is the very thing of the strategy of national security.*

*The consequent military tendency to the differentiated projection of the influence and vulnerability favors the development of the aerospace capabilities, firmly maintaining itself in the sphere of advanced technologies. The progress made in speed, range of action, agility, precision and lethality, completed by the "stealth" technologies, independence/autonomy, information and data transmission, raise the exploitation degree of the third dimension for military purposes by applying what we call air power.*

*Keywords: airpower; strategy; efficiency; political control.*

## **1. The nature and goal of applying the air power**

The understanding of the differences between the wars with limited political objectives and the total wars is essential for choosing the most appropriate military instruments, particularly for establishing the ways to assure the efficiency of the air power. Does the dimension of violence, also extended upon civil population, or the mobilization of the entire society, including the transition to war economy, represent sufficient distinction elements between the two types of war? Or are the background differences not given by the objectives of war, which can chase either the total destroying of the system of the enemy,

or the solving of a conflict condition, which does not endanger its survival? If total war is defined in the sense of violence extended to the level of the entire society, then the air power is the weapon of best choice.

As the Italian Giulio Douhet, the pioneer of aerial strategy, wrote in 1921, "Domains where someone could live peaceful and safe don't exist anymore for a long time, nor battle fields limited to the actual combatants. On the contrary, the battle field will be limited only by the frontiers of the nations in war and all citizens, becoming combatants, will be exposed to the aerial offensive of the enemy. There won't be a distinction between soldiers and citizens for a long time"<sup>1</sup>.

The critics who assign each military breakdown to the restriction imposed by the air power, for example the interdiction to bomb the interventionist China during the Korean war or the setback of withdrawing the electric net of Belgrade during the first night of the Kosovo war, define those conflicts as limited wars, whereas the level of violence was not maximized. Though, it is difficult to give proof if an unrestrictive usage of the air power would have changed the course of war to such an extent, that the argument would have gained validity. The settlement of a possible finality with the military means at disposal seems to be much more important.

At the beginning of this century there are states which detain enough military power in order to project aerial operations well beyond their frontiers and to impose upon their objectives in a few decades. This does not make their victories easier or cheaper and, what is more important, nor the peace more durable. The problem is not **that of the lack of means, but the absence of strategies.**

For example, the difficult situation of the United States of America at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, resembles the situation of Rome in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century B.C., described by a historian of the antique world: "Moderation represented the central



idea of the traditional external policy of Rome and the result was often the defeating of some enemies with whom it was obliged to fight for a second time. The general opinion was that Rome showed too much generosity during the past<sup>22</sup>. By changing its strategy from the limited war to the total war, Rome destroyed Carthage in the North of Africa and the Greek Corinth, it imposed loyal regimes in the area and this way ensured peace for the next centuries. The similitude to the situation of the two wars in the Persian Gulf, (1991; 2003) or to the war in Afghanistan and the associated political objectives is bold, but the existence of a more and more active internal and international public opinion, instantaneously refueled and influenced by mass-media, or powerful moral reasons represent essential differences.

Iraq and Kosovo are two geographical zones where the military superiority of the allies was indubitable, but also a demonstration of the lack of adequate strategy, as Raymond Aron reformulated the truth thought by the great German strategic thinker Carl von Clausewitz: "If strategy has a finality, it could be named in a single word – peace. The finality of a strategy or of fighting a war is peace, not military victory, even if each of the belligerents wants a different peace, or imagines peace in different terms"<sup>23</sup>.

Such a peace requires a fundamental political change in order to be stable. The winning belligerent has not only to impose peace, but also to establish his version of peace, ensuring that the losing belligerent abandoned any intention of fight. Therefore, the state "peacekeeping" does not represent a peace situation, but it actually proves that the war is not over. Clausewitz had fought in the napoleonian wars and, during two decades, resonant victories were gained by both sides. Peace was accomplished only after the final elimination of Napoleon.

During the Cold War, the strategy of Moscow, regardless if being applied through military intervention, coup d'état or revolution, tracked each time the setup of friendly regimes, who governed accordingly to the soviet politics. From Poland to Angola and from Nicaragua to Afghanistan, what was always wanted was the total victory.

After the Korean conflict, the American administration gave up the conventional war in favor of the doctrine of the massive riposte based on nuclear weapons. At the end of the 1950s, when the

USSR had already become a great nuclear power, the military theoreticians embraced the concept of limited war, seeing the military operations as part of the negotiating process. Victory, in the sense of the preceding years, was too costly and too hazardous.

The force was going to be applied gradually to send a message to convince the enemy that the victory would be as costly as for him. The opposed political leaders and their regime were not considered priority objectives, and the escalation would have followed only the limited belief on the other party to accept the reciprocal waiver of conflict. In most cases, the objective of war was restoring the situation of the past.

In practice, the difference between the Eisenhower Doctrine of massive riposte and "new" theory of the limited war was not so great as claimed. The air power continues to be the political choice, and preferred bombers as an instrument of coercion or weapon of victory, when coercion fail. Even if the nuclear warheads were replaced by napalm and, later, precision guided weapons, the strategy to impose policy objectives remain the same.

Limited war theory has reached its peak during the Vietnam War, when 500,000 American soldiers were limited to apply a defensive strategy, occupying positions in South Vietnam, without any intention to march to Hanoi. On the other hand, an expensive air campaign was trying to compel a regime whose survival was not actually in danger. After 1968, the air strikes were limited to prohibiting missions south of latitude 20, away from the vital areas and the Vietnamese Government.

In the air campaign in 1972, the restrictions were gone and Hanoi and Haifong cities, and other important targets, were hit, finally, by the B-52 bombers. Six aircraft carriers and more than 1,000 combat aircraft were deployed in the area, and December marked the period of maximum intensity of air attacks. The signing of the Treatment in Paris in January next year created a false impression of a victory imposed by the air power, but nothing changed in composition or the North Vietnamese government's intentions to conquer the South. In two years, the regime in Saigon was totally destroyed and the war from the North came, finally, to its real purpose.

In good measure, the failure of the American "aircraft" in constraint purpose was due to the



restrictive rules of engagement of the force, but also to the erroneous expectations that the air power could do everything. The physical infrastructure and networks used for political control can be relatively easily destroyed by the air powers well equipped and trained, but the inability to exploit the created opportunities and to change profoundly the political regime enemy certainly lead to failure in the medium and long term.

War involves police and government of territories and countries. It is clear that the air powers cannot do that, and more obvious that the military power is an odd shape, at least in the present and near future, preferred politically of any democratic system when the other instruments of state power fails in imposing their targets. The current situation in postwar Iraq, by unexpectedly large numbers of civilian and military victims, proves that when the force is used inappropriately, or the surface forces are not able to impose a lasting solution.

### **2. Effectiveness and political control in the application of air power**

As many military observers said after the Gulf War, the probability that the air power to determine decisively the end of the war between national states increased. The speed, maneuverability and range of action generate a reaction capacity, power of destruction and flexibility unseen in any other form of previous military power. In short, air powers have the capability to attack any of the national power instruments of the enemy state, providing to the policy-makers an important range of options.

The liberal democracies found in the development of air power the exception that minimize their losses in the war, keeping the military capabilities adequate to the political commitments. Other democracies share similar or identical values of prosperity and technological progress. The citizens of these democratic countries expect their governments, in the event of war, to use the full potential of the air power to minimize the risks and costs. The Air Powers secure the democracies the necessary tools corresponding to their common values.

One of the notable changes made in the current war by the air power is a great efficiency of the multinational operations. In the Gulf war

or Yugoslavia, the Air Powers of many nations developed complex air actions, without errors, accomplishing order of common action, developed, communicated, monitored in real time by a single air operations center.

The difficulties and challenges that have historically accompanied the military coalitions attempt to concentrate time and space in different strengths, disappeared at the same time with the advent of the air powers, which can focus effects, without the need to be arranged in a unique area (without the obligation to focus the forces too). The fluidity of air operations in the coalition war adds another advantage of air power utility of the democratic states. In other words, the air power is in accord with the democratic ideas, facilitates the collective reaction and the independent intensity.

The full potential of air power may be realized by those armed forces that accept and apply systematically the values of freedom of expression, competition of ideas and individual freedom. It is less likely to prefer the enhancement of the air power at the cost of reducing air power control. In case of authoritarian political leadership, the utility of the air power, as an instrument of the state, is usually limited by the political institutions, the consequences of major investments presumed by creating and maintaining the minimum air power or, sometimes, considered dangerous to the interests of the regime. Even if states encouraged the general technical development (the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany), creating very powerful air armies was accompanied by the imposition of doctrines that increase dependence on the single party in power or super-centralized control.

Recent wars show very clearly that the influences of the political culture on the development and use of the air power continue. Thus, the Gulf conflict in 1991, proves convincing not only that the air power became the dominant modern warfare, but also the shocking contrast between the effectiveness of Air Power belonging to the Western democracies and those in the services of authoritarian areas.

The best case to exemplify the way that the power of modern airline operates under the authoritarian political leadership is the Iran – Iraq war, the longest conventional military confrontation of the twentieth century.

One of the first measures imposed after Iran's Islamic revolutionary regime came to power was political control over the military elite. As a



result, the Imperial Iranian Air Force, designed, equipped and trained after the American model, was converted into Islamic Iranian Air Force, by imposing growing restrictions. Repressive measures have intensified the spiral of aviators educated in the West who left the country, more than 180 of them fleeing by 1982, with or without planes, but 55 were the result of fratricide, as a dramatic result of banning on use of equipment for mutual identification, IFF. A committee of three religious personalities was empowered to supervise air operations, the fuel on board was limited to the minimum necessary, and the crews were forced to prepare the mission immediately before take-off.

The measures imposed by the Islamic regime of its own air force continued to constantly erode the effectiveness in fighting, during the whole war. The extreme hostility manifested by Khomeini regime towards industrialized countries, the main supplier of military technique, significantly complicated the war effort, but the most corrosive effect on air power had the continual tensions and suspicions between the political elite and the air force. The imposed restrictions have made, in recent months of war, that the Iranian aviation execute several trips a day, while Baghdad reported hundreds.

Returning to the 1991 war, the almost complete failure of the Iraqi air force has led to the wrong conclusion that they reached the level characteristic to a non-performing military structure<sup>4</sup>. In fact, during the eight-year period of war with Iran, Iraqi air force had grown to represent a real regional threat. In reality, although it had invested in equipment, Baghdad has not had the available air potential, even in war with Iran, from rather immaterial reasons. Some general historical remarks are useful to understand how this purpose can be possible.

At large, militarized states tend to project their armed forces not in order to fight in war, but to prevent a possible coup d'état. The characteristics of *autonomous operation* and *lethal concentration of power*, specific to air force, have proved to be the key to the coup d'état in Guatemala (1954), Chile (1972) and The Philippines (1989), the Baath party having serious reasons to fear the militaries, especially the air force. Iraqi air forces were the main instrument in several changes of regime, including the coup d'état in 1936 and the Republican revolution in 1958. The Baath party has given its first coup d'état in February 1963,

capturing and executing the Air Force commander. That government, which brought Saddam Hussein in his first position to power, was overturned after eight months by militaries' rebellion and the powerful air attack on the general staff of Baath State National Guard, in Baghdad. The Baath party returned to power through a coup d'état that followed a true 'purification' of the military elite, orchestrated by the head of security, Saddam Hussein. In 1979, he removes president Bakr and, even from the first week of assuming the power, he claims that he discovered a conspiracy of the military. The purge that followed in all armed forces gave special attention to the Air Force. After that, the admission in the Iraqi Air Force Academy assumed, as a prerequisite, the affiliation to the Baath party, and the location of the academy was changed to Tikrit, the hometown of ousted from power only in 2003<sup>5</sup>.

Once the Iran-Iraq war started in September 1980, both air forces followed the 1967 Israeli strategy and tried to destroy each other's most important air bases, although Iran, applying the NATO model, had been building concrete shelters for aircraft since 1970's, by deliberate omission, to avoid risk or due to a strategic error, none of the belligerents insisted to eliminate or significantly reduce the air capacity of the other. Moreover, Saddam ignored Western criticism over how he had used air power and had adopted an original/personal approach. The commanders of air force structures were punished when they lost aircraft, even if the air actions effect against the enemy was positive, optimistic reports were rewarded, while negative warnings, although very precise, were punished. The decision to use air forces decentralized increased even more losses and reduced the rate of fulfilling the missions.

Despite these (political) errors imposed in the usage of air forces during the eight years of merciless reality of combat, Iraqi air power has become a real one, based on structures and pilots who had gained combat practice, including in advanced techniques, such as refueling while flying or usage of intelligent weapons. All the gain in capabilities transformed the air force into a serious threat to the Baath regime.

Although the Iraqi air power was not sufficiently exploited to gain victory, it prevented the defeat, having a compulsory role in the interception of the Iranian offensive. In 1988, Iraqi air force owned



probably more people with combat experience than any other air forces combined. But the Iraqi political elite continued to carefully monitor this very capable instrument of power, fearful to accept that it would remain loyal. Sufficiently well used to prevent the defeat in the war with Iran, Iraqi forces, deeply affected by the political restrictions imposed, have failed in the 1991 conflict with the air force of the democratic coalition and were, virtually, nonexistent, in the war in 2003, after a permanent authoritative presence of the Anglo-American air force in the area, between the two wars.

Assessment that “this is a war that Iraq can not win and Iran can not lose”<sup>6</sup> became obvious in 1988, when Iraq launched a series of offensives that had changed the war completely. Besides the internal lines created (network of roads and railways parallel to the border, which allowed rapid movement of forces to limit Iranian attack or counterattack), Iraq expanded the use of air force with the purpose of cover to gain time for maneuver/strengthening of advantageous foreign forces. Investments in modern military technology had focused primarily on the needed equipment for the air force. However, the repressive attitude and air force efforts focus to support defensive ground operations visibly affected the achievement of potential that would have allowed plentiful purchased military equipment.

### Conclusions

The air power, understood as a nation’s ability to fly, to operate in the air space and to control the flight<sup>7</sup>, is the most useful form of military force ever developed, having a reaction ability without match up to now. Constantly ascending, the air power proves its ability to dominate the war, and the different level of efficiency demonstrates that the air force rarely reach their true potential.

Although the effectiveness of air power is clearly dependent on training, equipment, organization and strategy, many comparative studies regarding air power tend to focus primarily on technical issues and equipment. In fact, policymakers and social organization may also have a **significant influence on the air power value as an instrument of power, amplifying or reducing its material potential.**

**The values system promoted by the state largely determines the military capabilities in the modern world**, while a rigid political direction tends to marginalize the use of air force as a tool in war.

### NOTES:

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<sup>2</sup> Caven, Brian, *The Punic Wars*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1980, p. 271.

<sup>3</sup> Aron, Raymond, *Clausewitz, Philosopher of War*, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice Hall, 1985, p. 97.

<sup>4</sup> Jeffrey Record, *Hollow Victory: A Contrary View of the Gulf War*, Washington, D.C., Brassey’s Inc, 1993, p. 64 and Miron Rezun, *Sadam Hussein’s Gulf Wars: Ambivalent Stakes in the Middle East*, Westport, conn., Praeger, 1992, p. 47.

<sup>5</sup> Hallion and Samir al-Khalil (pseudonym), *Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989, p. 36.

<sup>6</sup> Miron, Rezun, *Sadam Hussein’s Gulf Wars: Ambivalent Stakes in the Middle East*, Westport, Conn., Praeger, 1992, p. 36.

<sup>7</sup> “The Fundamentals of Air Power”, in Eugene M. Emme, *The Impact of Air Power: National Security and World Politics*, Princeton, D. van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1959.

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# A SHIELD FOR A NEW EQUILIBRIUM

Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD

*Unfortunately, the Theatre Missile Shield (TMD), also known as missile shield, cannot be seen only in itself, as a beneficial system for everybody, but especially as a European strategic safety solution, and meantime as a component of the US National Missile Defence (NMD).*

*We consider such a shield is a must, as the ballistic missiles, created and located in silos, submarines, strategic bombers, or other vectors (although they are, in themselves, vectors carrying different types of loads, including the nuclear ones) threaten everybody, including the ones owning them. This new anti-missile shield is related with the power relations and it is also related with a complicated and very sensitive security architecture, based on a moving and vulnerable equilibrium. A TMD is necessary, both for the United States, and for its strategic partners, and also for NATO and its European partners.*

*However, achieving, expanding or improving any anti-missile system, as well as any other offensive missile system (in fact, all missiles are offensive!) raises many problems. Even the current American TMD, which is meant to be a consonant and even integrated one, with a possible Alliance TMD, raises enough problems. Besides costs and more or less vehement Russia's reactions, although the system does not aim the offensive missiles of the Russian Federation, the future US anti-missile shield, which will be operational in 2015, wants to be – and it is – a strategic stability factor, for strategic equilibrium.*

*Keywords: shield; missile; anti-missile; system; involvement; protection; security.*

## 1. Reason for an anti-missile shield

It is known, the anti-missile shield is a product of the Cold War, actually, of the world's conflictuality during the arms race. It is an US project that

appeared during Ronald Reagan's administration. On March 23, 1983, there has been created the Strategic Defence Initiative ("Star Wars"), whose main task was to defend the United States against Soviet missiles. It was a very complex system, with developments in space, land, maritime, air, and virtual, who lost its reason in the last decade of the previous century, when the Soviet Union self-disbanded, and the Russian Federation achieved a strategic partnership with the United States.

However, they could not give up on such a project, at least for three reasons:

- improving, developing and expanding the nuclear arsenal and the increasing risk of a possible attack, even surprise attack or due to a catastrophic error;

- increasing the number of countries owning nuclear weapons and the possibility of a nuclear conflict between them;

- the possible access of terrorist groups and networks to components of nuclear arsenal (even to missiles with nuclear loads) and the possible use of these weapons against the United States and its allies and partners.

Therefore, Bush's project aimed exactly the creation and maintenance of some research components (proper intelligence, powerful sensors and radars) and striking components (vectors as Patriot and SM-3) which were to protect the United States and its military bases located in Europe and all over the world both against an attack with nuclear missiles over the polar ice cap, but also against smaller ones, and against possible attacks with nuclear missiles launched by some possible future emerging, but uncertain nuclear powers. The US administration of that time (and the current one, too) had in mind the policies and nuclear strategies of China, North Korea, and especially Iran. China and North Korea got somehow out of these assessments, but Iran did not. The Iranian



nuclear program worries, especially because Shahab-3 missile (weight - 16.250 kg, payload - 1158 kg, length - 16 m), as 3B, 3C, and 3D, tested even by the middle of 2008, has been already improved, and its range increased, from 1500 km to more than 2000 km. (Figure no. 1)

Bush project aimed placing a radar in the Czech Republic and some receptors in Poland, complementarily with reconnaissance and strike components located in Alaska and California. But the spread of challenges, dangers and threats, and, therefore, the vulnerabilities, the high costs and Russia's reactions have determined the giving up to this project and finding some variants acceptable for everybody, including the Russian Federation. The danger of the medium range missiles, which seem to be accessible to more and more countries, but also other breaking dangers, due to the degradation of the international situation and the increasing tensions in the area, justify such a project that other countries are also invited to take part, including Russia.

A quite wide area, covering even a part of our country, is vulnerable at a possible attack with medium range missiles. Systems as Patriot (which are actually integrated systems in air defence), acquired by some NATO member states, do not cover the whole area, but only a part of their territories and NATO's area. All the countries located in the area should contribute at such a system. Because all of them are vulnerable.

This is also the reason the United States Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, stated that "The United States is ready to cooperate with Russia on implementing a missile shield in Europe, but they oppose to the conclusion of the Treaty on the European security proposed by Moscow".<sup>1</sup>

This draft of a European Treaty, part of the Russian vision on building the strategic partnership with the European Union, is very important for this country, and that is why it has been posted on the website of the Russian Federation's President<sup>2</sup>. In fact, it expresses one of the ways the leaders of this country understand the European security.



Figure no. 1 Range of action for Shahab-3

Source: <http://images.google.ro/imgres?imgurl=http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cb/Shahab-3>

The US Secretary of State underlined that, in issues related with security, is better to follow and achieve common objectives, within the framework provided by the existing institutions - OSCE, NATO -, that negotiating new agreements proposed by Moscow.

The process of these negotiations is long and complicated, and the benefits are not and cannot be higher than the ones generated or which may be generated by the existing institutions.

Also, the US Secretary of State restated the United States' opposition to the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and specified that Washington is not trying to create partition lines between neighbours and partners: "There is only one Europe. And it is a Europe that includes Russia". according to the state of things, it seems Russia does not simply want to be included in Europe, as a certain European country, as it is spread on two continents, it is an Eurasian country,



with the largest surface, with resources, especially energetic, with strategic nuclear means, with a Eurasian *heartland* vocation, with active strategic partnerships with the United States, China, India and other countries. They want equality with the European Union, an active strategic partnership and not only a neighbourhood policy and a secondary role in an architecture it does not consider as adequate for its pride, prestige and its realities.

Therefore, the problem of the missile defence shield, more precisely, of achieving an American missile defence system in the European space is disfavoured by Moscow. Even if, in comparison with Bush project, derived from "Star Wars", Obama project was considered more realistic and acceptable by the Russian Federation.

Certainly, Obama administration needs European support for implementing this new missile shield project. The US partners' believe is that a missile shield is indispensable for NATO allies, in order to have them protected against Iranian missiles.

The system proposed by Bush administration for Europe (a powerful radar in the Czech Republic and ten receptors in Poland) was complementary to the interception bases located in Alaska and California. Such a system, besides the fact that it was very expensive, generated Russia's hostility that had already threatened to place some missiles in Kaliningrad enclave.

The Bush plan has been revised, due to some strategic impact measures within the Eurasian space. The new Obama project initially stipulated the placement of interceptors especially on the US ships located in Med. If there had been noticed that Iran's ballistic program would be intensified, intensification perceived as a threat for Europe and for the American forces located on the European continent, there had not been excluded the possibility to place some missile defence vectors even on the European land space.

Naturally, the US administration aimed to give this new plan a NATO dimension too, associating other Allied partners both in the development stage and also in the deployment one. Basically, it is about creating a NATO chain of command, similar to the one from allied air defence.

Within the US missile shield, this means more than an involvement of some NATO partners. It means the creation of a "NATO spine" of the defence missile system, of a command and control

system, and also adding, to the US system located on the ships from the Mediterranean Sea, not only new vectors located on different NATO member states, but also some short range Patriots, acquired by Germany, the Netherlands and Greece, in order to create a multi-layered system.

It is hoped such a project will be approved during NATO summit from Lisbon, where there will be also achieved an agreement on the new strategic concept which will define the Alliance's role during 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>3</sup>

Initially, Moscow took favourably the new plan of Obama administration. A shield made of smaller shields seems not to disturb this nuclear power, in the sense that it would not have affected the strategic equilibrium and would not have diminished the power of Russia's strategic vectors.

Such a system, aiming missiles as Shahab 3, does not target the Russian missiles, neither as technology, nor as strategy. Probably the Russian strategists have thought that, after all, on their ships, the Americans may place whatever they want, if they respect the strategic equilibrium stipulated in the in-force treaties.

Afterwards, Russia returned. By the end of 2009, Vladimir Putin proclaimed this shield as an imbalance factor within the strategic weapons and specified that Russia may develop new offensive weapons in order to counteract this shield's effects. It was hoped that during the international security conference, from Munich, February, 5-7, the divergences on the European security to be fixed up, but also other problems, such as NATO new Strategic Concept and the Alliance's capacity to achieve a fast and effective territorial defence for the member states located in the Eastern of Europe, especially for the Baltic states. So far, NATO avoided elaborating official intervention plans for supporting Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Obviously, for not offending Moscow. But Russia's intervention from Georgia, during the summer of 2008, changed things.

However, Russia, the North-Atlantic Alliance and the United States participate in a new security construction, where Russia plays a very important role. Russia may support NATO in Afghanistan offensive, generally speaking, in solving out the situation from Afghanistan, but also in solving out other problems related with the new NATO Strategic Concept, with the new security coordinates within 21<sup>st</sup> century.



Four NATO member countries are directly involved, together with Russia, in the energetic matters of Arctic area, but all the European countries need the energetic resources located in Russia. NATO debates all these issues both directly, especially within NATO-Russia Council, and also indirectly, through countries that have very strong relations with Russia (Germany, France, Italy, Turkey). Russia cannot remain indifferent to the missile shield achieved in an area that is considered as vulnerable to the attacks by the use of medium range missiles, and the solution is not necessarily the opposition, but, negotiation and participation, in our opinion.

### **2. A possible implication, an honourable and especially necessary one**

Among the possible strategic arguments determining the achievement of a missile defence system in our area, in the Wider Black Sea Area, as a matter of fact, there may be also considered the following ones:

- this area is the closest one to the disturbing outbreak spreading from Iraq to Afghanistan and becomes vulnerable to an attack with medium range missiles, other than the ones owned by the recognised nuclear powers;

- the area is crossed by numerous traffickers' corridors, and its conflictuality, on the fault line between NATO area and the one of possible emerging powers, others than Russia, may generate a new type of threat, including by the use of some missiles with classical or nuclear load;

- Russia's opposition to the previous version of the missile system (comprising a radar in the Czech Republic and vectors in Poland) and the US, and obviously, European, renunciation to these locations move the centre of gravity of the system to the South-East, therefore, closer to a critical area, represented by the Near East and the Middle East;

- within this area, there may be better integrated the ISR systems, with probable locations in Turkey, on the US ships located in the Mediterranean Sea, and, possible in the Black Sea, and striking vectors, located on the US ships located in the Mediterranean Sea, and, possible in the Black Sea, in the naval version in Romania (SM 3 systems) and Bulgaria (Patriot, probably);

- the interest of these countries to achieve a

consistent air and missile defence that cannot achieve by themselves.

Of course, there is also the objection that the areas where radars and vectors are hosted become targets for the possible attackers and non-involvement would be more advantageous. In our opinion, such a vision corresponds to the Second World War period. Now, isolation, neutrality, expecting the other to do something that you can benefit from, isolation or non-involvement are no longer in the pipeline. All the countries, absolutely all of them – nuclear or not, with missile defence systems or not – are vulnerable to a possible attack with nuclear missiles. The country hosting such systems is not more vulnerable than one not hosting them. Even if such a statement may seem paradoxical or taken out from the known wars logic, including the current ones (in Iraq, Serbia and Afghanistan the air defence systems were the first one stricken), when it comes to anti-missile defence, things are more nuanced.

Besides, a strategic partnership compels you to assume responsibilities, to involve in alliance and partnership policies and strategies, not to always wait for the others to do what you cannot or don't want to. We consider the option Romania has, to host some antimissile vectors (probably 3 SM-3 batteries), is not only honourable, but also necessary. During the conference on the international security, from February 7<sup>th</sup>, 2010, NATO Secretary General stated, that, for the time being, Alliance should involve in the global security, accept and adopt a new philosophy, the one related with the participation on solving global matters, obviously without substituting UN. This statement has stirred controversies. Some representatives of big powers regarded had reservations and even disputed such as a statement. According to Washington Treaty, signed in 1949, NATO is a defensive alliance and it should remain so. The two streams within the Alliance – a NATO with global interests and effects and a NATO having the interests of the 28 member states – generate serious debates regarding NATO's way in 21<sup>st</sup> century. Besides controversies, there should be perceived and analysed the essence of the new construct (probably, a synthesis or an intersection between these two) and its role in the Euro-Atlantic area defence and security. How will NATO participate in the shield? Will there be achieved a fusion or a synthesis between the American TMD and a NATO TMD? A NATO



TMD should be just a European antimissile shield or a Euro-Atlantic one? How should such a system operate at NATO and EU borders?

The Russian officials consider, even in Russia's National Security Strategy, that "developing and installing the missile defence systems, undermining the global stability and disrupting the strategic power equilibrium", as well as "the attempts to expand NATO's infrastructure towards Russia's borders"<sup>4</sup> are direct threats to Russia's national security.

This stipulation is not circumstantial, but has to be considered as it is. It is and will probably be a problem in the ongoing START negotiations, but it does not result that NATO countries and the United States' partner countries will not follow and express their interests and options.

Therefore, the approval by the Supreme Defence Council, on April 4<sup>th</sup>, 2010, for locating in Romania some vectors of the theatre missile defence system (TMD) is an important step for the real security of our territory. For us, this is not just a simple strategic game, but a matter for involving in building and developing a viable and coherent security system. In our opinion, there is no country in the world that may stay away, for a long period, from a coherent and consistent anti-missile defence system. This system is not in contradiction with Romania's interests, or with its strategic partners', but, on the contrary, it is in a full consonance. For instance, within the framework provided by the strategic partnership between Romania and France, signed in February 2008, our country has started some discussions about buying some short and medium range missile systems, 400 million Euros worth. The visit of the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, planned for March, also considers this topic.<sup>5</sup>

We think that a powerful radar and few interceptors placed on ships or the territories

of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey will not essentially change the strategic equilibrium, one that is negotiated, decided and achieved by the big nuclear powers. Instead, they may diminish the vulnerabilities of this very important area for Europe's security, including the energetic security. Probably there will never be a missile attack against Romania or South-Eastern European countries. But the TMD presence has a powerful deterrence role, and therefore, a significant stability effect. Moreover, once these vectors are placed, the area becomes important from strategic perspective and probably the benefits will be obvious very soon.

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1 *Washington prêt à associer Moscou au bouclier antimissile (Clinton)*, <http://fr.rian.ru/world/20100129/185961723.html> (accessed on February 27, 2010).

2 During Evian Forum, October 2008, the President of the Russian Federation, Dimitri Medvedev, stated the principles of the treaty for the European security. It is about guaranteeing an equal security for the states located in the Euro-Atlantic space. West thinks that such a treaty aims, after all, the NATO's split.

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4 *National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020*, Указом Президента Российской Федерации от 12 мая 2009 г. № 537, <http://www.scrf.gov.ru>

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# CERTAIN ASPECTS ON MANAGING THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN TERMS OF INCREASING GLOBALIZATION

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*The evolution of current and future security environment is marked by decisive political and economic interests of major powers. One of the factors that influence the stability and global security is the process of globalization, which can be a chance given to responsible political "players", who must treat with caution "sensitive" matters and seek appropriate solutions for global concord.*

*Keywords: risk factors; insecurity; terrorism; globalization; world order; economic war; energy; security.*

## Introduction

The history written today reveals that international relations are the result of ongoing clashes, alignments and realignments of collective forces, state or para-state bodies. In the complex security environment, subjected to significant changes in recent times, the international community's attention is directed to implement a vision that will contribute to strengthening peace and world security by identifying vulnerabilities on a global scale, the possible risks and threats that could lead to new sources of instability or worsening of existing ones.

In the first years of XXI century, a new era in international politics is being shaped, where security together with the competition for the affirmation and strengthening of new centers of power, occupies the central place in determining the development of the world and establish a new **world order**. There are many **risk factors** in this stage, and the strategic shifts that occurred suddenly in the political, economic, social and cultural areas have generated the need to reconfigure the physiognomy of nonmilitary conflict and the military.

Globalization, European and Euro-Atlantic integration, Russia's increasing needs of acquiring a role in international affairs, alongside with the ever more powerful assertion of Asia in world politics, plus the Gulf crisis, characterized the evolution of current security environment. The effects of natural phenomena (global warming, shortages of drinking water, floods, and earthquakes), resource depletion, demographic change, terrorism, epidemics (see the new forms of flu), the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the organized crime and poverty continue to affect more and more the stability and world security. At this stage, in which humanity is going through a period of constructive phenomena that are crucial regionalization and globalization, ethnic and religious elements are still powerful landmarks to define communities based on tradition and religion.

The expansion of terrorist phenomenon and its dangerous effect has led to joint action to counter it and has brought about a coalition of global amplitude. We are witnessing an impressive concentration of forces and capabilities, doubled by a political consensus unimaginable some time ago. States, known until yesterday as having divergent positions, considered even irreconcilable, are now on the same front of fighting against terrorism, generating positive signals, hope and optimism for resolution of critical issues that affect almost the entire planet.

## Managing the environmental security

It is known that the action of risk factors to the state, as basic player on the international scene, takes place at the territorial level and national identity, thus appearing the possibility of crises generating multidimensional character that ends



with economic and socio-political implications, which can cause different and complex reactions, closely related to the civilization area within it, occurs. Increasing number of ethnic-religious conflicts in recent decades has led to a closer approach of this area, allowing the international community to acquire the "lessons learned" that allowed the development of strategies to cover the existing conflict resolution, but also removing the causes that lead to unstable conflict states of cultural origin. Developments, which were registered on multiple planes of human, becoming, have determined the present society to reach an identity characterized by political pluralism, social participation, respect for diversity, free and fair competition, rule of law and the primacy of human rights.

Note that some countries, paradoxically, although possessing impressive energy (here we refer especially to oil resources) have a high socio-economic development just over the threshold, or even poverty. This feeling is enhanced by the existence of undemocratic regimes or with a weak institutional structure, massive refugee flows, environmental disturbances or major natural disasters, economic insecurity, ethnic conflicts, regional or local ones, perpetuate conflict status. Blurring of such risks, having the potential for massive destruction, bring about strategies and non-military or military policies increasingly complex. To this state contributes the divergence of interests, the different perceptions of the strategies and procedures that are to follow, given that the actors involved do not always converge.

Understanding the causes, manifestations and consequences of these conflicts, has concerned the politicians and the public opinion, thus, becoming a real challenge. The question naturally arises: what is the role of the international community when the relations between different ethnic groups become violent and get out of control? The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has as common ideal, the principle according to which only by teaching and education, the rights and freedoms of people can be respected; using progressive measures on national and international scale can determine their recognition and their universal and effective implementation, both among the people of Member States and the people from the territories under their jurisdiction. But these issues seem to be ignored when interest rules on ownership or

access to certain materials, or energy inputs are the priority item; then, the boundary between security and insecurity is very fragile, in the forefront being the personal interest of the holder of power (in any form this would be: economic, political or military).

The European Union has adopted important decisions and gave new impulses to its efforts to strengthen security and defense dimension. Developing a common foreign and security policy includes the progressive framing of a common defense policy. At the same time, EU is increasingly concerned about the completion of its internal institutional reforms and efficiency triggered debates on the future of Europe, the political construction of the continent. We must not omit particular risks faced by NATO states on the European continent, expansion of networks and terrorist activity, uncontrolled proliferation and dissemination of technologies and nuclear materials, the means of mass destruction, the arms and other lethal unconventional means.

Terrorism is but one of the most dangerous phenomena of virulence, being encouraged by fundamentalist currents, based on the state of frustration and extreme poverty of large parts of the planet. By its unpredictability, by defying the rules of reason and civilized life, by its emotional impact on public opinion, **terrorism** can generate response to destabilize the international community to hijack humanity towards isolation, suspicion and unilateral solutions. Virulent challenge of terrorism and other challenges and non-military risks of the world today can be eliminated only through open, multilateral, balanced and persistent cooperation, directed towards eradicating the roots and root causes, especially extreme poverty. Social inequalities, increasing number of those living below the poverty line, can produce intolerance, affect social solidarity, favoring populism, thus fueling radical and extremist manifestations, having the most serious effects on the state institutions and mechanisms of functioning.

It is already a certainty that the moment that marked the *globalization of insecurity* in the world is the terrorist attacks on the United States of America, September 11, 2001. The attention of media pays for such events multiplies the impression that security is becoming lower. The media will only increase the visibility of attacks and the events must give the impression of an



apocalyptic event. It is not ethical or professional, but “merely” economically efficient, for the media to resume ostensibly horrible and morbid aspects even if the attacks are less spectacular ones. Thus, it is obtained the over-dimensioning of the effect of social perception, making an unimagined service to the terrorists who aimed for inducing a state of panic.

International terrorism adds new features to insecurity, attracting in this area new territories and populations. In addition, measures are taken to counter the phenomenon that can affect the most important values and democratic principles and thus, the lives of millions. The current security architecture reflects the essential features of the geopolitical and geo-strategic environment that runs: competition between the Euro-Atlantic area for the redistribution of power roles; clear transition to multi-polar international system; NATO and EU enlargement; Russian Federation attempts to underline its great power status in the international arena; erosion of the control and influence ability of governments to fund accelerated globalization, to name but a few from a much wider range.

The *sine qua non* condition for a cooperative security management is not represented only by the institutional reforms, but also by the principles of indivisibility of security, transparency, global and regional engagement of the international community. A more obvious feature of the current **international security environment** is that states and nations, in the context of globalization, should construct another building security ideas, quite different from that in the Cold War concept, where the role of international and regional security institutions should be more prominent, and all relations should be based on scientifically research.

Although there are some differences between European and its overseas partner (USA), on how to use military force in order to meet the challenges of international security environment, the relations between the US and the European Union, as a whole, converge to a common purpose, namely to ensure **peace and security in the world**. The perpetuation of international terrorism and the obvious increasingly tendency of multiplication the global power poles in the medium and long term can have significant effects on security developments. Obviously, in this context, the imposition of decisions by a particular state of

the planet or within their spheres of influence is becoming less likely, due to the installation of combinations that originate in their desire facility for the national interests of states, in terms of diversifying global interdependence established as a result of globalization amplification.

On the other hand, the privileged position of great powers in international relations, their interrelationship and private interests, in some cases may lead to developments that affect the security of states with a lower potential by: imposing a desired solution by a certain power; tolerating non-application of international law in certain cases with high degree of similarity; acceptance of motivations manufactured to meet aggressive action; flagrant violation of generally accepted rules; blocking or ignoring the role of international bodies, etc.

However, the **loss of bipolarity** meant that international society enter into a process of transition from a policy based on balance of forces, in an order based on principles of democratic values, human rights and respect for the existing culture and civilization. The obtained security environment is fluid and flexible, allowing any construction, organization and reorganization according to certain prevailing, trends or interests, as well as the global changes of power poles physiognomy.

The **multi-polar world** of the new century, dominated by the global rush for strategic resources (control and their rule), frightened by the negative effects of globalization and natural processes (global warming, water scarcity, desertification, floods, earthquakes, natural resource depletion, etc.), by the uncontrolled demographic trends that will generate large destabilizing processes in various areas of the world, will be a world of predominantly **asymmetric** conflict. They will appear in multiple strategic situations, based on trends of regionalization, creating serious gaps, negative social events, the proliferation of regional risks (conflict situations, dissemination of weapons and other unconventional means of fighting, terrorism and organized crime, drug trafficking, ethnic and religious conflicts, never-ending environmental degradation).

Amplifying the importance of the safety of non-state actors (international security agencies, NGOs and movements such as peaceful, humanitarian, environmental and transnational groups, media,



ethnic-religious and scientific movements, and those elements of terrorism and as well as of organized crime) will be probably the most consistent trend of the XXI century, this could be inferred even in the last decade of the second millennium, when they came and performed actions that affected the security interests of other important actors, both on international and national plan. In this regard, we note some issues as:

- international organizations or groups, formed on various issues or areas, have played and probably will continue to play an important role in the development world, causing the change of certain processes, such as the environment or the use of sophisticated weapons (nuclear, bacteriological, etc.) in some cases affecting national or international values;

- others have acted to deal with specific terrorist weapons, of particular interest, causing the emergence of global phenomena like illegal migration of important masses of people, weapons, strategic products or drugs trafficking;

- Non-state security actors can increasingly influence decisions of international bodies or national governments and may cause essential changes of the military itself, the nature and pattern of global security architecture as well as regional, and emergence of new forms of action to counter the negative evolution of some of these actors.

During this very "sensitive" period that humankind has been undergoing, we can easily see that the security environment is a complex process of transformation and remodeling, characterized by the manifestation of two opposing trends: on the one hand, extending the process of democratization affirmation of human rights and market economy principles while expanding cooperation and integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures; on the other hand, a process of disintegration and fragmentation of multi-state entities. In parallel, there is a maintenance and risk diversification of military and non-military nature, first of terrorism as well as an increase of vulnerabilities of international and national institutions to them.

In this context, we can state that the current security environment is marked by the following features<sup>1</sup>:

- disappearance of bipolarity and entering a new phase. During this period, only the United States has proven capabilities and opportunities

for its effective involvement in managing the major problems of humankind, being considered as the only political, economic, financial and military superpower, which is also credible and viable. Accordingly, a feature of the current period is single-poled;

- highlighting the European Union as a factor for stability and progress, economic and military development of China, together with the diplomatic offensive of Russia, for whom the state of "vigilance" against the major problems of the world is not over, suggests that, for a long term, the new international structure will be built on a multi-polar system;

- devotion to international non-state actors. These have as main features the lack of belonging to a certain geographical area, management and specific rules, and reporting to other than national values (tend to control and manage the areas and sectors of flagship power: ultra technology, economy, finances and, the last but not least, the **energy resources**).

- implementing new solutions and technologies in the development and functioning of institutions and political, economic and international security organizations.

As such, NATO has transformed itself, developing and upgrading, both its strategy of integration and cooperation, as well as its consultation with the Russian Federation and Ukraine, while assuming responsibilities beyond its traditional area.

Under these circumstances, it is clear that the new world order is based on principles of global vocation and inspiration:

- management of energy resources with a high risk potential has led to the amplification the competition for their controlling, as well as increasing cooperative efforts in developing a management system for proliferation and dissemination of phenomena;

- increasing flattening of the distinction between internal problems within the scope of sovereignty of states and foreign issues determine their resolution in an international institutional framework;

- redefining the concept of power based on the emergence of new benchmarks: capacity retention, processing and dissemination of information, cross-border economic management, ownership and access to high-technology; existing



symbolic power sources, such as ethnicity or individual human values.

From this perspective, at least theoretically, more opportunities are opened up for the development of stable relations within the international security system, to the extent that each country has multiple opportunities to find a relational balance, based on **compromise and cooperation** in relations with other active actors from the political arena of the world.

By firmly adhering to the values of EU and NATO, Romania has assumed a new strategic profile, emerging as a leading provider of regional stability and active participation in the development of regional initiatives. The new assumed status has gained international legitimacy due to the success of domestic reform, Romania being a stable democracy based on rule of law, supremacy of law, full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, where citizens, regardless of their ethnicity, religion, sex or race, have equal rights.

### **The impact of globalization on security environment**

Globalization represents a stage in the general political and economic development, social and cultural key feature of the global economy in the XXI century. In essence, this process is characterized by an increased tendency to reduce and eliminate the barriers between national economies, as well as by strengthening linkages and interdependencies between them. Globalization has overcome the traditional paradigm of the use and combination of classical inputs only at national level, this extending at international scale. Of all the definitions of globalization, the World Bank once eloquently summarized the process: *“Globalization refers to the observable fact that in recent years a larger and larger part of global economic activity takes place between individuals and companies from different countries.”*<sup>2</sup>

The idea of globalization has been launched in the '80s in the US management schools from Harvard, and joined in the spirit of neo-liberal doctrine that promotes free trade between countries of the world. The main institutional actors of globalization are: the state, transnational corporations and nongovernmental organizations. The fundamental effects of globalization are reflected in increasing economic liberalization, opening of national

economies and the interaction between them, under the unprecedented development of information technology, telecommunications and cross-border movement of capital.

According to experts, globalization is seen as a last stage of widening the area of economic activities, with effect from a single global market, a process by which geographic distance becomes a less important factor in establishing and developing more diverse cross-border relations.

Globalization is obvious in all areas of life, leading to widening markets, allowing selective use of world resources, paves the completion of cheaper products by concentrating production at global companies, while ensuring competitive growth potential. Globalization is enhanced by technological advances in transport, telecommunications (infrastructure development) and computer industry, amplification of international cooperation, development of management as a science, and ensuring communication using more widely spoken languages.

In 1992, Glyn and Sutcliffe<sup>3</sup> characterized globalization as an extension of capitalist relations of production (post-communist transition processes) or the increased interdependence in the global economic system (universal access to information). Therefore, under the direction of movement of society and because of the advantages, namely, the forces propelling it, **globalization cannot be stopped**.

In this decade, the process of globalization has accelerated, causing an obvious increase in the level of economic interdependence and interaction between the states of the world. Globalization is marked by a dual-stage transition: **political transition** from the state to the block and **axiological transition** from the economic valuation to that of the social one.

Since ancient times, economics, as a whole, represented the foundation of military power capacity, namely, in one way or another, influenced the preparation and carrying on of a classic war; the assertion is also true from the other angle of view: together with the stated purpose of the war (of punishment, release, purification, etc.), there was a “supernatural”, unreported one, which meant economic issues (spoils of war, sources of raw materials or products, markets, employment subject or complete annexation of the occupied territories). Removing from the context of the



economic war, to distinguish it and consider its implications in terms of globalization, may seem inappropriate, considering that most times, the wars that humankind experienced, had an economic component.

In the current political and economic stage, there are two trends in the world, first, competition between states and groups of countries to conquer new markets and areas rich in resources, a trend that may lead to conflicts of interest, even violent in some cases, the other focuses on cooperation and integration, being implemented by new conquests of science and technology. Moreover, the involvement of transnational companies has fundamentally changed the global political-economic landscape. Acting in the entire world, they have created their own dominant, prosperous, economic space which they control, many of them being more powerful than the states in which they actually act, leading to the easily imposed conditions on the act of negotiation; quite often, companies are involved in the political life of any country providing that politics, once having gained power, favors the economics through protectionist fiscal policies.

**The economic war**<sup>4</sup> is now everywhere, most times it can not be seen, because on the surface things seem to take place peacefully, provided that it is brutal and unscrupulous in depth. Always, the strategic objective of the economic war is economic power, whereas it determines as well the political power, the military, etc. Generally speaking, in this competition, there are attracted well-trained people and institutions / prepared by strategies that are permanently improved, the information and psychological resources, as well as official and unofficial propaganda, are used in full. In order to win the economic war, all means that are available or not are used as it follows: infrastructure (physical or virtual networks), companies, IT components, gun competitiveness (reducing production costs, launching new products, high quality, aggressive advertising, favorable terms of sale), etc. Also, extra-economic means are used in full, such as industrial espionage, sabotage, denigrating the competition, parasitic competition, unlawful competition, tax fraud, dumping, all of them being part of an unfair competition, on the altar of economic war.

Even if this process of globalization concerns the economic sphere in particular, its effects have

essential connotations on all areas, from the socio-cultural to the political and military. Note that between globalization and integration processes there are indissoluble connections.

Globalization has and will have an increasing obvious number of **collateral and contradictory consequences**, both positive and negative, which will affect all countries, including those ones in the process of confirming or reconfirming their regional or global power in the economic arena. These consequences highlight some key aspects:

- globalization causes the amplification of solidarity between countries of the world. More and more governments and international organizations are realizing that maintaining regional and world peace, preventing and maintaining control of conflicts and crises, solving major humanitarian issues, which are not possible unless all state and non-state actors are involved, including the least developed ones. The general consensus on the fight against terrorism and the support humanitarian relief for disasters and catastrophes are conclusive examples;

- growing economic interdependence between countries in the world increases in global and regional stability. This positive trend towards a more peaceful and more prosperous world, where the risks of outbreaks of inter-state conflicts have decreased significantly, has as foundation the technology proliferation, particularly in knowledge, communications and informatics. More and more states are interested in attracting investment in the top of science and technology, and participation in global capital flow and exchange;

- on a longer term, globalization will lead to the strengthening of regional spirit. This will result in an increasing regional consciousness, of belonging to certain areas of civilization, a development of solidarity between members from the same regions that share common values. In contrast, there is an attenuation of national consciousness and patriotic feelings resulting from the **exodus of values** to highly industrialized countries;

- globalization results in an increased sensitivity of the global economy to any local or regional failure or difficulty. Interaction of the international economy leads to reduced opportunities of anticipating and preventing economic and financial crisis by state institutions. Also, gaps in international political-economic



relations can threaten and disrupt the military and technological capability of a country or more;

- dependence on the resources, information and technology from other countries leads to reduced levels of national sovereignty. Financial dependence of partnership and the relation of collaboration do not always allow foreign governments to take decisions according to their national interest, which can have negative repercussions on other fields than the economic areas. This is the case of cultural identity, control of the elements and criminal groups, as well as of the border mafia, etc.;

- destructive and restructuring stages of the current international system may cause crises. It is possible that under the impact of globalization and especially the consequences of disputes to a more profitable place in the hierarchy of world power, the current system be damaged and could get a different physiognomy, which can lead to disputes and economic, ethnic, religious or national crises. Some state entities insufficiently structured, unstable and economically unproductive, likely to fail in the great global competition, will meet growing social needs, will divide, or will have to become part of a powerful entity or its subordinate, or of certain powerful actors on the international stage (this start may occur beneath our helpless "eyes");

- the process of globalization, taking place concurrently with the confirmation of new planetary leaders, favors the emergence and proliferation of asymmetric threats and hazards whose adverse effects are felt by many countries. The most representative ones concern:

- o diversification of terrorist and mafia networks of illegal persons, drugs, weapons, military and nuclear technology trafficking;

- o penetration in information systems and banking, disinformation and manipulation of information;

- o reducing the state's authority and favoring the creation of autonomous mafia type structures with strong international ramifications, leading to the globalization of organized crime;

- o increased disparities between the development of various countries, restricted access to single global market and enhance the financial-economic and political dependence for a long time of the nowadays developing countries over the developed ones;

- o amplification of illegal immigration and, during crisis, of mass exodus alongside the environmental issues, of natural or industrial disasters, epidemics, which may include large areas and regions.

The process of economy globalization appears both as a resultant of intensification of multinational companies and transnational activities and, as a question of asserting their more powerful internationally. Although their work is concentrated mostly in the developed countries, their impact on developing economies should not be neglected. On the base of diversification and globalization of production, the **value added created** in activities **abroad** increased rates higher than those ones obtained on the national markets. The last decade has increased the number of so-called foreign sales *mega-companies* performing over 1.5 billion dollars annually. It can also be noted a trend of concentration of businesses in sectors with the greatest competitive advantage and to markets with high growth potential demand, boosted by a greater degree of liberalization and openness.

This wave of **capital globalization**<sup>5</sup>, whose promoters are primarily multinational corporations, differs in several respects from the previous ones, because it includes a wide range of activities dominated by services facilitated by highly sophisticated financial instruments. The process of globalization, in addition to being discussed and treated in different forms in terms of all sections of society, has become **inevitable**. Therefore, globalization is simply present everywhere, and we are full-fated to live into it, that is why, we must address to this phenomenon as a natural evolution of social and economic life worldwide.

### Conclusion

The evolution of global security in the last decade confirmed that the success of actions and stability can only be the result of multidimensional cooperation of the international community - primarily through enhancement of the dialogue in the institutional framework and by activating the crucial role that the major international organizations have in defining security state of the world.

In the present international circumstances, it is increasingly clear that addressing security



only in terms of strict military factor is no longer sufficient. At the same time, there is a consolidation of the security environment as a result of political decisions and the multiplication of democratic countries' efforts to build new European security architecture, which favors the building of a new world order.

The deep transformation of the first decade of the XXI century is in a relationship of direct proportionality, both with the increased role of the international community in conflict prevention, crisis management and resolution, as well as with the geographic expansion of democratization and globalization.

It can be concluded that **globalization will coexist**, paradoxically, with both the processes of integration and unification of states and those of fragmentation and division of others and asserting power centers will acquire connotations ever so acute as unpredictable. If, on long term a multi-polar construction can be shaped, on short and medium term, single polarity remains the main feature, given that the US is the only credible and viable superpower in the world.

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# THE EUROPEAN UNION – A GLOBAL ACTOR?

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*The paper deals with conclusions reached during the Slovak Strategic Forum (May 22 – 23, 2009) discussions focused on the European Security and Defence Policy. The conclusions from the 3<sup>rd</sup> Slovak Strategic Forum have been published in PANORAMA of global security environment 2009 by Center for European and North Atlantic Affairs<sup>1</sup>.*

*It examines a security dimension of bilateral relations between the European Union and Russia, with emphasis on a proposal of the Russian President Medvedev to create a pan-European security system. The paper accentuates the significance of energy within mutual relations, too. It examines options that the Slovak Republic, as an EU member, has within formulation of its interests towards Russia.*

*It summarizes the security experts' opinions on five years of existence of the European Security Strategy and concludes that it is necessary to develop a new document which should be prepared in coordination with preparation of a new NATO Strategic Concept.*

*It focuses on the EU missions and importance of the EU battle groups in terms of comparison between the EU's soft power and hard power.*

*The paper assumes that the EU capabilities and capacities, including a participation of the Slovak Republic, will be strengthened. In spite of existing troubles within common engagement of civilian and military forces, the paper admits a future possibility of their connection.*

*Keywords: Hard power; Eastern Partnership; EU missions; EU scenarios; European Security Strategy; European Army Concept; New NATO Strategic Concept; National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation; pan-European Security System.*

## Introduction

In comparison with previous forums, the third Slovak Strategic Forum<sup>2</sup> organized in 2009 by the Center for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA) was more focused on the European Union and its Security and Defence Policy. In the year when the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been held, the forum participants focused particularly on the issues of the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the EU missions. These issues are part of a broader discussion about importance of the Lisbon Treaty for a further development of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, for fulfilment of its growing ambitions, and improvement of operational capacities necessary for fulfilling them. The discussion about supplementation or a complete change of the ESS fitted in context of preparations of the new NATO Strategic Concept which will surely stay in the centre of the security analysts' attention in the coming period. With regard to the growing discussion about possible development of Russia, and in connection with its new National Security Strategy 2020, the Slovak Strategic Forum concentrated on the relationship between the European Union and Russia.

The Slovak Strategic Forum did not aim to unambiguously formulate the answers for the given questions. However, following some positive as well as negative opinions, it is possible to make certain partial conclusions which are summarized in this paper.

## The European Union and Russia

Despite several greater or smaller crises, the European Union has recently realised that further development of a strategic partnership with Russia



requires an insertion of a meaningful dialogue about security into the agenda. However, a security dimension of mutual relations cannot be separated from a broader European security structure. This implies several questions: To which extent can the European Union accept the proposal of the President Medvedev to create a new European Security System? Who was more weakened by the Georgian-Russian conflict—Russia or the EU? And which lessons should the EU take from it? Should the EU approach Russia independently or in coordination with the NATO (the US)? What is the role of energy within mutual relations? The discussion did not bring clear answers. However, it showed some trends within understanding these issues by the Slovak security community. In these terms, several participants pointed out Ukraine's vulnerability of in relation to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and at the same time emphasized a Trans-Atlantic Framework and importance of the cooperation with the US.

### **A meaningful dialogue between the European Union and Russia**

During the discussion about a more and more strengthened position of Russia in the international scene, the participants pointed out a need of balanced approach towards assessment of Russia's position towards Europe. On one hand, the participants came to an agreement that it is necessary to desist from stereotyped assessment of Russia (conservative, undemocratic, nationalist Russia with inclination to dictatorship, etc.), but, on the other hand they noticed that it is necessary to take into account that Russia follows its interests and, within the framework of strengthening its influence, it tries to return back to Northern and Eastern Europe. Regarding an observation of mutual mistrust between the EU and Russia, some experts argued that Russian mistrust towards a development in the EU could emerge from concerns relating to possible exhaustion and internal break-up of the Union. On the other hand, although the EU is aware of a need of cooperative approach to Russia, it does not believe Russia, since "to be cooperative" means for the Europeans "not to cross the *red line*" (Georgia, gas crisis, enlargement, etc.). There was also a question whether the cooperative approach of the EU is really the right one.<sup>3</sup> Most likely, neither a development leading

to the Union's "status" of a security actor is in the Russia's interest. For Russia, it would be a new, too powerful rival, different from NATO, because Russia is substantially dependent on the EU.

When judging the mutual relations between the Union and Russia, it is also necessary to take into account importance that these two actors attribute to each other. In terms of priorities of the Russian Foreign and Security Policy, the EU ranks behind the Commonwealth of Independent States and the US. Moreover, the National Security Strategy of Russia 2009 has mentioned a strategic partnership only in connection with the US<sup>4</sup>. In relation to the EU, comprehensive strengthening of mechanisms of mutual relations has been mentioned, including a gradual creation of common areas within economy, internal and external security, education, science, and technology<sup>5</sup>. However, Russia admits that 50% of its goods' turnover goes to the EU and that the Union represents a stable partner.

On the other hand, within the EU Security Strategy, Russia is considered an important player with whom it is necessary to establish a strategic partnership<sup>6</sup>. Paradoxically, the European Parliament has rejected a formula of strategic partnership. In this connection, one participant expressed a view that the EU should be much more compact in its approach towards Russia and support its values, as well as abandon its "black-and-white sight". In the matter of Slovakia, as a member of the Euro-Atlantic structures, it should support a clear approach of the Union towards Russia, since Russia is able to notice the smallest uncertainty of its partner at a negotiating table and take advantage of it. This is one of the reasons why the EU should agree upon some common "catalogue of interests and goals" which would characterize the needs of particular policies of the Union towards Russia. For example, several participants considered the EU project, Eastern Partnership, to be quite problematic one. It is very important what kind of confidence this project will invoke on the side of the participating countries in the future, because the present attitudes are rather tepid. Russia considers this project to be rather its competitor and views it as an obstacle in the efforts to strengthen its positions in these countries.<sup>7</sup>

Within the discussion about the proposal of the Russian President Medvedev to create a new European Security System, the participants did not concur. One group tended to the opinion that it is



necessary to take into account a Russian view that criticizes (in)competence of institutional structures and calls for renovation of the European security architecture.

However, this view is based on the opinions of current political administration in Russia, which tries to strengthen – in every possible way – its position in the world.<sup>8</sup> Russia has stopped preferring the OSCE and tries to enforce a new model, which Russia itself has not been able to define yet.

The participants expressed a view that Russia's effort to weaken the NATO within this system would be critical.

The discussion will be influenced by the fact that Russia has not become a part of Europe in accordance with the EU's visions, but at the same time, Russia itself sees some problems in the perspective of its membership in the EU. Russia does not want to have purely business relations with the EU and therefore there is a discussion about substitution of the Treaty on Partnership and Cooperation. Russia would prefer a much freer document that would provide sufficient space to maneuver. Russia is well known for its dual policy towards Europe – it acts differently towards the EU as a whole and at the same time it acts differently through its bilateral relations, particularly with Germany and France, and uses these relations for weakening the EU compactness.

The views on problems concerning the EU energy policy towards Russia were also ambiguous. The discussion confirmed the importance of energy within bilateral relations and the participants agreed that the existing Energy Charter has not been a guarantee of energy security – at the beginning of 2009, Slovakia and other countries had a first-hand experience of it.

The discussion, however, did not bring any view on more precise direction of the energy policy between the EU and Russia or possibilities of Slovakia to influence it in some way.

Within a meaningful dialogue with Russia, the Union should proceed in coordination with both important actors of the Euro-Atlantic Area – the Alliance and the US.

However, the Slovak community has realized that the Russian view is much more critical towards Alliance and so the relationship of Slovakia towards Russia should be based on a premise that Slovakia is a member of both organizations.

Although the discussion did not offer more

definite proposals or solutions, a part of the participants thought that the Slovak Republic should not be so “pro-extreme” as Poland or the Czech Republic.

### Partial Conclusion

In relation to the Russian Federation, EU should take into account the following:

- Russia strives for a real restoration of its power and influence upon regional and global scene and it is necessary to analyze this new reality in detail and take it into account within formulation of a particular policy.
- There is still a mutual mistrust between the European Union and Russia. Moreover, Russia still looks at the future development of EU with insecurity and so does the European Union with respect to the further development of Russia.
- There are some problems within International (European) Security System which was not (has not been) able to respond to the development of the security situation in appropriate way. The proposal of the President Medvedev to create a new pan-European Security System should be taken into consideration, but EU should prepare its own proposals and requirements.

The discussion provided this conclusion: it is necessary to deal with the proposal of the President Medvedev, but at the same time, it should be taken into account that there are some differences within the interpretation of global security, and within opinions concerning governance models belonging to the field of “common neighbourhood” of EU and Russia.

The Slovak Republic (SR) should:

- support a unequivocal approach of the EU towards Russia; Slovakia should influence a formulation of the EU interests towards Russia with respect to the SR interests;
- support a cooperative, not a confrontational, policy of the EU towards Russia and at the same time support a compactness of Europe and unification within particular policies;
- formulate its interests and policy towards Russia in a longer-term perspective.



### **The European Security Strategy after Six Years – How to Go Further**

In December 2008, there was the 5<sup>th</sup> anniversary of adoption of the European Security Strategy, the first security document of the EU. Since then, there have been several discussions concerning the future development of the ESDP and the European security issues have been discussed by the Council of the EU and the European Parliament, too. The discussion has also raised several questions: Is it necessary to develop a new ESS or just update the ESS 2003? Does the ESS make any sense without defining the common European interests within the security area? Should the ESS result from a comparison of national security strategies? How often should the ESS be revised? How to deal with issues of “effective multilateralism” and all kinds of polarities?

#### **Is it necessary to develop a new ESS or just update the ESS 2003?**

Within discussion, the experts focused on assessment of the positives and the “weak points” of the ESS that have occurred during five years of its real existence. The opinions on Strategy were mixed – there were critics of its existence and the process of its revision, but there were also those ones who argued that the ESS is a sufficient document which has its place and is needed, and that the Report from December 2008<sup>9</sup> had created sufficient conditions for its improvement.

The discussion incited a formation of two opinion groups. The critics pointed out particularly insufficient consensus which accompanied the ESS from its preparation and finally caused that the Strategy was written by a small group of people without taking into consideration broader European (regional) opinions. This issue occurred during the conferences on possible revision of the ESS in 2008, where the participants failed to reach a consensus on foreign and security policy. The mixed opinions occurred also in respect to the EU’s approach towards new security threats and a decision whether a new ESS should be developed or it is enough to complement the old one.

The supporters think that, from the point of view of structure and scope, the ESS is a good document, with good analytic part and vision, which has created a common starting point for

understanding threats and relationship towards external world. They consider the ESS to be a needed document and judge the Council’s Report on the ESS Implementation to be a good starting point for a work on a new document. The group of critics thinks the Union lacks “comprehensive strategic thinking” and discussion on the European level – although, on the other hand, there are still some pressures on enforcement of narrower national interests. However, it was said several times that the ESDP as a whole has reached several successes, e.g., the first missions in Balkan or outside Europe, which eliminates certain “pessimism”.

The Forum participants also concurred that the Lisbon Treaty would play an important role within the implementation of the ESS in response to the threat, although the opinions on the importance of the Treaty were mixed and some of the views were quite sceptical. However, the majority of participants concurred that the Treaty brings a new view on capabilities and structures and will bring a progress within the ESS implementation.

What poses a great obstacle in progress of the European security is an absence of strategic security interests and an insufficient “prioritization”, too<sup>10</sup>. Although the Council’s Report on the ESS Implementation has updated and extended the threats, the unity of political will during the decision-making about the response to the threats still remains a problem. At first, EU has to unify itself in definition of security interests that could be a starting point for a definition of the “European security identity”.<sup>11</sup>

Also, the experts discussed about an influence of parallel prepared NATO Strategic Concept on the ESS. They agreed upon the following: it will be very important which place will be given to the EU (possibilities and ways of cooperation) within the already mentioned concept and what attitude the SK NATO will take to a non-military dimension. As far as Slovakia is concerned, it must – as a NATO member – support preservation and further development of the NATO. Similarly, while preparing the new ESS, it is necessary to ensure that, alongside harmonization of the interests of all the EU members, the SR interests will be accepted, too.<sup>12</sup>

A question concerning the size and complexity of the ESS evoked opposing opinions. Some participants were pointing out that if the document would be extended and adopt often criticized



“implementation aspect”, the ESS could become very broad and so thinly usable document. The new ESS should represent a starting point for further strategies – whether an antiterrorist or energy one, and so on.

### Partial Conclusion

Based on the discussion, it is possible to abstract away the following answers for the questions which had been posed to the SSF participants:

- The participants tended towards the view that it is necessary to develop a new document that should be prepared in coordination with preparation of the new NATO Strategic Concept.
- Without definition of common European interests in the field of security, the ESS will remain the document without ability of implementation.
- Within the preparation of the ESS, the experts' views from individual member states should be taken into greater consideration (in comparison with 2003). It is a comparison of national security strategies which could serve as a fundamental starting point.
- The revision of the ESS (or at least its assessment) could be carried out in spirit of the European Parliament, in five-year cycle.
- Although the implementation of “effective multilateralism” is justified, it is quite complicated issue to which the Forum did not take a stand.

### The EU Missions – Experience

Within the framework of the ESDP, the European Union has so far conducted 22 missions, while 16 of them have been civilian ones. The experience has shown that if the EU wants to fulfil its resolutions within international crisis management, it needs to build up not only civilian but also military capabilities. The development in recent six years has brought many new challenges and forced the EU to face with new decisions: Should we act uniquely under the UN mandate or also under the regional command (NATO, OSCE)? Are there any geographical limits for the EU missions? Does Africa represent an area of interest for the whole EU? Is the concept of the EU battle groups on decline and will it be replaced by the European Army Concept? Are we willing to send the Czech-Slovak battle group wherever?

### The EU Battle Groups Concept vs. the European Army Concept

Within the discussion, the positives as well as the negatives of creation of the ESDP civilian and military capabilities and their usage in real conditions of engagement were assessed. The participants focused mainly on the EU ambitions, new scenarios and capabilities of the EU battle groups (BGs). The supporters of the critical attitude pointed out that the Union prepares its capabilities and structures without a cohesive foreign policy or a vision what should they serve to. This implies a question of a purpose of the EU BGs. A majority of participants supported the view that without capabilities construction the EU could not fulfil its ambition to be a respected player, less so a global one. The importance of the capabilities was pointed out even in the ESS 2003, and the Council as well as the European Parliament identify themselves with it<sup>13</sup>. A demand for the EU assistance has increased recently and the Union establishes greater ambitions and prepares more demanding scenarios<sup>14</sup>.

The discussion about the EU missions and capacities was marked by rather positive view. A majority of the Forum participants agreed with an assessment that the EU engages more and more through the missions and operations, enlarges a number of operations and area of action and their quality increases, too<sup>15</sup>. Especially in the West Balkans, the EU has taken the responsibility for stability and security, and at the same time solved the problems which had not been solved during the previous actions of the UN or NATO.

Within assessment of the EU's progress in this field, it was pointed out that the *soft power* has prevailed. This is considered to be a comparative advantage of the EU, since it is the only organisation that is able to engage such capabilities. The stabilisation is a long-term process and the means of *soft power* play a more and more important role in it. Although civilian operations have prevailed in the EU crisis management, there are some problems in preparation of the capabilities. This is caused by differences in quantity and quality of national contributions.

The same applies to Slovakia which has great problems within provision of civilian capacities. The discussion exposed that the greatest obstacle is represented by insufficient Slovak legislation for



such a kind of engagement. Our engaged staff is not provided with the same conditions, protection, insurance and subsequent incorporation into society after an arrival as staff from other states participating in these missions<sup>16</sup>. Although now the EU is not able to prepare and launch a combined military-civilian operation<sup>17</sup>, currently created tools of planning increase this probability.

All the participants concurred that an increase in the EU's ambitions is legitimate. However, one of important restrictions is a political will in fulfilment of ambitions and engagement of civilian and military capacities. At the same time, there has emerged a question whether the EU BGs are able to carry out the tasks of six supposed scenarios<sup>18</sup>, because from a military point of view their size and structure do not correspond with new ambitions of the Union. The battalion-sized groups are appropriate rather for arrangement of crises and conflicts of lower intensity; various national restrictions remain; and there are also other troubles, for example, in the area of strategic transport. In terms of a further development of BGs, various opinions have occurred. The BGs are considered to be a positive element in the military capabilities development. Their dissolution in a short-term horizon would pose a risk in spite of the fact that they have not been engaged yet. According to the participants, the NATO Response Force supposes a shift towards smaller forces since it has been proved that a size of the EU BGs does not play a negative role. The need of the BGs was defended also in term of a need to prepare the forces of the EU member states in compliance with "European military culture" – even despite the fact that it has its strict criteria. The discussion also brought the views that it is possible to think about replacement of the EU BGs Concept, however, there is no assumption that it could happen in a short-term perspective. Recently, various statements of the European politicians have occurred in this connection, for instance, a statement of the Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, about an effort to create a common European Army, or a statement of the Polish President, Lech Kaczynsky, about the European Army bound to the NATO. The United Kingdom has also opposed the engagement of the BGs in a real time.

The experts suppose that one of the weakest points of this concept at a political level may be for example a possibility of paralysing the

BGs engagement by some states, in case the EU member states would not find a common will. This was illustrated by an example of different views of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic on Kosovo – two countries that form the common BG in the second half of 2009.

The Forum participants also paid attention to the African continent, particularly in connection with the SR actions in the standby groups in 2009 and 2010. They were sceptical in respect to an approach of Slovak as well as Czech politicians and parliaments towards engagement of a common battle group in Africa. Although the African continent does not belong to the sphere of interest of the Central-European countries, several experts pointed out potential threats coming from this continent. As an example, we can mention mass illegal migration which currently threatens southern Europe, but which can gradually shift to the north. It means that Africa is becoming a similar challenge as Afghanistan.

Therefore, Slovakia should take into consideration heterogeneity of regional interests and priorities as well as realize the fact that it is not possible to orientate itself only to the exclusively narrow Slovak priorities. It is necessary to take into account the threats concerning the whole EU and coordinate our interests. We should not go against the EU interests.

### **Partial Conclusion**

Following positive as well as negative opinions it is possible to answer some questions that the Slovak Strategic Forum faced:

- The EU has confirmed its capability to plan and conduct the operations. In the recent ten years it has carried out more than 20 operations of different specialization – from operations launched by the NATO and taken up by the EU to operations and missions that have been launched by the EU itself. It points out the EU's ambitions to be a global player.

- The EU capabilities and capacities, including the Slovak Republic participation, should be still strengthened in the future. It is important to use the comparative advantages of the EU, particularly within civilian capacities, but also in the future potential connection between civilian and military forces, despite current troubles that occur during their common engagement.



- The existing ESS assumes the EU will respond to the crises only if it is granted with a UN mandate. However, there is also an assumption of action without a broader UN mandate – on the basis of bilateral agreements (particularly within European area, as the EULEX experience has shown).

- Despite opinion ambivalence, the EU BGs have represented a positive component and due to their capacity they are usable for fulfilment of some EU's ambitions. What still poses a problem is their size and composition that are not in compliance with the established ambitions, which could complicate engagement according to particular scenarios.

- The Security Forum has not excluded a possibility of replacement of the EU Security Strategy. However, it has supposed that formation of the common army in a short-term or a mid-term perspective is not realistic.

- The question of geographic limitation of the EU missions was not answered unequivocally. The participants agreed about the fact that there is heterogeneity of regional interests and priorities and that the final result will depend on the consensus within the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

- So far, Africa has stood out of the attention of the Central-European countries, despite some threats coming from this continent that could hit them. Although the ESDP has made some progress in relation to Africa, potential engagement of the Czech-Slovak BG is still marked by some scepticism: Would there be any political will to engage this BG in Africa?

- The political will, a willingness to engage the BGs, still poses a problem within the EU's ability of action and usage of already existing capabilities. Within engagement of civilian capacities, the EU's ability of action is restricted by insufficiently adapted legal system of individual states – this is an ongoing problem in Slovakia, too.

### **The EU as a Global Player – a Myth or Reality?**

During the Slovak Strategic Forum 2006, the representatives of the Slovak Security Community came to an agreement that the European Union should play more important role in ensuring peace

and security in the world. However, they did not agree on tools the EU should use to perform its role of a global player. Following opinions of the Slovak experts, the EU has got further in its role of the global player – but only when we take into account all the tools. However, when we take a purely narrow view (ESDP), and regarding the global trends, the expert look at the future development of the European engagement in this field is more cautious. The “*soft power vs. hard power*” dilemma has not been solved in the EU yet. The Slovak experts still think that the EU power remains particularly in the use of the *soft power* means. However, the Forum has observed progress within formation of *hard power* and partially in effort to create appropriate conditions for common engagement of both capabilities. Military as well as civilian experts realize that without formation of *hard power* capabilities, the EU will lose a chance to carry out its global ambitions.

There is no clear answer for a question to which extent the individual member states are interested to contribute to the EU's role of a global player. Only the key states have had a comprehensive strategic vision. However, their strategic vision is often different, sometimes even opposing, which supposedly poses the biggest problem within a formation of the common European strategic vision or strategic culture. At the same time, there are also the states without global strategic thinking. This ambition is generally supported by the European public and Slovakia should support this trend, too.

### **Instead of Conclusion**

From several points of view, the European Union has already been the global player. The supportive arguments include the EU capability to project a vision which has so far united 27 European states and served as an example for other countries (Turkey, Ukraine, West Balkans countries). The participants identified themselves with arguments that the ESS had stated as a confirmation of the EU's global influence<sup>19</sup>. There are geographic areas where the Union is able to attain greater success, since in these areas the EU's tools (political, economic, civilizing or crisis management tools) are more attractive and effective. However, there are also areas where this ambition does not have to fulfil. The reality within the crisis management is



that the EU is successful in engagement of the *soft power* elements. In respect to traditional military power, the EU is not able to be a global power, although it does not mean it should not build up its military capabilities. At the same time, those who support the EU as a global player have pointed out uncertainties in the future development. These uncertainties include dynamic multi-vector global trends to which the EU member states are not able to respond. The given vision can be braked or even reversed by the growing populism. The agenda has taken up short-term political interests and goals, which could exert influence upon instantiation, consensus and implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. In this connection, the influences of global economic and financial crisis have been discussed, as well as its influence on unification or division of Europe. Several participants agreed that crisis might be an impetus for some kind of shift within the EU, that it could influence an effort for improvement and increasing of efficiency of its functioning and riddance of those activities and tools that are not effective. They also agreed that the crisis will weaken *hard power* for some time, particularly in respect to decrease of budgets for defence or crisis management as a whole. However, it can strengthen the integration. The EU can play quite significant role in international regulation of financial markets and commerce. A polemic was evoked by the views which could be characterized as conservative ones. Their supporters argued that the current progress of the EU is too rapid, so it is not possible to harmonize all the elements, and they did not exclude something in the way of Europe *à la carte* or the use of coalition of willing.

According to these opinions it would be much easier to reach consensus within formulation of policy of crises solution and the use of mechanisms and tools that the Union (coalition states) has at its disposal. However, the majority of participants concurred that it would be a step back, traditional power centres would be formed again and the approach to security and its elements would fragment.

In terms of Slovakia, a negative vision of the EU development would be a problem. The participants agreed that we, Slovaks, still discuss rather critical arguments than those which are typical for an optimistic vision. Slovakia lacks a layer of politicians who would be able to join

the interests of Slovakia with those of the EU. The Forum participants also expressed the same opinion that Slovakia does not have any alternative – the EU position is important for us, regardless of variation in which it oscillates.

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Conclusions of the Brussels European Council of 11 and 12 December 2008 on the European Security and Defence Policy (17121/08).

### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> Internet URL : [www.cenaa.org](http://www.cenaa.org)

<sup>2</sup> The Slovak Strategic Forum (SSF) represents an exclusive open table which assembles the representatives of the Parliament, governmental structures, and experts for purpose of an open discussion about the future of the Transatlantic Security Policy. The aim of the SSF is to build up a network of the Slovak strategic community which, besides professional assessment of the Security and Defence Policy of Slovakia, will come with progressive views on the Transatlantic Security. The SSF has been organised by the CENAA once or twice a year. An intensive and open discussion has been guaranteed by the Chatham House Rules.

<sup>3</sup> According to the information after the EU – Russia meeting in Khabarovsk, the EU will not sign a new strategic pact with Russia, unless Russia enters the World Trade Organisation first (difficulties with timber exports, imports of cars, steel and milk). Europe still views a problem in observance of a peace accord on Georgia, safety of nuclear reactors and submarines, but also corruption and human rights abuses in North Caucasus. Source: *EU-Russia summit ends with prickly exchange over energy*, Euobserver, May 23, 2009, <http://euobserver.com/9/28173/?rk=1>.

<sup>4</sup> Russia will strive to build an equal and fully valuable partnership with the US, based on identical interests and taking into consideration an influence



of Russian-American relations on the international situation. National Security Strategy of the RF, Article 18, <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html>.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., Article 16.

<sup>6</sup> We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership. ESS, p. 14, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

<sup>7</sup> The partnership countries are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – authors' comment.

<sup>8</sup> According to the Russian analyses, the western (also peace) expansion was possible due to Russia's weakness. However, now the situation changes – Russia has overcome consequences of political and social-economic crisis and is becoming a key subject within multi-polar international relations, National Security Strategy of the RF 2020, Article 1, <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html>

<sup>9</sup> The report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, p. 14. The European Parliament resolution of 19 December 2008 – the development of the European security autonomy, building-up new security structures, including integration of civilian and military capacities.

<sup>10</sup> The ESS contains a wide range of measures that are derived from the interests of individual states, which is fine, however, it is not possible to take the same response for each threat – terrorism, piracy, organized crime, failing states and so on. Quite problematic is also the unambiguous view on a choice of particular tools for particular threats – the authors' comment.

<sup>11</sup> Within a preparation of a new ESS, two aspects will have to be taken into consideration: a *theoretical* one that is adequately represented in the current strategy and a *practical* one – a real EU policy, searching for adequate tools for given types of threats, consensus within the use of soft and hard power. Moreover, in the theoretical part, it is also necessary to unequivocally explain terms like security, security threat, security risk, security and defence strategy – the authors' comment.

<sup>12</sup> A problem within discussion may occur in harmonization of interests. The discussants talked about “strategic minimum of consensus“. According to the discussants, an influence of the “great European players” would surely manifest. It may also happen that the ESS will not be more specific and will contain just the “hung” interests of different states and groups of states – the authors' comment.

<sup>13</sup> Battle groups and Civilian Response Teams have enhanced our capacity to react rapidly, in Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy, p. 14. The European Parliament resolution of 19 December 2008 – the development of the European security autonomy, building-up of new security structures, including integration of civilian and military capacities.

<sup>14</sup> Conclusions of the Brussels European Council of 11 and 12 December 2008 on the European Security and Defence Policy (17121/08).

<sup>15</sup> Since 1999, the number of operations has increased; there has been also a shift from easier operations, that the EU took from the NATO, to independent operations in hard conditions – the authors' comment.

<sup>16</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic has launched a preparation of legislation that would create at least the same conditions as servicemen of the Ministry of Defence have. This issue has not been solved in the long term – the authors' comment.

<sup>17</sup> Experience from the Crisis Management Exercise CMX 2008 has confirmed it, too.

<sup>18</sup> The new scenarios include: two major stabilisation and reconstruction operations, with a suitable civilian component, supported by a maximum of 10 000 men for at last two years; two rapid response operations of limited duration using inter alia the EU's battle groups; an emergency operation for the evacuation of European nationals; a maritime or air surveillance/interdiction mission; a civilian-military humanitarian assistance operation lasting up to 90 days; around a dozen ESDP civilian missions of varying formats in a rapid reaction situation.

<sup>19</sup> The number of the EU citizens, GNP, the tools that are at disposal – the authors' comment.

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# EUROPEAN UNION – SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON ITS STATUS AS A RELEVANT SECURITY ACTOR

*Gheorghe IORDACHE, PhD*

*European Union's dimension of security and defence is a relatively new component in this organizational framework. European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was crystallized within the European Council from Cologne, in 1998 and was designed as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). CFSP and ESDP represent veritable instruments that the Union can capitalize to affirm on the international scene as a relevant security actor; means by which it can ensure not only its own security, but they also may be instruments used to take an active role in providing international security environment*

*The current paper aims to identify the elements which recommend EU as a relevant international actor in matters relating to security and those that may pose obstacles to shaping such a role.*

*Keywords: EU security; NATO; US; ESDP; perception from the inside; perception from the outside.*

## **1. A new possible world order configuration**

After the end of the Cold War, the world has been defined as a unipolar system, with the United States as the main centre of power. However, since the early '50s, a new actor on the international stage began to shape its form and objectives. We refer to the European Communities and, later on, the European Union.

The United States played the role of the global power centre for more than half a century, being seen as the only actor on the international scene which has the economic, military, political and cultural capacity to promote its interests in any other part of the globe. Although US hegemony is based on international cooperation with other state or non-state actors, which are funded on a series of treaties that govern their behaviour on the international scene, USA confirmed without

any doubt that the world order, from the end of the Cold War to nowadays, has been set up in a unipolar system, with America as the centre. There were even voices<sup>1</sup> that associated United States with all they imply – culture, social and political organization, economics - with globalization itself.

However, specialists' recent studies announce a change of international scene physiognomy. Gradually, United States begin to lose their influence they have had on other countries of the world, begin to lose their economic, military and political capacity to assume the role of a global player on the international scene. Massive expenditure under NATO-led operations in different parts of the world, global financial and economic crisis are factors that contributed to the weakening of US role as a main global player. A recent report of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World"<sup>2</sup>, announces a decline of US power, the rise of emerging powers, the disappearance of the unipolar world and its replacement by a multipolar one. But in the equation analyzed by NIC, EU, as a great global power isn't taken into account, is treated marginally only when reference is made to demonstrate the decrease of the role assumed by US in Europe. From the US perspective, EU is not seen as a potential future great power of the world, but China, India and Russia are reckoned to have such a potential.

At the same time, there is the idea that the EU has built and continues to build an image of a great power on the international scene. Immediately after the creation of the European Communities, strong links were established between Member States and between communities and third states. In addition, the current form of the European Union, assessing the number of Member States, the number of its inhabitants it includes, the area,



the economic capacity, the education level of the population, the technological level, its increased visibility in what concerns the involvement in solving crisis outside its borders, etc. represent quantitative and qualitative indices relevant to the efforts to clarify that the status of the Union, to decide whether it could be considered, at this moment, an international player worth to be taken into account. These indices will be the analysis criteria, which will form the basis of our efforts to determine whether or not EU is a great power.

### **2. The evolution of the EU as international actor**

The formation of the European Union equaled to the emergence an unprecedented period of peace and stability in the European history. The first treaties which formed the basis of the European Union, establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1950)<sup>3</sup>, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) (1957) were based, beyond the need for sharing the management of weapons materials to avoid a new confrontation, on economic interests. Architects of the Union aimed at developing wealth in a number of countries deeply economically affected by the World War, which they had just overrun, and to create a proper context for the development of prosperity. EU is defined as an important economic actor in international affairs. CFSP and ESDP represent means of establishing a political, security and defence dimension as strong as the economic component.

Premise that we should start from when analyzing EU's military capacity is that ESDP isn't a complete process yet, but one in full evolution. An attempt to lay the foundations of a supranational defence structures existed in 1950, when René Pleven, who, at that time, was the French prime minister and the president of the Council of Europe, proposed the creation of the European Defence Community, which should lead to the creation of an integrated European army. But, the project was rejected by France. Currently, the European Security and Defence Policy implies an autonomous decision capabilities, launching and conducting EU-led military response to crisis situations, the employment of Member States' resources in such operations being based on sovereign decisions.

The creation and development of ESDP constitute the first steps taken by the EU to establish a form of defence policy thus, strengthening its political dimension. ESDP is a mean of EU affirming on the international scene. A breakthrough towards building a common defence system was made at the beginning of 2009, when Parliament voted to create SAFE (*Synchronized Armed Forces Europe*). Synchronized Armed Forces Europe is, in fact, the first step to creating a European army. The same act supports the creation of a Council of Ministers to foster a greater degree of coherence in national policies. This effort clearly addresses the relation between sovereignty and security issue in Europe and underlines once again the difficulties of the transfer of sovereignty from the national to the supranational level. The same document supposes the creation of a European Operational Centre, which "has the ability to make strategic planning and to lead ESDP operations and missions" (Item 53 / Report on the European Security Strategy and ESDP). In terms of security, the Union aims, obviously, at creating a system of collective defence, continuing to define the responsibility to ensure security in terms of the Member States' duty. However, the EU's proposals, outlined by the German Member of European Parliament, Karl von Wogau, pursue a "dynamic future development of cooperation between national armed forces so as to become increasingly synchronized" [The Telegraph, Blueprint for EU army to be agreed, February 18 2009]. SAFE involves creating a European military body, permanently available.

### **3. EU-NATO relation**

Although the EU has developed its own dimension of security and foreign policy, NATO's role in the European security is undeniable. If the CFSP/ESDP were formed after the end of the Cold War and developed simultaneously with the changes that have taken place in the international security environment, NATO was subjected to transformation needs, a process focused primarily on changing the fundamental objective of the Alliance, valid in the period before 1991 – defending Western Europe against Soviet threats and focus on the new types of threats, risks and threats to Euro-Atlantic security, which must act against "unconventional asymmetric threats"<sup>4</sup>. NATO commitment in Europe is not the same as



it was before 1989, as the organization's survival depends at a certain extent by the efforts to build a European military potential. Given the fact that Europe, considered especially in the light of the organizational form that is achieving through EU, is not perceived anymore as a source of instability and, given the emergence of new types of risks and threats that jeopardize, equally, the whole world's security, EU must show it can be a security provider on the continent and in the whole world, as well.

NATO cooperation is the common place of the whole EU approach in what concerns the military capability. NATO, which remains the main guarantor of European and world's security, was directly involved in the creation of the European defense and security dimension. "Alliance is committed to strengthening its European dimension, by developing a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), effective and capable of meeting European requirements and to contribute, at the same time, to the security of the Alliance"<sup>5</sup>. The same document recognizes the need to assume a greater responsibility for European countries in terms of security, which will lead to improving transatlantic relations and to strengthen the Alliance as a whole. The development of these countries' military capabilities and the capacities to involve in assuring the European security is mentioned in the Declaration on the new strategic concept of NATO, elaborated in 1999, as the Organization affirms its support for the development of this identity within its own institutional framework, providing capabilities and assets for EU-led operations under the Union of Western Europe<sup>6</sup>. In 2002, NATO and EU signed "Berlin +" agreements, which stipulate that the Alliance permits EU to lead crisis management operations using NATO's resources<sup>7</sup>. The agreements represent a general framework for cooperation between the two organizations and provide a basis for NATO-EU cooperation in crisis management, specifying how EU may use NATO planning and command capabilities, in its own missions. The avoidance of double functions turned out to be especially important as most of the Alliance's members are also members of the Union. Basically, these agreements allow the Alliance to support EU-led operations, operations in which NATO, as a whole, is not engaged. The cooperation between NATO and EU has as primary foundation a set of common values that drive their actions, but also global security and economic

interests. Practically, NATO-EU cooperation, as organizations that provide security, has proven to be successful in crisis management in the Western Balkans. Their missions completed and continued each other. For example, in FYROM, NATO's mission, Operation Allied Harmony, was continued by the EU-led Operation Concordia, the first mission carried out under the Berlin Plus agreements. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO's mission, Stabilization Force (SFOR), was continued by Althea, the EU-led operation. The two worked together in managing the situation in Kosovo, where EU has sent the largest civilian mission (EULEX), in order to assist Kosovo's authorities in restoring the rule of law. In addition, the Union initiated and carried out military or civil missions in Congo and Darfur.

Thus, EU's dimension of security and defence has developed with the approval and direct support of NATO, both having an important contribution to assuring the European security. In addition, most NATO Member States are also EU member states, a status ensuring and guaranteeing the existence of stable states that are predictable in what concerns their behaviour on the international scene. Under these circumstances, the mere status of EU or NATO member state guarantees the security conditions. However, ESDP development involved the need to define the relations between the EU and NATO, in particular in what concerns the definition of the framework within which the European intervention is made – under NATO or outside it, and the identification of the added-value of ESDP to NATO<sup>8</sup>. Clarifying these issues was necessary because of two reasons; firstly, it is about the need to avoid function duplication and secondly, about the difficulties which EU has encountered during the development of this dimension.

Regarding managing crisis situations, NATO and EU have different approaches. The Alliance focused more on unilateral military actions or coalitions, designed to address a particular crisis situation (an attitude specific to the US security policy) and the Union has implemented more complex ways, trying a holistic approach to crisis management, focusing on the causes, including cultural and socio-economic aspects.

However, the relation between EU's defence and security dimension and NATO is more than a problem of coordination of efforts, as it involves, on the one hand, the increase of the role played by EU



on the international scene, EU's attempt to assume the status of a global player and, on the other hand, it involves the US willingness to share control and vision to develop a better partnership than present the present. As far as the first mentioned aspect, Europeans themselves exhibit different attitudes, being divided in two sides when it comes about European security - Europeanists and Atlanticists<sup>9</sup>. The contradictions manifested in the Union emerge from the *sui generis* nature of the organization, which operates both on supranational fundamentals and on intergovernmental principles. Intergovernmental nature of CFSP/ESDP often undermines shaping a coherent strategic concept. Certain European countries are still attached to the idea of European security provided by NATO (United Kingdom) while others prefer increasing ESDP capacity to guarantee European security (France, Germany, Belgium). The last three countries mentioned even tried to create an independent EU headquarters of NATO during the 2003 Iraqi crisis, but they met with the opposition of the first one.

#### 4. Perception

Hedley Bull<sup>10</sup> identified as an indicator of a great power the fact of being recognized by other international players as such, this status depending on the perception of the other countries leaders and peoples, which gives it a number of special rights and responsibilities. Given the specific hybrid character of the EU construction, the perception issue has also a double meaning – the perception as a great power from inside EU, by European citizens, and the existence of such a perception from the outside, by other international actors on the scene.

##### 4.1. *The perception from the inside*

The issue of the perception of the European Union as a great power from within, by its own citizens, is closely linked to that of internal cohesion.

Studies<sup>11</sup> show that EU hasn't yet fully developed this indicator. Euro-barometers<sup>12</sup> demonstrate that Europeans are still more attached to their national identity, and only partially to the European one. The trust attached to Union's capacity to act as a great power is more relevant in what concerns the way in which EU acts on the world's scene is seen from the inside. The researches in this area proved that the foreign policy engages little

interest from the public and that it is regarded as having a negligible impact on their everyday lives. As long ESDP is considered as a project, citizens manifest an attitude that was defined as *permissive consensus*<sup>13</sup>, understood as a benevolent position of European citizens towards the European integration project, without being appropriately informed, before adopting this attitude and without having the intention to acquire the necessary pieces of information. Permissive consensus characterizes only the project level approach of ESDP. If there were necessary that a national army was involved in an armed conflict, the citizens' interest would certainly increase. The low impact theory of foreign and security policy on the everyday lives of citizens does not apply in the event in which the authorities would require them to risk their lives on the battlefield. Finally, the possibility of developing a true European patriotism, the possibility that the Europeans will be willing to risk their lives in the name of European security is not credible in the current stage of development of the European Union, as it continues to function as a cooperative environment, as a legal framework for this, laws can not lead to the emergence of an authentic patriotism.

Wolfgang Wagner identified some statistical evidence of this phenomenon, by analyzing the answers given by the Europeans within the Euro-barometers<sup>14</sup> and he concludes that their support for CFSP reduces when citizens are made to choose between national and European defence.

##### 4.2. *The perception from the outside*

In order to be considered as a great power, a political entity needs the recognition of other international actors. The European Union, by involving in the conflicts beyond its borders, has gradually built this role, being more frequently mentioned in the official documents of other states. There are some aspects that argue EU's recognition as great power by other international actors, as:

- *Involvement in managing security issues in other states.* By the actions taken under the CFSP/ESDP, EU has made efforts to assert itself on the international scene as a relevant political actor. According to H. Bull, a great power has special responsibilities and the other countries nourish expectations regarding the actions of this power. The Union has undertaken a series of missions in the Western Balkans, in Africa, Middle East,



missions that confirmed this role.

- *The relations with the neighbours from the immediate proximity.* As far as its neighbours are concerned, EU implements a European Neighbourhood Policy. Therefore, the Union is involved both in promoting democracy and development in this area of interest and in the welfare of the peoples of these countries. Its attitude is peculiar to a great power. Supporting a stable and prosperous neighbourhood became one of the purposes of the European Security Strategy, and under the Lisbon Treaty (Article 7a), the Union “develops a special relation with the neighbouring states, to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, based on EU values and characterized by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation”<sup>15</sup>.

- *Other states grant an increase importance to the EU.* The fact that the Union is mentioned as an important partner in the economic, political, security areas by other states contributes to its image as a great power. Russia exports much of its gas and oil resources to the Union, becoming, in this way, dependent on the European capital at the same extent to which EU depends on the Russian oil<sup>16</sup>. European small states near EU’s borders also give a special attention to the relations with the Union, which is seen as a guarantor of economic welfare, political stability, and, thus, of the overall stability of the state, a security provider.

- *Humanitarian aid.* EU is one of the main global providers of humanitarian aid. Through its Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), EU has involved in managing the consequences in of natural disasters. In 2007, EU intervened to minimize the consequences of heavy rains in Somalia, of the hurricane El Niño in Bolivia, of the cyclone Favio in Mozambique, of the violent protests in various countries of Africa, Sri Lanka, of Solomon Islands Tsunami<sup>17</sup>, etc. In 2007, the EU provided humanitarian aid in parts of Africa, Caribbean, Pacific, Eastern Europe and CIS, Middle East and North Africa, Asia, Latin America worth over 760 million euros. This demonstrates that EU provides more than half of the funds for international development assistance and more than 50% of the global humanitarian aid<sup>18</sup>.

This state of things makes EU, even in the absence of a strong internal cohesion and a completely positive perception from the inside, to be still seen as a global security actor.

### Conclusions

EU has extensive interests in the security areas outside its borders, others recognize it as a great power and it is actively involved in resolving the security issues these states have to face with. These facts recommend the Union as a relevant security actor. EU is seen, therefore, both as a global player and as an entity with little relevance in the international arena because of its lack of consistency. But one should take into account that EU has the necessary resources and that, when Member States have this interest, it can really act as a great power on the international scene.

Given the international political, economic, historical, cultural context in which the European Union was created, the stage of its evolution is justified and remarkable at the same time. The Union does not enjoy a greater degree of internal consistency because of Members States’ own national tradition which is extremely difficult to change. At the same time, European states outlined a supra-national body, even if they were driven by the need to pursue their own interests, an institution can act unitary and that can represent the embryo of a coherent European federation.

In conclusion, the Union is a global security actor when Member States align and cooperate closely to achieve a common objective and, secondly, EU can be considered a weak political actor because of an apparent internal fragmentation, due to an insufficiently developed cohesion and coherence, because of a huge bureaucracy that hampers decision-making process. EU’s dual nature and hybridity marks its status on the international stage, being coherent and fragmented, important and irrelevant, a great power and a weak entity. Everything depends on the relevance of the entity to which we compare the status of the European Union.

### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> Benjamin R. BARBER, **Războiul Sfânt contra Globalizării. Modul în care globalizarea și tribalismul remodelează lumea**, Editura Antet, București, 2004.

<sup>2</sup> National Intelligence Council, „Global Trends: A Transformed World”, November 2008, available on-line at [http://www.acus.org/files/publication\\_pdfs/3/Global-Trends-2025.pdf](http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/3/Global-Trends-2025.pdf)



<sup>3</sup> The Treaty of Paris, which established the European Community of Coal and Steel, came into force on 23<sup>rd</sup> of July 1952, and had a limited duration of fifty years. As a consequence, the European Community of Coal and Steel ceased to exist on 23<sup>th</sup> of July 2002 and its responsibilities and good were taken by EC.

<sup>4</sup> General James L. JONES, *Transformarea structurii militare a NATO*, in NATO Review, Spring 2004, p. 15, available on-line at <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue1/romanian/military.html>

<sup>5</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook, Chapter 4, European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), p.63, Ministry of Public Information, NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels, 2001.

<sup>6</sup> The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23<sup>rd</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> April 1999, Part II – Strategic Perspectives, art. 18, available on-line at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>

<sup>7</sup> [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004\\_2009/documents/dv/berlinplus\\_/berlinplus\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/berlinplus_/berlinplus_en.pdf)

<sup>8</sup> Petre DUȚU, Mihai-Ștefan DINU, **Politica Europeană de Securitate și Apărare – cadru de manifestare și dezvoltarea a intereselor de securitate națională**, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, 2007, București, available on-line at [http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf\\_studii/pesa-cadrul\\_de\\_manifestare\\_si\\_dezvoltare\\_a\\_intereselor\\_de\\_securitate\\_nationala.pdf](http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_studii/pesa-cadrul_de_manifestare_si_dezvoltare_a_intereselor_de_securitate_nationala.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> Ibidem, p. 24.

<sup>10</sup> Hedley BULL, **Societatea anarhică. Un studiu asupra ordinii în politica mondială**, Chișinău, 1998, p. 192.

<sup>11</sup> Alexandra SARCINSCHI, Cristina BOGZEANU, **Europa: granițe, cetățenie, securitate**, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, București, 2009.

<sup>12</sup> European Commission, *How Europeans see themselves. Looking through the mirror with public opinion surveys*, Belgium, 2001, available on-line at [http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/eu\\_documentation/05/txt\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/eu_documentation/05/txt_en.pdf)

<sup>13</sup> WAGNER, Wolfgang, *The democratic legitimacy of European Security and Defence Policy*, Occasional Papers, Nr. 57, April 2005, European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, Paris, p. 11.

<sup>14</sup> Ibidem, p. 13.

<sup>15</sup> Constantin MOȘTOFLEI (coord.), **Stabilitate și securitate regională**, Cristina BOGZEANU, *Implicațiile conceptului de graniță în securitatea europeană*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, București, 2009, p. 1226.

<sup>16</sup> Cristian BĂHNĂREANU, **Arma energetică în contextul relațiilor internaționale ale începutului de secol XXI**, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I, București, 2007, p. 40.

<sup>17</sup> European Commission, Humanitarian Aid, Annual Report – 2007, available on-line at [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/media/publications/annual-review\\_2007\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/media/publications/annual-review_2007_en.pdf).

<sup>18</sup> Petre DUȚU, Mihai-Ștefan DINU, **Politica Europeană de securitate și apărare – cadrul de manifestare și dezvoltare a intereselor de securitate națională**, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I” București, 2007, p. 7.

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# NATO IN 2009 AND ITS NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT: BETWEEN OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

*Alexandra SARCINSCHI, PhD*

*North Atlantic Treaty Organization has initiated, in 2009, the process of drafting and adopting a New Strategic Concept that will allow it to adapt to permanent changes of the security environment's characteristics. This ambitious project can determine the future of the Alliance both opportunities and challenges that cover a wide range: from cooperation among allies on the one hand, and between NATO and other great actors of the international arena, on the other hand, to the issues of budgetary allocations for defence and even the ones of migration and public opinion. The stakes are significant: the justification for the claim that NATO is the key to Euro-Atlantic and world's security.*

*Keywords: economic and financial crisis; NATO's New Strategic Concept; opportunities; challenges; Article 2; Article 5.*

The year just ended may be characterized, at least with regard to the security dimension, by events and steps that have opened for international actors both opportunities for development and strengthening their state role in the world, and threats against their existence. Obviously, one of the stages through which mankind is passing is the economic and financial crisis that has affected all components of international relations. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other international security organizations could not escape the events that followed the onset of the crisis, due to their undeniable dependence on the political, economic and financial management of the Member States.

Synthesizing the NATO's activity in 2009, we list the main issues on its working agenda: enlarging the Alliance with two new Member States (Albania and Croatia); the beginning of the drafting process of a New Strategic Concept; the adjustment of the command structure and the approval of strategic

approach for Phase 4 (Transition) of ISAF; the new Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Out of these, we note the launch of discussions on the New Strategic Concept (NSC) as a central element of the response to the need to adapt the Alliance to the permanent changes in international security environment's characteristics.

## **The economic and financial crisis and NATO's new security approach**

The Director of U.S. National Intelligence (the country that is the main ally and partner of NATO) said at the beginning of last year, in a statement in front of the Senate Committee for Intelligence, that the primary near-term security concern of the United States is the global economic crisis<sup>1</sup>. In this assessment, the American Intelligence community states that no dominant adversary faces the United States that threatens their existence with military force, but the global financial crisis has exacerbated what has already been a growing set of political and economic uncertainties. The later the restoration is, the more affected U.S. strategic interests are.

Other analysts argue that the effects of the crisis are similar to those ones of a terrorist attack: destabilizing countries; destroying lives and properties; causing huge economic and social cost; contributing to lower economic growth and increasing political instability<sup>2</sup>.

Therefore, the impact of economic crisis might be considered for NATO as aggregation effects on all Member States, since each of the Organization's actions depend on the proper functioning of national and international institutional mechanisms.

Less commented, Article 2 of the Washington Treaty raises the importance of the good functioning of national economies and the economic cooperation between Member States



for the existence of the Alliance: “The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them”<sup>3</sup>. The relationship between, firstly, the welfare of the Member States and the economic cooperation between them and, secondly, the achievement and preservation of a high level of national and international security is obvious. It’s mainly about a complementary relationship between economics and security that can be seen best when economic power is translated into military power and vice versa<sup>4</sup>. NATO, as a political-military alliance, is the clear example for the existence of such relationship. However, in order to achieve its objective of being a “global security provider”<sup>5</sup>, the Alliance must take into account the fact that the global economy is constantly impairing, so not only the Member States’ one, which increases the potential of conflict in the world and, in the same time, reduces the ability to react and intervene of those who explicitly hold that role. Thus, NATO will be able increasingly difficult to answer needs of stabilization and crisis management as the international security environment will become more unstable. Experts of the Hague Center for Strategic Studies argue that NATO is facing a strategic dilemma that summarizes greatly the situation in which the Alliance is: the financial crisis and the global economic recession will create more and greater security challenges for the West, but at the same time they will undermine the credibility of the West and weaken NATO’s capability to act<sup>6</sup>.

One of the steps by which the Alliance responds to the challenges of economic crisis is the adoption by NATO Parliamentary Assembly Resolution no. 377 – “Moving Beyond the Global Economic Crisis”, by which the governments and parliaments of member countries are urged to implement a set of measures against crisis: to maintain ample liquidity in the economic system at this fragile moment of transition between crisis and growth; to develop exit strategies for winding down stimulus programs once recovery has firmly

taken root and to adopt medium-term measures to restore budgetary health; to bolster savings in periods of growth in order to mitigate the risk of boom and bust cycles and to generate savings for future economic downturns; to construct strategies for keeping workers gainfully employed, and, failing that, to ensure that they are trained for new jobs and maintained above the poverty line so as not to permanently undermine their employment prospects; to redouble efforts to co-ordinate economic strategy internationally, to engage the developing world in this process and to ensure that recovery strategies are environmentally sustainable; to resist the siren call of protectionism as free trade offers a tried and tested means of generating growth and prosperity; to overcome those hurdles blocking a successful conclusion of the Doha Trade Round; to co-ordinate banking reform initiatives thereby ensuring that “beggar thy neighbor” approaches to regulation do not trigger a race to the bottom that will leave the international economy vulnerable to future crises; to ensure that national security budgets are not overly compromised in this recession and to recognize that deeper procurement co-operation will generate savings without sacrificing capabilities; to defend international aid budgets targeted at dealing with this crisis particularly for fragile states; to recognize that the underlying conditions that caused the ongoing food crisis have not significantly changed and that policies are needed to ensure that food is available to the hundreds of millions living on the edge of starvation<sup>7</sup>.

Anti-crisis measures suggested by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly are similar to those ones already established by member governments, but one of them is noted as it is completely the opposite of a trend that manifested itself strongly around the world in the last year. Alliance expressed against protectionism, while according to recent analysis<sup>8</sup>, such measures have widened. Its rejection by the rules of market economy does not mean, however, that the state intervention in the economy has not always been a lever by which governments of different countries over the world protect the strategic sectors of their national economic system<sup>9</sup>. Even the U.S. promotes anti-crisis measures with a highly protectionist character, like “buy American”, and in other countries, the state became the majority owner of shares in banking or commercial sectors<sup>10</sup>. Provisions of Resolution



no. 377 are, however, recommendations because it is clear that the market economy mechanisms were not prepared to face such challenges and the economy and financial system still depends on state intervention.

### Opportunities and challenges related to the New Strategic Concept

NATO officials acknowledge the need to reform the organization due to the immediate effects in terms of national and international security of the economic and financial crisis<sup>11</sup>. Thus, in July 2009, they launched the process of drafting the New Strategic Concept (NSC) that was announced since the summit in Strasbourg-Kehl (April 2009) in the “Declaration on Alliance Security”. Launching a new concept is not just a response to the need to adapt to the changing characteristics of the international security environment, but above all, a reaffirmation of the unity of the Alliance’s members. The signing in 2010 by all of the 28 Member States (during the Portugal Summit) of the document on the NSC will be a challenge for

the new NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

NATO officials expect that the NSC will eliminate the idea that there is an irrevocable distinction between security at home and security abroad. The premise of this statement is that the protection offered by borders and geographical isolation in front of crisis has been overturned by globalization. That is why the former NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, argue that the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty can apply outside NATO territory as much as inside. According to him, the challenge lies not in defence of NATO territory but the population, the citizens of NATO countries who travel around the world<sup>12</sup>. The correlation between migration and citizenship is seen as a proof for the approach that states the NATO’s role as a provider of global security. Still, we argue that this considerations might become dangerous if used by potential conflict and terrorist non-allied countries due to the fact that the most consistent migration flux is directed to the NATO Member Countries not towards them (Figures no. 1 and no. 2).




Figure no. 1: Net migration rate per 1,000 population by development regions<sup>13</sup>




Figure no. 2: Net migration rate per 1,000 population by continents<sup>14</sup>

For instance, the figures above show that the net migration rate per 1,000 population is positive in the more developed countries and negative in the other countries of the world<sup>15</sup>. If we correlate these data with the U.S. State Department rating on the most important conflict and terrorist countries (“Country Reports on Terrorism”), we notice the fact that the migration flux is flowing from these countries to Europe and Northern America. The direction of the flux is from *state sponsors of terrorism*<sup>16</sup> (Cuba, Iran, Syria, and Sudan) to *terrorist safe havens*<sup>17</sup> (Afghanistan, Columbia, Philippines, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Somalia, Venezuela, and Yemen) to the rest of the world as seen in Figure no. 2.

Still, even if the scenario of non-NATO states attack NATO Members based on this assumption is very unlikely due to the deterrent potential of Alliance’s military power, it exists and must not be ignored.

Another argument in favour of developing a New Strategic Concept refers to the need to transform and reform the Alliance, particularly its forces and Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions. An analysis by the former Secretary General shows that NATO continues to spend much of the capabilities and equipment procurement budgets not directly for the allied operations or protecting

troops in Afghanistan; that is why it is necessary for the defence and capabilities planning to be much more related to the Lessons Learned from NATO operations<sup>18</sup>. Also, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has promoted a NSC that will establish the balance between ground, air and naval forces taking into account the fact that the naval dimension of security has become large predominant. There were taken into account new challenges such as: piracy, protection of maritime energy transport networks, prevent illegal transfers of ballistic missile technology and weapons of mass destruction, and, not least, the differences concerning the jurisdiction over the Arctic between the four NATO countries bordering the Arctic Ocean (U.S., Canada, Denmark, Norway) and the Russian Federation.

Unfortunately, the desire to reform the process of Alliance’s capabilities planning and development is hindered by budgetary constraints due to economic and financial crisis. According to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly report entitled “The Global Financial Crisis and its Impact on Defence Budgets”, many NATO countries of Central and Eastern Europe consider that it is necessary to reduce the military budgets and the military personnel, and some of them focused their attention on niche capabilities in order to streamline the financial terms of defence spending. Also, it is possible that large procurement programs in



Western Europe and the U.S. to be cut in order to transfer funds to other policy priorities<sup>19</sup>.

However, in order for these measures not to affect the operation of the Alliance, a better and closer cooperation between its members is needed. Otherwise, there will be heated debates on the relationship between contributions and benefits of Member Countries, including the changing balance of power within NATO due to France's two new key positions in the infrastructure of integrated command (Supreme Allied Commander Transformation and Allied Joint Command Lisbon).

Another challenge that may arise from the growing gap between special needs of the status and the role of the Alliance in the world, on the one hand, and economic and financial difficulties for Member Countries, on the other hand, is the massive loss of public support for country's participation in Alliance's activities, particularly with regard to budgetary allocations and human resources for non-Article 5 operations.

For instance, in U.S., which is the main contributor to the financial and human resources to

NATO, there has been already (in 2009) a downward trend in public support both on increased defence spending and on military operations abroad<sup>20</sup>. If in 2001, before 9/11, most of the people were in favour of maintaining the same level of defence spending as in previous years, a month after the terrorist attacks, the public opinion recorded a strong increase in the number of those who support increasing these costs, and in subsequent years - a stabilization of the opinion, followed in 2009 by increasing the number of those in favor of lower defence spending (Figure no. 3).

With regard to U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq (both in operations under the aegis of international organizations and in ad hoc coalitions), we notice a low public support compared to the support of experts in international relations from the Council for Foreign Relations, an independent, nonpartisan organization created by U.S. experts on problems of international relations (Figure no. 4 and Figures. 6), although, in the case of Afghanistan, both groups consider that the decision to use military force is correct (Figure no. 5).




Figure no. 3: When it comes to spending on national defense, do you think that the U.S. should...?<sup>21</sup>




Figure no. 4: Over the next year, do you think the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan should be...?<sup>22</sup>




Figure no. 5: Do you think the United States' initial decision to use force in Afghanistan was the right decision or the wrong decision?<sup>23</sup>




Figure no. 6: How much longer do you think a significant number of U.S. troops should remain in Iraq?<sup>24</sup>

Loss of public support for military operations abroad might be a security risk for both any of the Alliance's Members and NATO by losing the legitimacy of the decision making process, creating conditions for domestic social movements and, not least, the deterioration of relations between state partners and the international ones.

One aspect that NSC addressed to is the partnerships between NATO and other great actors of the international scene, such as the European Union (EU) and Russia.

A good relationship between NATO and the EU is hampered by the fact that these two organizations are characterized by similar, even identical to certain levels, territory, members, missions and capabilities. In addition, the returning of France into the Alliance's military command structure, correlated with the formal recognition for creating an independent EU defence identity, raises heated debates on the Europeanization of the Alliance and transforming the EU into the main European security actor, thus limiting the role of NATO<sup>25</sup>.

Another challenge for NATO is the relation with Russia. Debate topics cover a wide range: from the Alliance's Eastward expansion to the

supremacy in the Arctic Ocean. The vision of the new Secretary General of NATO on this issue starts from the premise that Russia is an essential part of the architecture of European security and NATO's relationship with the Federation should reflect this<sup>26</sup>.

### Conclusions

North Atlantic Treaty Organization is undergoing a period of redefining the problems that are raised not only within its borders, but also outside them. In 2009, NATO met both opportunities and challenges related to regional and global issues: from the expansion with two new member states (Albania and Croatia) and the decision to redefine the Strategic Concept to issues such as the relationships with traditional "competitors", the financial and economic crisis, the global warming, the extent of population infected with virus A (H1N1), etc. The most important opportunity is to increase the cohesion among Member Countries and to strengthen the cooperation with other state and non-state actors of the international arena, as an effect of mobilization to respond to crises



of the early 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Also, if NATO will respond effectively to the need to reform, it will increasingly benefit from the strengthening of its status as a global security provider, although such status implies an important and expensive role that not all of the Member States will be able or willing to provide. Moreover, such a role could give rise to and even increase the rivalries with other major international players that would be thinking that their statutes and roles would be affected by the Alliance.

Adopting the New Strategic Concept, as the focal point of all of NATO's activities, is a difficult task for the Allies as it must be prepared and approved by all of the 28 Members whose interests are not always uniform. Most importantly, the NSC must provide the entire public opinion of these countries the answer to the question of why NATO is still the key to Euro-Atlantic and world security.

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<sup>2</sup> MELESE, François, *The Financial Crisis: A Similar Effect to a Terrorist Attack?*, in NATO Review, No. 4/2009, e-version <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/FinancialCrisis/Financial-terrorist-attack/EN/index.htm>, downloaded at 14<sup>th</sup> of January, 2010.

<sup>3</sup> *The North Atlantic Treaty*, e-version [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm), downloaded at 14<sup>th</sup> of January, 2010.

<sup>4</sup> BĂHNĂREANU, Cristian, *Influența factorului economic în realizarea securității*, National Defense University „Carol I” Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009, p. 15.

<sup>5</sup> RASMUSSEN, Anders Fogh, *NATO as a Guarantor of Territorial Defence and a Provider of Global Security*, Speech by NATO Secretary General at the Conference „NATO Talk around the Brandenburger Tor” in Berlin, 26<sup>th</sup> of November, 2009, e-version: [www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions\\_59491.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_59491.htm), downloaded at 14<sup>th</sup> of January, 2010.

<sup>6</sup> KORTEWEG, Rem and Richard PODKOLINSKI, *New Horizons. Finding a path away from NATO's de-solidarisation*, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), Netherlands, 2009, p. 43.

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<sup>9</sup> Idem.

<sup>10</sup> Ibidem, p. 36.

<sup>11</sup> RASMUSSEN, Anders Fogh, *cited work*, 2009.

<sup>12</sup> de HOOP SCHEFFER, Jaap, *Launching NATO's New Strategic Concept. Introductory remarks by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the opening of the strategic concept seminar*, 7<sup>th</sup> of July, 2009, e-version [www.nato.int/cps/.../natolive/events\\_55992](http://www.nato.int/cps/.../natolive/events_55992), downloaded at 16<sup>th</sup> of January, 2010.

<sup>13</sup> Data from the U.S. Population Reference Bureau US Aid, *2009 World Population Data Sheet*, August 2009, e-version [www.prb.org/pdf09/09wpds\\_eng.pdf](http://www.prb.org/pdf09/09wpds_eng.pdf), downloaded at 16<sup>th</sup> of January, 2010.

<sup>14</sup> Idem.

<sup>15</sup> In *2009 World Population Data Sheet*, the category “more developed” countries includes the entire Europe, Northern America, Australia, Japan and New Zealand; the category “least developed” countries includes 33 African countries (DR Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, etc.), 15 Asian countries (Afghanistan, Yemen, etc.) and one Latin American and Caribbean country (Haiti). The category “less developed” countries includes the other countries of the world.

<sup>16</sup> United States Department of State Publication Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2008*, April 2009, pp. 181-186, e-version [www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/index.htm), downloaded at 12<sup>th</sup> of January, 2010.

<sup>17</sup> Ibidem, pp. 196-205.

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<sup>19</sup> BAYLEY, Hugh, *The Global Financial Crisis and its Impact on Defence Budgets*, NATO PA - 178 ESC 09 E rev 1, November 2009, p.



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<sup>20</sup> This is the conclusion of data analysis on the „America’s Place in the World 2009” dataset published by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press (<http://people-press.org/reports/questionnaires/569.pdf>). This survey is conducted on a national sample (2,000 U.S. population, 18 years of age or older) and on an experts sample (642 web and telephone interviews conducted with members of the Council on Foreign Relations) in October and November 2009.

<sup>21</sup> Question no. 22 from the cited survey, p. 77.

<sup>22</sup> Question no. 30 from the cited survey, p. 79.

<sup>23</sup> Question no. 28 from the cited survey, p. 78.

<sup>24</sup> Question no. 26 from the cited survey, p. 78.

<sup>25</sup> McNAMARA, Sally, *Europenizarea NATO slăbește apărarea Europei*, in *Adevărul Magazine*, 22<sup>nd</sup> of June, 2009, e-version [http://adevarul.ro/international/foreign\\_policy/NATO-Europenizarea-Europei-Sally-slabeste\\_0\\_65993414.html](http://adevarul.ro/international/foreign_policy/NATO-Europenizarea-Europei-Sally-slabeste_0_65993414.html), downloaded at 19<sup>th</sup> of January, 2010.

<sup>26</sup> RASMUSSEN, Anders Fogh, *cited work*, 2009.

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# PROGRESSES AND OBSTACLES IN THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION OF WESTERN BALKAN STATES

*Cristina BOGZEANU*

*The present paper aims to illustrate and analyze the key events that occurred in the area of Western Balkans in 2009. Assuming that this space is one with a European vocation, we have subjected the internal realities and the behaviour on the international scene of these states to a brief analysis, which has the goal to assess the progress to their aspiration to integrate in the Euro-Atlantic space.*

*We believe that the accession and integration of these states is the link between most of the events that occurred in this area, last year, influencing both domestic and foreign policies. This aspiration of Western Balkan states reveals the vulnerabilities, risks and threats that they must face with, but also the progresses they have made in strengthening democratic institutions.*

*Keywords: Kosovo; Serbia; Bosnia-Herzegovina; the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro; Albania; Croatia; European integration; security.*

## **1. General trends**

The whole world has been marked, during the last year, by the effects of the global financial and economic crisis, which left visible marks on the economic, social, political and security dimensions of states and of the every-day life of individuals, thus, most of their concerns focused on reducing or eliminating the effects of this crisis. In the case of Western Balkan states, alongside the economic and financial crisis, there were a series of political and social crises, but there have also been progresses regarding the Euro-Atlantic integration. Basically, as far as this key issue of the Western Balkan states is concerned, we appreciate that there is a number of states that made a perceptible shift in this way, and another series of states, which have

stagnated in their way towards the acceptance in the Euro-Atlantic club. These countries, situated in the immediate proximity of the European Union and the North Atlantic Organization, seem to walk separately on the way towards integration, raising obstacles to each other.

However, integration is conditional on the bilateral relations between them, so that these obstacles are overcome when states reach a compromise, when proving they build, little by little, a culture of good neighbourliness. Nevertheless, this goal proves to be difficult to achieve in an environment in which states are still claiming territories or are still in the search of a national identity, an environment in which the international community plays a major role in maintaining stability and security. Moreover, the attitude of the other actors, especially those ones with a considerable influence on the international scene, turns out to be a catalyst of the project of developing a mature democracy, the rule of law and capacity of self-government within this region.

## **2. Croatia and Albania – NATO member states, EU candidates**

In 2008, European Commission confirmed and reaffirmed the European perspective offered to Western Balkan states. Since then, these states evolved differently, on distinct ways, towards Europe, but interdependencies and mutual influences still existed. Perhaps the most important progress, in this sense, is constituted by the acceptance of Albania and Croatia in NATO. MAP (Membership Accession Plan) members since 1999 (Albania), respectively 2002 (Croatia), both states cooperated with NATO in a wide range of areas, particularly in the reform of the defence and security sector, but also in the democratic and institutional reform.



Both of them signed the Protocol of Accession in 2008 and became, officially, member states on 1<sup>st</sup> of April 2009.

This event has important implications for their aspiration to join the EU. Traditionally, NATO is known as the main supplier of stability and security on the European continent and contributed substantially to Europe's integration. Moreover, recent history has shown that NATO was a stepping stone for East European states into the Union. However, as far as the Balkans are concerned, the accession process may be delayed by the relationships between the states.

For example, in the case of *Croatia*, the Western Balkan country that has made most progresses in the EU accession process, was blocked for nearly ten months (December 2008 - September 2009) by Slovenia, an EU Member State, due to a border dispute – the demarcation of the maritime boundary in the Bay of Piran and a small portion of the border land – a dispute that began after the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991. Thus, since the opening of the negotiations four years ago, integration was very much hampered by this issue. In September of 2009, the two countries have resolved the boundary conflict and negotiations were reopened in October. European Commission estimates that the negotiations would be complete in mid 2010.

But the dispute with Slovenia was not the sole impediment that Croatia met in the effort to achieve the EU standards. The boundary subject often served as a tool to distract public attention from the corruption scandals and crimes that shocked the public opinion<sup>1</sup>. Beyond the economic problems, corruption remains, for Croatia, one of the biggest domestic vulnerabilities. Although the most recent European Commission report on the progress of Croatia in the last year reckons that this state has made progresses in fighting against corruption, it is still a reality in many areas, especially in politics. Consequently, the fight against corruption has turned into one of the most important goals of Croatian politicians, so there were voices asserting that, during the presidential elections that took place at the end of the year, the fight against corruption has replaced nationalism and became a new kind of patriotism and even a tool to gain votes<sup>2</sup>. Organized crime, corruption and judicial reform represent the most urgent tasks, in which improvements are difficult to achieve.

As far as Croatia's relations with the other Western Balkan countries are concerned, we consider that the relations with Serbia are the most important. This is because we appreciate that their fate could deeply influence the fate of the entire region. Perhaps the most tensed aspect of their relations is the issue of Kosovo's independence recognition<sup>3</sup>. However, in this regard, 2009 was marked by the efforts made by both parties to bring some relief in their relation and to communicate. There were a number of bilateral high-level official visits. Although they have not yet reached a common position regarding the status of the province, the two states appear to have found in common, in which cooperation is possible. They signed an agreement on police cooperation, to readmission of illegal immigrants and perhaps the most important dimension of their foreign policy – cooperation on European integration.

If, after having received the NATO membership, Croatia made clear progresses towards European integration, which is expected to be completed in a relatively near future, *Albania's* situation is quite different, as it maintains its status of potential candidate. However, there have been some progresses in this case, too. For instance, the Stabilization and Association Agreement, which establishes a framework for mutual cooperation between Albania and the EU in the area of political, economic and commercial areas, was ratified by France, Germany and Greece in February of 2009 and entered into force on April 2009. The next step consists in an opinion developed by the Commission on this application. But Albania continues to be marked by internal vulnerabilities, which are real obstacles to European integration. Perhaps most the obvious was the failure of Albania to obtain authority to travel without visas in the Schengen area. If the Serbian, Macedonia and Montenegrin authorities succeeded in meeting the conditions required by Brussels – introduction of biometric passports, strengthening border controls, strengthening the fight against corruption and organized crime – Albanians, along with Bosnians have delayed the implementation of these requirements and they were given a new deadline in the summer of 2010.

In reality, this problem hides a wide range of other internal vulnerabilities that Albania has to cope with. We are referring especially to corruption and organized crime. Rule of law, in



particular, fight against corruption, independence of the judicial system, functional public institutions continue to be key aspects of the relations between Albania and EU, aspects which are considered by the officials in Brussels as sectors where the Albania should continue reforms. Despite these internal weaknesses, of whose elimination or mitigation depends the acceptance of Albania in the European club, this country was appreciated for some political reforms and for the way in which the parliamentary elections were carried out in June 2009, as they met most international standards.

However, the relationship between Albania, on the one hand, and NATO or EU, on the other, can be considered good, given the fact that it sent several military contingents in peacekeeping missions. Thus, even if Albania withdrew its troops from Operation Iraqi Freedom by the end of 2008, in June 2009, it chose to double the number of soldiers sent for International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), in Afghanistan. Additionally, Albania has taken a role in maintaining regional stability, as it has troops in EUFOR ALTHEA mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Another aspect influencing the relation of Albania with other Western Balkan countries and with EU also refers to its position to the Albanian communities from in the rest of the region, especially from Kosovo. Here, the Albanian community represents the majority, and the idea of "Greater Albania" has often marked the activity of nationalist politicians. But, the pro-European speech has replaced the nationalist one and one could remark a consensus among politicians in Tirana, regardless their belonging to government or opposition. They seem to have understood that maintaining speech favorable to nationalist ideas will undermine the European perspective of Tirana and of the entire region too.

However, Albania rallied to the position of the United States and of the most Western European states regarding Kosovo status as it recognized its independence. Nationalist discourse has lost ground to the one that promotes the unity of Albanians within the European Union, pursuant to the idea that national borders will have a reduced relevance and to the idea that economic union is preferable. Economic integration continues to be part of the foreign policy in Tirana and in Prishtina<sup>4</sup>. However, the relation with Serbia has

been badly affected by Albania's recognition of the independence of Kosovo and the last year didn't show progresses in this sense. There were no bilateral political visits, although, in March, the Chambers of Commerce of these countries signed a Memorandum of Cooperation. Moreover, the relations were further strained by the Albanian Prime Minister's statement, from August, arguing that national unification should be leading idea for Kosovo and Albanian politicians<sup>5</sup>, statement which drew harsh reactions from Belgrade. The tension was attenuated a month later, when Tirana reaffirmed the importance of relations with Serbia, as it continues to be an important partner for Albania, especially in what concerns the stability in the region, which is a priority in regional policy of Tirana.

### 3. The controversial status of Kosovo

One could observe that, although the issue of recognition of *Kosovo's* independence from Serbia passed in the shadow of global financial and economic crisis, it remains a focal point of Western Balkan relations. By the end of 2009, 64 states recognized the independence of Kosovo<sup>6</sup>, including United States, Canada and the majority of the EU Member States except Spain, Cyprus, Romania, Greece and Slovakia. Serbia continues to maintain its stand on Kosovo – continuing to consider that it is part of its national territory under United Nations administration, according to the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia from 2006.

The issue of recognizing Kosovo's independence gave birth to a division of the international community into two flanks, each of them having arguments for its position, but also reasons related to their national foreign policy. Thus, the United States believes that the political process carried out in accordance with UN Resolution 1244 is terminated and that the independence of Kosovo is the only reasonable and feasible solution<sup>7</sup>. European Union position is similar. European Parliament's resolution of 5<sup>th</sup> of February 2009 clearly states the EU's readiness to assist Kosovo in economic and political development, by providing a clear perspective of European integration, as for the whole region as well. In addition, EU encourages its Member States to recognize Kosovo's independence. On the other side, in addition to the five EU countries that do not recognize Kosovo



as an independent Republic, there are also Russia and China. They support Serbia, that considers that the declaration of independence is actually an act of ethnic secession, which undermines the very foundations of international law. Moreover, as long as Russia and China will not recognize Kosovo's independence, it will not be accepted in the UN or in any other forum, where they have the power to prevent it. However, in 2009, Kosovo has managed to become a member of World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

The problem of the recognition of Kosovo's independence has been put, at the end of 2009, on the table of the International Court of Justice, which must decide whether the unilateral declaration of independence is legal or not. A final decision is expected in 2010.

However, although the international community tends to have a favourable position to this event, although Kosovo has created its own national authorities, a wide range of international institutions are still involved in solving its most serious problems – corruption, democracy development, establishment of rule of law, security, poverty, unemployment, building a multicultural society. We refer to EULEX, which aims to assist and support Kosovo authorities in establishing the rule of law, particularly in what regards police, judiciary system and customs control. Along with it, there are some more international institutions continuing to operate in Kosovo – EU Special Representative (EUSR), the International Civilian Office (ICO), the European Commission Liaison Office (ECLO), KFOR (NATO's mission in Kosovo) and UNMIK (Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo - UN mission).

Last year, KFOR continued its mission of providing state security in Kosovo and has overseen the creation of Kosovo Security Force (KSF). So far, Kosovo had a Protection Corp (KPC), which had no defence missions and could act only in emergency response missions. After the declaration of independence in 2008, Kosovo, along with KFOR, began preparations for the establishment of KSF, a security force equipped with light weapons, as requested by NATO, which could lead crises response missions in Kosovo and abroad, operations of civil defence and of supporting civil authorities in the management of other emergencies. Although, according to its definition, KSF is a multi-ethnic security force,

its inception triggered negative reactions from Kosovo Serbs, on the ground that it will contribute to increasing the state of insecurity in the province. Although officially launched on 4<sup>th</sup> of January, 2009, KSF has not yet fully replaced KPC.

The beginning of 2009 was marked by the debate over the six-point plan developed by the United Nations on 26<sup>th</sup> of November 2008, which was meant to regulate relations between Serbia and Kosovo, giving more competencies to the Serb minority in Kosovo and putting EULEX under the authority of UNMIK, pursuant to resolution 1224. The plan consists in a set of proposals in what concerns the relations between Belgrade and Prishtina on police, customs control, justice, transport and infrastructure, boundaries and Serbian patrimony<sup>8</sup>. Formally, Kosovo authorities have opposed the plan as they considered that it could contribute to the widening of the disagreements between ethnic communities and that it violates state sovereignty and independence. However, Prishtina did not oppose to *de facto* implementation of Ban Ki-Moon plan, the UN Secretary General, as EU and US required its putting into, on the grounds that the plan will contribute to improvement of Kosovo's security.

The year that has just ended was, for Kosovo, the year of the first local elections, the first since the declaration of independence. The international community considered that they were well organized and that they met most international standards, despite the opposition from Belgrade, which considered them illegal. In addition, despite attempts to boycott the elections in the Serb minority, there were 22 Serbian parties that took part in the scrutiny, there are two Serb ministers in the Government and the Serb minority has ten seats reserved in the legislative body<sup>9</sup>, thus being obvious Kosovo authorities' efforts to determine the Serbian minority to participate in elections.

Backed by the international community, recording progresses in what concerns the rule of law, Kosovo status remains however a controversial one. Moreover, there is a range of some obvious internal vulnerabilities. Security on the territory of Kosovo continues to be provided by the international community, which makes it a stable area, but without resolving the problems that undermine the efforts to establish the rule of law. In this case, we refer to the poverty of population, to the high rates of unemployment, the high-level



corruption and organized crime networks. These are plagues affecting the whole Western Balkan space, but, in Kosovo, they are even more harmful, the higher as this status is still one of controversy, as the relations with Belgrade remain tensed, and relations between ethnic communities remain strained.

#### 4. The crisis state of Bosnia-Herzegovina

If we could define the situation in Kosovo as relatively stable, although it is undermined by the status issue, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina developed, in the recent period, as a crisis one. Although it is not the only Western Balkan state to face problems in the process of European integration, Bosnia faced, certainly, the biggest difficulties in this regard. A potential EU candidate country, Bosnia was marked by a serious domestic political crisis, perhaps the most serious since the end of the Bosnian war, a crisis characterized by an aggressive nationalist discourse.

The Prud Process, launched in late 2008, which was a framework for the representatives of the main political parties to meet and decide the initiation of a constitutional reform, aiming at obtaining a higher degree of compliance of the Constitution to the European Convention on Human Rights, failed during the last year. Political leaders turned out to have different visions on their country's future, so that they could not reach a compromise, or a common conclusion.

European integration supposes implementing a set of reforms, in which Bosnia continues to be very poor; however, this need was often hampered by the deep dissensions between ethnic communities. The current constitutional order provides multiple tools that allow clocking the political decision-making process. Using provisions as the "entity vote"<sup>10</sup>, representatives of Republic of Srpska (RS) have often blocked the enactment of important laws. This happened, for example, in the case of a set of laws necessary to gain the right to travel without visas within the Schengen area.

Nationalist discourse, however, is a feature of both political sides. On the one hand, Serbs from the Republic of Srpska often called the right of self-determination and systematically opposed to the central level of state to be endowed with new powers, even in the Stability and Association Agreement framework. On the other hand, and

the political discourse of the Croats and Bosnians is also obviously marked by nationalist elements, especially if we consider that some politicians continue to question the legitimacy of the Republic of Srpska, arguing that it is the result of the genocide carried out by the Serbs. The international community, trying, repeatedly, to forge a compromise, has addressed these dissensions between the two entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The political crisis began in September, when the High Representative imposed a set of laws, using his Bonn powers<sup>11</sup>; it was a set of laws that the Prime Minister of RS rejected, threatening to withdraw all Serb representatives from government, whether the measures will be implemented. The crisis was not caused by nature of the laws, but by the struggle for the authority to impose laws between the OHR (Office of High Representative) and RS Prime Minister. Serbs' withdrawal from state institutions would entail a constitutional crisis, as any legislative activity would be practically blocked.

However, the Assembly succeeded in adopting an amendment to the Constitution, providing that the District of Brčko (included, until then, into the RS) is a territorial unit of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the right of self-government; this is a step towards the termination of the period of supervision of the Office of the High Representative. It seems to be the single point from the list of conditions listed by the Peace Implementation Council<sup>12</sup> (PIC - the international body supervising the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement). However, more progresses in this regard are impossible to be achieved as the government is practically paralyzed. The international community responded to this political crisis by holding high-level negotiations at Camp Butmir, which sought to find a compromise solution for the constitutional reform, which would have allowed the closure of the OHR.

The present situation is caused by the attitudes that the three ethnic communities have to each other. Bosnians, for example, fear that Bosnia can not function in accordance with the Dayton Constitution, without international supervision, because the RS will continue to hamper the activity of the state institutions. Moreover, they also fear that RS will try to put into practice the threat of secession, unless it is controlled by the international community or whether Bosnia-



Herzegovina will not become strong enough. This assumption is, however, little realistic, since even the main supporters of the RS – Serbia and Russia – do not agree to this option.

Bosnian Serbs fear that autonomy of the RS will be undermined by the action of the international community, determining the weakening of this entity and even its dissolution. This explains their strong reluctance to the international community's efforts to build strong state, increasing the functionality of the central level institutions.

Despite the current political crisis is caused by Serb representatives, there is also an irreconcilable conflict within the Bosnian Croat federation, as the main goal of Croatians is territorial autonomy in a separate entity or any other form. The subject is so sensitive that was not even addressed in the negotiations at Camp Butmir.

EU and US representatives attempted to identify, at Butmir, a set of provisions acceptable for all parties, based on the idea of the progress towards Bosnia's receiving NATO and EU membership, the only aspiration seems to overcome ethnic conflicts and unite the three communities. It was therefore decided that the Constitution must be amended so that Bosnia could have a representative in Brussels, to negotiate accession. This includes giving more powers to the central state, which will have the responsibility for negotiating agreements and for assuming obligations. The second point relates to compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights and to the necessity to reform the electoral system until elections from April 2010. The third point of the package involves improving the functionality of the state, by increasing the number of seats in the legislative body, which is a measure that will increase state's ability to adopt the *acquis communautaire*, as well as an attractive measure for politicians, since it provides more places to party representatives. Under this measure will increase the House of Representatives from 42 delegates to at least 100 members.

But the cornerstone of the entire package consists in the state property issue, whose resolution is necessary to close the OHR. Its difficulty resides in the fact that the Bosnian parties will not approve the proposal for state property until the RS will not approve the constitutional reform and the RS will not do so unless it includes the termination of the OHR mandate<sup>13</sup>.

Although EU and US offered in exchange for

the acceptance of Butmir package Bosnia's right to move within the Schengen area without visas and promised to accelerate NATO membership accession and the inclusion in EU candidate states category, the negotiations did not resulted in the commitment of the representatives of the Bosnian entities to implement the proposed provisions. Bosnian Serbs have deemed it too drastic, and Muslims and Croats considered them insufficient. Basically, no US or EU threat or promise could convince the Bosnian Serbs to give up the rights and privileges granted by the Dayton Agreement. Serbs in the RS want to have full control over their destinies and fear that if they continue to transfer authority to a central government, Bosnian Muslims, who are more numerous, will get to have that control. The result is the maintenance of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a dysfunctional state, stopping in its process of modernization. Perhaps the clearest message in that sense was that, after Bosnia had applied to join the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), in October, two months later, its accession was refused, as it is conditional on implementing a set of reforms. The international community has decided to postpone discussions on the future of the OHR until February 2010.

The present situation determines Bosnia-Herzegovina to stagnate in its way towards European integration, as it is not likely that PIC would decide to terminate the OHR in Bosnia. The presence of an international body with high powers of government is not compatible with the European aspirations of Bosnia.

But, on the other hand, the serious dissensions between the representatives of the three ethnic communities make it impossible to close the OHR, which guarantees the territorial and constitutional integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is also possible that next year, which is an election year, would see a deepening of the political and ethnic dissension, determined by the political crisis, and the weakening of social cohesion caused by the effects of the global financial and economic crisis.

### 5. The active foreign policy of Serbia

As far as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are concerned, the main challenge for the central authorities and for the international community as well is the relationship between the majority ethnic group (Albanians in Kosovo and Muslims and



Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina) with the minority ethnic group – Serbs. Therefore, *Serbia's* position is the key factor in the equation of stability and security of the Western Balkans. Serbia's political, economic and social stability contributes to maintaining stability and security throughout the whole region.

If, as regards Kosovo, Serbia argues that it is an autonomous province within its own territory, Belgrade has a different approach in what concerns RS officials' declarations on the secession from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although RS has a majority Serb population and Serbia is one of its biggest supporters, Belgrade opposes to its secession from Bosnia-Herzegovina, considering it would be contrary to the national interest of Serbia, since the separation would not be beneficial to any country in the region and not even to Bosnian nationals<sup>14</sup>. In addition, the principles evoked by Serbia and its supporters in the question of Kosovo would be incompatible to the ones that would support the recognition of independence of the Republic Srpska.

Nonetheless, Serbia stood out through a very active foreign policy based on three priority pillars: EU, US, China and Russia. These priorities seem to be, in certain circumstances, contradictory and were often interpreted as an attempt of Serbia to restore the role played during the Cold War, as a bridge between East and West.

Thus, foreign policy in Belgrade pays a particular attention to EU requests for moving towards membership, but also to the relations with Russia or China. Perhaps the most difficult aspect of these relations is the issue of Kosovo.

European Union, on the one hand, supports and promotes recognition of its independence, while Russia and China, on the other hand, are the most important allies of Serbia in keeping Kosovo within Serbian national borders, as defined by the Constitution. Presently, Serbia expects the International Court of Justice opinion, which is likely to be ambiguous, given the fact that international law hasn't clear provisions on the right to secession and self-determination. For example, most Western countries support Kosovo's independence, but not that of Abkhazia or South Ossetia from Georgia.

However, Serbia has recently succeeded in achieving a number of visible progresses towards EU accession. Stabilization and Association Agreement

was signed in early 2008, but its implementation was blocked by the Danes' opposition, who have conditioned its implementation of the arrest of Ratko Mladić, a Bosnian Serb general who was accused by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for genocide during the 1992-1995 war, and Goran Hadžić, which are believed to be hiding in Serbia. Although not yet found, the Danes were satisfied with the fact that Serbia has fully cooperated with the judicial authority responsible for their arrest and raised the veto at the end of the last year.

This event was immediately followed by Serbia's formal application to EU membership and it is waiting for the EU Council's agreement. Acceptance of the application is very likely, given that the Council Presidency is held, from January 2010 by Spain, a state with whom Serbia has maintained good relations and which has certain common objectives of foreign policy and maintains Serbia's position in the Kosovo problem. In addition, Serbia achieved, for its citizens, the right to move freely, without visas within the Schengen area.

Serbia has also made progress towards the integration into the North-Atlantic Alliance. Member of the Partnership for Peace since 2006, Serbia signed in 2009, the first Individual Partnership Program (IPP) with NATO, which sets out priorities for cooperation between the two entities. IPP relates to further cooperation in the security issues, in science and environment, information and defence and security sector reform.

The orientation towards Euro-Atlantic integration is largely due to the pro-European government in Belgrade, but this does not mean as we have noticed, that the relationship with Russia or China passes on the second place. The relationship with these actors is very important for Serbia, especially from an economic point of view, but also in what concerns the support that they give to Serbia in the Kosovo issue. The two countries have supported Serbia's position in the International Court of Justice.

The economic dimension of these relations is a salient as possible – the Serbian government may benefit from China's promise to invest 200 million euros in a new bridge in Belgrade, or from the loan of one billion euros from the Russians, under particularly advantageous conditions.



One could also notice that the work of the two political orientations, a pro-European one and a traditionalist one, which, unlike the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, succeed in cooperating and even in making out of this ambiguous, dual foreign policy ambiguous a beneficial policy for Serbia.

### **6. The integration difficulties of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and of Montenegro**

Similarly to the other western Balkan states, the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)* and *Montenegro* have established the Euro-Atlantic integration as the key objective of their foreign policy. Montenegro signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2007 and has submitted the application for membership in December 2008. The Council asked the Commission for an opinion on this application, which is expected in 2010. However, Montenegro has made progress in meeting the political criteria for accession, but it needs to improve the administrative capacity. Along with FYROM, Montenegro has achieved for its citizens the right to travel visas in the Schengen area. But the fight against corruption remains a serious problem as the latest EU report on the progress made by Montenegro states that the Montenegrin authorities have not fully implemented the afferent legislation.

FYROM has evolved steadily in implementing reforms required for accession to EU, but the biggest problem is represented by a dispute with Greece over Macedonia's name. This dispute delays the invitation to join NATO too, as Greece blocked FYROM's accession to NATO in 2008, arguing that its name implies territorial claims on Greece's Northern Province, which still bears the name Macedonia.

### **Conclusions**

Euro-Atlantic aspiration is emerging as the only common point of the Western Balkan states authorities' preoccupations, but it is also an important catalyst for maintaining stability and security in the region. If, after the end of violent confrontations in the region, Western Balkan states were assisted by the international community in stabilization, security maintaining, in building

the foundations of modern states, endowed with the capacity of self-government, in the efforts to impose the rule of law, we can appreciate that these states made different progresses towards this ideal. In other words, even if Euro-Atlantic integration was the main concern of the Western Balkan states and the only common point of their foreign policy, they have not chosen the same route. Society's division, the preservation of strongly nationalist discourse in some cases, disputes aroused and maintained between the states of this region continues to constitute obstacles in their way to Europe and to NATO.

The necessary reforms for the European integration, strengthening good governance and the rule of law, fight against corruption, respect for ethnic minorities have constituted for many of the states in question problems which turned out to be difficult to overcome, problems for whose solution both the states and the international community have to make further efforts.

It should be also considered that, despite the fact that last year the Western Balkans have been driven by intraregional conflicts, their accession appearing to have reached a stalemate – Croatia was blocked by Slovenia, Serbia by Denmark –, at the end of the year, their situation seemed to have improved considerably, at least in what concerns the two states mentioned above. Their evolution can influence the situation in the entire region, so that, while Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo have to overcome more obstacles to accession, they may benefit from Croatia and Serbia's progress. However, except Croatia, the rest of them have still a long way to accession. This also happens because, perhaps one of the most serious obstacles to joining the EU, as far as the Western Balkans are concerned, emerge from the very nature of the European construction – the enlargement fatigue. Nonetheless, we reckon that, in the case of West Balkan region, the efforts to overcome it and to continue the integration process is absolutely necessary. Although integration of the Western Balkans can be seen as the acceptance of unstable countries in the European club and, therefore, the integration of possible sources of insecurity within the European construction, expansion in the region equals to ensuring a stable environment on the continent by a comprehensive approach of the flaws that may become possible sources of threat to the region overall and for the



whole Europe as well.

Moreover, given the very strong disputes between these countries, the maintenance of a nationalist discourse, territorial claims, we argue that it is also necessary that the whole Balkan Peninsula should be integrated, because only in this way, a framework for political dialogue could be built, a framework within which the problems will be resolved by diplomatic means. Although, in our opinion, a future armed conflict in the Balkans is not likely, Western Balkan states must build a culture of peaceful resolution of disputes, cooperation, a process to which EU could have a substantial contribution. Regardless of how much the negotiations and the pre-accession stage of stabilizing the region will last, we consider that this is absolutely necessary in order to ensure EU's long term security.

In conclusion, in what concerns the evolution of Western Balkan states to be accepted in the Western European club, there has been a slow but undeniable progress. Although most of them remain poor countries, affected by the economic and financial crisis, still characterized by strong domestic vulnerabilities, such as corruption, ethnic divisions and continue to be an area of organized crime, reforms and efforts to assimilate the *acquis communautaire* make their placement on the European path impossible to be questioned nowadays.

### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> *The Economist*, 16th of April 2009, *A Balkan state in balk. Hopes for early European Union accession recede in Croatia*, on-line edition, available at [http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story\\_id=13497022&source=log\\_in\\_pay\\_barrier](http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13497022&source=log_in_pay_barrier).

<sup>2</sup> *The Economist*, 30<sup>th</sup> of December 2009, *The Balkans and the European Union, Lightening the gloom?*, on-line edition, available at [http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story\\_id=15180906](http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15180906).

<sup>3</sup> Kosovo declared its independence to Serbia in February 2008. The latter continues to consider Kosovo part of its sovereign territory, under the interim administration of the United Nations, referring to it as the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohia, accordingly to the 2006 Constitution of Serbia. Croatia recognized

Kosovo's independence in March 2008, establishing diplomatic relations with it during the same year.

<sup>4</sup> In this sense, the words of an Albanian analyst, Gjergj Erebara, are relevant – “the future belongs to the market-states, not to the nation-states, and, under these conditions, the whole Balkan Region could become a single market-state, with Albania and Kosovo as hinterland areas”, cited in *Foreign Policy Romania*, January/February 2010, Besar Likmeta, “Albania Mare”, „*Albania Mare*”, *doar economică*, p. 71.

<sup>5</sup> *Albanian Times*, 27<sup>th</sup> of August 2009, Erind Kurti, *National Unification between Albania and Kosovo*, on-line edition, available at <http://www.albaniantimes.com/2009/08/national-unification-between-albania.html>.

<sup>6</sup> To these, we should add Mauritania, which recognized Kosovo's independence on 13<sup>th</sup> of January 2010.

<sup>7</sup> Written Statement of the United States of America, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-government of Kosovo, Request for an Advisory Opinion, April 2009, available on-line on the official web site of the International Court of Justice, <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15640.pdf>.

<sup>8</sup> The key-elements of the plan can be read on-line at <http://www.kosovocompromise.com/cms/item/topic/en.html?View=story&id=1571&sectionId=1>.

<sup>9</sup> *Adevărul*, 20<sup>th</sup> of November 2009, Ion M. Ioniță, *Fatmir Sejdiu: „Kosovo nu poate fi văzut ca un precedent”*, on-line edition, available at [http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/eveniment/Fatmir\\_Sejdiu\\_-\\_Kosovo\\_nu\\_poate\\_fi\\_vazut\\_ca\\_un\\_precedent\\_0\\_154784575.html](http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/eveniment/Fatmir_Sejdiu_-_Kosovo_nu_poate_fi_vazut_ca_un_precedent_0_154784575.html).

<sup>10</sup> From the government system point of view, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a democratic federation, composed of two entities, Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation (area in which the Bosnians and Croats hold the majority) and Republic of Srpska (where Serbs hold the majority).

<sup>11</sup> They allow the High Representative to act as a government, to enact laws and to dismiss officials.

<sup>12</sup> The list, which is known as the “5 +2” list, provides that, in order to the Office of the High Representative to be closed, Bosnia-Herzegovina should achieve: a) acceptable and sustainable



problem solving in competence division between state and other governmental entities, b) acceptable and sustained solution in what concerns the property of defence, c) determining the status of Brčko District, d) Fiscal Sustainability e) strengthening the rule of law (demonstrated by the enactment of the National Strategy for War Crimes, the National Strategy for the Legal Sector Reform, the Law on Foreigners and Asylum; f) signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement and obtaining a positive assessment of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina

by PIC Control group, showing the full application of Dayton Peace Agreement, g) Declaration of the PIC Control Group.

<sup>13</sup> International Crisis Group, *Bosnia's Dual Crisis*, Europe Briefing No. 57, Sarajevo/Brussels, 12 November 2009, available on-line at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6386&l=1>.

<sup>14</sup> *Serbianna*, 27.11.2009, *Bosnia breakup against Serbia interests*, available on-line at <http://serbianna.com/news/?p=3571&cpage=1>.

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# THE MILITARIES' PLACE AND ROLE IN NEW DEMOCRACIES

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*According to the definitions given by the reference dictionaries, **military** is the total of a state's military forces, or, in a more nuanced form, a state's total of the military units and its services. They often use the **armed forces** term, as there are implied synonymic relations between these two terms.*

*The use of the both terms in the specialty literature, in mass-media and even in the official papers associated with different contents, more or less nuanced, create a conceptual confusion, misinterpretations, including on establishing roles, missions, and also competences and responsibilities.*

*According to our analysis, the above-mentioned phenomenon is met in the countries which proposed and act in order to become a sovereign state, according to the western democracy model. The conceptual indeterminacy refer to establishing the types of military forces, their organization and endowment with weaponry and fighting technologies, to the relations between them, to the missions they can accomplish and the way the legality of their activity is legally fundamented.*

*It is our intention to present some of the conclusions resulted from the comparative analysis of some interesting aspects regarding militaries from new democracies or from the traditional ones and the Romanian one.*

*Keywords: militaries; armed forces; force institutions; internal security; national safety.*

## **Theoretical fundaments for analysing the militaries' evolution**

The analysis of the evolution of national militaries after 1989 determined us to formulate some strictly theoretical elements about describing the context they have been initiated and the steps have been made for their transformation and modernization.

If we are to learn something from history – as Henry Kissinger mentioned in his memoirs – then there is no peace without a balance<sup>1</sup>. Obviously, this balance speaks about the two protagonists of a possible confrontation. It is a principle very well known by politicians and applied due to support they receive from their military advisers, who see this balance from the unitary value of the forces ratio (military potentials) corresponding to the possible enemies within an armed conflict.

Redimensioning the areas of influence is a major objective for the big powers, within the evolution of their power cycle. If it not achieved due to an armed conflict between them, it may be obtained only due to a lasting process comprising several stages. The compulsoriness of their existence, their succession or simultaneity, and the order of their coverage is not an imperative. They may be:

- the increase of the own or firm allies' military potentials/taking measures leading to the attenuation of the national military potentials of the countries considered possible enemies;
- drawing new members within that politico-military alliance that it leads (creating alliances, if they are absent)/ quantitative and qualitative diminish of the enemy aliance;
- modifying the geopolitical spectrum of the area of interest by the state destructure of the countries within that region/rebuilding, even partially, and in other forms, the previous state structures.

The diminish of a state's military potential may be achieved by imposing (inducing the self-imposement), more or less concealed, of the following ways:

- adopting some limits for quantitative and qualitative armed forces' dimensioning;
- adopting low defence budgets, allowing the survival of the national military body with huge efforts and not its development;
- reducing the duration for military service, an action with direct repercussions on the appearance and increase of the deficits on recruiting, for



scription, and forming a reserve force weak professionally trained;

- adopting some high rates for professionalizing militaries, despite the substantial implying costs;
- taking part in international military operations, with numerous manpower, supporting high expenses, in expense of satisfying the priorities common to the military body;
- taking part in common military activities, consuming heavily material and financial resources, corresponding to some insignificant actions for the military's basic mission;
- diminishing the potential of the national defence industries, up to their destructure and elimination.

We will continue by exclusively deal with the aspects related to the militaries' place and role.

### **Military or armed forces? The military's place among force institutions**

The end of the Cold War determined the option the countries from Central and Eastern Europe had, that is for their modernization in concordance with the models represented by the Western states, where the main characteristic was subsumed to the phrase "a new democracy". One of the first objectives of the approach for achieving the sovereign state was projecting their militaries, within their national military forces as distinctive elements, even if they were still part of the Warsaw Treaty, together with other force institutions.

An aspect creating conceptual confusion is the use of military, armed forces and military forces as being synonyms. First of all, the confusion is generated by all the Romanian dictionaries, where you can find definitions as: "Military forces = subunits, units, organizations and formations composing the armed forces"; "armed forces (*or* military) = military"; "force (usually at the plural form and with "armed" determination) = the total of a state's military units; military"; "armed forces = military, military units".

It is asserted that the **armed forces** term has a distinct field of using, but also some corresponding subdivisions, as for instance: *Belgium – Armed forces*, *The United States – National Guard*, *Ohio (The United States) – Militia*, and also for the collectivities designating different services (*land, air, navy* and sometimes autonomous forces, as *gendarmerie*, or, in the United States, *Marine*

*Corps*). Also, for the international organizations having military forces at their disposal, they appear as followed by the subdivision "armed forces", as, for instance: *The United Nations – armed forces*, *North Atlantic Treaty Organization – armed forces*<sup>2</sup>.

There is a clear distinction between armed forces and military in the Romanian legislation. Both the Romanian Constitution from 1991, and the one modified and completed, known as The Romanian Constitution 2003, article 117, respectively 118, refers to **The armed forces**. Within those articles, there are made references to **Military**, *police, state's intelligence services and other components of the armed forces* (1991), respectively *other components of the armed forces* established in accordance with the law.

The law of the Romanian national defence (L.45/1994) mentions, at article 11, that "**Armed forces** comprise **military**, high units and units subordinated to the Ministru of Interior, the ones from the intelligence services and other armed defence formations, according to the law".

On a web site of a Romanian official institution, it is mentioned that "The Romanian Military is built up from three services: Land Forces, Air Forces and Navy Forces, under the command of the General Staff, directly subordinated to the Ministry of National Defence. During war, the Romanian President is the supreme commandant of the Military Forces"<sup>3</sup>. Within that statement, there are some errors generating conceptual confusions. It is true that the Romanian Military has three services, that the General Staff is a component of the Ministry of National Defence and the Romanian President is the commandant of the Military Forces (not a supreme commandant), attribution valid even during peacetime, not only during war.

Another debatable definition is given in the Classification of Occupations in Romania: "The armed forces comprise persons that, on the basis of their job obligations or by virtue of the obligation established by the current legislation, carry out activities within different services or auxiliary services, without the permission to cumulate with other activities from the civilian life. Within this group there are appointed the full time personnel of land, navy, air services or others, and the ones recruited for a regulated period of time, for completing their military service or other



services. There are not included in this group the people from public institutions having defence competences: custom officers and members of other armed civilian services; people temporary called for a short regulating period for training or military exercises; reservists<sup>74</sup>.

### The evolution of the national militaries' manpower

For the countries that opted for modernising the state on new, democratic bases, after the end of Cold War, the military has been projected as a distinct component of the national military forces, coexisting together with other force institutions, having different nominations.

Table 1 presents the evolution of the militaries' manpower from the group of states we analyse. The values, corresponding to 1989, are diminished to the real ones, at least in Romania's case, as its military had almost 320000 people in December 1989. The difference comes from the fact that, in the quoted source, there were not included the air defence troops, the border guards, the staff from the military units built up for achieving strict missions within the national economy, disciplinary units, etc.

From the very beginning, the start of militaries' restructure and modernization aimed the diminish of manpower and limiting the possessed conventional

weapons from five categories: fighters, attack helicopters, armoured vehicles and artillery over 100 mm, belonging to those 22 state-parties what signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) at Paris, on November, 19, 1990.

In the Helsinki Final Negotiation Act on the armed forces stationed in Europe, signed at Helsinki, on the 10<sup>th</sup> of July 1992, each participating state committed to limit its troops or the ones stationed in Europe, to 40 months after the Treaty came into place, at the values mentioned in table 2.

The restructure of the national armies, former members of the Warsaw Treaty, located in the Central and South-Eastern Europe, aimed achieving objectives as:

- Diminishing the national militaries' troops at the limits imposed by CFE Treaty;
- Placing in the budgetary limits meant for the military field;
- The national military bodies should attain the standards imposed by NATO's joining and integration;
- Adopting the armed forces' structures and endowment variants allowing the interoperability with the military forces of NATO's military forces;
- Armed forces' transformation and modernization for the new missions, in the context of collective defence or actions within multinational alliances.

Table no. 1

State Year	BULGARIA	THE CZECH REPUBLIC	GREECE	POLAND	ROMANIA	CROATIA	SLOVAKIA	SLOVENIA	TURKEY	HUNGARY
1989	150.000		201.000	350.000	207.000				780.000	109.000
1990	129.000		201.000	313.000	126.000				769.000	94.000
1991	107.000		205.000	305.000	201.000			15.000	804.000	87.000
1992	99.000		208.000	270.000	172.000	103.000		12.000	704.000	78.000
1993	52.000	100.000	213.000	250.000	167.000	103.000	40.000	8.000	686.000	78.000
1994	53.000	93.000	206.000	230.000	200.000	105.000	47.000	8.000	811.000	75.000
1995	80.000	86.000	213.000	215.000	200.000	105.000	47.000	10.000	805.000	71.000
1996	90.000	70.000	212.000	200.000	200.000	73.000	43.000	10.000	818.000	64.000
1997	102.000	62.000	206.000	195.000	200.000	58.000	41.000	10.000	828.000	56.000
1998	102.000	59.000	202.000	190.000	180.000	56.000	45.000	10.000	788.000	49.000
1999	81.000	54.000	204.000	187.000	140.000	53.000	45.000	10.000	789.000	51.000
2000	80.000	52.000	205.000	191.000	130.000	53.000	38.000	9.000	793.000	50.000
2001	60.000	48.000	205.000	178.000	144.000	60.000	35.000	10.000	803.000	49.000
2002	45.000	44.000	229.000	159.000	92.000	34.000	20.000	9.000	816.000	44.000
2003	43.000	51.000	229.000	150.000	92.000	29.000	19.000	5.000	823.000	45.000

Source: <http://first.sipri.org>



## SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

Table no. 2

<i>Participating-state in CFE Treaty</i>	<i>Maximum levels</i>
BELARUS	100.000
BELGIUM	70.000
BULGARIA	104.000
CANADA	10.660
THE CZECH REPUBLIC	140.000
DENMARK	39.000
FRANCE	325.000
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY	345.000
GREECE	158.261
HUNGARY	100.000
ICELAND	0
ITALY	315.000
LUXEMBOURG	900
THE KINGDOM OF NETHERLANDS	80.000
NORWAY	32.000
POLAND	234.000
PORTUGAL	75.000
ROMANIA	230.248
RUSSIAN FEDERATION	1.450.000
SPAIN	300.000
TURKEY	530.000
UKRAINE	450.000
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRLAND	260.000
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	250.000

In Romania, the military's restructure had remarkable results by diminishing the military's manpower to lower levels than the ones established by CFE Treaty. In 1999, after ten years of restructure, Romania's military had 144000 militaries and 36000 civilians. At present, there are around 75000 militaries and 15000 civilians. These values were attained by dissolving many military structures, whose mission was not specific to some modern armies. We mainly refer to those military structures whose single mission was working for the national economy (building industrial objectives, all types of transport, civilian objectives, etc.). We mention that personnel from the operational military structures were also involved in these activities.

The military's manpower was also diminished by transferring the border troops to the Ministry of Interior<sup>5</sup>. Also, a reduction has been achieved by dissolving the troops meant for defending the territory, re-organised within the air forces.

Going back to the military forces' restructure, we should make a delimitation of the forces belonging to the military and the other ones subsumed to

other components of the state's military (defence) system. It is stated that, within the ensemble of the national military forces, the ones belonging to the military, with missions exclusively aiming external actions, are under the level of the ones regarding to hostile manifestations on internal level. Moreover, within military forces there are not included those troops considered civilians, as police, but there are added force structures belonging to the intelligence services.

### **The new militaries' missions**

From Clausewitzian perspective, stating that war is a continuation of politics, by other means, but also from the perspective of the real definition Carl von Clausewitz gave to war, military, and armed forces are associated with the destructive effect of their actions, because of the armed fight. But militaries are built-up even during peacetimes, are trained and act in war, armed conflict, peace, exceptional situations times, but also during crisis, as this is specific both to peace times and war times.



Depending on the states' military policy, the missions established for the armed forces, and military, may be characterised as it follows:

- Within the ensemble of the developed activities, military has a role as a mean (tool) of action, for achieving the tasks established by the political factor;

- There are aimed the activities done by different types of actions, both violent and non-violent;

- The opponent of the armed actions belongs to the forces outside the own territory, but there are not excluded the situations when enemies are from the state's interior;

- Alliances and military coalitions are the main operational framework, without excluding the actions from national perspective.

Starting from the missions established for the militaries from the states belonging to the established, western democracies, we mention here the following:

### *The United States of America*

The US Congress defines the military's missions at it follows:

- preserving peace and security, defending USA;

- sustaining the national policies;

- implementing the national objectives;

- defeating any nation which may endanger US peace and security by aggressive actions.

The military has missions during peacetime, military conflicts or wars aiming actions outside US.

### *The United Kingdom*

The military accomplishes missions addressed by the Government, and its main mission is to defend United Kingdom's interests, within its space, but it may also imply missions outside the national borders, as part of NATO or any other multinational forces development. Also, soldiers may be sent in missions led by UN and used for solving out other emergency states.

The military has to handle the new international threats – terrorism, the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, weak states, and failed states.

### *France*

The military has the following missions:

- preserving France's vital interests –

maintaining France's national territory integrity, the free exercise of sovereignty and protecting the population and the nationals;

- contribution to the security and defence of the European and Mediterranean space;

- contribution to actions for peace and international law.

Engaging force during crisis may vary, from the simple presence, to the show of force with retaliation actions, with modern weapons used from a high distance, and the protection implies ensuring the permanent security by gendarmerie forces (belonging to the armed forces), the security of the maritime and air space.

### *Italy*

The armed forces are undertaking the following tasks:

- defending the national territory against any aggression;

- defending the Euro-Atlantic space;

- supporting the positive solving of the international crisis;

- preserving the national institutions and supplying assistance in the event of a natural disaster or any other emergency situation.

### *Germany*

Bundeswehr, a term defining the armed forces together with the administrative civilian personnel, has only a defensive role and expressed within preserving the state's security as a whole. Bundeswehr provides the capacity for external actions, contributes at stability within European and global framework, provides national security and defence, provides assistance for defending the allies, supports cooperation and the multinational integration, and, on internal level, it provides subsidiary assistance, in case of disasters and accidents.

### *Turkey*

The missions and responsibilities of the Turkish Armed Forces are mentioned in the Constitution of Turkey and are defined by laws. They include the reaction to the new security challenges and crises, being ready to face certain insecurity sources and ensuring Turkey's security in front of internal and external risks<sup>6</sup>.

The National Security Council, considered the symbol of the militaries' involvement in policy,



considers military as the guardian of the new order and ideology - Kemalism. Through the National Security Council, military continues to have a large influence on the politics, although it has been lately diminished by consecutive reforms, determined by the need to fulfil the criterion required for joining EU<sup>7</sup>.

In 2007, when Abdullah Gül, former member of an Islamist party, was elected as the president of Turkey, the military made a public statement of its own political interests, underlining that it is its duty to defend the state's secular system. The declaration ended with a clear warning, that, if the secular nature of the Turkish Constitution will be infringed, the military is ready to intervene: "The Turkish Armed Forces maintain their strong determination to fulfil their tasks stipulated by laws in order to protect the unchanged characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. The loyalty of the Armed Forces towards this determination is absolute"<sup>8</sup>.

### *Greece*

The main mission of the Armed Forces<sup>9</sup> is to defend the state's independence and integrity, the national territory, but also the contribution to achieving the state's political objectives.

During peacetime, the armed forces have the following main objectives:

- ongoing vigilance towards the security of the national territory;
- maintaining a high level of operational readiness for preventing and effective combat of dangers and threats, and also ensuring a rapid response capacity;
- contribution at international peace and security;
- contribution at social welfare activities and supporting the state's services in case of emergencies.

Regarding the new democracies, we remind that the missions established for the militaries followed the model of NATO member states, considering the national specific.

### *Bulgaria*

The armed forces' missions correspond to the Constitutional obligations, long-term national interests on security and defence, to the tendencies from the strategic environment and Bulgaria's integration priorities. They may be summarised:

a) Contributions at national security during peacetime: maintaining armed forces' training and fight capabilities; guaranteeing the state's security regarding the air and naval space; protecting population and leading missions in emergency and rescue situations and in case of some natural disasters, industrial accidents, calamity and dangerous contamination; military assistance for ministries and agencies; participation in preventing and eliminating the effect of a contamination with CBRN agents; participating in timely preparing the locals, the national economy, the reserves for wartime and the infrastructure for defence; public tasks (for instance, ceremonials).

b) Contribution to the global peace and security: the contingents' participation in multinational forces for peace support; participation in humanitarian and rescue operations beyond the national borders; armament control, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, measures for building trust and security; military assistance for other states.

c) Participation in national defence: participation in crisis response which are a direct threat for the national security; defending the state's territory; participation in defence forces coalitions.

### *Hungary*

According to the principles of their security policy, the Hungarian Defence Forces contribute to strengthening the national stability and security by bilateral and multilateral military cooperation, achieving the following tasks:

- Armed defence of Hungary's independence, territory, air space, population, material goods against external attacks;
- Fulfilling military obligations – especially the ones related with collective defence, peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, specified in treaties signed with NATO and other international organizations;
- Protecting and defending constructions requiring additional protection measures;
- Providing military tasks for host-nations' assistance;
- Participation at preventing violent acts by the use of weapons, in concordance with the specifications of article 40/B, para 2 from Constitution: "Armed forces may be used only for stated emergencies, in accordance with the



constitutional stipulations, in case of an armed action meant to overthrow the constitutional order or to take over the absolute power, but also in cases of act of violence committed using weapons, or in cases of using force in a manner that may endanger citizens' lives and properties, and only when the deployment of police forces is not enough”;

-Eliminating the found explosives and completing other tasks for eliminating the explosive ammunition, in exchange of money;

-Contribution at achieving tasks for disaster prevention;

-Achieving tasks requiring military expertise and special tools for public bodies, in exchange of money;

-Participation at fulfilling public protocol tasks.

### *The Czech Republic*

The essential mission of the Czech armed forces is to train for defending the state and protect it against an external attack. Simultaneous, they fulfil other missions deriving from collective defence commitments the Czech Republic has undertaken by signing some treaties with international organizations. The Czech military has the obligation to ensure the state's security interests, which are defined in the Czech Republic Security Strategy:

- vital interests – guaranteeing the existence of the Czech Republic, its sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, **defending democracy and the sovereign state** (our underlining), protecting the fundamental human rights and the nationals' freedom;

- strategic interests – the Euro-Atlantic space security and stability, maintaining UN global stabilizing role, the solid transatlantic connection within NATO and building the strategic partnership between NATO and EU, the complementary development of NATO and EU's capabilities, developing the role played by OSCE in preventing armed conflicts, stabilization and democratization, the fight against international terrorism, decreasing the risks related with the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, including the ones related with the people transporting them, eradicating the organised crime and illegal migration, supporting the regional cooperation, ensuring the republic's economic security, strengthening the competitiveness of the Czech Republic's defence industry, ensuring

an optimum level of reserves, supporting freedom, democracy and sovereign state;

- other important interests – preventing and training for disasters and unexpected, natural, environment accidents, protecting the environment, becoming aware of the possible global environment changes, the lack of water and food, the lack of the industrial and energetic potential.

### *Poland*

The armed forces' missions are stipulated in the White Paper on Defence – 2001:

- defending the national territory against the armed aggression and ensuring the inviolability of air, maritime space and land borders;

- defending and protecting citizens;

- participating at the common defence of the NATO member states' territories, in concordance with article 5/ Washington Treaty;

- supporting international institutions and organizations in their actions related with response crisis and measures for political and military stabilization;

- developing a safe environment around Poland by the cooperation with other states, especially with the neighbours.

### **Romania's military missions**

The Constitution from 1991 clearly states Romania's military basic destination, on art. 117, alin. (1): “for ensuring the state's sovereignty, its independence and unity, the country's territorial integrity and the Constitutional democracy”.

The revised Constitution (2003) establishes, besides the basic missions mentioned above, other two missions for military:

- contribution to collective defence within the systems of military alliances;

- participation to actions aiming peacekeeping or peace restoring.

Therefore, military is a tool someone may use for intervening for defending and re-imposing the above-mentioned values.

Within some acceptable risk limits, the military has the capacity to protect and guarantee Romania's national security<sup>10</sup>.

In the White Paper of the National Security and Defence, starting from the fundamental mission of the Romanian Military, there are detailed its missions<sup>11</sup>.



**The fundamental mission** of the Romanian military consists of protecting Romania's national interests, considering the Constitutional democracy and the democratic and civilian control over the armed forces. The military has to be ready to prevent, deter and counteract an eventual armed aggression against Romania and its allies.

For fulfilling this role, there are stated four missions for the Romanian military, which have determined the specific requirements of its restructure and modernization.

### **1. Contribution at Romania's security during peacetime, by:**

- providing the control and protection of the airspace, fulfilling the obligations undertaken within NATO regarding the contribution to NATINEADS;

- supporting the Border Police, for ensuring the integrity of the territorial maritime waters, the contiguous zone and the exclusive economic one, but in certain circumstances, to provide the required support for overlooking, guard and protect Romania's interests within these areas;

- performing activities related with gathering data and information, processing, analysing and disseminating information within the defence area, in order to provide the political, politico-military and military decision-makers the required data for exercising the leading and command acts, as well as for the exchange of data with allies and partners;

- performing or participating at specific actions requiring the extraction and evacuation of the Romanian citizens from abroad, whose lives are in danger, if the intervention measures with non-military means prove to be inappropriate;

- providing security for the military bases/facilities and communications provided to the Alliance due to the Host-Nation Support, as well as providing the transport protection for equipment, techniques and military personnel on the Romanian territory.

- providing specialised personnel for military ceremonies and state protocol activities, as well as for protecting military notables, both Romanian and foreign, on the Romanian territory.

### **2. Defending Romanian and its allies, by:**

- rejecting an armed aggression against Romania or its allies, within the framework

provided by NATO's collective defence;

- providing support to the state institutions entitled to provide the continuity of the vital capacities for communication and the protection of the infrastructure elements, as well as the economic objectives with a higher CBRN risk;

### **3. Promoting regional and global stability, including the use of defence diplomacy, by:**

- participating at crisis response operation conducted by NATO, EU, OSCE and UN, with national contingencies or contingencies in multinational formations and regional initiatives;

- participating at humint, search and rescue operations, and for removing the disasters' effects, both individually or within some multinational formations, outside Romania;

- participating at military operations within some ad-hoc coalitions, together with other states, in order to support allies and partners in the fight against terrorism and in order to provide the international stability;

- contributions to the increase of trust and stability at sub-regional, regional and European security levels, by promoting the diplomacy of defence and by participating at cooperation arrangements and processes within these fields;

- providing military assistance and support for other states by bilateral and multilateral cooperation activities with allied states, as well as with other states, also by offers for training and education in the facilities located on the national territory, donations of equipments, etc.;

- contribution to national and international efforts for the armament control and combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

### **4. Supporting the state's institutions and local authorities in case of civilian emergencies, by:**

- participation with forces and logistic support for limiting and removing the disasters' effects, by the request of the civilian authorities;

- providing assistance to the civilian authorities, if required, in cases of accidents to CBRN installations and labs;

- supporting the civilian search and rescue actions, depending on the available resources, complementary and in coordination with other responsible institutions.

The reform of the Romanian military body includes approaches aiming the transformation of



the Romanian Military, from a defence military, to a security military, from a national military, to an alliance military.

During Prague Summit, November 2002, the Alliance's member states and the invited ones convened on a package of basic operational capabilities, focused "for turning into effective the performing of a whole range of missions, including the ones against terrorism<sup>12</sup>". The implementation of the aimed 400 capabilities, on short, medium and long term, beyond 2009<sup>13</sup>, aims "the development of an integrated, coherent force", directed to the introduction of long term priorities.

At the level of the Romanian military, there will be emphasized:

- transformation of own military capabilities;
- operations' preparing, assistance and support;
- implementing the deployment capabilities.

Our military specialists assert that these changes will require new abilities, new tools and a new mentality. The simultaneous achievement of these three requirements will contribute at improving the troops' training during missions the forces are involved at present, therefore offering a coherent example on the benefits of involving Romania on achieving the global security interests.

Romania's armed forces may participate at the following types of missions, in concordance with the obligations undertaken by our country by treaties, agreements and other international understandings:

1. collective defence operations;
2. peace support operations;
3. missions for humanitarian assistance;
4. military operations as coalition type;
5. joint exercises;
6. individual missions;
7. ceremonials.

### **The Romanian military and security /national safety**

If the military's role on defending state's sovereignty, independence and unity, its territorial integrity against external threats has always been precisely defined, as the reason of its main mission, it is not the same situation when we refer to the role it plays on internal security, therefore,

on guaranteeing the constitutional democracy.

The conceptual ambiguity, determined by the synonymy induced by the Romanian dictionaries, between **security** and **safety**, between the differences imposed by legal texts and incompletely developed in the specialty literature may create confusions in establishing missions and the way they are fulfilled by military, but also the other force structures within the national defence system, if there are responses to the threats within the national territory, within the corresponding values of the constitutional democracy.

In the White Paper of the National Security and Defence, in a systemic and comprehensive approach of the internal security (as this is the title of chapter VII), it is mentioned that the internal security is both about the citizen's safety and the public security, the borders', energy's, transport's security, of the one related with the systems for supplying with vital resources, as well as the protection of the critical infrastructure. From structural perspective, it includes the societal security and providing the legal state, counteracting terrorism and the organised crime, the security of financial-banking activities, of the informational and communication systems, the protection against disaster and the environment protection<sup>14</sup>. It is also mentioned that the task of providing internal security implies responsibilities from a large number of institutions and agencies mostly belonging to: public administration and public order structures, as well as the ones dealing with civil emergencies' prevention and management, the borders' security and the guard coast; structured dealing with intelligence, counterintelligence and security; the bodies responsible for preventing money laundering and control of strategic imports and exports; military structures, in special situations, for certain activities. (n.b. – without mentioning who these structures belong to, what are those special situations). Also, it is shown that, considering the amplification of risks generated by the possibility of producing some terrorist actions, the effective and pro-active counterattack of terrorism on the national territory is the main priority of the internal security.

The responsibilities of the internal security revert to the Ministry of Administration and Interior, by its specialised institutions, the Romanian Gendarmerie and the Romanian Police, and to the Romanian Intelligence Service.



Also, in the conditions stipulated by law, the Romanian Gendarmerie performs the attributions it has on defending the order and the public breach, the citizens' fundamental rights and freedoms, the public and private property, the prevention and the discovery of criminalities and other violations of in-place laws, as well as the protection of the state's fundamental institutions and combating terrorist acts<sup>15</sup>.

The Romanian Police exercise attribution on defending person's fundamental rights and freedom, the private and public property, preventing and discover criminalities, complying with the order and public breach, within the conditions established by law<sup>16</sup>.

Among others, the attributions and competencies of the Romanian Intelligence Service aim defending democracy and the constitutional order, the citizens' fundamental rights and freedoms – guaranteed by Constitution, and also protecting their exercises<sup>17</sup>.

For psychological and historical reasons, related with the military's involvement during events from December 1989, and, partially, to the ones from June, 13-15, 1990, when the convicted guilty are only the ones from the ones from the military, the Romania's military participation at the internal security may determine numerous reluctances, not only from political figures, but also from military men themselves or from the public opinion.

The Romanian Military involvement in actions assuming the use for force, excusing the ones related to the assistance in emergency cases, must be examined considering three criteria: legitimacy, efficiency and opportunity<sup>18</sup>. Moreover, its intervention implies a prior and strict definition of the rules of engagement and behaviour.

### **Democracy, coup d'état and military**

According to the Romanian Constitution, the sovereign state is organised on the principle of powers' separation and equilibrium - legislative, executive and judicial – within the framework provided by the constitutional democracy<sup>19</sup>.

As a condition and a guarantee of the constitutional democracy, in the Romanian society is determined by the pluralism of the political parties which have the constitutional obligation to contribute at defining and expressing the political will of citizens, obeying the national sovereignty,

the territorial integrity, the public breach and the principles of democracy<sup>20</sup>.

The coup d'état means to overtake the state's power, by the use of force, the violent overthrow of the state's leadership<sup>21</sup>. The second part of the statement, with its origins in an Explanatory Dictionary, has already introduced a state of confusion. As it makes reference to the state's leadership, it includes, among the state's powers, the President of Romania, who, according to art. 80, alin. (2) from Constitution, "exercises a mediation role between the state's powers, as well as between state and society".

Analysing the events, starting from 1989 and up to now, it seems that the phrase "coup d'état" has become a fad for some representatives of political parties, governmental or nongovernmental institutions, media, or, lately, of a syndicate of the reserved and retired militaries.

It has not been clarified if December 1989 was a revolution or a coup d'état, they continue to associate the term "regime" with the name of each Romanian President and his term, but when it was about suspending the President, they spoke about a... velvet attempt for a... velvet coup d'état. Based on the discussion related with the draft law on the unitary system of pensions, for keeping some of the rights, they promote, as a solution, the... judiciary coup d'état.

A special paper on the topic debated within this article is the book "About coup d'état and the defence against it" (Victor Strâmbeanu, PhD, general of the Romanian Military and presented in the previous issue of "Strategic Impact" magazine<sup>22</sup>).

The author considers that the initiators of a coup d'état aim the exercise or current leadership, being in power in the reference moment, but also the current political regime<sup>23</sup>, and the violence characteristic is provided by a group of forces, usually, an army. Also, the author presents the definition given to the coup d'état by the Concise Oxford Dictionary, "a sudden violent or illegal seizure of power from a government"<sup>24</sup>.

For this study, we started from the premises that the fight for power within the state is between the representatives of the three Constitutional powers, where military is mandatorily involves them, and, among them, the subject of the coup d'état may be the executive branch, represented by the government.



Analyzing the phenomena from two NATO member states facing coups d'état, Turkey and Greece, there have been drawn up some aspects which have to be considered.

Thus, in Turkey, in the last five decades, the military overthrew or challenged the collapse of four governments, translated also as coups d'état, but armed force was used only in two cases.

In Turkey, by tradition, military is the defendant of secularism and even of the democratic institutions. After the Second World War, the generals rebelled three times, once every decade, starting with 1960. The last coup d'état was in September 1980 and the civil power's restore was possible only after three years. Also, in 1997, there was an indirect putsch, a "soft coup", when, on apparently legal ways, using a combination of public pressure, and also from the inside, the generals overthrew a government considered by military as Islamist. Finally, by the end of February 2010, the Turkish military entered in an open conflict with the executive from Ankara, which accuses the military hierarchy of a coup d'état attempt. High ranking officers, active or retired, were charged for belonging to a clandestine organization. It seems that this clandestine organization, in 2003, would have plotted for overthrowing the conservatory government. The military rejects the accusations stating that, as a matter of fact, what authorities call as a plot was a scenario prepared on paper for a military seminar.

In Greece, in 1967, a military coup d'état determined the setting up of "the colonels' dictatorship", of an extremist political regime who took out all the political parties from the political arena, and the king was forced to leave the country, a civilian government coming back to power in 1974.

It is noticed that, in all the cases presenting the military, violence has not always been used, but the targeted purposes aimed both the change of government, and the political regime.

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<sup>1</sup> Conf. W. Ehler, *Kein Frieden ohne Macht* in *Truppenpraxis*, RFG, nr.5, Sept.-Oct. 1990.

<sup>2</sup> [http://www.bibnat.ro/dyn-doc/ghid-lives/subd\\_flotante\\_fortearmate.pdf](http://www.bibnat.ro/dyn-doc/ghid-lives/subd_flotante_fortearmate.pdf)

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.romania.gov.ro/index.php?page=for-ele-armate>

<sup>4</sup> [http://www.rubinian.com/cor\\_2\\_subgrupa\\_majora.php?id=0](http://www.rubinian.com/cor_2_subgrupa_majora.php?id=0)

<sup>5</sup> The troops' transfer has included the corresponding retirement funds for this service's reservists.

<sup>6</sup> See the official website of the Turkish Armed Forces General Staff, [http://www.tsk.tr/eng/genel\\_konular/gorevi.htm](http://www.tsk.tr/eng/genel_konular/gorevi.htm)

<sup>7</sup> See the official website of the National Security Council

<sup>8</sup> Article from BBC NEWS (extracts from the Turkish Military Declaration), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6602775.stm>

<sup>9</sup> See the official website of the Ministry of Defence from Greece.

<sup>10</sup> See [www.mapn.ro](http://www.mapn.ro).

<sup>11</sup> The White Papers on Security and National Defence, Bucharest, 2004, pp. 30-31.

<sup>12</sup> Report on Prague Capabilities Commitment, p. 1-1.

<sup>13</sup> Ibidem, pp. 1-2.

<sup>14</sup> The White Papers on Security and National Defence, București, 2004, pp. 39-40.

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.jandarmeriaromana.ro/ro/intro.htm>

<sup>16</sup> [http://www.politiaromana.ro/prima\\_pagina/index.aspx](http://www.politiaromana.ro/prima_pagina/index.aspx)

<sup>17</sup> <http://www.sri.ro/categorii/22/apararea-constitutiei.html>

<sup>18</sup> See, VIDAL, J., *Armata și securitatea internă*, in *Armées d'aujourd'hui*, France, year 54, no. 3, March 1998, pp.89-94.

<sup>19</sup> Constituția României, art. 1 alin. (4).

<sup>20</sup> Ibidem, art. 8.

<sup>21</sup> See Dicționarul explicativ al limbii române – DEX și Noul dicționar explicativ al limbii române – NODEX.

<sup>22</sup> About coup d'état and the defence against it, *Reviews, Impact strategic/Strategic Impact*, no. 4/2009.

<sup>23</sup> STRĂMBEANU, Victor, *Despre lovitura de stat și apărarea împotriva ei*, Editura Risoprint, Cluj-Napoca, 2009, pp. 25-30.

<sup>24</sup> Ibidem, p. 23.

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# CLIMATIC CHANGES AND ENVIRONMENT SECURITY, THE NEW PARADIGM OF THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

*Francisc TOBĂ, PhD*

*Today, the evolutions of human civilization tend to generate the biggest conflict and the most important source of the global imbalance: climate changes.*

*Today paradigms, which refer to the environment protection, is limited from the holistic approach of the present phenomena. We sustain a new paradigm - environmental security –, which must be understood both like prophylactic and punitive process – which is the concept of maximum generality concerning the evolution of the human civilization and also the concept of incorporated environment.*

*Keywords: environmental security; incorporated environment; ecotransology; the green development.*

*Homo Sapiens* evolution was also marked by his relation with the **incorporating environment** or with what we call today in reductionist terms “the surrounding environment”.

Over the centuries, *Homo Sapiens*’ relation with the environment was limited to the absorption of the necessary resources for living, and in the industrial and postindustrial era to the rejection of the technological surplus and the storage/disposal of the life expired products known as wastes.

In his evolution over the past few decades, the man was not concerned with the direct or perverse consequences of his attitude. The imbalances generated by his attitude have had a slow but implacable evolution.

At present, nature is drawing more violently the bill for man’s sometimes-defiant attitude towards it. Nature’s destructive arsenal sometimes goes beyond man’s capacity to realize the dangers and the manner in which he used to process the information regarding the environmental balances proves to be the most serious handicap today, for the very survival of the human being.

The climatic changes have been noticed either by the inhabitants of the planet through the devastating consequences of nature’s forces or by the scientists who started realizing the discreet manner in which imbalances are progressing towards critical thresholds. More and more often and violently, nature begins to impose the reconsideration of man’s relation with the environment. The natural ecosystems act as subsystems of the mega-system, which is nature with the ultimate purpose of restoring the balance. This step of nature can be fatal even for the existence of the human being on the Earth.

Climatic changes are mega-processes, which are developing to another time scale as against what the consumerist civilization understood to be the time reference system. Globalization of the economic processes has determined inter-conditionings at the planetary level where fewer and fewer people are the beneficiaries of the profit and more and more people are crushed by natural disasters. Nature is severely imposing the reconsideration of the concept of man’s relation with nature, the urgent need to switch from a profit focused civilization to a resource focused Civilization.

Humankind must concentrate on the cost-profit analysis in terms of relations with the environment. In this respect, we advance the idea of the need for a new paradigm which is the **environment security**. This concept takes into consideration the holistic approach of the man-nature relation, of the civilization-environment global system.

The **environment security** enables the awareness of the limits in this relation and the adequate methods for reducing the existing imbalance and the reorientation of human activity to cooperation and not defiant relations with the environment. “Therapy” activities such as the recovery of seriously damaged natural environments or the waste recycling must be accompanied by



prophylaxis or prevention activities, anticipating and minimizing unfavourable consequences on the surrounding environment.

The man-nature partnership is the only win-win solution, the unique option human race has at its disposal if it wants to continue its existence on the Earth. **The environment security considers both the bios security and the manner in which natural resources, as a result of human actions, sustain the bios existence on the globe.** *The human civilization development must not weaken the surrounding environment.*

The decision-makers of each nation and of all the world's institutions and bodies should go beyond the stage of security environment analysis towards an integrating vision which only the environment security analysis can offer. Today, the environment security is today the result of our incapacity to provide an adequate management for the security of the environment we belong to. To give an example, food or power security is the direct consequence of a limited approach in respect of the natural resources problems and the inter-conditionings between them and the planetary bios.

The chaotic forestry operation causes huge mutations in the biodiversity of a region, sometimes with devastating results for the flora and the fauna as well as for the soil fertility and the habitat quality, for the air and water quality. These processes are more often irreversible and it takes time and effort to restore the balance. The whirlpool of climatic degradation is pulling the whole humankind to the bottom, irrespective of the region, of the international statute or the financial potential.

Last century, characterized by two world conflagrations, determined the powerful countries to allocate huge human and material resources for the military arsenal field. At a certain moment, humankind attained voluntarily or accidentally the critical mass of its own destruction, thousand times the consequence of the nuclear arsenal held. Humankind knowledge potential has reached the point of maximum vulnerability. The leaders of the nuclear superpowers had the wisdom to make a step backwards.

Today, the "nuclear button" is no longer in the hands of one powerful country but in the hands of each of the thousand millions human beings of the planet, same as the atomic mushroom contributed

to humankind growing aware of being on the brink of self destruction, today it is more than ever necessary to be aware of the different disaster it is confronting with which can destroy the human being itself and its whole civilization in a relatively short period of time and inexorably.

The new **environment security paradigm** cannot be operational without the reconsideration of other concepts regarding the very essence of human civilization. The conquest of space requires the allocation of significant resources and the use of the space for peaceful purposes is obviously a social demand. We must equally consider the soil, the planetary ocean and the air quality we are breathing every moment. The global decision institutions in conjunction with the academic and the business environments should re-draw the list of attainable objectives by technological research and development, enabling the performing management of huge natural imbalances. Humankind has a new list of priorities defined by its chaotic evolution over centuries of existence.

Civic activeness is again in the forefront of the strategic decisions and the reorientation towards the green energy has become a first rank vector in the family of favourable solutes for a durable development. Nature's more and more limited capacity to cope with the resources operation has determined the identification of solutions based on energy regenerating resources. To this end, the world's institutions such as the European Union or the developed countries have allocated significant funds in the field.

Unfortunately, Romania makes proof of managerial incapacity at the level of its fundamental institutions since the funds dedicated the energy regenerating resources promotion cannot be accessed even at the end of 2009, due to lack of secondary legislation, guides and adequate methodology. The funds allocated for Romania to cover the period 2008-2013 and for the promotion of energy regenerating resources amount to 200 M € of which 169,7 M € are non-reimbursable and are provided through the European Fund for Regional Development and 30,3 M€ represent the co-financing from the state budget<sup>1</sup>. An additional amount of 100 M € is provided by the Ministry of Environment in order to increase the energetic efficiency. Energy becomes more and more important and at the same time attractive for the business environment. The stagnation in this field is



merely a problem of public business management, where Romania, once again, proved to have serious structural and institutional deficiencies.

The management of the economic crisis, which dominates the whole world today, can also be achieved by the green development as specialists estimate that the climatic changes may have devastating consequences by comparison with the economic crisis. It is worth mentioning therefore that today, the energy regenerating resources market is twice or three times larger than the conventional energy market. *The disconnection from the coal technology is not only dictated by climatic reasons but also by economic reasons.*

The majority of the developed states and more and more of the emerging economies consider the energy resources as vital for their national security. The majority of the developed countries security strategies consider the access to the power resources a component of the power security and an essential objective of national security. From this point of view, the power regenerating resources discourage the conflicts arising from the access to the power resources eliminating the dependency on a sole resource and on a sole supplier which plays a decisive role in the national security policies.

The development of green technologies and the increase of the power efficiency reduce the power resources requirement and, implicitly, diminish the vulnerability in the power security field. The beginning of the millennium has demonstrated that the world policy has replaced gunpowder by hydrocarbons and the nuclear button by the gas supply. These are real facts which require reconsiderations of a conceptual nature and the technological research and development reorientation.

Under Lord Stern's coordination a 600 pages report on the economic impact of the climatic changes was drawn up in 2006, based on the studies conducted until 2001 by the Intergovernmental Group for Climatic Changes<sup>2</sup>. In accordance with the conclusions of this report, the risks and costs associated to the climatic changes are equivalent to a 5%-20% yearly loss of the global GDP, while the pollution reduction costs represent 1% of the global GDP. The Stern Report sustains that the extreme weather phenomena will amplify and aggravate, thus seriously affecting agriculture production and reducing dramatically the water resources.

The United Nations warns that the future of

humankind may be in danger unless an adequate management is provided for the issues pertaining to the **environment security** and in particular the climatic changes, the loss of certain species and the increased number of inhabitants of the planet. During a UN conference on biodiversity, held in Bonn, in 2008, the study *The Economy of Ecology Systems and Biodiversity* was presented. Pavan Sukhdhev, a high official of the Deutsche Bank in India, and the author of this study, made the following statement in this paper: "We are trying to sail on troubled waters with no map and with a faulty compass".<sup>3</sup>

The study also states that certain ecosystems cannot be restored any longer since they were destroyed for good and other ecosystems will be lost if mankind fails to act in a responsible manner until 2050. The study also warns that 11% of the natural areas (at 2000 level) will disappear by being transformed into agriculture lands or they will be lost due to climatic changes; 40% of the traditionally cultivated lands will become intensive operational lands and 60% of the coral reefs may also disappear with consequences hardly to be estimated. Pavan Sukhdhev sustains that 150 species of the flora/fauna are lost every day. This is a rate of a dynamics that exceeds by 100 – 1000 times the rate of natural loss.

**The welfare of the world depends on ecosystems**, but humankind is still considering ecosystems just priceless public goods, which have no market. Mankind pays an excessive price for the biodiversity destruction; the yearly loss at the global level is 1.350-3500 billion €. <sup>4</sup>

In January 2009, at the beginning of his presidential term of service, Barack Obama, the President of the United States of America, stated that America intended to become an independent country in terms of energy resources and sustained that for Obama administration, the dependency on outside oil resources and the global heating are real threats to the USA security. For a better management of this field, Barack Obama appointed Todd Stern, main counsellor and chief negotiator for climatic changes, based on his experience as a former negotiator of the Kyoto Protocol<sup>5</sup> and emissary for the climatic changes, on behalf of the USA during Clinton administration.

While world leaders, under the pressure of national and transnational economic interests, are postponing the decision-making, scientists have



initiated new knowledge horizons in the field. **The environment security** with its core problem of the “climatic changes” has determined the reconsideration of every day life in terms of man’s attitude to nature and particularly the manner in which he designs and builds his daily habitat.

In 2006, Mitchell Whitney Joachim<sup>6</sup> took his doctorate on integrated design for urban mobility and advanced the new concept of **econtransology**. For scientists, econtransology is a concept that integrates ecology, mobility and space. He is a considered a pioneer of environmental and urban design, sustaining the necessity of reconsidering urban mobility from the environmental design point of view. His solutions contain a critical vision on the green town planning and his outlook changes the current practice in town planning and design, promoting an integrated, holistic and interdisciplinary approach of the design process.

This new field of **ecotransology** is in an incipient stage and it proves to be a mix of several disciplines such as: road ecology, town design, transport planning, car engineering and energy evaluations.

In 1970, professor Charles M. Eastman<sup>7</sup> introduced the Building Product Model concept whose engineering definition is “product model” and has an identical meaning with “data model” or “information model”. Today, as a result of the progress in this field, we have the Building Information Modelling (BIM) syntagm which is a building parameters generating and administering/control/management process over its physical existence.

Designers traditionally resort to 3D (three dimensional) programs in real time, in order to to increase productivity in building design and construction. The BIM generating process includes the building geometry, space relation, geographical information, the component properties and quantities. BIM can provide performance developments of this kind by modelling the actual part and component representations used in the construction achievement. BIM is a significant step as against the computer aided design. The American Institute of Architects defines BIM as it follows: “a technology based on modelling, supported by a design information Data Bank”. *Modelling includes variables such as air pollution, water pollution or information regarding people and nature behaviour.*

The Buckminster Fuller Institute (BFI) which has a global thinking and futurist orientation, made a proposal on its 12<sup>th</sup> anniversary, in 2007, for the initiation of a 100.000 USD award for proposed variants to support the development and implementation of the solutions with a high potential of solving mankind’s most urgent constraints in the shortest possible time with regard to the *Earth environmental integration*.

The mind of the most creative scientists of the world is stimulated by the responsible democratic societies to identify solutions for what has been destroyed by humankind over decades of exaggerated consumerism. It is an unseasonably, complex and expensive process. Let us be optimistic and trust that reason will defeat the greed and lack of responsibility of the god of profit slaves.

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### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> National Reforms Programme. Implementation report, [www.ec.europa.eu/growth/jobs/pdf](http://www.ec.europa.eu/growth/jobs/pdf)

<sup>2</sup> IPPC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

<sup>3</sup> During the meeting of the Environment Ministers of the G8 and of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa, that was held in Potsdam, in March 2007, the German government proposed a study on "The Economic importance

of the global biological diversity”, as part of the so-called „Potsdam Initiative” for biodiversity. At Potsdam, there has been agreed, within a global study, to initiate the process of analysing the global economic benefit of biological diversity, the costs of the loss of biodiversity and the failure to take protective measures versus the costs of effective conservation. The proposal has been accepted by G8+5, during the reunion held in Heiligendamm, June, 6-8, 2007. Following that decision, the Federal Environment Ministry and the European Commission initiated the conditions for drafting a global study on The Economics of Ecosystems & Biodiversity – TEEB. Pavan Sukhdev, a senior banker at Deutsche Bank and director-founder of “Green Accounting for Indian States Project” organization, was appointed as the study’s independent leader, assisted by a group of worldwide experts. Details are available at [www.ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/economics](http://www.ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/economics).

<sup>4</sup> [www.ecomagazin.ro/distrugerea-biodiversitatii-produce-anual-pagube-de-miliarde-de-euro/](http://www.ecomagazin.ro/distrugerea-biodiversitatii-produce-anual-pagube-de-miliarde-de-euro/) -

<sup>5</sup> The USA has not ratified it yet!

<sup>6</sup> He works for Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Architecture Department, was mentioned, in 2008, on a list of the most important 15 persons the US President should listen to and he is also on the list of the 100 people who have changed the United States.

<sup>7</sup> Georgia Institute of Technology.

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# CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO THE INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION PERSPECTIVES IN THE 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY

*Ionel STOICA*

*In the context of globalization, the dynamics of international migration has registered significant shifts, with a major impact upon states and societies affected.*

*This paper presents on short the developments that will stimulate international migration in perspective and signals some shifts registered in the current immigrant profile. Although migration is a phenomenon with evident negative effects on long term, for the moment, it is a sine qua non condition for maintaining a securing economic and social level for European societies.*

*Key words: international migration, immigrants motivations, demographic trends, climate change, labor market, immigrants, globalization.*

The European Commission has stated that the 21<sup>st</sup> century will be “the era of migration”. Indeed, nowadays, we face different types of migrations; as world becomes “a global village”, the human mobility increases. Migration has played a paramount role in the history and economy of many people, it has contributed to the global economical growth, to the evolution of states and societies, and has enriched culture and civilization. In the context of globalization, international migration has become one of the key factors that shape our world. It plays a central role in the current global economic, social and political changes, but it is shaped by these changes and at the same time, it shapes them.

Due to the fact that the international migration is a component of globalization, its dynamics will be closely related to the directions towards which globalization will evolve. Today, international migration system is more integrated than in the past. It is expected that globalization will intensify international migration in the 21<sup>st</sup> century because, as Peter Stalker stated, “the free movement of

goods and capitals has increased inequality between incomes and has shackled the traditional labor markets”.<sup>1</sup> This trend will influence the characteristics of the future migratory systems, shaping them and being in their turn shaped by the globalization forces, but also by the older actors that take part to the international migration process.

At the same time, the current international migration is the result of the social discrepancies between different regions of the globe as well as of the realities on the labour markets in the most industrialized countries. The host countries of international migration are profoundly involved in this process (including in the illegal migration), providing conditions and circumstances in which international migration survive and even thrive - a perspective that often lacks from the literature in the field.

Migration for better economic conditions remains a constant of the human being, but one cannot ignore the potential of forced migration. People will be motivated to emigrate to protect themselves or their families or to escape from the economic and social decline of the societies in which they live at a certain moment. International migration will continue to be stimulated by the political, social or cultural intolerance or by the human rights violation, but also by the failures of the governments in the countries of origin for international migration to solve social problems of their citizens.

Apart from these motivations, international migration will be stimulated by the following developments:

**-the tradition of migration.** The pre-existence of some political, social, economical or technological relations between sending and receiving countries of international migration, which also include a



tradition of migration, reduce the migration costs, which means that it encourages the process;

- **the expansion of the services sector to the global level.** *Temporary migration from the developing countries towards developed countries will still be necessary in the services trade, where those who produce have to move towards those who buy in order to deliver their products. On the other hand, the temporary migration of those having professional expertise or managerial skills from developing countries towards developed countries will continue to be required in order to provide capital and technological intensive services;*

- **the subsidies provided by the developed countries to their farmers.** *This measure will continue to destroy the agriculture sector in the developing countries, thus leading to the emigration of the people occupied in this sector. At the same time, it will increase demand for the labour force in the developed countries' agriculture;*

- **the trend towards fragmentation occurred in many countries will be joined by the massive transborder migration,** *as it happened in the past in the case of Germany, Yugoslavia or in Sudan;*

- **the low level of births' rates in the developed countries.** The current demographic projections indicate a decline in the developed countries, simultaneous with a substantial growth at this indicator in the developing countries. This makes international migration an important demographic force in the developed countries. For instance, in the second part of the 1980 decade, international immigrants represented around a quarter of the population growth in these countries; the figure rose at 45% in the first part of the 1990-decade and currently this increase is estimated at 75%<sup>2</sup>. Currently, in The European Union (EU), international migration leads to a demographic increase of the 85%<sup>3</sup>. Of course, the average often hides large national or regional variations, but the trend is obvious.

If we consider, apart from those mentioned above, the high rates of unemployment in the countries and regions where population is largest (see Fig. 1), we may expect an increase of the migration pressure towards developed countries.

While increasing life expectancy and in the context of reducing the rate of the active labour force in the total population (and implicitly of smaller volume of taxes), the dependency rate will increase in these countries. Even if the fertility

rate would increase quite a lot on the short term, it would not be sufficient because it would have too little effect on the dependency rate in the following two decades due to the required time for the young to enter the labour market.

In the case of such a scenario, the obvious question is how international migration can help these countries. According to a report of The European Commission, *The demographic future of Europe* (published in October 2007), in order to compensate the decline of the active population in EU-27, 56 millions of immigrants will be necessary by 2050<sup>4</sup>. At the individual level, those countries facing low birth rates and emigration will need a growing number of immigrants.

Different scenarios illustrate that in order to compensate the decline of the active labour force at the European level after 2020 and in order to maintain constant the level of occupation around four millions immigrants will be needed yearly. Thus, the current estimations imply that in a large number of European countries the demographic changes will occur mostly because of international migration. (Annex 1). Currently, the average rate of migration within the EU is around a million, annually<sup>5</sup>. Migration alone cannot solve all the structural problems facing the European countries. Additionally, countries that have received important migratory flows in the last decades will begin to register changes in the ethnic and racial composition of the labour force, as a growing part of the new entries on the labour force in these countries is represented by the immigrants or their descendants. Therefore, such a scenario it is not viable neither from the social, nor the political point of view.

A partial solution to this problem would consist in the increase of the retirement age in these countries. But a durable solution would be to elaborate some coherent policy regarding labour market structure, reforms in the pension systems and measures to increase labour productivity:

- **Population ageing<sup>6</sup> in the developed countries.** *Active population's ageing and the increasing of life expectancy lead to an unprecedented increase of the aging population in the developed countries<sup>7</sup>. Moreover, improvements in the technology of birth control and many other social, cultural and economic factors contribute to the maintaining of a low level of the young population in these countries.*



## ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS. EVALUATIONS

These two realities will generate political, social and economic dilemma (contradictions) difficult to solve, which will soon become hot issues on the political agenda for all these states. The intensity of these challenges and the exact moment of their occurrence will depend on the domestic and regional context (which will be different from one country to another), but the trend is implacable and, at least for the next two decades, it is, in fact, predetermined.


Demographic implications upon the labour market will be felt directly in the economic sector by the fact that although demand for some economic activities will continue to increase substantially, the nature of the jobs offered (predominantly great physical demands and/or prolonged working program), the social standard and the wages levels for these jobs will make them even more unattractive for the native population than they are at this moment.

No country will be immune to the transition effects that occur in another country or region. Demographic changes will likely influence the production types, the manner in which they will be provided (for instance, using more labour or more capital) and which products will be exported or imported. The differences between the moment

of the occurrence and its pace will make some regions more attractive than others for the labour markets in those countries having a surplus at this production factor.

A separation of the influence of the demographic trends from the influence of the other trends upon international migratory flows is difficult to assess, but we may say that the developing countries will definitely continue to represent sources for the international migration and developed countries, destinations for these flows. Climate changes will have an important impact on the international migration.

Current estimations regarding the displaced persons as a result of the climate change foresee between 200 millions (*Stern Review*<sup>8</sup>) and 250 million persons (*Christian Aid*<sup>9</sup>), until 2050. A typical situation regarding the complexity of this issue is provided by the Bangladesh experience, where floods in the Gange-Brahmaputra Delta affected the survival capacity of 35 millions persons in the latest 30 years. This represented a critical motivation for some 11 - 15 millions people of this country who emigrated illegally in India and for about 600.000 persons who emigrated in the Chittagong district<sup>10</sup>. In both cases, migration led to political instability and often to low intensity conflicts.



Notes: The composition of the groups of the table 'Employment-to-population ratio' and graph 'Unemployment rates' corresponds to that used in ILO, *Global Employment Trends January 2008*  
\* 2007 are preliminary estimates  
Sources: ILO, *Global Employment Trends Model, 2008*, ILO, *Global Employment Trends January 2008* and ILO, *Key Indicators of the Labour Market, 5th Edition, Geneva (2005)*.

Fig. 1 - Unemployment rates by geographical regions, 1997 - 2007; Source: World Bank, *Migration and Development*, 2008.



***Climate changes will likely increase the incidence of the fortified borders, which will raise international tensions and will also lead to demands related to the changes in the current international legislation as far as the assuming of the responsibility is concerned in the case of the refugees.***

In the UN report on development (*World Development Report, 2007*), it is stated that an increase of the global temperature with 3-4°C could lead to the displacement of 330 million persons, permanently or temporarily, as a result of floods. More than 70 million persons could be affected in Bangladesh, six millions in Egypt and 22 millions in Vietnam.<sup>11</sup> Estimations related to drought on short term could have a greater impact upon international migration. Even a moderate level of the climate change will impact the increase of the frequency of extreme weather conditions in the rural areas, which will accelerate domestic migration (rural-urban), often a first step towards the international migration.

The potential of the climate changes to amplify the economic differences between countries, stressed in the context of a lack of an adequate response at the global level, will increase even more the migration pressure. Some countries already have on their territories important immigrants communities coming from the countries quite vulnerable to the climate changes, such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Jamaica or Nigeria. Pressure to accept a large number of refugees from these countries, on the basis of humanitarian reasons, could become intense and, if it will happen, an important part of the resources from the budget allocated to the long term development of these countries will be designated for the humanitarian goals or to prevent disasters. It will likely increase pressure for a new category of refugees, *environment refugees*, which will induce the responsibility to accept and provide safe haven from other countries than those situated in the proximity of those affected or of those countries with tradition in this regard.

Changes in the current international system make the prognoses regarding international migration highly uncertain. The profound changes that recently marked the actual societies have led to important shifts regarding the reasons of migration. As such, the explanations regarding migration will need revision and reassessment for the analysis of this process to include all social, political and

economic factors that have an important impact in the current global context. The new theories of international migration will need to focus on the individual factors and on the social ones, as well as on the interactions between them.

We are currently witnessing a change in the immigrants profile in some countries. Unlike in the past, nowadays immigrants have a higher educational level. Thus, in France, Italy, Greece and Spain, legal immigrants have an educational level equal or even higher to that of the local citizens<sup>12</sup>. The new profile of the immigrants is, mainly, the result of the rapid expansion, after the Second World War, of the educational systems in the developing countries, as well as of some government policy which aim at keeping young people longer in the education systems, as a measure to prevent the increasing unemployment.<sup>13</sup> The fact that these countries, which possess labour force in excess, have a quasi-equal level of wages is equivalent with the protection of the unskilled workers or of those semi-skilled, which stimulate the emigration of the skilled persons<sup>14</sup>.

Currently, new attitudes and behaviours of the immigrants are taking shape, in parallel with the traditional ones. Thus, the new immigrants, as the old immigrants, prove availability toward any jobs, paying a greater importance to the short term gains than to the considerations related to the social status, prestige in society or even to the perspectives for the careers advancement. Therefore, they even accept jobs under their qualification level, which the local citizens would often reject. Once immigrants have learnt the receiving country's language, their preferences and their attitude towards work changes, are more and more influenced by the local population. They start seeking jobs hunted also by the local population and their position as substitute (instead of complement) on the labour market becomes more evident. At the same time, they create new jobs that can be delivered to the newcomers in these countries, thus continuing the need for migration. In the traditional countries of international migration, especially, immigrants have changed previous preferences and expectances.

This explains, in part, the decision of the immigrants to reside permanently in the countries where they emigrate.

From the perspective of the developed European countries, we can identify several arguments for



the acceptance and stimulation of international migration. One argument refers to the fact that the knowledge-based economy, which European countries proposed to promote, the human capital became the essential element of the labour productivity and development.

The efficient labour force is of paramount importance for innovation and for the creation of new jobs. For instance, a study on the Green Card program, applied by German authorities to the immigrants from the field of information technology, estimates that each skilled immigrants created on average 2,5 new jobs in this country<sup>15</sup>.

Another argument is that, despite the unemployment in the European countries, many local workers are still selective in choosing a job and/or location for a job (the current situation generated by the global economic-financial crisis, in which the native workers accepted jobs that they couldn't normally accept, is a conjectural one) and they are better skilled than they were a decade ago. As such, although the number of professions that claim a low level of qualification has reduced, there is a substantial deficit related to the recruitment for these jobs, especially in the agro-alimentary industry or in the field of home services<sup>16</sup>.

There is also a deficit in the public administration sector, for the jobs which require university degree, as a result of the income level in the field. All these deficits will be filled with immigrants.

A third argument aims at the growing dependency' rate in these countries, which will lead to new pressures upon the social security system, as the medical services will become more and more expensive.

The aging of the population will lead to changes in the consuming structure, especially to the increasing demand for medical services and leisure activities, creating, in turn, an additional demand for the activities in these fields<sup>17</sup>.

On the other hand, in many European countries, issues such as migration (in all its forms), asylum right and immigrants integration have become more and more contested/controversial, the governments of these countries facing pressures to include ethnic minorities interests on the domestic political agenda, in the context in which these countries have become multiethnic.

The populist mobilization puts even the liberal-orientated governments under pressure in order to adopt restrictive measure in the field.

The European governments which apparently want to restrict migration (which is not so sure, taking into account the advantages this process brings to their economies), will face a range of normative and institutional constraints. As liberal democracies and welfare states (as they name themselves), these governments depend on the vote of the native population. Citizens, in their turn, expected not only security and civil rights from the governments, but also access to welfare, social services and opportunities on the labour market. Moreover, liberal and democratic principles underline that these systems are based on the egalitarian and non-discriminatory logic. The extension of these rights to the foreign citizens living in these countries was promoted by these states. In this sense, the contradictions in the migration policy reflect ambiguity in the logic of the democratic liberal states, but also tensions and imbalance between the economic and political considerations.

The current migration policy within the European Union is characterized by several contradictions which can be grouped into four distinct issues: labour migration, migration control, immigrants integration and the asylum and protection systems.

Taking into account the current trends and projections, we may consider that world will look quite different 30 - 40 years from now. A comparison between the demographic dynamics in Europe and Africa is illustrative in this sense. In 1800, Europe had around 20% from one billion population of the globe at that time and Africa had only 8% from this population. In 2000, the population of Africa exceeded that of Europe (Europe had 728 million persons and Africa 800 million persons). Projections for 2050 indicate a population of around 660 million persons for Europe (7% of the total population of the globe), while Africa will have around 1.8 billion persons (20% from the total population)<sup>18</sup>.

Speaking strictly from the economic point of view, the changing of some countries from origin spaces into destination spaces for international migration will occur only in a limited number of cases; the developing countries which manage to take this step could take advantage of the low cost of the labour force and of the intensive exports in the labour forces.<sup>19</sup> Most developing countries will suffer negative impact associated with the




development process and will increase the labour forces export on short term. The developed countries and those of the transnational companies strategies designated to improve their competitiveness will erode the skilled labour forces stock in the developing countries, thus continuing to increase the current economic discrepancies between the countries and regions of the globe<sup>20</sup>.

The increasing demographic, economic and security differences between the states and the regions of the globe and the expansion of the modern technology in communications and transport will facilitate international migration, will contribute to the strengthening role of the immigrants networks and will reduce the costs for international migration. In this context, there are premises to reconsider the perception of international migration, in order to change it from a process which develops, in large part, randomly, into an organized international affair, which involves instead a vast budget, puts together all the states of the globe and is led by a group of persons, organizations, agencies and institutions, all having their own interest to promote their own business.

It can be said that international labour migration represents an incomplete dimension of globalization, being at the same time an example of the way in which globalization has been pushed ahead so far. In the context of the intensification of the international migration, the establishment of transparent mechanisms made to stream migration towards safe legal and human developments will become stringent if we want to maximize the benefits resulting from the process. A failure in this direction will not only affect negatively the economic growth and the global prosperity, but it will also fuel illegal migration, creating at the same time the favorable conditions for human trafficking and other illicit activities.

The way in which migration will be guided in the interest of the security of the states, but also of the individuals interest, will represent one of the greatest challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Migration, may it be voluntary or forced, is more and more evidently related to other pressing issues, such as development, trade and human rights, and its approach needs to be an integral part of the conflict management, conflict resolution and peace building.





At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup>, century a range of questions remain without an answer. How should states facing this challenge act? Which are the real security threats which international migration induces for states and for individuals? To what extent do legislation, policies and practices in the migration field make the democratic societies more vulnerable to the security risks? What should be the rights and the responsibilities of the immigrants? How can migration policy realize the balance between different competing interests? What should be the role of the civil society in influencing international migration policies and management? What role should the United Nation (by its specialized institutions) play in the management of the issues related to security that derive from international migration?

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<sup>4</sup> Valer DORNEANU, Smaranda DOBRESCU, *Migrația forței de muncă*, in *Raporturi de muncă*, nr. 6/2008, p. 23.

<sup>5</sup> Idem.

<sup>6</sup> UNODP estimates that the number of the persons having 60 years old and above will increase from around 600 million at the middle of 1990, towards two millions in 2050. For the first time in the human history, the number of the people over 60 will exceed that one of the children. At the same time, the number of the people between 15 and 64 years will be reduced.

<sup>7</sup> Not only the developed countries but also the developing countries will face population ageing. By 2050, it is expected that 79% of the population over 60 will live in these countries. (for details see Vasile S. CUCU, *Fragmente din geopolitica României*, Transversal Ed., Târgoviște, 2007, p. 147).

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<sup>11</sup> Idem.

<sup>12</sup> Fakiolas Rossetos (1999), *Socio-Economic Effects of Immigration in Greece*, in *Journal of European Social Policy*, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 211-229.

<sup>13</sup> Idem.

<sup>14</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>15</sup> Christina BOSWELL (2005), *Migration in Europe*, <http://www.gcim.org/attachements/RS4.pdf>.

<sup>16</sup> Idem.

<sup>17</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>18</sup> Philip MARTIN (2003), *Sustainable migration policies in a globalized world*, Geneva, <http://www.ilo.org/public/englis/bureau/inst/download/migration.pdf>

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<sup>20</sup> Idem.

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# ABOUT THE NAVAL STRATEGY

*Marius HANGANU, PhD*

*The article presents few points of view on the place of the naval strategy within the naval military art, starting from the point that at all the levels of the general military art (component of the military science), there is, to a certain extent, a correspondence with the naval forces, as such a topic may be debated for the other military services.*

*It is argued the need for a Romanian naval strategy which may refer to the elements of Romania's maritime power, such as: military marine, merchant marine, harbours, the naval infrastructure, the international relations, etc. A state's naval power may be larger or smaller and it refers to the way that state uses the sea.*

*Keywords: strategy; military art; naval strategy; principals of the naval strategy; tactics; maritime power.*

## Introduction

Naval battles have their written origins in ancient times and probably, the unwritten ones have theirs in human history or rather in the history of navigation because where people are conflicts are too and man's travel on sea has always been necessary.

Big or small naval battles have had the same goals as those of big and small land battles that is conquering new lands and accumulating riches.

The lessons learned from the naval battles have been transmitted from one generation to another under written or oral form and have become science. A science with principles, rules, methods forming the strategy.

Thucydides (460-404 BC) is the pioneer in the field of naval strategy and in his memoirs, History of the Peloponnesian War, he established a series of concepts of naval strategy and provided examples on the importance of maritime power. The theories on naval strategy were developed and applied in the years to come.

Names like Alonso de Chaves with his "Espejo de Navegantes" in 1530, Sir Walter Raleigh and Sir Francis Bacon in the 17<sup>th</sup> century and Paul Hoste with his 1691 paper *Traité des évolutions navales* are well known in the field of naval theory. The French were the first to realize that science must be included in the navy and that officers need to be trained in schools for their professions.

Naval strategy is closely connected to a country's maritime power regardless of how big or small this power is (power expressed by the way to use the sea for the country's interest).

History has demonstrated that a country with sea which didn't know how to exploit it didn't know progress or as a well known geography teacher said in the 1930's "a country with no sea is like a house with no street".

## 1. Naval strategy within military art

The maritime power of a state is closely connected to maritime strategy. If we analyze the modern meaning of the word strategy, that is establishing a plan to achieve a certain purpose, we will see that all the naval power components, military navy, commercial navy, shipyards, maritime relations system can make the object of maritime strategy.

However, if we analyze the word strategy as part of military art we must admit that the old Greek concept of strategy that is the art to order or the art to prepare and conduct a war, cannot be the same today. It's hard to establish war strategic purposes for one or more states which should be achieved only by one service: navy, aviation or land forces regardless of the way army services are presented.

While in ancient times, military strategy was seen as a way to lead forces in a battle and in the Middle Ages it referred to theatre operations and in last century's battles it referred to the immense strategic fronts, today we use the concept of geostrategy which engage continents. It can be



considered as a world strategy expanding and developing in the field of space strategy.

The subject we are analyzing here, maritime strategy, is still present in a certain aspect of military strategy. Moreover, we will always have to study it because military science, as any other science, deals with concrete facts in time and space.

Of the three fields of military art, tactics, operational art and strategy, tactics is specific to each of the army services. The actions conducted by navy units or greater tactical units will never be the same as the land forces or air tactical actions.

At the operational art level, one service military actions are less probable even if we analyze for instance the navy communications defence operation which is 80 percent achieved by naval forces. This statement refers to the classic military action. For what is happening today, the military theorists face other problems. For over half a century, military operations have been imbalanced or asymmetrical and the conflict areas have been criticized by the international public media through its most authorized organization, the UN and solving the conflictual situations meant the action of a multinational force under the UN mandate.

This type of military action, multinational renders an even bigger importance to the services' wartime and peacetime missions but this will not change the armed combat's main principles. As Mahan showed in his book "Navy influence on history, 1660-1783" published in Boston in 1890, *"while many of the conditions of conducting a war vary from one age to another; depending on the development of weaponry, there are certain lessons history taught us, lessons still valid today. These can be considered principles"*.

While at these two levels, tactical and operational art, we can deal with problems at the level of army service, at strategic level it's clear that dealing with problems within services is impossible, at least at the level of military actions.

The principles of strategy are valid in any historic period. They are less influenced by the development of equipment and weaponry compared to the principles of tactics. As Mahan stated over 100 years ago: "from time to time, the tactics' superstructures must be changed and sometimes its whole structure is changed. But the old principles of strategy remain unchanged and rock solid".

## 2. The necessity of a Romanian navy strategy

Due to the amplitude the word strategy involves on many levels, it seems that the subject of Navy strategy is very delicate and theoretical in the case of a country with reduced shores like Romania.

There are enough arguments in favor of these subjects as there probably are arguments questioning the existence of "Romanian navy strategy".

Before enumerating some of the arguments favorable to the development of this subject, we present a motive valid not only for our pleading but for stimulating the courage to approach any such types of subjects. This argument consists in the necessity to develop and stimulate the theoretical part of military art and at the same time, apply the theoretical ideas in practical activity.

Such well conducted and encouraged connection of theory with practice has beneficial effects on the institution we serve: "Romania's Army".

Our military personalities belonged to both categories: commanders and theorists.

Practical personalities respectively commanders remained in history if they were successful in battles and theory personalities remained in history if their writing influenced the concepts, laws and principles of armed battle. Our theoretical subject 'naval strategy' must be known and analyzed realistically in order to be put in practice.

The way navy strategy theory is put in practice as well as navy operations and tactics, is an art more or less beautiful depending on the commanders' personality and training from all points of view.

Military art as part of military science, encompass the naval art with its three levels: tactical, operational and strategic. The naval strategy, as the highest form of preparing and conducting a war, is necessary regardless of a state's maritime power.

In the past, all the studies and opinions on naval strategy had as a main idea the necessity to concentrate naval forces for the decisive battle to gain control of the sea. After the Second World War, strategy underwent important changes. The surface ships weren't fighting against each other and airplanes, missiles and submarines were the main enemies. Big surface ships had as main mission to destroy land objectives, insignificant mission in the past but dominant at the time.

The maritime strategic thinking has been developing and now using the fleets is more



important in peacetime than in wartime.

For most planners of navy actions, the indirect battle with enemy fleet has become an exception but knowing the way navy force is used in peacetime is much more necessary and current. Keeping the seas open for commercial traffic and protecting it against terrorism and also the possibility to apply the naval power are the two main peacetime missions the fleets have to accomplish.

We can say that maritime strategy can be defined as that part of military art which studies wars at sea and also campaigns, operations and battles in maritime theatres to achieve the objectives.

In order to achieve the navy war objectives which once meant controlling the sea in order to use it to achieve the country's objectives, maritime strategy has as object of study the character of the future war at sea, preparing and organizing the forces and fundamenting the campaign plans.

A good strategy will give the possibility to choose one of the many alternatives of action in a given situation. In wartime, navy strategy represents the guide of operational and tactical planning actions and in peacetime it must find the way to choose the most suitable forces to achieve the country's maritime goals and interests.

The national strategy defence is applied when a country faces an aggression and aims at the sovereignty, independence and integrity of the national territory. The maritime strategy as part of the national defence strategy is applied in peacetime and wartime; in peacetime the action can be a lot ampler. If an island or peninsula can be attacked from the sea, a country with land borders like Romania can face aggression without sea actions. However, a lot of commercial, industrial, scientific activities can be attacked in peacetime. Hence the need that any country with a sea and with maritime activities possess a strategy to defend these activities, a maritime strategy.

The main factors of the navy strategy are: the nation's maritime interests in peacetime; the state's geographic position; defending the peacetime navy interests; important geostrategic positions; naval bases and using the naval forces as a tool of naval diplomacy.

### **3. Several characteristics of a maritime strategy**

The first characteristic of the maritime strategy is clarity which will provide a coherent character

to the sea operations and troops' way of thinking. The navy war strategy must be understood by all officers because when each has a clear idea about their role in the war, they will improve their performances and will be motivated.

The second trait of the navy strategy is given by the term application. It has to be on long term in order to represent the base to choose and achieve the personnel training program. Once the navy strategy adopted, it will represent the base to establish the endowment program as there is a very big and diversified technological variety for ships while the domestic technological possibilities and economic and financial power of each state are very limited.

While the navy strategy provides clear guidelines to adopt endowment programs, these must be ongoing and not be changed by each political and military leadership.

Thirdly, maritime strategy must present costs and priorities because it is the only way that strategic planning will take into account the financial, industrial and technological constraints.

If this cost criterion is not applied, then the strategy will be only a political document with goals, objectives and wishes but which will not be able to foresee the concrete ways of action to achieve the sea operations strategic goals. Without costs and priorities, we cannot analyze the forces' training and endowment programs and the strategy will be but a simple utopia.

### **4. Maritime strategy and naval strategy**

When referring to navy, we often come across the words "strategy" "maritime" and "naval".

It appears to be no differences between the notions of "maritime strategy" and "naval strategy" or by extrapolating it, between naval operations and maritime operations. We could say that maritime strategy refers only to the use of seas and oceans while naval strategy includes the use of rivers, channels or lakes and closed seas.

However, there can be other interpretations as well. One of these can be deduced from the notion of maritime power. The connection between maritime power and maritime strategy is achieved by the state's politics. Thus, the maritime power is first of all the fruit of the legislative and executive leadership and is necessary to establish political, economic relations on sea. Creating and



developing a maritime power and in both fields the state's politics has the decisive role, the way the leaders consider and understand the role and importance of the sea.

In literature, the word naval strategy refers directly to the use of all forces and means including military ones in order to achieve some goals with the sea as a theatre. These goals are perceived as a result of a conflict. But, as we define maritime power not only from a military point of view, maritime strategy can also be the way to achieve the maritime power goals in peacetime. In other words, we can speak about a maritime strategy with the goal of developing the maritime power factors (mainly military navy, commercial navy, harbours, international relations) and also a naval strategy referring to the science and art of using the military maritime forces to obtain victory in a war.

The first meaning, that of maritime strategy is analyzed and applied for all states with a sea thus for our country as well.

The second meaning – naval strategy – used especially in wartime, can be applied for countries with powerful military maritime forces. These states can achieve their political goals by a confrontation at sea applying a certain naval strategy. In other words, in this case, military strategy finds its correspondent in the naval strategy. However, the states with less developed maritime forces cannot

set political goals at sea.

We can say that the word maritime strategy can have the meaning of training and coordinating the actions of economic, political, diplomatic and military forces in order to exploit all the country's resources. The word naval strategy as part of maritime strategy, establishes the actions of the military maritime fleet in relation with those of the military air and land forces. The naval strategy is an integrant part of military strategy and expresses the military strategy requirements limited to the actions of forces and means specific to military and commercial navy.

As military strategy operates with "means of strategic action", naval strategy uses the term "naval means of strategic action" or "constitutive parts of naval strategy" or maritime strategy concepts.

The naval strategy referring to the ships' activity and the maritime strategy referring to all of Romania's maritime power elements are very interesting domains. Establishing and knowing them not only by those connected to maritime activities but also by a large part of the population is very beneficial for our country.

In conclusion, studying the maritime power and naval strategy must be a constant preoccupation for military theorists and the theories must be effective in practical activity.

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# THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. FACTS AND PROSPECTS OF WORLD ECONOMY

*Cristian BĂHNĂREANU, PhD*

*The crisis that has affected the world economic system is still an important source of vulnerabilities and insecurity at national, regional and global level. Disruption or collapse of the national economy take effect at all levels of security. Its gravity and extension are unprecedented, with destabilizing effects that are felt in all structures and areas. That is why the financial system and, in general, economy still depend on state intervention.*

*Keywords: economic crisis; recession; recovery; security; vulnerabilities.*

The year 2009 started with the global economy in a disastrous situation comparable to the Great Depression of the '30s, and ended in a positive note with most of the world economies growing. Asian emerging economies, such as China and India, were more resistant to the effects of the crisis, unlike the USA and European ones which have gradually entered into a recession. Thus, the efforts of the world's great actors focused on identifying and applying the most effective measures for restructuring and regulating the international economic and financial affairs, reducing the scale of the recession and creation the recovery premises.

Important steps in the process of strengthening the global financial architecture and recovery the world economic were made by G20 leaders at the meeting of April 2, 2009 in London<sup>1</sup>. G20 expected to be necessary to spend of about 5 trillion dollars for global economic recovery until late 2010. The measures adopted here are: rejection of protectionism; allocation of 1 trillion dollars to international financial institutions, including 750 billion dollars for the International Monetary Fund (IMF); financing the world trade with 250 billion dollars; outlawing of „tax havens” that do not conform to international tax rules; transforming the IMF and World Bank to reflect the changes produced in the global economy; establishing

new rules regarding banking secrecy, but for the payment of salaries and bonuses granted to large companies' directors; offering for sale by the IMF of gold reserves to help poor countries; adopting urgent measures to complete the Doha Round.

Also, G20 leaders proposed a range of other measures to avoid another global economic crisis at the summit of September 24-25, 2009 in Pittsburgh. The Final Statement<sup>2</sup> stipulates that the G20 will become the main forum for economic coordination and cooperation at international level, giving emerging powers – like Brazil, India, and China – more influence on decisions to be taken. In addition, it was decided to: reform the global economic architecture; conclude a framework agreement for strong, sustained and balanced growth; stricter international regulation of the banking sector in terms of increasing capital, discouraging excessive borrowing, equalizing wages and limiting bonuses; transition from public sources of demand and consumption to private ones; helping the poor by improving access to food, energy and finance; countermeasures against protectionism, etc.

Implementation of these measures will demonstrate the major world economic players' will for collaboration in order to achieve a new balance between targeted measures to support financial sector and global demand, on the one hand, and those focused on providing new regulatory and supervision standards of the financial system, on the other.

## **Global economy between recession and recovery**

During 2009, as contagion and effects of the crisis have spread and intensified, imbalances continued to exist and many countries have faced a period of maximum amplitude of the economic crisis. Thus, deepening of crisis gradually led to




## ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS. EVALUATIONS

the breakdown of macroeconomic indicators, to the collapse of some financial institutions, to further fall of stock-exchanges, to highly volatile prices, to the growth protectionist measures, etc. Central banks continued to inject and to guarantee billions of dollars to support financial systems and economic activity and, even, to reduce the interest rate at historically low. According to UN<sup>3</sup>, the rescue of financial sector has cost governments worldwide around 20 trillion (30% of global GDP), while the measures introduced in the economic recovery plans have reached 2.6 trillion in 2008-2010 period.

At present, the world economy is in a transition process from one economic cycle, increasingly dominated by globalization and macroeconomic policies to support aggregate demand, to a new economic cycle. Cyclical adjustment is based on stimulation measures adopted by the monetary and fiscal authorities, which reduced to maximum the governments' margin of maneuver. Further increase will be supported by government policies and measures. This idea is shared by the IMF Managing Director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn: „we recommend erring on the side of caution, as exiting too early is costlier than exiting too late”<sup>74</sup>.

If during 2008 and early 2009, prospects of international economic organizations were becoming more pessimistic, noting decreases of the major macroeconomic indicators in most world's countries, later last year estimates showed an improvement in the situation. Thus, the global economy recorded a serious GDP contraction, from about 60,917 billion dollars in 2008 to 57,228 billion dollars in 2009<sup>5</sup>. This decrease was enhanced by degradation of the financial system, low public and business confidence, rising unemployment, increasing fiscal deficits and public debt, etc.

Previous analysis showing that the year 2009 will be the peak period of economic and financial crisis have been almost entirely true, the recession putting his mark on global growth that recorded more lower rate: from 5.17% in 2007 and 2.99% in 2008 to -1.06% in 2009<sup>6</sup>. Since the second half of last year, world economic recovery has made clear progress. This process was initially supported by increased investment in developing countries like China and emerging industrialized economies of East Asia. Also, rich countries' contribution to the global economic recovery was deepening once state subventions and stimulus measures have begun to take effect, especially in terms of increasing



Forecast of GDP growth rate in 2009  
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, 2008-2009



domestic demand, imports, and production. For the current year, the latest forecasts indicate a recovery of world economy, but the risk of a return to recession is still very real (so-called recession-type W).

For the first time since 1960, the estimated increase in developed economies contracted in 2009 by about 3.3%<sup>7</sup>. Although, the specialists speak more extensively about the rejection of protectionism and state support exit strategies, such plans to recover the economy were implemented in the year ended: Germany – 50 billion euros (January), Canada – 40 billion dollars (January), USA – 787 billion (February), France – 26 billion euros (February), Japan – 184 billion euros (December), etc.

Last year, major economies of the world have recorded significant growth reduction, for example: USA to -2.73% in 2009 from 0.44% in 2008, Japan to -5.37% from -0.71%, Germany to -5.30% from 1.25%<sup>8</sup>. However, after a period of many difficulties and decline, from the second or third quarter of 2009, developed economies like the USA, Japan, Germany and France have turned positive. The European Union has managed to surmount recession, but in the end of last year, economic and financial situation of some countries like Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, the Baltic countries continue to worry Brussels' officials.

Although the third quarter of last year was recorded the end of recession with a positive growth of 0.6%, Russia's economy was severe affected by the crisis with a decline of 5.60% in 2008 to -7.55% in 2009<sup>9</sup>. Decreased demand and international oil prices led to the reduction in exports of Russian energy resources, which means about 60% in total exports of the country.

China and emerging economies in the Asia passed quickly over crisis due to good condition of the financial system and public budgets, but also the huge capital accumulated over time. Asian states and petroleum exporters are controlling financial assets worth about 7 trillion dollars, most foreign exchange reserves and sovereign funds that could counteract the negative effects of global financial and economic crisis. China with a growth of 8.50% in 2009 and India with 5.36%<sup>10</sup> were the main „engines” that has restarted the global economy.

Most developing countries and economies in transition were initially less exposed to risks

of financial crisis, but the economic activity was seriously affected. According to data provided by the World Bank<sup>11</sup>, 25 developing countries reported negative growth since the first quarter of 2009. The developing countries were put in an extremely difficult situation by the sharp decrease of domestic and external demand, production and exports, blocking financial flows from developed countries, low investment and revenue in the budget and, not least, increasing deficits and borrowing costs. These governments reduced expenditures through firings, reduction/freeze of wages and pensions, decrease imports, while appealing to international bodies' specialized assistance. In 2009, the IMF<sup>12</sup> signed or has in progress a series of stand-by agreements with Hungary, Romania, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Iceland, Latvia, Serbia, Ukraine, etc. Moreover, the IMF adopted last year an unprecedented measure by the canceling by 2011 the interest payments on loans to poor countries.

During the recession of global economy, international trade decreased last year with about 10%<sup>13</sup> according to the World Trade Organization. Moreover, the liquidity crisis and a drastic reduction in demand have hampered international trade activities. The decrease was higher in developed countries (-14%), unlike developing countries where growth is greater based in commercial activities (-7%).

In 2009, China seems to become the largest exporter in the world, reflecting the capacity of low prices' manufacturers to maintain external sales despite the fall in global demand. It exceeded last years leader, Germany, with around 30 billion dollars<sup>14</sup>. Regarding imports, USA continues to maintain the top position of the world ranking. The protectionist measures rejection and trade liberalization through concluding the Doha Round negotiations is vital for economic recovery.

Rising unemployment is one of the biggest problems caused by the crisis that has destabilized the world economy. The increased reduction of production, consumption and trade has had a serious impact on the demand for labour. Conditions on labour market have worsened since the beginning of crisis, so the number of unemployed worldwide would increase by 33.8 million people in 2009 than in 2007, which means a total of 211.5 million people (6.6%)<sup>15</sup>. Accordingly, the International Labour Organization adopted in June 2009 an Agreement<sup>16</sup> to create new jobs, protect labour and



stimulate economic recovery. Also, one of the main priorities of the EU relates to the development of a Strategy<sup>17</sup> to find the best ways and solutions to create new jobs in any Member State.

Last year, most countries in the world have recorded increases in the number of unemployed people, some with a record level of unemployment in recent years. USA ended 2009 with an unemployment rate of 9.3% from 5.8% in 2008<sup>18</sup>. In November 2009, EU27 had a rate of 9.5% from 7.5% in the same month the previous year<sup>19</sup>, an addition of 4.978 million people. The largest increases in unemployment were recorded in: Ireland – with an average of 11.7% for the first 11 months of 2009, Spain – average of 18% for the first 11 months, Estonia – average 13.1% for the first 9 months, Latvia – average 17.2% for the first 11 months, Lithuania – average 13% for the first 9 months, etc. It is expected that the number of unemployed people in developing states to increase significantly in the next period, which will generate and intensify social tensions and protests.

Reduced world demand and lower food and fuel prices since the second half of 2008 led to a gradual decrease in inflationary pressures. The risk of inflation has declined sharply in the last year, so that developed countries have experienced a rate of just 0.6% in November 2009 compared with 5.2% in mid 2008 and developing countries a rate of 2.6% to 12.4% in mid-2008. The inflation in low-income countries was 1.2% in October 2009 compared to 15.4% in mid 2008<sup>20</sup>. Although international food prices have fallen significantly, a large part of the millions of people under poverty line could not fully benefit from this positive effect of economic crisis.

According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) forecast for the first two to three quarters of last year, the global financial and economic crisis led to foreign direct investment (FDI) fell by 38.7%, from about 1,697.4 billion dollars in 2008 to 1,040.3 billion dollars in 2009<sup>21</sup>. Negative trend of FDI flows to developed countries began in 2008 continued in 2009, with a decrease of about 41.2%.

In contrast, developing countries and transition economies recorded an investment increasing in 2008 and, then, a heavy fall in 2009 to 34.5% and, respectively, 39.4%.

The most affected countries by the reduction of investments seem to be: Hungary with -165.2%,

United Kingdom with -92.7%, Malaysia with -66.6%, Sweden with -64.4%, the Czech Republic with -63%, Spain with -60.6%, etc. Overall, the EU could record in 2009 a minus 146.8 billion dollars of FDI compared to 2008 (-29.2%). Except possibly China with -2.6%, nor USA (-57%), Japan (-53.4%) or Russia (-41.1%) did not experience a better situation.

Difficulties of the financial markets, especially credit conditions, continued in 2009, and many countries have already exhausted fiscal and monetary solutions to counter the crisis. Since the beginning of the crisis, central banks of the world states have injected hundreds of billions dollars into the banking system and expanded the assets that they have accepted in exchange for funds borrowed. Many banks have been recapitalized, but credit revival towards business and households has not returned to normal.

With funding channels still partially blocked, the measures taken by central banks have targeted the improvement of financial capacity and the solving of the credit market's problems, particularly by easing monetary policy and reduce interest rates. On December 16, 2008, the US Federal Reserve (Fed) has operated at a 75-100 percentage points' reduction of the reference rate. The key interest rate reached a margin of fluctuation between 0-0,25%<sup>22</sup>, the lowest level in history.

By this measure, the Fed has exhausted its possibility to manipulate monetary policy through interest rates, but it will continue to put more money in circulation by buying government bonds. Japanese key interest rate set at the end of 2008 (0.1%)<sup>23</sup> was maintained during 2009. Key interest rate for the Euro Area generally followed a downward trend, from 2.5% in December 10, 2008 to 1% in May 13, 2009<sup>24</sup>. This was an attempt to give new stimulus to the European economy.

Those who expected an appreciation of US dollar were incorrect and the fact that the USA were among the first states to overcome the recession has not demonstrated that American currency is able to restore the world economy. In 2009, the dollar lost around 14% against the euro<sup>25</sup> on the government's aggressive measures to combat recession and rising deficit. This situation raises the raw materials and commodities prices, especially oil which has reached about 80 dollars per barrel. In relation to the yen and yuan, the US currency remained relatively constant.



According to some views, China is by far the biggest winner from the crisis and in 7-10 years yuan could become the third international reference currency, after the dollar and euro.

Also, growing budget deficits remain a pressing issue of the current phase of world economic and financial system reshaping. USA remains in the top states which spend each year much more than they produce, recording in 2009 a minus of 1,841 billion (12.9% of GDP)<sup>26</sup>, including costs of the new economic stimulus plan. The EU27 deficit will be about 6.89% of GDP in 2009 compared to only 2.33% of GDP in 2008<sup>27</sup>. The biggest differences between revenue and expenditure were recorded in Greece – 12.7% of GDP, Ireland – 12.1%, Portugal – 9.3%, Spain – 8.4%, which far exceeded the limit of 3% of GDP imposed by the European Union. For the next period, most world countries announce more stringent budgetary measures in an attempt to reduce these differences. Addressing the high public debt is another priority for many governments, which have borrowed heavily in order to rescue their economies.

### Forecast for 2010

The world economy has passed over the most critical moment of the economic cycle, but it would take a long period until the national economies will fully recover from recession. Since there is a number of associated risks and unresolved issues, the restoring process will be extremely slow and fragile. Economic recovery will not be achieved simultaneously and with the same speed in all regions of the world. Thus, while developed states slowly recover many of the developing and transition economies continues to be in crisis.

According the latest United Nations forecast<sup>28</sup>, the world economy will recover gradually in 2010 with a moderate growth of 2.4%. Developed economies would record a growth rate of 1.3%, given that GDP will advance by 0.4% in the Euro Area, 0.9% in Japan, and 0.6% in USA. In contrast, developing economies expected to grow faster by 5.3%, well below the levels recorded in the years before the crisis. UN experts warned, also, that a premature withdrawal of stimulus and recovery measures could cause a W-type recession. In addition, the risk of increasing the US deficit and foreign debt could cause problems for the dollar and a new financial instability.

The International Monetary Fund in its prognosis<sup>29</sup> argues that the global economy is recovering faster than was expected, with an estimated growth for 2010 of around 3.9%, more optimistic compared with the previous 3.1%. However, the restoring process will have same speed all over the world, giving the fact that the advanced economies are still dependent on government stimulus measures. Developed economies will experience a slow increase of 2.1%, while the GDP of emerging economies will increase by about 6%, supported mainly by domestic demand.

For USA, the IMF expects an advance of economic activity with 2.7% in 2010, a level much better than 1% that will be recorded in the Euro Area or than 1.7% in Japan. Moreover, China will continue its economic expansion with the rate of 10%, followed a short distance by India with 7.7%.

In contrast, the World Bank<sup>30</sup> estimated that the global economic recovery in 2010 will be slow and fragile, with an increase of 2.7%, as the impact of government stimulus policy will be reduced. Problems in financial markets will persist and demand for goods and services will fall on the basis of the unemployment's increasing. Developing countries will be the first who will overcome the recession and record a growth of 5.2% this year, but access to finance for investment will be more difficult and costly. Unlike, developed economies will grow at a rate much more attenuated by only 1.8%.

International trade will return slowly from the sharp decline that was recorded last year to a 4.3% growing in 2010<sup>31</sup>, largely on the continuation of stimulus measures, improving confidence among private sector and financial stabilization. Also, commodities prices will increase by an average of only 3% during the current year and the oil is expected to remain relatively constant at a level of 76 dollars per barrel.

According to the Director of the World Trade Organization, Pascal Lamy<sup>32</sup>, the out of world economy from crisis this year is not guaranteed due to bubbles created by the massive investment of public funds into financial systems to prevent their collapse. Moreover, many economic analysts warn that despite the desire for reform, the old practices still persist, which could lead to the formation of new bubble on stock markets, emerging markets or



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commodity markets. To avoid the transformation of global economic recovery process from V to W, state and international decision makers must consider a number of measures and solutions<sup>33</sup>:

- fighting deflation, but keeping an eye on inflation;
- cleansing the banks rapidly, but keeping credit lines open;
- providing fiscal stimulus, but cutting public debts.

Although the rules of market economy exclude state involvement in the decisions of the economy, it seems that the current crisis has brought to the fore the need for its intervention. First, coming in support of banks and auto industry with billions of dollars to protect them from failure, the state appear to have acquired a right of interference in the business field, which could last after the crisis ends. On the other hand, the launch of “exit strategies” will depend on each state’s specific conditions, and as long as private demand is not robust enough to eliminate the need for authorities intervention it must not give up supporting the economies.

Based on the above data, we can say that the world economy has managed to surmount the recession and the recovery process began. For most developed economies, unfortunately, the recovery will be a gradual and very fragile. Favorable trends, such as stimulus policies, improving financial conditions and rising demand are partly neutralized by other strong trends such as increasing unemployment, the effects of prolonged real estate and financial crisis, and reducing the fiscal stimulation.

For 2010, the main predictions concern the following:

- The restoration and recovery of the US economy and especially the European and Japanese will be achieved slowly;
- The most emerging economies, especially in Asia, will continue their expansion;
- The fiscal incentives will be diminished and gradually eliminated;
- The commodity and oil prices will enter a downward trend;
- The inflation will be low in most regions of the world, with the exception of emerging countries in Asia or the Middle East;
- The unemployment continues to grow and reach record rates in some countries;

- The key interest rates remain very low;
- The credit costs will be increasingly higher;
- The US dollar may appreciate against the euro.

After a reduction of global imbalances, the existent vulnerabilities probably will increase the potentiality that the crisis to worsen again and the risk of a more severe economic crisis to remain quite high.

The current economic crisis of unprecedented complexity and extent complicates the international relations, intensifies the competition for resources and markets, increases deficits, destroys structures and infrastructures, aggravates tensions and creates new ones. In addition, state vulnerabilities, whether political, economic, social or military, are increasing and the national capacity to react in case of tensions, crises or conflicts weakens.

However, this difficult economic situation led to a closer cooperation between world actors in order to rescue and recover the national economic system and, by extension, the regional and international ones. Probably under crisis, increased economic interdependence and cooperation between countries is the best way of achieving that balance to ensure and preserve the acceptable level of security in all its dimensions.

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# DYNAMICS OF MAIN INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN 2009

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*This article analyses the evolution of major international actors in 2009. The analysis is focused on the referential issues of the global scene, on the generalized background of the global economic crisis.*

*In this regard, the author sets as points of interest the dispute over Iranian nuclear issue, the development of the European construction, sino-russian strategic interest in the Asian region, and the Turkey efforts, both for the EU integration, and normalization of the old tensioned relations in the region.*

*Keywords: security; foreign policy; Russia; China; Central Asia; military exercises; EU; Turkey; PKK; Kurds.*

The 2009 beginning brought with itself a series of events that in the perspective of many analysts is considered a priority of the European Union. At a word, we allude to the European energetic dependency on Russia's deliveries. Although natural gas deliveries were regulated through a UE/Russia signed agreement, vast European regions faced the leak of natural gas supplies during winter. This impediment brought around the discussions table representatives of EU, Russia and Ukraine. After a period of seven days pause, the natural gas delivery process was restarted. Beyond the urgent solving of this impediment, the situation in itself emphasized the EU urgent need to identify a new energy paradigm (both alternative suppliers and alternative means of energy production). This new paradigm could signify that EU must reorient towards the Middle East, Caucasus or Central Asia energy suppliers. In this regard a series of aspects must be taken into consideration:

- generalized instability of the Middle East security environment;
- competition for resources with China in the Caucasus region and Central Asia, where China seems to have a strong advantage supported

by two important factors: on the one hand, the strategic partnership with Russia and on the other hand, its cooperation with the Central Asian states in the framework of Shanghai Cooperation Organization;

- finding safe transport routes for the oil and natural gas from these regions;
- the need of deepening the cooperation with the US in mentioned regions, considering the equal US interests in energetic resources, and the advantage that US companies seem to have gained in terms of drilling and extraction technology<sup>1</sup> at the expense of Russia's Gazprom;
- effects of global financial crisis.

According to George Friedman, one of the founders of Strategic Forecasting division at Stratfor Agency, the current financial crisis, whose origins were placed in the US, is not the worst situation, but similar with the 70's period<sup>2</sup>. The strategic forecasts made by the same specialist indicate that the history of the XXIst century will be dominated by the dynamics of two opposing forces: the first who will be constituted by the secondary powers that will form coalitions in order to limit and control US power, and the second force, US that will act in the sense of preventing such coalitions<sup>3</sup>.

In many aspects, US seemed to take a step back in the year 2009, moving from the dominant power position to a collaborative, networked position.

This trend must have a positive impact on transatlantic relations, now, when Europe – with a fully approved Lisbon Treaty – elected its president, Herman Van Rompuy, and a foreign ministry, baroness Catherine Ashton<sup>4</sup>. We think that there is a window of opportunity for EU to solve two of its urgent issues:

- European Security, which is still depending, at military level, on American assets, and at energy level on Russian resources;
- an increased level of co-operation with the



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US on foreign policy, defense and energy security.

Solving these issues mainly depends on the EU and US will approach three main aspects of the international security agenda: the situation in Afghanistan, relations with Russia and the situation in Middle East. From our perspective, there is a need for a more deepened co-operation, especially in the realm of foreign policy (table nr. 1), due to the continuous enforcement of China's position, both economic and military, position that is backed up by the strategic partnership with Russia.

After a brief comparison between EU and US foreign policy agendas we can determine some differences regarding the resulted responsibilities, which can be interpreted as an indicator of different interest and options also.

Although in the past years many scenarios foresaw a close relationship between EU and Russia, with an existent, but not very near, perspective of Russia's accession to EU (an EU which members will be Turkey and Ukraine, also), the actual situation is far from this perspective. The last two years disputes over the natural gas

Table 1. Comparison of foreign policy priorities for EU and US

EU	USA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• effective multilateralism</li> <li>• the Middle East</li> <li>• relations with Russia</li> <li>• relations with China</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• situations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan</li> <li>• Iran's nuclear program</li> <li>• relations with Russia</li> <li>• relations with China</li> <li>• climate issues</li> </ul>

deliveries stimulate the Europe reorientation towards other reliable sources.

Moreover, the EU's foreign policy and energy security issues are amplified by both new and inveterate internal issues:

- demographic challenges: rapid ageing of population, decreasing of labor force and immigration;
- the overcome of global financial crisis;
- climate changes.
- dilemma over continuation of the enlargement process.

Although the enlargement process seemed to have been going through stagnation, we consider that this situation is not a step back or a disfunctionality of the process, but a necessary phase in the ongoing European project. The Lisbon treaty was approved by all member states, there were elected the European president and foreign ministry. Meantime, the states being in the accession negotiation process took the opportunity to reach some of the objectives must be accomplished in order to acquire the full membership of the EU. In this situation is Turkey, whose accession ambition is dating from decades. The accession to EU is a key issue not only referring to the fact of becoming a member of the union but for the future role that Turkey must play in the regions of Middle East

and Central Asia, where EU has energy interests. A Turkey with double status of NATO and EU member, strengthened by its traditional role in these regions might be a supplementary advantage for these regions stability and security. The leading role that Turkey might play in these regions it is possible to be challenged only by Iran. It is already known the rivalry between Turkey and Iran, at least over the cultural leading role in the region. The old issues related to religion, the Turkish secularism versus shiia Islam of Iran, linguistic aspects over the prevalence of Persian or Turkic originated languages, Turkey's support for Azerbaijan in the azero-armanian conflict, domestic and transnational issues related to Kurdish nationalism, and the problem of islamists groups, are characteristics of the Iranian-Turkish rivalry.

Faithful to the "zero problems" principle in the relations with its neighbors, in the year 2009 Turkey succeeded to reach an agreement with Armenia over the existing disputes, and the opening of Armenian border, closed due to the azero-armanian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh province<sup>5</sup>.

The agreement is signed on 10 October, in Zurich, in a ceremony<sup>6</sup> in which took part the US secretary of state Hillary Clinton, Serghei Lavrov, French foreign minister Bernard Koucher, and



the chief of EU foreign policy at that time, Javier Solana.

The agreement stated the termination of the imposed blockade to Armenia, and the establishment of mixed governmental committees which tasks would have been both the development of bilateral relations in economic, commercial and cultural sectors and the study of historical events that generated so many tensions between the two neighboring states.

Turkey also made major steps in the relations with Syria announcing the future collaboration in the military field, planning future joint military exercise<sup>7</sup>, as a part of deepening the co-operation between neighbors.

Related to its domestic policy, Turkey adopted a governmental plan over the Kurdish minority rights extension. Following this change in attitude, a group of Kurdish rebels<sup>8</sup> surrender to Turkish authorities as a sign of good faith in supporting the new government plan over Kurdish minority. This governmental approach, collaborated with the response of rebel Kurds might be the beginning of new horizons for diplomatic talks, putting an end to 25 years of conflict, and more important, to the series of 45000 victims<sup>9</sup> of this conflict.

In our view, the improved relations with Kurdish minority, as well as with Armenia are positive referential for Turkey road map to EU ascension. On the other hand, opening the border with Armenia, Turkey gave Russia a sign in the sense of a better collaboration between two states. This might be a very important step, taking in the account the fact that Russia gradually developed a strategic partnership with China, a partnership that is strengthening the position of both, Russia and China, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where Turkey has solid interest, culturally based, at least.

The sino-russian relation is not a new issue for the security studies scholars, but they are closely analyzed, in order to foresee both the strategic intentions of the two states and dynamics of security environment in the regions they manifest their interests.

A very important dimension of sino-russian relations is the military one. In this perspective we will further focus on sino-russians co-operative joint military exercises. The last year took place the third co-operative military exercise, after those in 2005 and 2007. These co-operative initiatives

reveal not only the each partner concern over mutual display of power, or the common one of improving military co-operation, but also the intent of forming a viable military alliance in the framework of SCO as a counterweight for the western alliance NATO.

The military exercise Peace mission 2009 was held between 22-27 July, its main objective being to showcase the abilities and resolutions of both sides to jointly cope with various kinds of security threats and crack down on terrorist, ethnic separatist and extremist forces. Started not long after the 5 July violent turmoil that took place in Xinxiang province, Peace mission 2009 drills aligned about 3000 military troops, 300 units of military hardware and over 40 airplanes and helicopters<sup>10</sup>.

In our view these exercises might reveal the equal concernment regarding their response to domestic issues (China's case) or to those emerging in the border proximity (Russia's case). Moreover, a sino-russian military alliance might be at any time a serious factor in setting the balance in global power relations, in the case of an emerging crisis in the regions they are dominating (Caucasus, Central Asia or Korean Peninsula).

Therefore, beyond the spectacular display of power, we think that several ideas might be concluded regarding the strategic interest of Russia and China. First of all we must keep in mind Russia's ambition in keeping its dominant status beside the former soviet republics, both in the Caucasus region (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) and Central (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan). This dominant status would guarantee, by maintaining these regions' control, a buffer zone in the front of both western interest and regional actors like Turkey, Iran and even China.

In its turn, China focuses toward its domestic issues, like Uyghur minority situation, keeping in mind that the Uyghur communities located on Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan might negatively influence its domestic security.

As prior mentioned, the sino-russian military alliance might intervene out of the partners borders, preventing escalation of any crisis in the region (North Korean crisis) on the one hand, and sending strong signal toward Japan, on the other hand, both Russia and China having territorial disputes with the eastern prior mentioned neighboring state.



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We argue this idea with the statement of Russian general Nikolai Makarov, Chief of Staff: “Russia and China should develop military cooperation in the wake of North Korean missile threats that prompted intensified military preparations in Japan and South Korea”<sup>11</sup>. The Chinese colonel Li Jiang, Deputy Chief of the Foreign Affairs Office of China’s Ministry of Defense, added that “the world order must be multipolar, which would rule out the possibility of any diktat of any country with regards to other members of the international community”<sup>12</sup>.

We can not help to notice the similarity of this later statement with the one<sup>13</sup> stated in the past by the former Russian president Vladimir Putin and not to mention the way Stephen Blank ended its article „Peace mission 2009: A military scenario beyond Central Asia”, by asking in a rhetorical manner: “who then is the rider and who is the horse in this partnership, Russia or China?” From our perspective, this alliance is a “win-win” relation, China’s need of new energy resources coming in the support of Russia’s ambition in keeping it’s “hard to get” status in its relation with NATO, especially regarding the issue of enlargement of the later one towards Russia’s borders.

As a matter of fact, sino-russian partnership goes forward and is proving functional also in the Iranian nuclear problem. Both Russia and China are supporting Iran’s ambition for developing its nuclear program. In this sense, the last year was a more difficult that it would suppose to be at the anniversary of three decades passed from the victory of Islamic Revolution.

Although many international analysts foresaw an Iranian military clash with US or Israel, the weapons remained silent over this matter, main Iran’s challenges emerging from domestic policy. Domestic Iranian crisis originated in the presidential elections. The Iranian electorate was divided over two candidates: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – the actual president, possessing a critical attitude toward the Occident and a strong anti-israelian discourse – and Mir-Hossein Mousavi Khameneh, perceived as a reformist politician, and a partner in a constructive dialog with the Occident.

The announcement that Ahmadinejad win the elections with 63% votes, started a period of street protests which lasted till the end o the year. The electoral dispute was this way extended and transformed in violent clashes between

anti-governmental protesters and state security forces. The security forces intervention destined to put an end to street protests lead to a number of 36 victims and approximately 1000 arrests, including members of reformist opposition<sup>14</sup>. The reaction of international community was prompt, condemning<sup>15</sup> the violent means used by the Teheran government.

Iran situation become even more complicated when US advance their proposal to the Security Council in order to impose new sanctions to Iran over the leak of progress in dialogue showed by the Iranian representatives over its nuclear program.

Although wishing to stop the Iranian uranium enrichment activities, Security Council did not rush in accepting US proposal. Hereby, rounds of negotiations took place on September, at Geneva between the representative of international community and the Iranian negotiator, Saeed Jalili.

In spite of the fact that a supplementary round of discussion took place between the later and the US sub secretary of state, William Burns, the conclusions let no place for any compromise. Iran advocated his right to develop its activities in the field of nuclear energy, and agreed to allow inspectors from International Atomic Energy Agency to visit<sup>16</sup> the sites where the enriched uranium activities are supposed to took place, in order to dissipate any suspicion related to the development of nuclear weapons by the Iranian side.

The leak of real progress in Geneva<sup>17</sup>, and the discovery of two more undisclosed sites destined for enriched uranium activities lead to US initiative in the Security Council framework to further extend the sanctions<sup>18</sup> applied to Iran. An agreement have not been reached but Russia, China, UK, US and Germany proposing the alternative for Iran to transfer the enrichment uranium activities destined for obtaining nuclear energy towards similar Russian facilities, in order to ensure a real transparency over Iranian nuclear program for international community.

Iran did not agree<sup>19</sup> the proposal and this lead us to conclude that the Iranian nuclear program will further remain a major issue on the international security agenda, the near future allowing us to see no amiable compromise that would put an end to the tensions raised by this matter.



### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup><http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-energie-6846380-gazprom-pierde-piete-favoarea-statelor-unite-fondul-noilor-tehnici-extractie-dezvoltate-americieni.htm>

<sup>2</sup>[http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/books/item\\_EZhbOkKqCW7WWgEebVRreL;jsessionid=07E1015F48371BE0A7F6401C92C03A03;+ã](http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/books/item_EZhbOkKqCW7WWgEebVRreL;jsessionid=07E1015F48371BE0A7F6401C92C03A03;+ã)

<sup>3</sup> Idem.

<sup>4</sup><http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,662732,00.html>

<sup>5</sup>[www.nypress.org/books/Black\\_Garden\\_products\\_id\\_3613.html](http://www.nypress.org/books/Black_Garden_products_id_3613.html)

<sup>6</sup> [www.rferl.org/content/Turkey\\_Armenia\\_To\\_Sign\\_Landmark\\_Agreement\\_To\\_Normalize\\_Ties/1848293.htm](http://www.rferl.org/content/Turkey_Armenia_To_Sign_Landmark_Agreement_To_Normalize_Ties/1848293.htm)

<sup>7</sup><http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/10/200910141059701561.html>

<sup>8</sup>See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8315088.stm>; [www.opendemocracy.net/terrorism/article/security\\_briefings/201009](http://www.opendemocracy.net/terrorism/article/security_briefings/201009)

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.amnestyusa.org/amnestynow/leyla.html>

<sup>10</sup> [http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/20-07-2009/108250-russia\\_china-0](http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/20-07-2009/108250-russia_china-0)

<sup>11</sup> Stephen Blank, Peace mission 2009: A military scenario beyond Central Asia, în China Brief, vol.9, nr 17, august 2009, p.7

<sup>12</sup> Idem.

<sup>13</sup> “The Universal, Indivisible Character of Global Security”, Vladimir Putin’s speech at 43rd Munich Security Conference, Munich, 11 february 2007 ([www.securityconference.de-konferenzen-rede.php?menu\\_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=179&](http://www.securityconference.de-konferenzen-rede.php?menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=179&))

<sup>14</sup> See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8432297.stm>

<sup>15</sup> [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/8432884.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8432884.stm)

<sup>16</sup> <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/10/02/86737.html>

<sup>17</sup><http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL1771615820080719>

<sup>18</sup> First set of sanctions against Iran was adopted in 1737 resolution of Security Council in the year 2006, the second set in 2007, 1747 resolution of Security Council, and the third one in march 2008.

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-6837438-ministrul-rus-externe-regretam-iranul-respins-aparent-oferta-imbogati-uraniu-strainatate.htm>

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# THE MATTER OF BIOMETRIC PASSPORTS AND THE FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, OPINION AND RELIGION

*Mădălina Virginia ANTONESCU, PhD*

*This article shows the dimensions of violation brought to fundamental human rights and freedoms consecrated into the national Romanian Constitution, in international treaties ratified by Romania, in Lisbon treaty, in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, made by Romanian authorities competent in providing human persons living on EU territory (as the Romanian territory) with electronic passports.*

*Despite the orthodox majority and national identity of Romania, despite de legal obligations of Romanian state to respect fundamental rights and freedoms of human person, Romania, as EU member state, is, at the beginning of XXI century, placed in the bizarre position to be the first state in the world that has in the same time, incorporated into the electronic passport, the facial image of the person, the digital imprints and the RFID having his personal data. This is not only an abusive and non-constitutional practice of the state authorities, not only a flagrant violation of human rights, but also, it is neglecting the majority orthodox identity of this country that is profoundly opposed to the use of biometry.*

*The article is showing the modalities and the degree of violation of human rights, both through domestic legal acts (of Romanian authorities) as well as through European legal acts. Also, the article is showing some democratic ways of defending freedoms of opinion, of conscience and religions, discussed here, at the national jurisdictional level, in the EU system of jurisdiction or before the European Court of Human Rights.*

*Keywords: Fundamental human rights and freedoms, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, European Convention on Human Rights, biometric passports, electronic documents, electronic chip, the Treaty of Lisbon, the European*

*Union, Schengen agreement, Orthodoxy, national identity, EU Member State, European Law.*

From January 1, 2010, the Romanian state authorities responsible for issuing passports and travel documents have begun to issue, allegedly on request, passports of biometric type<sup>1</sup>. In what follows, we shall consider the illegality, the non-constitutionality of such measures and their non-compliance with international and EU treaties to which Romania is party, to show **their real lack of legal basis and absolute invalidity<sup>2</sup> of such measures seriously violating** the human rights and those of European citizens in a united Europe but willing to be democratic and free<sup>3</sup>.

## **1. Non-compatibility of internal legal acts on biometric passports with paragraph 1, Art. 1 of the Constitution of Romania**

Even from the beginning of the constitutional text, in Art. 1, paragraph 1, we see the flagrant violation by the Romanian state authorities, while abusively invoking regulations and decisions of EU institutions<sup>4</sup>, that they “rely” upon when imposing the Romanian citizens to receive passports of biometric type. Beyond the ridiculous excuses such as the passports concerned would be provided with more security features compared to the classic ones<sup>5</sup>, as if the only purpose of the entire European society of the XXI century is to find new ways of restricting the freedom of the human person and strengthening the security measures, something which is the clearest hint of emptying the contents of the EU’s democratic character and hence the states constituting it and the drift of the Union to a new form of totalitarianism (which we call a totalitarianism of electronic type, different from the other historical forms of totalitarianism as forms of violation of human rights and fundamental



freedoms), other issues should be noticed as well.

Thus, although the state authorities state that they will issue the passports of biometric type **on request**, in order to show that **there is not an obligation for citizens to have such type of passport**, while he can « *choose* » *between a classic one and a new one of biometric type*, all authorities come with a statement intended to show **what level of gravity lies upon the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms** (in this case, freedom, human dignity, freedom of movement of persons and freedom of religion), when saying that old-style passports *will be issued only temporarily*<sup>6</sup>, namely for periods of *one year*, while the passports of biometric type, considered as safer by the state authorities will be issued for *a period of five years*. Of course, nothing prevents a citizen, even if initially opted for a biometric passport, from reversing its decision and choosing, on the expiry of five years, for a classic one, without biometric elements but he **is already taken in the biometric database and his personal data stored on such passport are already abusively placed there**, with guarantees from the state authorities that such data will be protected (authorities whose interest is actually, as history has recorded many times, to increase the control of the person against her freedom).

Biometrics offers countless problems with the freedom of the human person, including the aspect of the personal data protection as the control of the state authority on the human person, irrespectively of his capacity of citizen is dangerously increasing, through the personal data that are stored in databases which are not guaranteed a national protection and that can be accessed by anyone or by a privileged group in their own interest and against the individual concerned. Here is the limit of resistance of democracy itself, of the state governed by the rule of law, as there is, in our opinion, a conflict between the trend of the state authority of continuously increasing its control over the individual and the latter, who has the interest to be linked to state only through basic obligations and to keep his freedom, moreover, making the state, through all its authorities and actions to respect and to guarantee such freedom.

**Biometric passports are illegal** because, **by using biometrics they violate the human fundamental freedoms** (freedom of movement and freedom of religion) **but also the human**

**dignity** (while the human is treated as a potential perpetrator because the biometric society can not possibly be free and democratic but a coercive one, of institutionalized suspicion and totalitarian, ie of violating the human rights and fundamental freedoms). While it seems to be a trend of the Western societies in the so-called confrontation with international dangers such as international terrorism, **an excuse restricting each time the human freedoms and rights in favour of a pre-eminence of the reason of ensuring the public safety** (to be seen as an **exception**, as an exceptional measure, applicable in cases clearly provided by law and with a **temporary** nature), the Eastern European societies just emerging from the totalitarian experiences of communist type must be more circumspect and critical to the new forms of restricting the human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Moreover, we think that they should take, before the Western societies already affected by this disease of biometrics, a role of guardian of the real spirit of democracy and democracy itself, that is that of guaranteeing the state governed by a rule of law and the human rights and fundamental freedoms. The societies most likely to induce the Western type societies that are currently under the biometric inclination to regain their state of confidence in the democratic orientation, and to not give in to the momentum to become some societies of widespread suspicion, that are of Big-Brother type where the citizen becomes a potential suspect and where the state authority self-assumes powers that are specific to a police state, continuously narrowing the exercise of the human rights and fundamental freedoms, until leaving them without content, are represented by the Eastern European societies.

In Art. 1, paragraph 1 of the Romanian Constitution, the **national** character of the Romanian state is set out clearly and without any doubt. We are talking here **about Romania, a country with a specific national identity, namely the historical union of Orthodoxy with the Romanian national spirit on this millennial territory**<sup>7</sup>. Romania is not a state of whatever kind but a state belonging to a people that, even **from its origins, was a Christian one**: the birth of the Romanian people in its millennial Carpatho-Danubian-Pontic path, was firstly a Christian-Orthodox birth<sup>8</sup>. This is essential for **properly understanding the type**



**of the Romanian national identity, essentially and inextricably seen as an Orthodox Christian one, as an unbreakable symbiosis between the idea of the nation and the idea of God<sup>9</sup>.** Any other people and any other state, as well as any integration alliance or organization or entity like the EU **must respect this historical and spiritual fact forming the Romanian national identity.** Romania is more than one state, is a *nation* and this *nation* is an Orthodox Christian one<sup>10</sup>, even if it appears to some postmodernists or globalists as something anachronistic and ridiculous. The national identity<sup>11</sup> and, in case of the Romanians, the Orthodox Christian identity are not ridiculous at all and he who considers *the very essence of a people* to be ridiculous is actually a narrow-minded spirit, without the culture of the nation he comes from or speaks about and a ridiculous being through his very demanding foolishness to overlook the big ideas that substantiate any people as a spiritual being<sup>12</sup>.

Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Constitution is not a fool or outdated one at all because it affirms the national character of the Romanian state ; by contrast, is an article **that indubitably recognizes such spiritual essence of the Romanian people, from its birth in this area until nowadays.** Romanian people are a nation born Orthodox Christian, unlike other peoples who were either later Christened, or never Christened, and **it is specific of the Romanian people, not discussed but respected, including within the European Union as a community of democratic countries, based on a relationship of respect with the Member States<sup>13</sup>.**

The European Union can not issue any directive, decision or any other European legislation, by any of its institutions, **that is contrary to the national identity of any Member State.** When it comes to Romania, the European Union should be **the first to respect and to assure Romania of its unconditional and real respect** for the Orthodox Christian national identity of that Member State with full rights in the Union since 2007.

**Romania can not be treated as second-class Member State in the Union, falsely and tendentiously considered being a de-Christianized state, one in which there is no majority religion, and that should not be taken into account.**

Romania is not a state born yesterday or today, that is, without a past; we see how, throughout the

course of its troubled history, located at the turn of empires, threatened with permanent fragmentation, **Romania has defended its national values and its idea of Orthodox Christianity as part of its very national being<sup>14</sup>.**

Neither the European Union, nor other state or nation, or the EU institutions through their directives or decisions have the right to question the Romanian identity, namely the identity where the orthodoxy is intertwined with of the national character; it is an identity in which the Romanian nation is inextricably woven with orthodoxy, even from its birth as a nation in this area. The disappearance of the Orthodoxy of the nation leads to the disappearance of the nation itself, since its birth and forming, its development over the centuries and resistance in this area were all closely related to the preservation of Orthodoxy, which is a religious identity. So the European Union has no right to question the Romanian identity, i.e., a specific identity, simultaneously a national and religious one, by attempting to relativize or discredit it on grounds of not being “democratic”.

The European Union must respect the identity of a Member State as it formed over the centuries, and not seek to shape it according to its interests, as states may be artificial constructs but nations are organic-spiritual constructs, where the religious aspect (relationship between human and God) plays a key role. The Romanian identity is an Orthodox one, as Romania, remember, is a country with a majority Orthodox population<sup>15</sup>. In addition, it is not an identity formed yesterday or today, but historical one<sup>16</sup>, accompanied by a religious tradition, almost 2000 years old<sup>17</sup>. Therefore, the European Union must take into account the majority and the religious identity of the majority of a country, because this is the real spirit of democracy, if we choose to relate to democracy.

The European Union must respect (and here we speak of an **express legal obligation** imposed by the Treaty of Lisbon) the national identity of a member country, in this case, Romania, as a majority Christian Orthodox country. **Romanian Orthodoxy is perfectly compatible with democracy and the exercise by the citizens of the freedom of religion**, so that each citizen should be free to adhere or not to a religious or philosophic belief.

**But this should not be used by the European Union as a way to ignore, to distort and violate**



through the legal acts of its institutions (acts of European law with direct effect and general application, in some cases) **the identity of the people of Romania, which is a deeply Orthodox one**<sup>18</sup>. If the EU undertakes to respect through its institutions both the national identities of the component states and the freedom of religion, among the fundamental freedoms which it recognizes for the European citizens, then the EU should have clearly in mind, **when relating to the Romanian national identity, that it is an indissoluble, symbolic and spiritual whole, in which the nation has been intertwined with the orthodoxy**, not due to a whim or an isolated historical circumstance but for nearly 2000 years, even since the birth of the Romanian people in the Carpathian-Danubian – Pontic space.

So, Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Romania, when asserting the **national** character of the Romanian state, we should keep in mind that this is **an implicit Christian Orthodox character**, because Orthodoxy has been and will be the majority religion of this people, which continues to define itself on the basis of it. So the issue of the freedom of religion in case of issuing biometric passports becomes even more acute in the case of Romania, whose national identity is simultaneously and deeply a majority Orthodox one<sup>19</sup>.

### **2. Non-compatibility of the internal legal acts on the biometric passports with the Art. 29 of the Constitution of Romania**

Corroborated with Art. 1, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Romania, the issue by the Romanian state authorities of the biometric passports on the basis of European regulations and decisions breaches Art. 29 of the Constitution, on the **freedom of conscience**, as well. This article is a framework one, in which, along with the freedom of thought and opinion, the freedom of the religious beliefs is included as well. According to this article, **the freedom of religion can not be restricted in any way**, so the constitutional text requires an express prohibition against **any form of restriction** of such freedom.

Paragraph 1, Art. 29 of the Constitution is therefore **a constitutional guarantee** that all Romanian and European citizens may invoke for the protection of their fundamental rights and

freedoms in a state governed by the rule of law as Romania (Article 1, Constitution) and in a community of democratic states, as the European Union wants to be (Art. 1 / TEU, amended by the Treaty of Lisbon).

Therefore, **no state or EU authority may impose any Romanian citizen** (which belongs to a country that has not only a national and majority Orthodox identity but that is also a democratic and social state, governed by the rule of law,) **any restriction, discrimination or violation of his freedom of religion**. On the other hand, we see how precisely the freedom of religion is violated by the Romanian state authorities in the so-called ‘enforcement’ of the European regulations and decisions (because **any EU decision, Regulation or any other legislation issued by any EU institution should be issued while respecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of the European citizens, in this case, freedom of opinion, thought and religion**), when they rush into issuing biometric passports regarded by the Orthodox Christians as contrary to their faith.

It’s like one day, the EU institutions would impose the Muslim communities living on its territory and having European citizens of Islam belief as members (by the nationality of an EU Member State), to accept the issuance of an act that is in deep contradiction with Koran precepts, so likely to violate the freedom of religion of those European citizens of Islamic belief.

So, in *any* of its actions and in *any* of the normative documents issued by its institutions, *having or not* direct effect and general application, the EU must pay attention to respecting the freedom of religion, opinion and thought of individuals within its territory and *immediately* remove those measures or acts which cause such violations. Otherwise, the Union (having legal personality, just as the Romanian State) may be sued by persons living in the EU, and by the Romanian state as well, in this case, in the European and the national law (which is an entire jurisdictional ensemble according to the Treaty of Lisbon) for violating those fundamental freedoms.

The issuance of the biometric passports, infringing upon their essence the Orthodox faith and the free exercise thereof outside the European space<sup>20</sup> (as the Orthodox Christian sees his free movement restricted in the spaces of the Union’s third countries, precisely because of his religious



faith not allowing him to apply for a biometric passport) is an internal measure<sup>21</sup> of the Romanian state starting from a European standard<sup>22</sup> violating Art. 29 of the Constitution of Romania and also the international treaties on human rights to which Romania is party and which are part of the internal law.

Article 29 of the Constitution mentions very clearly and without the possibility of distortion, that any restriction in any way, of the freedom of religion is not allowed.

So the Orthodox Christian is protected at constitutional level, based on Art. 1, paragraph 1 and 3 and Art. 29 of the Constitution of his country, in the relation with the public authorities of the Romanian state and the EU institutions that can neither relativize nor restrict a fundamental freedom which the Union binds to respect through the Treaty of Lisbon itself.

Furthermore, Art. 29 of the Constitution **completes the express and total prohibition against limitations of any kind** of the freedom of religion by saying that *'nobody can be forced to adopt an opinion... contrary to his beliefs'*. This constitutional text comes to establish a **dual legal guarantee for the citizen**, namely that the Romanian state will respect his freedom of religion and will not force him, by any measure of its authorities, to adopt an opinion contrary to his beliefs.

So, the issuance of the biometric passports that are deeply contrary to the Orthodox faith by their very essence is a measure by which **a state authority actually comes and requires the citizen to adopt its opinion on these passports** (an opinion which **favours them** but is **contrary to the religious beliefs of the citizen**).

This blatantly violates, in its letter and spirit, the constitutional text of Art. 29, while the **'measure'** of the state authorities on issuing biometric passports in a majority Christian Orthodox country (in which the national identity is a specific one namely simultaneously a historical and a deeply orthodox one) **is an unconstitutional measure thus affected, in our opinion, by absolute invalidity** because we are dealing with **the infringement of a fundamental human freedom, which is a supreme value, guaranteed by the Romanian State** (Article 1 of the Constitution, paragraph 3).

### **3. Non-compatibility between the internal normative acts concerning the biometric passports and the international treaties to which Romania is party**

In terms of the international treaties ratified by Romania (and which, according to the Constitution, are part of the internal law), the issuance of the biometric passports<sup>23</sup> violates the provisions related to the freedom of religion stipulated **by such treaties**.

Thus, Art. 18 of the **Universal Declaration of Human Rights**<sup>24</sup> establishes that **everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion**. This right, according to the UDHR, includes the freedom to change your religion or beliefs as well as the freedom to manifest your religion or beliefs, either individually or collectively, both publicly and privately, through education, practices, worship and pursuance of rites. Similarly, we should also note here the Art. 19 / UDHR, according to which **any individual has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to not be abashed for his opinions**.

So, in conjunction with Art. 29 / UDHR, allowing only restrictions **established by law** but made for **the sole purpose of ensuring the recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others** and meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and general welfare, in a **democratic** society, it results that the Declaration, as a fundamental document on human rights, which any democratic state must necessarily relate to, **allows by way of exception, only one type of restrictions on those freedoms**. Thus, restrictions must be established by **law** (and not by other normative, either internal or the EU institutions' acts,) and must have only one purpose, stated above. Always the political and legal context in which the restriction occurs by way of exception, is mentioned in Art. 29 / UDHR: the context is that of **a democratic society, i.e., a society which respects the letter and spirit of all legal norms concerning the human rights**<sup>25</sup>, to which the state concerned is a party or included in its constitutional order.

Furthermore, Art. 30 / UDHR prohibits a biased interpretation or in bad faith, made for allowing a state, group or person to have any right to engage in any activity or perform any act leading to the abolition of the rights and freedoms set out in



the UDHR. In other words, Art. 30 is the most powerful legal guarantee established by UDHR by which neither the Romanian state, nor a group or person may be entitled to engage in an activity or to perform any act leading to the abolition of the freedoms concerned ( of thought, opinion, religion). Therefore, concerning Art. 29 and Art. 30 / UDHR, the Romanian state authorities are not entitled *to impede the exercise* of these freedoms, other than those specified in Art. 29 *or to issue* biometric passports, as a type of activity that leads *to the abolition* of the freedom of religion, opinion or thought itself (for the free thinkers who do not agree or who feel prejudiced or harmed in their conviction by the issuance of such passports ) as set out in Art. 18 and 19 / UDHR.

Further, in conjunction with the above provisions, we see how through the **discrimination among the Romanian citizens as far as the issuance of passports is concerned**, by the Romanian state authorities while implementing Community acts, the **International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights**<sup>26</sup> **2 is violated**, namely Art. 2, paragraph 2 establishing the express obligation of the states parties to guarantee that the rights set forth in the Covenant will be exercised **without any discrimination**.

It is a universal and imperative obligation, opposable *erga omnes* and an obligation to effectively respect in good faith the human rights and fundamental freedoms, in this case the **freedoms of opinion, thought and religion, whereas they have a *ius cogens* character in the international law**.

Thus, Art. 18 of the Covenant expressly provides the right of everyone to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. It also states that nobody *may be subjected to any constraints which may impede* his freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of his choice. So the Romanian state which is party to this Covenant is bound by its capacity of a signatory state itself and also by the character of *ius cogens* of the freedoms of thought, conscience and religion, to respect that article of the Covenant. Neither the European Union nor any of its institutions may oblige the Romanian state to bring restrictions or derogations from the fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any state party to that Covenant, when the state applies legal rules of any kind (laws, conventions, regulations, customs)<sup>27</sup>, under the pretext that the

Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent.

At the same time, the EU can not rely on the pretext of the integration character of its rules of European law (direct effect, immediate and general application) to bring restrictions or derogations from the human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Priority of the rule of European law is valid only in relation to a rule of internal law **and not to a rule of *ius cogens*, which is internationally mandatory and opposable *erga omnes*** (to all states and the EU, in our opinion, an entity that has elements of statehood but legal personality as well<sup>28</sup>, while it could use its legal responsibility including internationally for the breach of the *ius cogens* rules).

Secondly, the EU can not use those integration characters of its right to require the Member States to internally restrict the exercise of the fundamental human freedoms (in this case, the freedom of thought, conscience, religion) or to make derogations from those, intended to affect them in their exercise and their very essence. Article 18 allows only restrictions provided by law and (a cumulative condition) that are necessary for safeguarding the public security, order and health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. But we should see them as mere exceptions, as the restrictions on the fundamental human freedoms can only have a temporary character, exceptionally and proportionally to the circumstances justifying them; firstly, they must be legal restrictions, ie to occur only in the context established by the domestic law of that state (and here the Romanian Parliament is primarily competent as a national parliament and not some other internal state authority nor the EU institutions, as restrictions may be made by law only, according to Art. 18 and 19 and not through acts of institutions outside the state signing of the Covenant, such as the rules of Community law issued by the EU institutions).

The Romanian state authorities, when issuing biometric passports, did not have in mind all the above considerations, undertaking measures that have neither constitutional nor international legality, as they concern the exercise and the very essence of the human rights and fundamental freedoms, that have been prioritized, as *ius cogens*, compared with the national standards of the state and the rules of Community law (especially



since the EU declares that it is a democratic state community, that is precisely one based on the principle of respecting the human rights and fundamental freedoms).

The invocation by the Romanian state authorities of the fact that, by issuing biometric passports, a “legal” limitation according to the above Article would be brought, is in our opinion, an abusive and even tendentious invocation, out of the clearly established context of the Art. 18 and Art. 19 / Covenant on the exercise of the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or opinion. It is not a « legal » limitation, is a limitation for **applying a rule of European law** (through the membership of the Romanian state to an entity with a legal and political integration character), so it is not a limitation coming from the Romanian Parliament, as the **supreme representative** authority of the Romanian people (supremacy that is valid **in relation to the EU institutions, as well**) ; it is not a limitation that is required for respecting the rights and reputation of others or for safeguarding the national security, public order, health and public morality. Even if this would absurdly be the case, the issuance of biometric passports is itself an activity **breaching the essence as well, not only the exercise** of the freedom of thought, conscience and religion of the person who disagrees with this type of passport using such freedom, by the mere fact that the **biometrics itself is a way to control the human person and to abolish his fundamental rights and freedoms, specific to a totalitarian regime, not to a democratic one, where the person becomes a potential offender, and the suspicion is widespread, institutionalized, lifted at level of government policy.**

Biometrics uses the exception of the public security diverted from its natural purpose, that of having a temporary and exceptional nature and to not affect the essence but only the exercise of a human right or fundamental freedom, and that only limited and specifically prescribed by the law of a state. The biometric society, unlike the democratic one, uses biometrics as a means of increasing control over the individual, of permanently controlling and abolishing his fundamental rights and freedoms that the democratic society respect and guarantee.

Moreover, **between a biometric society**, of generalized suspicion, where the self-arrogated, permanently growing right of the state authority to

control the personal lives in detail under the pretext of guaranteeing the public safety, prevails and, on the other hand, a **democratic society**, where the state undertakes to ensure the person that his basic liberties and rights shall be completely exercised, **there is a complete and insurmountable opposition**, which the lawyers of the XXI century should understand **now** in its real meaning and in the consequences for such rights and freedoms.

At last, another regional legal document that the Romanian state authorities infringed, while they may be held liable by any natural person, any nongovernmental organization or group of individuals<sup>29</sup> claiming to be the victim of any violation by the Romanian state (as party to the Convention or its Protocols) of the rights conferred by the Convention and the Protocols thereto, is the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Thus, any person (stateless, bipatrid, foreign citizen, Romanian citizen, European citizen or citizen of a third state to the Union) considering to have his freedom of thought, conscience or religion affected by the issuance of biometric passports, could sue the Romanian state (as the case may be, if free thinker or a religious man, if his religion does not allow him to hold a biometric act or if his own conviction or thought does not allow it) to the European Court of Human Rights based in Strasbourg.

The Romanian state is required by Art. 9 and Art. 10 of the Convention, to respect the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, the freedom of expression of every person, so whether is an EU citizen or not. This is of great significance because, for the conception of the ECHR, the citizenship is irrelevant but the capacity of human person, ie, as far as the human rights are concerned, the capacity of human person, which has legal effects<sup>30</sup>, is always prioritized compared to any other capacity (of citizen of a state or integration entity such as the EU).

According to Art. 13 of the Convention, any person (so not only the European or Romanian citizens, where the measure was introduced) considering that his rights and freedoms recognized by this Convention are violated by the issuance of a biometric passport, by the mere existence of the biometric passport (in this case, freedom of belief, opinion<sup>31</sup> and / or religion) can effectively address a **national court**. This right to protect his violated right or freedom in any **competent**



**court in Romania** is allowed by Art. 13 of the Convention, including when **the violation is done by people who acted in an official capacity**. So the law allows the human person to defend, based on Art. 13 of the Convention, his freedom of opinion, belief and / or religion, **turning against people who acted in violation of such rights and freedoms while exercising their official duties** (the principle of personal responsibility of officials for an act that violates a right or a freedom established by the Convention).

According to **Protocol 11 to the Convention**, through which the control mechanisms established by this were restructured (the new Title II of the Convention, Art. 34 on the European Court of Human Rights), **the right to refer to the European Court of Human Rights** is offered to any individual, NGO or any group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the high contracting parties (in this case, the Romanian state and also the EU, when it joins the ECHR as such) of the rights conferred by the Convention and its Protocols. The referral may be made by an application to the Court, after the person or group of individuals has used up the internal means of appeal in a period of 6 months, which commences from the date of the final internal decision. The anonymous applications will not be kept. The Court will reject the application **if it is essentially identical with a previously considered application or if it is already submitted to other international Court of investigation or settlement and if it contains no new facts**. The individual application considered by the Court as incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or the Protocols or manifestly unfounded or abusive will also be rejected by the Court as inadmissible.

On the basis of another article of Protocol 11 to the Convention (Art. 33), **any state party to the Convention and Protocol 11** may refer to the Court on any alleged breach of the Convention and its Protocols (in this case, the violation of the freedom of opinion, belief or religion by the authorities of the Romanian state through the issuance of the biometric passports) by another contracting party. It's for the competence of the Court to give a decision on the **interstate applications**, through which the Romanian State may be brought before it by any other state party to the Convention and Protocol 11. At the same time, **even the Romanian State may bring** under

Art. 33, before the European Court of Human Rights, **the European Union** when it becomes a contracting party to the Convention and Protocol 11.

#### **4. Non-compatibility between the internal legal acts on biometric passports and the Treaty of Lisbon**

All internal normative acts issued by the authorities of the Romanian state under the pretext of "being measures for implementing European law acts", viewed from the perspective of the **Treaty of Lisbon**<sup>32</sup> are not compatible with them.

According to the provisions of the TEU (Treaty on European Union, namely Maastricht Treaty), as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, **the Romanian government and EU institutions which issued documents on the issuance of biometric passports in Romania, a member state with full rights in the EU, violate, in our opinion, Art. 1a**. Through this article, the EU, which has legal personality, undertakes the express obligation **to respect the values of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the state governed by the rule of law and human rights**. The Union must not only to respect them but also **to base on them**, which is a legal guarantee similar to Art. 1, paragraph 3 of the Romanian Constitution (while the Art. 1a/TEU is the backbone of democracy in the Union and the most powerful legal guarantee against the totalitarian drift of the EU towards a police state).

The specification of the human rights in that article clearly shows that the intention of the Union and the Member States that have become parties to the treaty is to respect democracy and to place the human person, its rights and freedoms, and not its restriction, in all their actions and normative acts of any kind.

**The acts of the EU institutions**, providing the issuance of biometric passports, applied in Romania as a majority Orthodox state and therefore in violation of the freedom of religion not allowing biometric documents, **breach Art. 3a/TEU, as well** (as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon), whereas **the Union assumes here the legal obligation** (for which it may be held liable before the Court of Justice of the EU, in its own jurisdictional system) **to respect the national identities of the Member States, inherent to**



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**their fundamental political and constitutional structures.** We should not interpret paragraph 3, which establishes the principle of loyal cooperation between the Member States and the Union<sup>33</sup> as a relativization or neglecting by the states or the Union of the paragraph 2 thereof.

According to Art. 52, paragraph 3/ EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, insofar as the Charter contains rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and extent of such rights will be **the same as those of the Convention.** But these provisions can not prevent the European law from providing a **wider protection** of them. Therefore, under paragraph 3, Art. 53/Charter (a document of European law having the same legal value as the European Union treaties)<sup>34</sup>, **the Union can enhance the legal protection of the freedom of opinion, belief or religion** (in this case), while is obliged to **ensure at least the same level of legal protection** as that provided for these freedoms (to which we refer in this article) **by the above Convention.** From here, we understand that **the EU assumes an express obligation, through the Art. 53 of the Charter, to guarantee and respect such freedoms, so no act of any EU institution (Commission, Council, European Parliament, etc.) should violate the freedoms provided by the Art. 10 of the Charter** (freedom of thought, conscience, religion) by requiring the issuance of biometric passports. Moreover, under the Art. 53/Charter, these acts should provide a protection at least **equal** to that provided in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. So the EU institutions may be held liable **in the EU judicial system** not only in case of **violation** of such rights and freedoms as protected in the Charter and the Convention above but also **for the fact that they did not provide a protection** of such freedoms and rights **at least equal** (those in the Art. 10/Charter, in our case) to the protection given by the Convention (ECHR).

Moreover, by violating the freedoms in Art.10 /Charter by imposing biometric acts in countries where the citizens disagree with that (especially in light of a simultaneous national and Orthodox identity, as specific to the Romanian people), **the EU institutions and the Romanian state authorities also breach the Art. 6/TEU as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon.** According to that article, **the fundamental rights**, as guaranteed

by the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as resulting from the common constitutional traditions of the Member States, **constitute general principles of the Union law.** Here is a clear specification in the TEU (so at the supreme level in the legal hierarchy of the Union law) **that not even a legal order of integration can not omit, ignore, relativize or violate the human rights.** The Union takes over and incorporates in its (integration) law a level of legal protection at least equal to that given to those rights and freedoms **by the ECHR and the common constitutional traditions of the Member States** (and therefore by the constitutions of those countries, which provide legal protection of the human rights). In other words, **the Union law, although is an integration law (in which the acts of the EU institutions have priority, direct applicability, direct effect, etc.) should be permanently compatible with the constitutions of the Member States, with the provisions of the ECHR and the other international conventions to which the Member States are parties.**

The EU law, although is an integration law, is based on some general principles that are the very fundamental rights protected in the legal level provided by the ECHR and the common constitutional traditions of the Member States (including the Romanian Constitution). Therefore, no act of any EU institution can affect the freedom of opinion, religion, conviction of any person living on the EU's territory (in this case, of people living in Romania, as an EU member state and who disagree with the issuance of such passports, because they infringe, put into question and are likely to abolish the freedoms in the Art. 10/Charter, in their essence).

No act of the EU institutions, whether an act of integration (direct effect, primacy over the internal documents, direct applicability etc.) or not can violate or restrict the exercise or affect the essence of the freedoms of thought, belief or religion of people living throughout the EU, because they belong to the category of *fundamental rights*, which constitute *general principles of the entire EU's integration law*, under Art. 6, paragraph 3/TEU as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon.

Therefore, the EU law, although an integration law, is based on the human rights and fundamental freedoms, so the Article 6, paragraph 3/TEU appears as an important legal guarantee that the



Union is bound, by the acts of all its institutions, to respect the human rights. There is a provision of the TEU which, as a treaty establishing the new EU, is supreme in the hierarchy of the EU integration law, with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (which has the same legal value as the Treaties).

### Conclusions

The question of the issuance of biometric passports **is in itself**, in our opinion, an **activity that violates the human rights and fundamental freedoms**, resulting in **emptying the contents thereof**, which for any democratic society and state governed by the rule of law (such as the EU Member States, Romania, and the EU) represent **supreme values, guaranteed by the states of the democratic community**. Therefore, at the beginning of the XXI century, instead of a process of **consolidation** of the democratic community (in this case, within the EU) we are witnessing, **on the contrary, to a clear relativization, even an downright denial** of democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms that the democratic constitutions and the international law in force continue to consider of utmost importance and to base upon them.

No state authority in the EU Member States may be bound by any EU institution or anyone else to adopt measures violating the essence of the human rights (in this case, the freedoms of opinion, thought and religion). **The EU can not override the spirit and letter of Art. 1a / TEU as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon or Art. 10/ EU Charter of Fundamental Rights**, as it would mean that shortly after its establishment (by the Treaty of Lisbon) it begins to place the Member States in a dangerous situation of having to implement or comply with the various provisions of the EU institutions that flagrantly violate the human rights (in this case, the issuance of biometric passports). We remind you that **no EU institution may require a sovereign state on human rights matters** (matters that are not communitarized<sup>35</sup> in the European law, on the contrary, continue to belong to the international law and to be part of the Romanian internal law since Romania is party to the international treaties on human rights matters): **the EU itself undertakes to respect the level of international legal protection provided on human rights matters through the ECHR**

**and other international conventions to which the Member States are parties**. The EU itself **undertakes to adhere to the ECHR**, so to take over its level of legal protection given to the rights and freedoms provided by the Constitution and to engage its responsibility as such, for failing to respect them.

The Union **itself** is not a democratic entity, because democracy in the Union **should be assumed and accomplished at any time**, in relation to the Member States, the European citizens, and any human person living in the EU. Democracy is neither an empty word, nor a dead letter in the Treaty of Lisbon.

Whether the EU will be willing to recognize its very serious totalitarian drift (by imposing the Member States to issue biometric documents) or not, **the true nature of this unprecedented entity and the place that it will occupy in the historical categories of organizations and structures will be known**: either the category of the **true democratic societies** that managed to fulfil the dream of European construction, or the category of **totalitarian structures** that used the integration nature of the European law to impose their will before the Member States, but in a way leading to the abolishment, emptying the content of human rights and a police state, of control, monitoring, human monitoring and abolishing its fundamental freedoms and rights in their essence.

Member States of the European Union, in this case Romania, should make use of all legal instrumentalities to indicate the European Union that it is going to a wrong direction whereas also Romania, like many other countries newly acceded into the Union as well, has recently undergone through the totalitarian communist experiment and it looked forward to entering into the Union and finding the European family based on intrinsic democratic values which the Member States and the European Union are willing now to permanently respect in their letter and spirit.

All human persons living on the EU's territory (in this case in Romania, as an EU Member State) have many handy democratic ways to attack the decision of the Romanian authorities to issue biometric passports that affects their fundamental rights and freedoms **themselves**. These legal means can be followed simultaneously or not, depending on the referred court or institution and its specific referral procedures:



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- Petitioning the **Ombudsman** (a constitutional institution in Romania<sup>36</sup>), for the violation of his freedom of thought, opinion and religion

- Petitioning the **European Ombudsman**<sup>37</sup>, an institution established by the Treaty of Lisbon, for the infringement of the freedom of thought, opinion and religion, by the issuance of biometric passports by the Romanian authorities as an execution of acts of European law

- Referral to **the internal administrative litigation courts** for challenging the administrative documents issued by public authorities in Romania on the issuance of biometric passports<sup>38</sup>

- **Appealing the emergency ordinances concerning the issuance of biometric passports to the Constitutional Court** under Art. 114, paragraph 4 bis / Constitution, which stipulates very clearly that the normative acts of Government can not affect the rights, freedoms and duties provided by the Constitution. Similarly, **all internal normative acts** on the issuance of biometric passports can be appealed to the Romanian constitutional court

- **Appealing the internal normative acts of the Romanian authorities to the ECHR** and, in our opinion, (since the EU has legal personality and expressly assumes the obligation to accede to the ECHR, under the Treaty of Lisbon), **there is no impediment in bringing the EU before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg**, for the issuance through its institutions, of acts of European law abolishing the rights and freedoms provided by the European Convention on Human Rights - in this case, the freedom of thought, opinion and religion - and requiring the state Romanian authorities to issue biometric passports. It is a means of appeal to be open after using up the internal (national) means of appeal

- **The appeal for annulment within the EU judicial system**, before the court of first instance (and then, before the Court in Luxembourg of the European Union) **for the abolishment of the acts of the EU institutions** (the Council Regulation, the Commission decision) practically **imposing** the Romanian authorities to issue biometric passports in a majority Christian Orthodox country, in violation of Art. 10/EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 1a / TEU as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon and Art. 3a / TEU as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon (for breaching by the Union of its obligation to respect the national identities of the Member States, which in case of Romania is

a specific, majority Orthodox one, fundamentally opposed to biometrics and biometric documents).

- **Appeal for interpretation, through which, when brought before the national court** (in the Romanian state) to address the application (**on civil law**, not administrative litigation), of a person living in Romania and considered to have his fundamental rights and freedoms, guaranteed by the Romanian Constitution, violated, the court may require the suspension of the case and the reference to the CJEU for the interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty and the Charter concerning the Union's position on the issue of biometric passports and their relation to the human rights and fundamental freedoms, including as guaranteed by the EU Charter.

- **Appeal to the CJEU in full jurisdiction, namely referral to the Court of the EU judicial system for violating the human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Union in relation to people living on its territory** (therefore, the capacity of citizen is not relevant on human rights matters but only the legal capacity of human person). This is an appeal (a specific judicial means before the CJEU) that **the Court can not possibly reject** because **the Union receives legal personality by the Treaty of Lisbon, so it can sue and be sued by any individual**, unlike the previous situation. In addition, it would be absurd for that to decline its competence, since the Union, through the Treaty of Lisbon, **assumes very clear obligations in relation to the Member States and its citizens and also in relation to any human person living on its territory**. The issue of human rights should not remain outside the CJEU jurisdiction because the Union proclaims to be a democratic community of states, based on the values in Article 1 a / TEU. Therefore, through this **specific and new type of appeal, which we recommend precisely by virtue of the obligation of the Union to respect the human rights and freedoms**, the CJEU can not declare itself as not having jurisdiction, because **otherwise repeated violations and abuses of power by the EU institutions and the Union would take place in relation to the Member States, the European citizens and any human person**. The European citizen and every person living on the EU territory should have, **through the Treaty of Lisbon, the respect of its fundamental rights and freedoms by the EU institutions effectively and actually**



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**guaranteed, especially since it is a law of integration**, where the decision of supranational authorities is pre-eminent, ignoring the Member States. This can easily be a **cause for abuse and systematic violation of the human rights in the Union**, because, as said before, democracy is not a static concept but it must be respected and maintained in force at any time.

These are some of the possibilities of legally challenging the issuance of the biometric passports, including by the opening of trials concerning the respect of the human rights in societies proclaimed to be democratic but which, through abusive practices of the state authorities, are affecting even the essence of such human rights and freedoms, opening the way for electronic totalitarian drifts.

### *Declaration*<sup>39</sup>

*The undersigned*<sup>40</sup>.....residing in....

*I declare that I disagree with the issuance of a biometric passport, considering that my **constitutional freedom of thought and / or opinion** is thus violated (Article 29 and Article 30 / Constitution) because the opinion of the Romanian public authorities on such passports is presented as favourable as compared to the classic ones, without a prior public and authentic debate concerning such documents and without taking into account the opinion of most people of this country, the petitions to the competent authorities for stop issuing such passports in Romania. In addition, I believe that a discrimination between the two passports is intentionally introduced, intended to affect my right to freedom of opinion and choice concerning the biometric passports, as they are favoured by the Romanian state authorities in terms of the issue fee and period of validity, thus contravening to Art. 16, paragraph 1 / Constitution.*

*The Article 29, paragraph 1/Constitution guarantees that no one can compel me to adopt a view that is contrary to my beliefs, in this case I can not be bound by any Romanian state authority to accept, neither now, nor later<sup>41</sup> the biometric passport, which is contrary to my personal conviction about the incompatibility of biometric passports and any other biometric acts with the democratic society and the supreme values guaranteed by Article 1, paragraph 3/ Constitution<sup>42</sup>.*

*I declare that I disagree<sup>43</sup> with the issuance of the biometric passport because I think that in a democratic country and a state governed by the rule of law as Romania (under Art. 1, paragraph 3/Constitution) it is contrary to **my freedom of religion**<sup>44</sup> (Christian Orthodox, Christian Catholic, Protestant, Islamic, Evangelical, Lutheran, etc.) and, moreover, abolish it in its very essence (given that the Art. 29/Constitution guarantees me the respect by the Romanian state of that freedom, while **prohibiting any restriction of it**, so including the issuance of the biometric passport).*

*I declare that I disagree with the issuance of a biometric passport, either now or later (I consider here the **temporary** nature of the classic passport **arbitrarily** set by the Romanian state authorities, authorities which can not oblige me to give up the classic passport in order to replace it with the biometric one, under any circumstances and under any form).*

*I believe that otherwise my freedom of thought, opinion and religion is seriously violated, contrary to the clear, compelling and unequivocal provisions of Romania's supreme legal text.*

*I communicate the competent state authorities to issue passports or other travel documents for travels to the Union third states, **to issue me, without discrimination and unconditionally, only a classic passport whenever I apply for one**<sup>45</sup>, namely I communicate these authorities to thus respect my fundamental freedoms above, under the Romanian Constitution, the above mentioned articles, under Art. 10/ EU Fundamental Charter and Art. 1a / TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon and under all international treaties to which Romania is party and which are part of the internal law, taking precedence over the national laws, when not corresponding to them.*

*In case of violation of these laws that protect my fundamental freedoms above, please note that you will bear the legal consequences, both on the internal system of jurisdiction and the European systems of jurisdiction, on human rights matters, including your obligation to financially compensate me for the moral prejudice that you bring me by affecting these freedoms.*

Date

Signature



### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> Introduction from January 1, 2009, in Romania, of biometric passports, which have chips embedded containing the photograph of the holder thereof under electronic format and his fingerprints. Until December 31, 2008, Romania **will have** to comply with the European standards on the security and biometric features integrated within the travel documents. **Biometric data** means introducing within the computerized page of the passport, **an invisible electronic chip** that will contain the photograph of the holder in electronic form. It is a color photo, size 35mm/45mm. Another measure of identification will be the **incorporation into the electronic chip, near the facial image, of the fingerprints from each hand.** According to Cotidianul newspaper, of September 26, 2008: *Passports with chip, from January 1, 2009.* It is therefore **an obligation of complying with the European rule of law, violating the human rights,** leaving no option to people living in Romania as a EU Member State. We consider that by this, **the EU departs from the true democratic spirit, heading for a dangerous totalitarian drift, to be sanctioned as such** by any human person living on its territory, on behalf of the EU's obligation to respect the human rights, [http://www.cotidianul.ro/pasapoartele\\_cu\\_cip\\_de\\_la\\_1\\_ianuarie\\_2009-59336.html](http://www.cotidianul.ro/pasapoartele_cu_cip_de_la_1_ianuarie_2009-59336.html)

<sup>2</sup> Invalidity to be recognized by any judicial court of Romania and the European judicial systems on human rights matters.

<sup>3</sup> To these facts, we come with a view of the Eastern doctrine of European Law.

<sup>4</sup> Council **Regulation** no. 2252 / 2004 *on standards for the security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States*, published in the EU Official Journal. L 385 of December 29, 2004, Commission **Decision** C (2005) 409 *establishing the technical specifications on the standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States*

<sup>5</sup> Romania introduced from January 1, 2009, biometric passports. Such passports have 50 security features and **includes for the first time in the EU, both the facial identification element and that of fingerprints.** It is expected to bring significant improvements to the regulation, including the creation of a **uniform European system for verifying compatibility between biometric components and data stored in chip.** The Regulation provides **the general obligation to give fingerprints,** which are stored on a chip in the passport, European Parliament

[http://www.euractiv.ro/uniunea-europeana/articles|displayArticle/articleID\\_16055/Pasapoarte-biometrice-mai-sigure.html](http://www.euractiv.ro/uniunea-europeana/articles|displayArticle/articleID_16055/Pasapoarte-biometrice-mai-sigure.html), January 15, 2009. All this makes us see how serious the totalitarian drift is, beginning to occur in the EU, threatening to empty the fundamental human rights guaranteed by the constitutions of the Member States, the Treaty of Lisbon, the ECHR, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and other international documents on the matter.

<sup>6</sup> By this we believe that **there is not even a real choice between the two types of passports,** because **they do not have the same term of validity,** as the biometric passport is "more convenient" because it is **intentionally issued for a longer period of time.** At the same time, **discrimination between citizens is operated by a different fee charged for each type of passport,** as the one for the biometric passport is higher but is **paid less frequently** (every five years), while the citizen who does not want this type of passport **is forced to take out of his pocket each year a charge half the fee for biometric passports,** which leads eventually to a higher expense (hence a higher fee charged for the one who wants a classic passport (and more trouble every year, one must apply for classic passport). In this way **a discrimination between citizens is made, in breach of Art. 16 of the Constitution of Romania,** where citizens are equal before the law and before public authorities, **without privileges or discrimination.** However, we see how **the public authorities on the basis of domestic laws in full violation of the spirit and letter of the constitutional text and the international treaties ratified by Romania (on human rights matters) and which are part of the internal law and take precedence over the provisions of national law, violate Art. 16 through the discrimination operated between citizens, depending on the type of passport issued.** At the same time, we see that **it is a false option, in reality a measure intended to discourage citizens applying for the issuance of the classic passport** in favor of the biometric type issued for a longer period of time for which a single charge is paid once every five years. Secondly, the discrimination between the Romanian citizens, by which the letter and spirit of Art. 16 of the Constitution is violated, also concerns the **temporary nature of the classic passport.** If it were a real right of choice, the classic passport would have been issued for a fee equal to that charged for the other type of passport for an identical period of time and without having a temporary nature (namely one that indicates that it is provisional and will be



replaced eventually, necessarily, with a biometric one). Basically, **the option of the citizen is a false one**, whereas the classic passport, apart from being intentionally more expensive, is the one to be renewed every year and in addition, is a temporary one, ie it is intended to be phased out at a time in favor of the biometric type. So finally, **the citizen has no right to choose because he will have, ultimately, to apply for a sole type of valid passport, namely the biometric one. This is a flagrant violation of the rule of law, the spirit and letter of the Constitution and the human rights and freedoms established by it and by the international treaties to which Romania is party and that is obliged to respect as supreme values and guarantee them to its citizens, in the spirit and letter of Art. 1, paragraph 3 of the Constitution.**

<sup>7</sup> His Beatitude Patriarch Teoctist - *To the role of the Romanian Orthodox Church in the life of our people*, in the Foreword to the third ed. of the manual of *The Romanian Orthodox Church History*, Bucharest, 1987. See also Nicholas Dobrescu – *The role of Church in the Romanian history*, Bucharest, 1909.

<sup>8</sup> Prof. Dr. Mircea Păcurariu - *History of the Romanian Orthodox Church*, Ed Bible and Mission Institute of the Romanian Orthodox Church, Bucharest, 2006, p. 17 to 22.

<sup>9</sup> Nicolae Iorga – *To the use of studying Romanian Church History*, reprinted after the preface to the *Romanian Church History*, vol I, ed. I Vălenii de Munte, 1908.

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, *The teachings of Neagoe Basarab to his son Theodosius* (written between 1518-1521), a brilliant medieval work of instruction and religious and moral education, a compendium of Eastern ascetics and mystics, which shows the traditional concern of Christian sovereigns in that area to respect the Orthodox belief and to keep it unaltered, as an identity of this nation. See, to the concept of trans-historical and deified nation, different from the political or cultural one, Dan Puric - *Who are we*, Platytera, Bucharest, 2008 p. 72-82. Prof. Dumitru Staniloaie-*Spirituality and communion in the Orthodox liturgy*, Ed Bible and Mission Institute of the Romanian Orthodox Church, ed. II, Bucharest, 2004, p. 18-20 (about the concept of *person* in the Orthodox belief, as opposed to the number applied to being, which separates him from God and his salvation).

<sup>11</sup> **The EU obligation under Art. 3 / TEU as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, is to respect the national identities of the Member States, inherent**

**to their fundamental political and constitutional structures.** For Romania, **the EU can not overlook, like it does not exist, the Orthodox, historical identity, closely woven by the people political and consciousness identity of this nation.** If the EU respects the rights of the various minorities, then the more it is necessary that in a democracy (dominated by the rule of the will of the majority) **to respect the Orthodox identity of the majority of that country.** See Madalina Virginia Antonescu - *Biometrics, human freedom, human dignity, at the beginning of the XXI century*, in *Perspectives of security and defense in Europe*, Vol IV, Session of scientific communications with international participation, 19-20 November 2009, Bucharest, UNAP, Ed UNAP, Bucharest, 2009, p. 186 to 215.

<sup>12</sup> Dan Puric, interview “*We are a suffering nation that must learn to lift up to Christian dignity in the name of Christ*”, interview by Stelian Gombos, journal *Geopolitics*, year VII, no. 31, special issue *Romania between empires*, p. 17-29.

<sup>13</sup> Article 3 / TEU as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, paragraph 3. The obligation of loyal cooperation that the member states have to the EU must not be interpreted under any circumstances as obliging the Member States to abandon their historical and national or religious identities for becoming within the EU some areas without a past, memory, history, spirituality and their millennial belief. Any construction that does not respect these traditions of the national being of a Member State is bound to fail.

<sup>14</sup> Dan Puric-*Who we are*, op. cit .. See also Stelian Gombos - *Speaking about church and state - between course and discourse*, col. *Geopolitics*, Ed Top Form, Bucharest, 2009, p. 22-23.

<sup>15</sup> In religious terms, **86.8% of people living in Romania are Orthodox Christian**, 5% Roman Catholic, 1% Greek Catholic, 6% Protestant and Evangelical, 10,000 people of Jewish faith. See Stelian Gombos-op. cit., p. 167, 174.

<sup>16</sup> Among the defining characteristics of Romania, composing its national identity referred to in Art. 3a, paragraph 2/TEU as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, we mention, for a better knowledge by the EU’s decisional level: the historical continuity of public institutions, strong ethnic and religious homogeneity, strong Roman tradition, religious tolerance, robust anti-extremist mentality of the population, sometimes with moderate-conservative accents (**abolishing embarrassing labels like religious fanaticism for those who want to defend their freedom of religion and religious identity**),



authentic European orientation in a democratic, pluralistic era of dialogue and tolerance between faiths and religions. See Stelian Gombos-op. cit., p. 167.

<sup>17</sup> Prof. Dr. Mircea Păcurariu, op. cit.

<sup>18</sup> Romania is **the only country in the world** to deliver a **model of electronic passport** comprising, right from the time of introduction, both identification features, namely facial image and digital impressions. <http://www.mediafax.ro/social>. We believe that **this is not only a willful ignorance but a real challenge to Romania's Orthodox Christian identity, as an EU member state, a community declaring to be democratic.**

<sup>19</sup> **The Romanian Orthodox Church affirms the idea of Orthodox Christianity as a fundamental element of the Romanian soul;** as a result, in a national state by the constitution as Romania, the Romanian Orthodox Church is **regarded as the national church.** ROC is defined as a spiritual, not political factor, interested at the same time in keeping the specific values of the Romanian people. See Stelian Gombos-op. cit., p. 175, 22. **ROC identified throughout the history of this nation with the Romanian people,** fighting with him for the national cause, for its ideals, for its civilization, same as nowadays. In all the polls, **around 90% of the Romanians trust in ROC,** which shows that the Romanians feel they are limbs of this Church and view it as a unity factor, including in the civil society. **Church is formed by the very Orthodox Romanians.** See Stelian Gombos-op. cit., p. 23. **It is therefore inconceivable** for the EU or other organizations, judicial courts of European law or human rights, when involved in a dispute or judging a dispute where the human rights are violated by biometrics, **to disregard these facts**

<sup>20</sup> Several NGOs organized at the Patriarchal Palace in Bucharest, a protest by which they expressed their dissatisfaction with the mandatory introduction of chips within acts and also with the Law 298 of 2008. According to the opinion of the persons taking part in the protest, the **mandatory introduction** of biometric chips in all identity documents **is contrary to Article 23 of the Constitution** which provides that "the individual freedom and security of person are inviolable" and also Article 29 which states that "the freedom of thought, opinion, and religion can not be restricted in any way." From January 1, the state made mandatory the application on the identity documents of Romanians of a wireless identification device, a chip containing biometric personal details and other data, including digital fingerprints. "Without any

public debate, the Romanians are marked as cattle, with a chip that will monitor their activity, placed, for the time being, on the so-called biometric passports and driving licenses, and in the near future including the ID cards", a press release of the organizers stated; 1 Feb. 2009, <http://www.mediafax.ro/social>.

<sup>21</sup> According to the Government Emergency Ordinance no. 94/2008 *for the establishment of measures on issuing electronic passports as well as producing other travel documents*, personalization of the **electronic passports** is done by the Sole National Center for Customization of Electronic Passports, which operates in the structure of General Directorate of Passports of MAI. Under the same **legislation**, the blank passports are produced by the National Printing House - National Company December 31. 2008 <http://www.mediafax.ro/social>

<sup>22</sup> As of December 31, 2008, Romania, as an **EU member state**, issues electronic passports in accordance with Council Regulation no. 2.252/2004 *on standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States* <http://www.mediafax.ro/social/pasapoartele-biometrice-avizate-de-comisia-de-aparare-din-camera-3891638>

<sup>23</sup> This measure is to be one of the stages for accessing the Schengen area in 2011 and to comply with EC Regulation no. 2.252/2004 *on standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States*. By this act with 18 additional security features the fact that Romania could join the Visa Waiver Program is thus justified, [http://www.financiarul.com/articol\\_21105/pasapoartele-biometrice-de-trei-ori-mai-scumpe-decat-cele-normale.html](http://www.financiarul.com/articol_21105/pasapoartele-biometrice-de-trei-ori-mai-scumpe-decat-cele-normale.html). But, we believe that accessing the Schengen area or any other space does not justify a renunciation of the Christian Orthodox national identity of the Romanians as in case of issuing biometric passports. **Incompatibility between biometrics and Christian religious identity, as well as the expression and the very existence of religious freedom is clear, unequivocal and can not be maintained by acts of European law, even integration ones, if the EU is considered a democratic community of states that respect the human rights on populations living in these countries.** EU has **no competence** on the issuance of acts of European law in **areas directly relating to the national identity of a Member State** as in case of the intrinsic relation between identity papers or passports and the Orthodox national identity. The issuance of passports, identity acts, before relating to the CPJP space, is an activity that must take account



of **the national identity of that state**, a domain where the EU has no power of decision.

<sup>24</sup> Signed by Romania on December 14, 1955, when, by R 955 (X) of the UN General Assembly, was admitted among the Member States.

<sup>25</sup> Several NGOs, including “Justice and Truth”, “Civic Media”, Association for protection of public freedoms, have argued before the Court of Appeal, that the ordinance concerning the **introduction of biometric passports** violates rights of the Romanian Constitution, such as **the right to privacy and the right to religion**. The challengers of the ordinance have also argued that **the government did not publicly announce such legislation and did not subject it to public debate, with the intention that through this decision to meet the EU requirements without taking account of the Romanian public opinion**. Another lawyer indicated that “placing chips on passports affects the **right to religion**, as makes a name given by God in a number”. The lawyer also revealed that this is “**a warning**” whereas it **seeks abduction of the human freedom through measures of monitoring and control**. <http://www.mediafax.ro/social/ordonanta-privind-pasapoartele-biometrice-merge-inainte-video-3944786>.

**The ordinance concerning the introduction of biometric passports is still applicable after the Court of Appeal of Bucharest rejected the request of several NGOs to suspend the effects of that legislation**. So, inexplicably, we say, the Court of Appeal decided to not suspend the national legislative act from being applied, **although it clearly violates the freedom of religion and other fundamental human freedoms in their essence as well as the international treaties to which Romania adhered and that precede over the national law as well as the Treaty of Lisbon**. Given this decision of the Court of Appeals, we consider that the Romanian court should have taken into account all arguments on human rights, which we exposed above as well as **the obligations of the Romanian authorities to the rules on human rights which have priority in the national law (including to a rule of European law**, in our opinion, having regard to the obligations which the EU itself assumed under the Treaty of Lisbon on human rights matters). The Court of Appeal should have considered the violation of the human rights by biometrics in a **majority Christian Orthodox country**, where there was no public debate, as would have been natural, where a **collective**, not only a personal **damage** of the Orthodox religious identity and freedom of the people in this country existed. **We believe that approaching the court by these NGOs**

**is a perfectly normal in a genuine democratic and European society and that any court should take into account the democratic character of the state and Orthodox national identity of this country, where judging such case, including that the Romanian court should ensure the respect of the freedom of religion as a fundamental human freedom, violated in its very essence by the biometric documents and should not allow the creation of dangerous precedents for the essence of democracy and the state governed by the rule of law.**

<sup>26</sup> Ratified by Romania on October 31, 1974, by Decree no. 212, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 146 of November 20, 1974.

<sup>27</sup> Heterogeneous and demonstrative enumeration, which means **any legal, internal and international rules, fixed by conventional or customary way**. So this is an illustrative listing which also includes, in our opinion, **legal acts of European law, irrespective of their kind**, issued by any of the EU institutions, which **can not be issued in breach of *ius cogens* norms**, the backbone of the international public law and that the EU can not ignore under the pretext that it has an integration character (priority of the rule of European law is not valid in relation to a rule of *ius cogens*).

<sup>28</sup> Through Art. 46 A/TEU, as amended by the treaty of Lisbon.

<sup>29</sup> See Art. 34, new Title II, on the European Court of Human Rights, of the Protocol 11 to the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Convention was ratified by Romania by Law no. 30 of May 18, 1994, published in Official Gazette no. 135 of May 31, 1994. Protocol 11 to the Convention was ratified by Romania by Law no. 79 of July 6, 1995, published in Official Gazette no. 147 of July 13, 1995.

<sup>30</sup> **The Romanian state, under Art. 14 of the Convention, has the express obligation** (including the EU, which was given legal personality by the Treaty of Lisbon and which intends to adhere as such to the ECHR) **to ensure the exercise of the rights and freedoms established by the Convention without distinction** (the non-discrimination principle). So the Romanian state has an express obligation to ensure every human person (not just to the European citizens) by the application in good faith of the principle of non-discrimination

<sup>31</sup> Whereas the Romanian authorities describe the biometric passport **in an attractive way as for a higher possibility to be issued upon request, in comparison with the classic passport** (on the issuing



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## POINT OF VIEWS

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fee and the term of validity) to positively influence the free opinion of the people on the biometric passport and therefore **creating a discrimination between citizens** based on the exercise of the above freedoms. This is accompanied not only by the damage of the exercise of the three freedoms but also of the **very essence of these freedoms by the biometric nature of the passport, specific to the totalitarian societies**, where the emphasis is not placed on protecting the human rights and freedoms of individuals or the citizen but his **tracking, monitoring, marking, which are totally opposed to the genuine democratic basis and the state governed by the rule of law.**

<sup>32</sup> Occupying the supreme position in the hierarchy of European law. Hence, the obligation of complying with the letter and spirit of the Treaty, any European legal acts issued by any of the EU institutions.

<sup>33</sup> Paragraph 3 of Art. 3a/TEU as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon provides that: **the Member States shall adopt any general or particular measure**, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations under the Treaties or resulting from acts of the EU institutions; Member States shall **facilitate** the achievement by the Union of its mission and **refrain from any measure** that could endanger the fulfillment of the objectives of the Union. **But, in our opinion, these two obligations of the Member States can not be interpreted in isolation or absolutely, ie they must be read in conjunction with paragraph 2 of the same article, so with the obligation of the Union to respect the national identities of the Member States** (in this case, the EU must respect an Orthodox national identity of the Romanian state, which the EU can not ignore or back out of, by any act of its institutions). Therefore, **a hierarchy between the EU obligation of paragraph 2, Art.3a/TEU and the obligations of the Member States in paragraph 3, art.3a/TEU can not be created**; these articles should be **harmoniously** interpreted and applied, **so that the Union is not favored to the Member States and vice versa**. Moreover, the entire article 3a/TEU should be interpreted and applied in **good faith** by states and the EU, and **should be permanently linked to the obligations of the Member States and the Union to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms** (whether an EU citizen or not).

<sup>34</sup> TEU and TFEU, the two conventional bases of the new EU, amended and completed by the Treaty of Lisbon.

<sup>35</sup> **Such competence of the EU does not appear in the Treaty of Lisbon (in the list of powers mentioned by the TFEU). Such competence of the Union to act in matters concerning human rights**

**and fundamental freedoms does not appear.** It is **an area that belongs to the sovereign jurisdiction of the Member States, that respects it under the rules of national and international law in force.** As EU members states, the states are required to also comply with the **EU Charter of Fundamental Rights** (which is an act of European law having the same legal value as the EU treaties). They may sue the Union (for issuing legal acts in excess of its jurisdiction also violating the human rights) either on the internal law, where the human rights are incorporated and have precedence over the internal law or on the ECHR system (under the EU obligation to accede to the ECHR) or in the EU judicial system, to the CJEU. We believe that, **after being referred, CJEU can not decline its jurisdiction because it is the case of an excess of jurisdiction committed by the Union through its institutions and an infringement by their acts of the obligations assumed by the Union in the Lisbon Treaty.** CJEU can not prevent a Member State or a natural person on the EU territory **to sue the Union or its institutions for violations of the human rights** (as the EU and its institutions have legal personality, so they can sue and be sued, whether it is a Member State's, the European or the international justice). So, **even if the EU has no authority to regulate on human rights** (here, to give acts of European law, of integration, leading to damages of the human rights by the introduction of biometrics), **the EU has a procedural capacity**, has legal personality, so it can sue and be sued, regardless of the domain and its regulatory powers.

<sup>36</sup> Art 55/Constitution of Romania, according to that the ombudsman function is precisely to defend the rights and freedoms of the natural persons. Art 56/Constitution establishes either a power according to a decision of the authorities or on a request by natural persons who consider to have their rights and freedoms violated.

<sup>37</sup> Art 195/TFEU as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, through which any EU citizen or any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State can address the European Ombudsman through a complaint, made either directly or submitted through a Member of the EP. **The complaint must not contain facts that are already subject to judicial proceedings.** The complaint must relate to the cases of **maladministration in the activity** of the EU institutions (except CJEU, CFI in the exercise of their functions).

<sup>38</sup> On the basis of Art. 125/Constitution of Romania, which guarantees this possibility of appeal given to the persons harmed by **administrative acts issued by the**



**public authorities in Romania** and that violate one of their legitimate rights or their fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution and that are supreme values in the Romanian democratic state. According to Art. 125/Constitution, paragraph 6, the jurisdiction of the administrative courts is also to settle claims of the persons harmed **by ordinances or where appropriate by provisions of ordinances declared as unconstitutional.**

<sup>39</sup> Specimen of declaration that may be submitted by any person wanting a classic passport, to the competent state authorities in Romania, without the possibility to be rejected by them. Otherwise, a violation of the Constitution occurs **while the silence, the refusal to issue or indefinitely renew the classic passport** (due to fundamental human freedoms, in this case freedom of religion, thought, opinion invoked) **leads to challenging the administrative authority in administrative litigation**, with the use of **the means of appeal stated above**, while the state authorities can not invoke the character of integration of the European law to relativize, infringe or restrict such fundamental human rights.

<sup>40</sup> There is no need to mention the Romanian or European citizenship or both because what matters in this kind of declaration is the legal capacity of human persons living in the Union and nothing more (due to the universality of the human rights matters).

<sup>41</sup> As has been said that the classic passport is temporary, while the biometric one would not be. This means that the classic passport is expected to become obsolete in order to be replaced only by the biometric passport. **Then the abolition of the human fundamental freedoms will occur and the totalitarian drift will be complete, because people will be forced to adopt biometric passports, contrary to their opinions, beliefs, religion.** This will be the clear indication that the Union became a totalitarian power, which fails to meet its own commitments on human rights matters to people living on its territory (in this case, Romania).

<sup>42</sup> For people living in the EU (in this case, in Romania) who are free thinkers, therefore not having reasons to invoke the freedom of religion.

<sup>43</sup> Only one paragraph of the three concerning the three fundamental human freedoms (of opinion, thought, religion) may appear in the declaration, as appropriate, according to the will of the signatory.


<sup>44</sup> Paragraph of the Declaration to be written by people living in Romania as part of a creed or religion that does not allow biometric practices.

<sup>45</sup> So not only temporarily, but for a certain period of time as the Romanian state authorities abusively say. **But permanently, because nobody can be forced to accept a biometric act contrary to his will** (a violation of his individual freedom, which is **inviolable** according to the Art. 23, paragraph 1/Constitution).

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# NATIONAL IMPERIALISMS: NEOCONSERVATISM AND NEO-EURASIANISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE



The work about to be presented within the following pages, *When Empire Meets Nationalism. Power Politics in the US and Russia*, by Chaudet, Didier; Parmentier, Florent; Pélopidas, Benoît, Ashgate (2009, Farnham, Burlington) appeared also in Romanian translation by the title *Imperiul în oglindă. Strategii de mare putere în Statele Unite și în Rusia* (Cartier Publishing House, 2008) without, however, benefiting of an adequate review in the academic and research environment, a fact which led to an unworthy shading of its scientific qualities. Intending to fill, at least partially, this gap, the present paper is centered upon the description of the general analytical framework proposed by the three authors, focusing mainly on its interdisciplinarity and the niche conceptual constructions for a work belonging, at first site, to the field of geopolitics.

Trough the density and the pertinence of the advanced theoretical frame, the book rises above classical geopolitical analyses, based on cause-effect argumentations in studying the spatial distribution of power and on positivist approaches, calked upon the assertion of a firm distinction between the researcher and the object he is studying, where personal values and subjectivity are perceived as presenting little importance for

the finality of the research. Political ideologies, discourse analysis and the last theoretical tendencies in security studies, all are contributing to the shaping of a complex and, I would add, pioneering research trough the manner in which the ideological resorts of contemporary imperial projects are systematically deconstructed.

In the case of the United States, it's pointed out, the imperial temptation embraces an unusual shape, being polarized between Monroe's doctrine isolationism and global expansion towards surpassing the presumptive national insecurity which some think-tanks from Washington never get tired of inflaming. In other words, an isolationism reached trough global hegemony. The American academic environment from the first years of the Cold War witnessed the appearance of a new way of thinking over the place and the role of the United State within the global security matrix. Neoconservatism emerged in the second half of the 40's, having as predecessors' famous theologians and historians, like Reinhold Niebuhr or Arthur Schlesinger Jr. Animated in the first place by the anticommunist obsession, Niebuhr sustained the necessity of an American foreign policy based on classical conservatism principles, like those exposed by Edmund Burke in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, (cautiousness, moderation, realism), but tempered by liberalist ideas centered on 'the value and the dignity of the individual'<sup>1</sup> – while Schlesinger Jr., taking from Niebuhr the pessimist conception regarding human nature and therefore the inexistence of moral progress, insisted on the United States occupying the central position on the international arena and fulfilling its 'global destiny'. However, one should not forget that, in the case of Niebuhr, conservative values were applicable to the means of American foreign policy, not to the major aim: global preeminence.

As the authors emphasize, one interesting aspect regarding early Neoconservative



movement, known under the name of *Vital Center*, is that it was affiliated to the Democratic Party, consequently claiming a center-leftist perspective over the political specter. And indeed, its members advocated in favor of extending traditional American values – belonging to the classical liberal doctrine – upon the entire world, through the prism of an intellectual and political activity that almost resembled Trotskyism. Unlike classical conservatism, which intrinsically contains a past-ridden tendency, the national values supported by Neoconservatives are oriented towards the present and even the future and could be resumed through the following formula: the pride of being an American in a world vassalized as much as possible. Gradually, once the radical changes experimented by the American society in the 60's and 70's were beginning to take place (the civic awakening of the Afro-Americans, of women, the emergence of hippie counterculture), the Neoconservatives will shift towards the Republican Party, which traditionally represented the right-wing electorate.

The new generation of Neoconservatives was profoundly indebted to the philosophy of Leo Strauss, based on the rediscovery of the virtues of Antiquity like power, honor, prestige – opposed to the modern era equalitarianism, demonetized by being associated to homogenization and social stagnation as a result of smothering the competition spirit, understood as the foundation of any verisimilar progress. Still, Strauss related to politics in an Epicurean way, considering that it is not indicated to maculate his own philosophical preoccupations with the daily activities of managing community affairs; despite the 'master's' position, his followers will use his teaching precisely for political purposes.

Judiciously, the book discusses next the main tenets of Neoconservatism in the field of foreign policy. Those were fervent anticommunism, on one hand, and the massive and unconditional support conferred to Israel's policy in the Middle East, on the other hand. Tel Aviv's assistance (a constant of Neoconservative geopolitics) was not as much a consequence of the Judaic origins of many of the movement's founding members, but of Israel's strategic position as a bridgehead of Western influence within the Middle East. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War entailed a reconfiguration of Neoconservative ideology. Interventionism was now a central element in

the dichotomized international agenda of the Neoconservatives, for which states were simply divided between allies and 'aggressive' ones. Illustrative for the Neoconservative's conception of international phenomena is the well known 'axis of evil' brought into existence by president Bush Jr. in 2002. In the 90's, the movement – mainly recognizable through the *Project for a New American Century* think tank – benefited from the adherence of the Christian Right, but also of the 'neoliberals', another democrat faction which was close to the Republican Party and considers that the United States' economic interests are best served at the global level by a totally free market, released from national government's interventions, a market thus controllable by the interests of some elitist American groups.

Also, very well lightened is the reconstruction of the itinerary of post-Soviet Russia's imperial ideology, namely Neo-Eurasianism (which the authors refer to as Eurasism or Neo-Eurasism). In its classical acception, Eurasianism was shaped in the backwash of the Bolshevik Revolution, especially as a reaction towards it. A part of the Exiled Russian intelligentsia brought once again into attention the problem of Russian cultural and spiritual identity, stating that the Russian ethos is not integrable neither in the European civilizational matrix, nor the Asian one, although it pays tribute to both of them. Trying to overcome this identity split of Russia and with it the classical conflict of Russian intelligentsia between westerners and Slavophiles, those intellectuals affirmed Eurasia as an unique cultural and spiritual entity, placed at the encounter between Europe and Asia, continents and civilizations which they tried to reconcile in a superior, Hegelian synthesis. Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism, ways of thinking matured within the 19<sup>th</sup> century Russian intelligentsia, which was undergoing a rapid process of radicalization – both influenced constitutively Eurasianism, but also left their mark on what was to become Bolshevism.

Denouncing the pernicious influence of the 'Roman-German' culture over Eurasia, these intellectuals pled for the elimination of the historical hostility between Russia and the Islamic world, sustaining that Russian identity was crystallized under the protection of the Mongol *milieu*, tolerant and respectful towards cultural alterity; if it would have had the ill-luck of experiencing European domination, things would have been



highly different. One can affirm therefore that, for the founders of the movement, the Asian dimension of Eurasian identity is somehow more important than its European counterpart, despite the fundamental significance granted to Orthodox Christianity as a defining element of Eurasianism. Marxism, and its communist exacerbation which devastated Russia, represented a corpus of ideas circumscribed to the 'Roman-German' culture and therefore a proof of the harmful within the Eurasian cultural space.<sup>2</sup> Gradually, however, some Eurasianists are starting to declare their sympathies for Stalinism, perceiving it, despite its major shortcomings which were not being overlooked, as a well deserved global affirmation of Eurasia's might. Classical Eurasianism, having as emblematic exponents names belonging to a large variety of scientific preoccupations such as economy (Nikolai Troubetskoy), geography (Piotr Savitski), musicology (Piotr Surcinsky) or theology (Gheorghii Florovski)<sup>3</sup> – will reach its intellectual zenith to the end of the 20's, but will enter a process of evanescence which will culminate with the beginning of the Second World War, when, due to various reasons, the contact between the members of the movement will disappear.

Eurasianist ideas reappear in the Soviet Union at the end of the Brezhnev era and manifest themselves especially during the effervescence of Gorbachevist reformism.

But they put on a different form, rather fascistic, having also a much more pronounced political orientation. Even if in both Eurasianism and Neo-Eurasianism coexist two different and in the same time complementary tendencies, the first being philosophical, axed on theoretical issues, and the last pragmatic, manifesting interest especially for practical, political issues – the period one Neo-Eurasianism's 'gestation', which I called somewhere else pro-Soviet Neo-Eurasianism<sup>4</sup>, brings out a political and militant vine that exceeds by far the cultural propension of the movement's founders.

Oriented towards the desideratum of preserving a crippled ideologically and politically Soviet Union, which was also economically dysfunctional, embryonic Neo-Eurasianism valued the international Soviet posture as an expression of Eurasia's global affirmation, an achievement in respect to which any other arguments became secondary or even negligible.

As pointed out on another occasion, important differences are to be found between classical and Neo-Eurasianism, and they are not at all superficial. The first one is especially a cultural project, because it adopts a defensive attitude towards what it perceives as being the treath of the 'Roman-German' culture. It does not want to confront it in the global arena, but rather be left alone in its isolated geography, penetrated as little as possible and preferably not at all by western values. Neo-Eurasianism, on the other hand, is a geopolitical construct, subsidiary possessing an aggressive ideological mixture oriented towards restoring Eurasia's 'true' position within the inter-civilizational global space. Dughin and its followers vehemently condemn Atlanticism not to isolate in front of its provocations, but to take its place on the international stage.<sup>5</sup> (E.C.)

### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> Reinhold Niebuhr, *Christian Realism and Political Problems*, Fairfield, Augustul M. Kelley Publishers, 1977, p. 71. For an analysis of the way Niebuhr understands the reflection of conservatism and liberalism at the level of American foreign policy from the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, see the whole chapter „The Foreign Policy of American Conservatism and Liberalism”, pp. 53-73.

<sup>2</sup> Vladimir Maximenko, „The Russia-Eurasian Idea (Pax Rossica)”, in *Russian Analytica*, nr. 6, 2005, p. 10.

<sup>3</sup> Paul Dobrescu, Alina Bârgăoanu, *Geopolitica*, SNSPA, București, 2001, 132.

<sup>4</sup> Emanuel Copilaș, „Cultural ideal or geopolitical project? The paradoxes of Eurasianism”, in *Strategic Impact*, nr. 3, 2009, p. 69.

<sup>5</sup> Ibidem, p. 69, 73.



# THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES

JANUARY - MARCH 2010

*In this period, into the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from "Carol I" National Defence University was published the study: "The evolution of security environment, risks, threats and actional elements in the aerospace dimension".*

*As every year, also in 2010, the Centre will be involved into the organization of STRATEGIES XXI annual scientific communication session, Defence and security section, which, this year is entitled: "European security in the economic-financial crisis context", and will take place on April, 15-16. For this activity are to attend specialists from United States of America, The United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Spain, the Moldavian Republic and Ukraine. Information about the session is published on [www.unap.ro](http://www.unap.ro) site.*

*In this year, the Centre will also organize the seminar on the theme "Spatial dimension of security environment", on 28th of May 2010 and the 10th scientific communication session with international participation "The impact of the international relations evolution over the security environment", on 18th-19th of November 2010.*

*Information about Centre's activities will be published on <http://cssas.unap.ro> webpage.*

*Irina CUCU*



## INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

*On selecting the articles there are taken into consideration: the area of the subjects presented in the magazine, the actuality of the topic, its novelty and originality, its scientific content and the adequacy to the editorial norms adopted by the magazine. The article should not contain any party political connotations.*

*The papers' scientific evaluation is done by two scientific experts that are either professors or senior fellow researchers.*

*The article, written in a foreign language (English, French) may have maximum 10-12 pages (6.000 – 7.000 words) and has to be sent both in print and paper, using Times New Roman font, size 12, one line, and the tables and schemes have to be printed separately. The translation into Romanian will be provided by the editor.*

*The text has to be preceded by an abstract which is not to exceed 250 words, both in Romanian and English and not more than 10-12 keywords. The papers have to be signed adding the authors's scientific degree, name, first name, the institution he comes from and have to end with a curriculum vitae, which should include the following elements: a short bio, a list of personal papers, birthyear, birthplace, address, city, postal code, country, telephone, fax, e-mail address, photo in jpeg format.*

*The footnotes are to be included by the end of the article and have to respect the international regulations. Authors can publish only one article by issue.*

*The text has to present an easy structure, using titles (subtitles). The abbreviations will be marked on the text only at their first mention on the text. It is likely to end the papers with some important conclusions regarding the importance of the research.*

*The articles will not use classified information.*

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Issue organizer: Corina VLADU  
Designer: Corina VLADU  
Masterproof: Corina VLADU  
The National Defence University "Carol I" Printing House

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