

ROMANIA
NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY "CAROL I"
CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES



STRATEGIC IMPACT

No. 1 [38]/2011

68-72 Panduri Street, sector 5, Bucharest, Romania

Telephone: (021) 319.56.49; Fax: (021) 319.55.93

E-mail: cssas@unap.ro; Web address: <http://impactstrategic.unap.ro>, <http://cssas.unap.ro>

NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY "CAROL I" PRINTING HOUSE
BUCHAREST, ROMANIA



The Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies' scientific quarterly magazine acknowledged by the National University Research Council as a B+ magazine

STRATEGIC IMPACT

Editorial Board:

Teodor Frunzeti, Professor, Ph.D., chairman

Marius Hanganu, Professor, Ph.D.

Constantin Moștofleu, Senior Researcher, Ph.D.

Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, director, Ph.D. (Institute for Compared Strategy, Paris, France)

John L. Clarke, Professor, Ph.D. (European Centre for Security Studies "George C. Marshall")

Adrian Gheorghe, Professor Eng., Ph.D. (Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia, USA)

Libor Frank, Ph.D. (Institute for Strategic Studies, Defence University, Brno, Czech Republic)

Dario Matika, Ph.D. (Institute for Research and Development of Defence Systems, Zagreb, Croatia)

Ilias Iliopoulos, Professor, Ph.D. (Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia)

Eng. Pavel Necas, Ph.D. (Armed Forces Academy, Liptovsky Mikulas, Slovakia)

Scientific Board:

Mihai Velea, Professor, Ph.D.

Petre Duțu, Senior Researcher, Ph.D.

Alexandra Sarcinschi, Senior Researcher, Ph.D.

Cristian Băhnăreanu, Senior Researcher, Ph.D.

Nicolae Dolghin, Ph.D.

Grigore Alexandrescu, Ph.D.

Richard Stojar, Ph.D.

Andryi Volosyn

Editors:

Constantin Moștofleu, Senior Researcher, Ph.D., editor-in-chief

Cristina Bogzeanu, Research Assistant, deputy editor-in-chief

Mirela Atanasiu, Ph.D.

George Răduică, Ph.D.

The authors are responsible for their articles' content, respecting the provisions of the Law no. 206 from the 27th of May, 2004, regarding the conduct in scientific research.

ISSN 1842-9904 (online edition)



CONTENTS

THE POLITICAL-MILITARY PRESENT

Global problems: the balance of power in the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean Area Teodor FRUNZETI, PhD.....	5
Antimissile shield between past and future Constantin MOȘTOFLEI, PhD.....	17
Considerations on the evolution of the relations between the European Union and the Western Balkan states Gheorghe IORDACHE, PhD, Cristina BOGZEANU.....	25

GEOPOLITICS AND GEOSTRATEGIES ON THE FUTURE'S TRAJECTORY

During all wars the most dangerous enemy was and probable will continue to be from and among us Mihail ORZEAȚĂ, PhD.....	35
Negotiating on Social Space in Afghanistan and Iraq Iulian ALISTAR.....	42

NATO AND EU: POLITICS, STRATEGIES, ACTIONS

Considerations on organized crime in Central and Eastern Europe Marius HANGANU, PhD, Ion CHIORCEA, PhD.....	51
The impact of NATO Summit and of NATO-Russia high-level meeting on their relations Petre DUȚU, PhD., Ioana Valeria ALEXE.....	57
Security implications of NATO and EU enlargement to the Black Sea Gheorghe CALOPĂREANU, PhD.....	63

SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

National Security Strategies of the United States of America from 2002 and 2006: towards more and better security? Pavel NEČAS, PhD, Blažej LIPPAY, René NAD'.....	70
Maritime and fluvial critical infrastructure security Marius HANGANU, PhD.....	79
Considerations of the Airpower importance in the future operational environment Virgil RISTEA.....	85
Critical energy infrastructures – enhancing element of national security Cristian BĂHNĂREANU, PhD.....	92

ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS. EVALUATIONS

Symmetry and asymmetry in International Relations Florian COLDEA, PhD, Liviu Bogdan VLAD, PhD.....	99
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----



STRATEGIC IMPACT

New strategy: heartland or energoland?

Mihai-Ştefan DINU, PhD.....106

Globalization and its effects on economic development

Irina TĂTARU, PhD, Florin JIANU.....113

POINT OF VIEWS

(Geo)political implications of Roma minorities in the European Union. Feseable solution for integration

Ionel STOICA, PhD.....118

The cyberspace protection against terrorism

George RĂDUICĂ, PhD.....126

An analysis of risk factors against the urban security

Mirela ATANASIU, PhD.....128

REVIEWS

The perception of Russia in Romania, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine.....139

CDSSS' AGENDA

The activities of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, January - March 2011

Irina TĂTARU.....141

Instructions for authors.....142



GLOBAL PROBLEMS: THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN AND INDIAN OCEAN AREA

Teodor FRUNZETI, PhD

After 21 years since the end of the Cold War, the balance of power in the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean, as otherwise in the whole world, is evolving, changing under the pressure of countries that have become economically and especially military powerful. The US, China, India and Russia have argued over the status of world powers in the area. All these countries have realized that only relating on all levels, directly and continuously, each can fulfill their aspirations for strong global player recognized by the international community.

Key-words: state; relations; regional power; world power; Sino-American relations; Indo-American relations; military power; USA; China; India; Russia.

1. Preliminary considerations

All the countries in the world have known, know and will know a different evolution from a social, economic, political, military, cultural and environmental point of view. This happens due to significant differences in terms of: *social organization; possession of natural resources, especially, energy resources; population size; political system; organization of the economy; military power.* Outstanding results on all or on most of these plans provide a high international standing status recognized by other non-state actors and international and regional states. According to this status, each state takes a number of roles, both regionally and globally. A high international status is sought by all states that have large and very large resources (human, economic,

financial, natural, especially energetic resources) because these allow them to involve themselves both in an active, responsible and decisive way in maintaining world peace and stability, and sustainable economic and social development.

In all regions of the world we assist, 21 years after the dissolution of the USSR and the disappearance of bipolarity, to important changes in international relations. If within that time, the US was the only major power that has been involved continuously, actively and responsibly in maintaining peace and international stability, today, new countries affirm their wish to play an increasingly important role, more active and constant on stage of the world. Among these states there are, in our view, China and India, on which the attention of other countries, such as USA and Russia, is directed.

Both the US and Russia want to develop relations in all fields with China and India and to attract them on their side. Both China and India have large populations and, therefore, they may represent two major markets for the US and Russian products. Moreover, Russia is working with China within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization¹¹. In turn, the US seeks to develop relations with the two states.

On the other hand, China, one of the countries with strong economic development, and a great military power as well, wishes for its high international status to be recognized and seeks to improve relations with its neighbor India.

In fact, China needs the Western countries and the US to modernize and become tomorrow's great economic power. If the interdependence between



the two countries is a factor of tension, it still makes their cooperation necessary.

China depends on the American consumers in order to support its exports and the US depend on China as their first creditor. In fact, their economies are highly interdependent. The nature, content, level and quality of the relations between the US-China, US-India, China-India, China-Russia, India-Russia and not only will set a different balance of power in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean area in the coming years.

2. The relations between China and the US

2.1. The evolution of the relations between China and the US

The Sino-American relations are historically ambivalent and unstable. In the late 1960's China enters the world stage during the Sino-Soviet ideological schism. After 20 years of quasi-diplomatic nonentity, China is officially recognized by the US which had preferred Taiwan until then, and occupied a prominent place in the UN Security Council. This Sino-American closeness presents a dual reality: *partnership* and *rivalry* – two recurrent and increasingly prominent features of the Sino-American relations; because China is a serious rival with which the US aims to make a privileged partnership, while Beijing seeks a susceptible partnership capable of raising it to the level of rivalry.

After 1989, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Sino-American relations have changed radically. The mentioned event makes the world stop being bipolar and there only remains one superpower – the United States of America. China has never been a great power, but it nourishes hope and ambition to become one². It aspires to be equal to the US and seems indeed to be the only country able to meet this challenge. But China needs for this the Western countries and the US in particular. Regarding the Americans, they are aware that China is a kind of economic „super-Japan” in the making, while it already is a political and military power.

On the other hand, China has all the advantages of becoming a great power: it is an important nuclear power, member of the UN Security Council, the world's most populous country (1.34 billion people), owner of some very important natural

resources and with an unparalleled economic development until today.

Indeed, the Americans are the first to have restored contact with Beijing since November 1989. In January 1990, the US sanctions imposed on China were lifted. This speaks about the fundamental importance of the economic dimension of Sino-American relations, on the one hand, and mutual dependence between the two countries, on the other hand. Indeed, the US fears it will not be the greatest world power anymore. The best way to resist this inexorable movement of history is going through a preferential economic partnership with China. In this regard, President Bill Clinton spoke about a constructive engagement and a strategic partnership³. Today, China is the world's first exporter⁴, the world's second largest holder of foreign currency⁵, the main pole of global growth and despite the Asian crisis it has economic and commercial opportunities that Americans do not want to lose in favor of the Europeans or the Japanese.

Although China is the adept of multipolar and equality among states, it however takes into account the post-Cold War reality: the world is unipolar. Therefore, the modernization policy of Beijing and its security environment depend so much on the US and they should maintain a stable relation with this country. Also, China is the focal point of the US Asian policy and the debate between containment and commitment continues to fuel the American academic and political circles. Being aware of the importance of China on the international scene, George W. Bush appreciated that the Sino-American relations are stable and constructive and are necessary for preserving the US interests, and for maintaining world peace and stability: “China can easily affect the stability of the Asia-Pacific area and because of this affects world's peace and prosperity”⁶. A qualified engagement policy is encouraged in order to manage the emergence of China and to preserve American interests.

President George W. Bush changes the US policy towards China. The latter is no longer seen as a statu-quo power, but a strategic competitor of the US⁷. Indeed, the US is more skeptical both about China's intentions and about the virtues of its policy of commitment, to ensure that China's emergence will not be against the US interests. Therefore, Washington aims to counter what it



THE POLITICAL-MILITARY PRESENT

perceives as the Chinese will to impose regional influence: “among the sustainable national interests of the USA, there is the need to prevent hostile domination of critical areas including the coast of Eastern Asia and stretching from southern Japan to the Bay of Bengal via Australia... In this area, maintaining a stable balance could be a challenge.... There is the possibility for a military competitor that has considerable resources (China) to appear in the region”⁸. The challenge which China represents for the US is old, but the answer was quite different depending on the political nature of the US administration (Democratic or Republican).

However, the attacks of 11 September 2001 forced the US to put the disputes with China in the background. For Beijing, 11th September 2001 represents the advantage of leaving for a time the U.S. lath line. This improvement, then, is rhythmically continued through numerous meetings between the leaders of the two countries. In August 2005, a strategic dialogue is established between China and the US (says Beijing) or the US-China Senior Dialogue (according to Washington). In addition, China is recognized as a “stakeholder”⁹ and is called to be responsible. In March 2005, Condoleezza Rice, in an Asian tour that has not forgotten to include India, goes for a few hours in China; George W. Bush made a visit in November 2005; in April 2006, Hu Jintao is visiting the US, and his visit, as that of Bush, does not offer but less than conclusive results. From a military perspective, Donald Rumsfeld visits China in October 2005. This visit, like all that followed, made by the Chinese and US senior officials confirmed the conservative revival of bilateral military relations. At the beginning of his first term, in a perception of China as a strategic competitor, the Bush administration was not favorable to resume military relations with China: the latter had to be selective and to carry out case by case¹⁰, which interrupted the Sino-military diplomacy of Clinton's years in the US. This activity shows that both countries recognize the central importance of their relation and the need for political and strategic dialogue to avoid any malevolent interpretation of the other's objectives and try to resolve bilateral and international issues that require discussion and cooperation, but which do not hide deep underlying rivalry.

Beijing regretted the leave of the Bush administration with whom they had overall good

relations. The policy of the Bush administration was to avoid any confrontation with China. Even if George W. Bush received Dalai Lama, he came at the opening ceremony of Beijing Olympics. Therefore, China's official newspapers hailed his departure from the White House calling him a “friend of China”¹¹. The Chinese leaders did not know what to expect with the coming of a new administration. Traditionally, they had no confidence in Democrats, who are generally more concerned about human rights issues and their links with trade unions, more sensitive to the impact of Chinese commercial practices on the US labor market.

Since the end of the Cold War and particularly after the arrival of the Obama administration, the definition of the Sino-American relations has become a key to healthy and stable development of relations between the two countries. Since the strategic partnership of the government of Bill Clinton's government to the strategic competition of the George W. Bush government, then to the phase “neither enemy nor friend”, all American governments display an attitude of mistrust towards China. However, it is necessary to clarify the nature of relations between the two countries and enhance mutual strategic trust.

The relations between the US and China will shape the twenty-first century, said US President Barack Obama, in Washington, on 27 July 2010, at the opening of a summit, to persuade China to increase its cooperation¹².

However, China has become the second global economy¹³, its currency and huge trade surpluses are targeted by the new US administration, since coming to power. The Sino-American relations, which are crucial for the world, deteriorated considerably in 2010, causing the concern of the international community, but they have known, since January 2011 a positive change. They will inevitably influence the evolution of global relations. At the same time, the friendship between the two countries is important to their populations.

China and the US have gained considerable importance in all areas and in a manner unprecedented in history; they concentrate 35.3% of the world's population and a third of the world gross domestic product¹⁴.

The Chinese President's visit, in the second half of January 2011, in the US opens the way to



THE POLITICAL-MILITARY PRESENT

build a cooperative partnership based on respect and mutual benefit to promote common interests of both countries and to meet the opportunities and challenges of the 21st century¹⁵. At the same time, this visit seems to enhance the strategic mutual trust and guide the strategic cooperation between the two countries. On this occasion, they discussed politics, economics, technology, humanity and culture.

Both China and the US play a key role in the world and share extensive common interests and important responsibilities. Building a partnership based on respect and mutual benefit is beneficial not only for the people of both countries but also for development and prosperity in the world, for solving global problems and bringing benefit to the rest of the world. Currently, China is “the main world exporter and the greatest producer, its currency reserve exceeding 2.5 trillions of dollars”¹⁶.

The cooperation between China and the US indicates that the world challenges will help promote world peace and security in the world.

The two countries agreed to advance their cooperation: to counter violent extremism; to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and of the means of delivery; to strengthen nuclear safety; to eliminate infectious diseases and hunger; to end extreme poverty; to respond effectively to the problem of climate change; to fight against piracy; to prevent and mitigate natural disasters; to combat transnational crime; to fight against human trafficking.

On the other hand, cooperation in global economic issues will help propel the development and prosperity of the planet.

2.2. China – great military power

Today, China's output growth is evident in at least *two fronts: economically and militarily*. Economically, China has become the second world power¹⁷. From a military point of view, after 1990, the Chinese People's Army has engaged in a doctrinal reform, which marks the progressive disappearance of its mass army. Basically, the People's Liberation Army has gone from a mass army designed for lasting wars on its national territory, to a military institution capable of leading and winning battles of brief strong intensity where

it is necessary against high tech opponents. The goals to be achieved are:

- *reducing the staff*. Regarding staffing, the Chinese army was composed, in 2005, of 2.3 million people, compared with 5.5 million people, in the 1940s¹⁸;
- *making of military units formed of professionals*;
- *investment in evolved technological weaponry*. Presently, China has started to produce advanced weapons and its military-industrial complex is the most developed sector. In this area, China is working with Russia, Ukraine, France and Israel and has conducted weapon programs with Pakistan¹⁹.

China is modernizing and developing its army in order to achieve certain objectives. Among these are: deterring of superpowers to attack it militarily; forming an army strong enough to intervene in its border states in case of need; power to fight against separatism; possess a stronger arsenal than that of the US²⁰. Nonetheless, in a nuclear era, a confrontation between the American armed forces and the Chinese ones is little probable²¹.

Of course, the Chinese army participates in multilateral peacekeeping operations under the UN flag in Lebanon, Haiti, and Sudan. But this does not mean that any risk has disappeared, when the military balance has changed in favor of continental China against Taiwan. In addition, the rise in power of China also occurred in the border area with India. At the same time, insufficient transparency, especially, in matters of doctrine and military capabilities, risks to create a negative perception of China's intentions, as pointed out by many Western experts²².

From a military perspective, it is true, the effort is enormous, even if China's military spending remains in terms of GDP percentage, much lower than that of the US. But after the US estimates from 1996 to 2008, China's military budget has increased by 12.9% per year, i.e. a higher rate than that of the economic growth²³. According to the Pentagon, Chinese military expenditures in 2008 were between 105-150 billion dollars.

Strengthening military capabilities of forces covered all categories. The first increase is around 25% of its nuclear arsenal, which however remains very far after those of the US and Russia (which represent approximately 96% of the total worldwide 23,360 nuclear weapons)²⁴. According



to the quoted sources, China has about 240 weapons, which classifies it between the nuclear powers like France and Britain.

Today, China clearly aspires to become a world power on all levels. Although it is an economic giant, it is militarily inferior to its American competitor, which the latter does not forget to remind China, by interposing between it and Taiwan and blocking its access to the Pacific. US military power remains a major argument of the supremacy of their world, and China's ability to put them in disarray goes from asserting its own power. However, it seems that it has chosen, along with its military modernization, a strategy of avoiding confrontation.

Indeed, according to numerous reports emanating from the US government services, China will develop capabilities that will allow asymmetric warfare, in case of conflict with the US to counter superior US armed forces, and that by exploiting their vulnerabilities, especially their dependence on communication systems. Objectives include anti-satellite missiles and laser weapons, electromagnetic weapons, or attacks on computer networks. Their reason of being is to neutralize their opponent's communications in a critical moment, making them unable to operate and allowing an army technologically inferior to restore balance.

On 11 January 2007, China's voluntary destruction of one of its weather satellites by a ballistic missile sounds like a warning. Several months earlier, an American spy satellite had been temporarily neutralized by a Chinese laser²⁵. These events remind the vulnerability of navigation and communication of the systems in space and, by extension, to the weapons that depend on such systems, threatening, in case of attack, these systems to be neutralized and unable to work. Moreover, this boosts the vital importance of considering this area as a new potential battleground for future confrontations.

The military and civilian computer networks are other vectors of asymmetric attack and are future battlefields considered by China. Beyond espionage, they may be the victims of attacks that would make them ineffective in crucial moments. China does not hide its ambitions on a cyber war and constituted for this purpose a structure which as a result was built in the US armed forces also.

Finally, in terms of economic and information warfare, informatics piracy and financial speculators

integrate as key drivers of future wars. This is proof that China takes into account all possibilities of attack in order to exploit the opponent's weaknesses, including those directed against the economic and financial system. Moreover, during the financial crisis, US financial institutions banned the sale on open financial markets. Beyond the invoked reasons, namely to prevent speculation based on a rate reduction to limit, could hide a safeguard against a hostile power to take advantage of the crisis to precipitate the collapse of the American system. However, China has huge reserves of dollars. But what strategic interests could China have in promoting such a specific type of weapon? Beyond the tactical aspect, that of deterrence is the most strategic, because these weapons aimed at the two main policy tools of American power, namely its financial system and its armed forces. Indeed, even attacks directed against the American system could have disastrous results, as the recent financial crisis has showed.

The strategy of asymmetric conflicts arises from China's power politics, planned and constructed for nearly 20 years on the long term. Qualified as peaceful emergence, this policy moves in a first time by using the economic development benefits of the globalized capitalist economy. To guarantee economic prosperity, China's interest is to avoid a direct conflict with the U.S., at least for the moment.

3. The relations between China and Russia

Since the end of the Cold War, the relations between China and Russia have been marked by an unprecedented revival. This burst continues to accelerate both in terms of politics and in terms of economy, military and energy²⁶.

Indicators of the deepening of political relations between the two countries are numerous. A closeness takes shape on sovereignty issues (for instance, in relation to the sovereignty of Chechnya and Taiwan), on human rights issues (common intention to affirm the principle of noninterference in internal affairs) and, also of more or less coordinated policy in Central Asia.

Moreover, *the strategic factors are central*, especially, in terms of intention of showing that a multipolar world exists, where the American hyper-power would be rebalanced by the other powers. This strategic convergence is actually



affecting the Chinese and Russian policies on the major international cases, such as: North Korean and Iranian nuclear issue, Middle East and Africa crisis, antimissile defence in Europe and Asia, the independence of Kosovo. All this assume the Sino-Russian military cooperation.

The economic relations, although secondary in relation with the commerce that both the US and EU have, have rapidly developed, being stimulated especially through the rapid growth of Russian energetic trades made in China. Thus, the first sectors in which Russia and China cooperate are: energy, weapons and commerce. The complementarity of the two countries that exists in the energy area is the core of the cooperation between Russia and China. Indeed, on the one hand Russia has huge resources, whose exploitation is vital for its economic development, while China, whose resources are not enough to nurture its increasing energy need requested by its economic development and demographic reality, has been forced to import more and more since 1993. Russia has important oil and gas reserves. For instance, in 2001, Russia was the second world oil provider (348 million tones), and second world gas provider (542.2 billion cubic meters)²⁷. In comparison, China's energy situation is complementary. With 22% of the world's total population and a powerful economic raise, its need will increase. In 2002, China was consuming 231.9 million tones of oil which means a third of the world's consumption, which placed it behind Japan and the US²⁸. Between 2001 and 2002, Chinese oil imports increased, on average, with 74%, going from 40 million to 70 million tones.

Currently, trades between Russia and China worth about 30 billion dollars, while China and India change more than 40 billion dollars on goods²⁹.

In the relations between China and Russia an important role is played by the issue of the common security environment. „The orange revolutions” have helped highlighting the interest community between Moscow and Beijing. After the decay of USSR, China got anxious seeing that the new central-Asian republics were establishing connections with NATO, which lead to the expansion of the US influence in the area. For China, this meant a true offensive of external forces in order to control regional security. Also, it was an ideological threat, linked to the US objective to promote

regime changes. After the terrorist attacks of 11th September 2001, for many Chinese analysts, the US has sought to achieve strategic superiority in Central Asia through military and ideological penetration. Therefore, “the orange revolutions” that took place in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan were the result of an attempt to destabilize, serving as an aim to strengthen the US influence area.

Since 2005, Moscow and Beijing have tried to reduce their differences to better make a common front against the US unilateralism³⁰. By creating the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in 1996, the Russians and the Chinese wanted to build an organization capable of stigmatizing the domination of international relations by the U.S.

The formation of the Russia-China-India triangle is particularly interesting. The attacks of 11 September 2001 have given an important impetus to the idea. Thus, the fight against terrorism is currently the link that keeps the triangle together. Russia shares with China and India the concern over the risks that arise from the Islamic groups on their territory and Russia has similar views in terms of major international issues:

- *Disarmament and mass destruction weapon control.* On principle, Russia and China are both favorable in monitoring the nuclear disarmament. The only fear is the possibility for China to claim its recognition as a superpower on the grounds of its strategic arsenal;

- *Missile defence in Europe and Asia.* Cooperation in this field is obvious through the support that Russia offers to China in terms of its concern towards the Japanese and American cooperation on missile defence systems setting in Asia. The same point of view between the two countries has been highlighted in Russia's fears regarding the development of the American antimissile defence in Europe;

- *Iranian and North-Korean cases.* China and Russia share the same concerns about the military, political and economic evolution in North Korea, showing a particular firm opposition to making nuclear the Korean peninsula. Sino-Russian-Iranian cooperation is articulated around all forms of energy: hydrocarbons and nuclear energy. Chinese rhetoric on the nuclear file is close to Russian rhetoric: opposition to sanctions and turning to military means and the preference for negotiations way;

- *Kosovo.* China and Russia support each other



in terms of secessionism. Russia believes that the international order would be threatened in terms of borders inviolability. In the Kosovo case, the respect for the states' territorial integrity and sovereignty against secession is questioned.

4. Relations between China and India

China and India combined represent more than one third of the world's population. Both countries have had an impressive economic growth in recent decades.

The relations between India and China are complex. They have unsolved legal problems and mutual distrust relations, in spite of a limited policy approach initiated in 1988. There followed a series of mutual visits of senior officials of the two countries in 1991, 1993, 1996, when they signed a series of agreements without solving the central issues, such as: contentious border issues; the Chinese help offered to Pakistan, the question of Tibet; regional rivalry.

At the beginning of this period, New Delhi and Beijing were confronting the potential convergent interests pending a multipolar order, yet they were aware of the differences between them.

Both for China and India, it was about stabilizing their borders and employing a dialogue dynamics for the benefit of their economic security and development, without however giving up the main points. In addition, for Beijing, India is not an important foreign policy issue, since the fall of the USSR, it does not appear as the South Asian bastion of Moscow. Instead, China was still perceived by New Delhi as a major threat to its security, a feeling reinforced by the Chinese-Pakistani relations. Thus, in the onset of post-Cold War years, India feared more China than the latter feared India. This "asymmetry in threats perception"³¹ is an important feature of the Indo-Chinese relationship.

India and China will continue to simultaneously develop and their policies must take into account this reality. The idea of competition and rivalry should not be simplified in a way that would prevent the attempts of establishing certain relations which are rationally determined. There are both challenges and opportunities for the development of the Sino-Indian relations.

Although differences linger on the borders, through joint efforts they can be exceeded. India's

trade with China knows a rapid growth. China is the most important trade partner for approximately 60 billion dollars per year³². India is one of the largest markets for China and for infrastructure projects.

The participation to G20 and the fact of being included in the category of emergent powers – BRIC (Brazil, India, Russia and China) are opportunities for them to work together. Also, a common work ground for both states is to combat terrorism and extremism in a region such as Asia, strengthening maritime security, protecting the environment.

The current relations between the two countries remain polite. Each of them talks about openness and cooperation. The reality is that they are still in a close competition in many areas: ranging from foreign investments, through energy, to natural resources.

5. Relations between India and Russia

For India, the decay of the USSR meant losing its main ally and international isolation, due to serious internal difficulties. Since July 1991, India initiated a policy of internal reforms and, also, a new foreign political reform called „Look East Policy”. However, India is isolated in the region: on the one hand, the other states of South Asia see it as the hegemonic policy and, on the other hand, they are in conflict with Pakistan, since obtaining its independence in 1947. China is the other traditional rival of India since the armed conflict in 1962.

In the recent years, the relations between Russia and India have known a certain growth, without being similar to those prevailing during the USSR period. Thus, the military relations were restored and Russia signed contracts with India, for weapons worth 20 billion dollars³³. In this way, they mostly bought especially helicopters and 126 multifunctional fighter planes worth 10 billion dollars, as well as other types of military equipment.

Trades between India and Russia reached 10 billion dollars in 2010 in comparison with 3 billion in 2005 and their volume is expected to reach about 20 billion dollars in the next 5 years³⁴. Basically, Russia and India have a great potential to enhance their mutual cooperation in fields like high technology, space, energy, nuclear energy,



agriculture, pharmacology, creation of joint ventures.

Therefore, Indian officials believed that the relations between Russia and India have the character of a privileged strategic partnership³⁵.

The relative decline of trade relations and of cooperation between India and Russia is largely due to New Delhi's openness towards other countries, including the US and China above all.

6. Relations between the US and India

The decay of the USSR, Washington's alienation from Pakistan in 1990, the new Indian politics (both internal and external) may appear as factors making India to get closer to the US. However, during this period, India and the US maintain their distance, even more because South Asia is no more than a "strategic detail"³⁶ for Washington. One of the main reasons of keeping this distance resides in the non-proliferation policy led by Washington, another great priority of the American foreign policy from the 70's. The nuclear issue remains the central goal of the Indian policy in Washington and a major threshold of the bilateral relations. The US would like India to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and join the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, thus abandoning its nuclear program, which New Delhi refuses – in their opinion these treaties are instruments that allow major nuclear powers to maintain monopoly and to have such a pressure instrument on the states which do not possess nuclear weapons.

This US move is seen by India as seriously undermining its sovereignty and security. It maintains the historical climate of mutual distrust between the two countries. Likewise, the relations between India and the US are hampered by the fact that the US believes that India and Pakistan are one and the same problem: two proliferating countries, whose relations are conflicting. However, India, which plans to be a democracy that wants to be a regional power, even of the world, can not tolerate being treated on the same level as Pakistan is. Moreover, India regards the years 1995-1996 as a period marked by an American policy favorable to Pakistan.

A first amendment to the Indian policy towards Washington starts, however, based on the onset of Bill Clinton's second term in January 1997.

Senior US representatives visited India, fact that triggers the beginning of a new period of relations between the two countries. Washington has acknowledged the political and strategic necessity and usefulness of giving more importance to India in Asian politics. From the Indian viewpoint, a more positive relation with the US can provide political, economic and strategic advantages: they want to get closer to Washington, but this can not be done at the cost of giving up nuclear option, in a context where, especially, China continues a rapid development and remains at the core of the US Asian policy.

Indeed, to all the above mentioned it is added another major obstacle to the Indo-American relations: the Sino-American relations.

India's perception is that its security position is damaged. India can not accept that its traditional enemy, an acknowledged nuclear power, having an envied international status, participates, next to the US, at maintaining Asian balances, including in South Asia. In this regional framework seen as being risky to its security, India believes that having nuclear weapons is a double advantage: strategic and political. The latter is important because "nuclear weapons are not military weapons. Their logic reveals international politics and world nuclear order... India wants to be an actor and not an object of the world nuclear order"³⁷.

Jaswant Singh says that Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization favor a "nuclear apartheid"³⁸, in the center of which there is the US, in the opinion of New Delhi's officials. This order will meet the Indian requisition of an international acknowledgement of its status as a regional power with global vocation and with its security imperatives. This requisition is even more powerful as India carefully monitors China's growing power and wants to obtain status parity with China and to ensure security on the latter.

On 11th and 13th of May 1998, India conducted nuclear testing. Immediately, Washington imposed, very rapidly, sanctions to India. Paradoxically, despite the severe reactions of Clinton's administration, it had been proved that India's becoming a nuclear country is a factor of rapprochement between Washington and New Delhi. The US government obtained from the Congress to lift the first sanctions on 14th of July 1998. In June 1998, India started the dialogue with



the US and this marked a decisive turn between the two countries.

Also, Clinton's trip to India in March 2000, followed by the one of the Indian prime minister in the US, in September 2000, represented a diplomatic victory for India: it marked a major step for the two countries' rapprochement. The tone of discussions between the two countries has changed since May 1988: India and the US are thought to be "natural allies" and Washington sustains India's role in the stability of the Indian subcontinent – hence its rank of "responsible regional and global power"³⁹.

From 1998 to 2004, the relations between India and the US had seen significant improvement. Thus, in January 2004, it was launched the initiative called *Next Step in the Strategic Partnership* (NSSP). So far, NSSP has not kept its promises: a closer collaboration in the nuclear and civilian space areas; a more developed trade in terms of high technologies; an expanded dialogue on ballistic defence.

The closeness between India and the US has been supported by⁴⁰: 1) continuing to get closer in terms of strategy and diplomacy (joint military maneuvers between different categories of armed forces of both countries; signing an agreement called *open skies*, in January 2005, which allowed any Indian or American company to establish a connection between any cities of the two countries); 2) structural factors of the closeness Indo-American (an economic partnership with a powerful high tech content; the role of the diaspora and student community. Next to economy, the social ties play an important role in terms of closeness between India and the US, firstly, the US Indian diaspora, whose population has doubled in 10 years, to reach 2 million people⁴¹. The legal Indian flow of immigrants is now higher than the Chinese one. Many immigrants come to study computer science, high technologies and more).

Also, the terrorist attacks of 11th September 2001 allowed the Bush administration to make progress in its Indian policy. Thus, they signed the following documents: in January 2004, Next Step for Strategic Partnership (NSSP); in 28 June 2005, an Indo-American defence agreement; Joint Statement, in July 2005; US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, in March 2006. All these talk of a strategic partnership between the US and India. Moreover, the strategic opportunity

that New Delhi represents for Washington could be fully sensed: for the first time, India is mentioned in the Quadrennial Defense Review from 2006, in which this state is presented as a key strategic partner⁴². In addition, following the transformation of the Bureau of South Asian Affairs of the State Department in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs in February 2006, India, by its importance and its ties with Washington, might also strengthen the US project of "greater Central Asia" that impedes the Sino-Russian policy in Central Asia developed within Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). China can not be but anxious for its safety by the changes that reach its flanks to the South and West, where the American presence and influence has strengthened, as well as on the East.

To the extent that it is estimated that India will become the third or fourth world economy by 2030, this country could become the most important strategic partner for the US. Therefore, in the coming years, it will become vital establishing an important bilateral partnership to manage China's major impetus and to encourage, in Asia, a balance of power favorable to India, the US and Asia in its whole. India's success as a democracy also strengthens global freedom and protects the American interests in their whole. In this complex and complicated context, the relations between India and the US will develop both from the wish of these countries which hope, thus, to fulfill a set of economic and security expectations.

Conclusions

The Pacific Ocean area and the Indian Ocean area are very complex in terms of geopolitical factors. Here, there are two of the world's most populated countries, China and India, both with great ambitions of regional and international powers.

China's alert economic development and its ascending evolution as a military power give it the right to aspire to the great status as a world power. In its turn, India has the same aspirations, even though it is not yet a member of the "club of the world's nuclear powers" and it still has to catch up on the economic dimension the distance that separates it from China and the US.

China and India understand that the fulfillment of their aspirations to become great world powers



acknowledged by the international community is possible, on the one hand, through the multilateral collaboration with the US, and, on the other hand, through the collaboration between them. At the same time, the US is fully aware that its role and influence in South-Eastern Asian region depend on the nature, quality and content of the relations with China and India. On the other hand, the relations that the U.S. has with India and, especially with China, can help counter Russian influence in the region. The latter is a member of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and so is China. In addition, both China and India have multiple connections with Russia, either bilateral or within certain regional organizations.

The influence of what is happening between the three countries – the US, China and India – has a stronger impact on the relations between the other two states and/or interests and, therefore, the policy of the third. If on the onset of the Cold War period, the Sino-Indian relation had only little importance in the eyes of the American decision makers, and if Beijing did not raise the issue of the Indo-American relation, at the end of the analyzed period and, without doubt in the future, the attitude of the three capitals (Washington, Beijing and New Delhi) towards the evolution of the links between them will be a positive and dynamic one. However, the influence exerted by each country on the other is unequal. We believe that the Sino-American relation is crucial to the development of relations between the three countries, on the one hand, and to the Asian stability, on the other.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ASTAKHOV, Dimitry, *Inde-Russie: un partenariat stratégique privilégié*, <http://fr.rian.ru/world/20101221/188185984.html>.
2. BECKER, François, *La Chine devient le premier exportateur mondial*, <http://chine.aujourdhuilemonde.com/la-chine-devient-le-premier-exportateur-mondial>.
3. CLEROT, Fabienne, *Vers une tension dans les relations Etats-Unis / Chine ?*, <http://www.affaires-strategiques.info/spip.php?article794>.
4. COHEN, Stephen P., *The United States, India, and Pakistan*, ACDIS Occasional Paper, July 1997.
5. HEINRICH-AGOSTINI, Sophie, *La relation triangulaire entre la Chine, l'Inde et les Etats-Unis* depuis la fin de guerre froide, http://www.africt.org/IMG/pdf/19_Heinrich-Agostini.pdf.
6. HUBERT-RODIER Jacques, *ANALYSE, La puissance militaire chinoise interpelle le monde*, <http://toutsurlachine.blogspot.com/2009/11/analyse-la-puissance-militaire-chinoise.html>.
7. JAFFRELOT, Christophe, *L'Inde, nouvel allié asiatique des Etats-Unis*, <http://www.cairn.info/revue-etudes-2005-10-page-309.htm>.
8. RACHMAN, Gideone, *De data asta e pe buna*, in *Foreign Policy Romania*, January-February 2011.
9. SINGH, Jaswant, *Against nuclear apartheid*, in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. LXXVII, n° 5, September-October 1998.
10. TURBANSKA, Agata, *L'état actuel de la puissance militaire chinoise*, <http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMAnalyse?codeAnalyse=750>.
11. ZOELLICK, Robert B., *Deputy Secretary of State, Whither China: from membership to responsibility?*, Remarks to National Committee on US-China Relations, New York, 21 September 2005.
12. WOLFOWITZ, Paul, *Deputy Secretary of Defense, to Honorable Carl Levin, Chairman, Committee on Armed Service, US Senate, US House of Representatives, Washington, 8 June 2001*.
13. ***, *Chine, États-Unis: partenaires ou rivaux ?*, http://membres.multimania.fr/cyberbobline/le_livre_du_mois.html,
14. ***, *La Chine est désormais la deuxième économie mondiale*, <http://www.liberation.fr/economie/0101652514-la-chine-est-la-deuxieme-economie-mondiale>.
15. ***, *La Chine face à la puissance militaire américaine, une réponse asymétrique*, <http://www.infoguerre.fr/matrices-strategiques/la-chine-face-a-la-puissance-militaire-americaine-une-reponse-asymetrique/>.
16. ***, *Dossier : l'Organisation de Coopération de Shanghai*, http://french.peopledaily.com.cn/french/200308/06/fra20030806_62307.html.
17. ***, *„L'émergence pacifique” de la Chine dans le monde*, <http://www.senat.fr/rap/r05-400/r05-40010.html>.
18. ***, *Les réserves chinoises en devises étrangères représentent 30% du total mondial*, <http://fonzibrain.wordpress.com/2010/02/22/>



les-reserves-chinoises-en-devises-etrangeres-representent-30-du-total-mondial/.

19. Remarks by the President Clinton to the Joint Session of Indian Parliament, New Delhi, 22 mars 2000.

NOTES:

1 File: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, http://french.peopledaily.com.cn/french/200308/06/fra20030806_62307.html.

2 China, U.S.: partners or rivals?, http://membres.multimania.fr/cyberbobline/le_livre_du_mois.html, p. 2.

3 *Ibidem*, p. 3.

4 François BEKER, China becomes the first exporter of the world, <http://chine.aujourdhuilemonde.com/la-chine-devient-le-premier-exportateur-mondial/>.

5 China's reserves in foreign currencies account for 30% of world total, <http://fonzibrain.wordpress.com/2010/02/22/les-reserves-chinoises-en-devises-etrangeres-representent-30-du-total-mondial/>.

6 George W. Bush, Remarks at the Yale University commencement ceremony, New Haven, 27th May 1991, apud. Sophie HEINRICH-AGOSTINI, The triangular relationship among China, India and the United States since the end of cold war at, http://www.afri-ct.org/IMG/pdf/19_Heinrich-Agostini.pdf, p. 295.

7 Cf. Sophie HEINRICH-AGOSTINI, p. 304.

8 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, 30th September. 2001, p. 4, apud. Sophie HEINRICH-AGOSTINI, p.304.

9 Robert B. ZOELLICK, Deputy Secretary of State, Whither China: from membership to responsibility?, Remarks to National Committee on US-China Relations, New York, 21st September 2005.

10 Paul WOLFOWITZ, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to Honorable Carl Levin, Chairman, Committee on Armed Service, US Senate, US House of Representatives, Washington, 8th Juin 2001.

11 Cf. Fabienne CLEROT, Tension in the relations between the United States/China?, <http://www.affaires-strategiques.info/spip.php?article794>, p. 1.

12 Relations between China and the United States, http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relations_entre_la_Chine_et_les_%C3%89tats-Unis.

13 China is now the second largest economy, <http://www.liberation.fr/economie/0101652514-la-chine-est-la-deuxieme-economie-mondiale>.

14 The Relations between the United States of America and China. "The War of Currencies", <http://www.dissertationsgratuites.com/dissertations/Les-Relations-Entre-Les-Etats-Unis-Et/117435.html>.

15 A new guide for Sino-US relations, http://french.beijingreview.com.cn/alaune/txt/2011-01/21/content_327558.htm.

16 Gideone RACHMAN, De data asta e pe bune, in Foreign Policy Romania, January-February 2011, p. 67.

17 See China is now the second largest economy, <http://www.liberation.fr/economie/0101652514-la-chine-est-la-deuxieme-economie-mondiale>.

18 According to The peaceful rise of China in the world, <http://www.senat.fr/rap/r05-400/r05-40010.html>.

19 Agata TURBANSKA, The Current State of Chinese Military Power, <http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMAnalyse?codeAnalyse=750>, p. 2.

20 Agata TURBANSKA, p. 3.

21 Gideone RACHMAN, De data asta e pe bune, in Foreign Policy Romania, January-February 2011, p. 69.

22 Cf. Jacques HUBERT-RODIER, ANALYSIS - The powerful Chinese military challenges the world, <http://toutsurlachine.blogspot.com/2009/11/analyse-la-puissance-militaire-chinoise.html>, p. 1.

23 Cf. Jacques HUBERT-RODIER, p. 1.

24 Cf. Jacques HUBERT-RODIER, p. 1.

25 According to China facing U.S. military power, an asymmetric response, <http://www.infoguerre.fr/matrices-strategiques/la-chine-face-a-la-puissance-militaire-americaine-une-reponse-asymetrique/>, p. 1.

26 China and Russia between differences and distrust, <http://www.irenees.net/en/fiches/documentation/fiche-documentation-616.html>.

27 Sébastien COLIN, The development of border relations between China and Russia <http://www.cerisciencespo.com/publica/etude/etude96.pdf>, p. 6.

28 Sébastien COLIN, p. 6.

29 BRIC. Budding alliances in emerging markets, http://asie21.com/asie/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=283:bric-des-alliances-en-devenir-entre-pays-emergents-lc8&catid=65:generalites&Itemid=115.

30 China and Russia between convergences and distrust, <http://www.irenees.net/en/fiches/documentation/fiche-documentation-616.html>, p. 1.

31 John W. GARVER, Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese threat perceptions, The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. XXV, n° 4, Décembre 2002, pp. 109-134.

32 India/China/Foreign policy. India/China/Competition/Cooperation, <http://www.chineinde.info/blog,les-relations-sino-indiennes-entre-concurrence-et-convergence,1433082.html#suite>, p. 2.

33 The restoration of Russia and India nuclear and military cooperation, <http://inde.aujourdhuilemonde.com/la-russie-et-linde-renforcent-leur-cooperation-nucleaire-et-militaire>, p. 1.

34 Russia-India: 10 billion dollar in trades in 2010, <http://fr.rian.ru/world/20101118/187904959.html>.

35 India-Russia: a privileged strategic partnership, <http://fr.rian.ru/world/20101221/188185984.html>.



THE POLITICAL-MILITARY PRESENT

36 Stephen P. COHEN, The United States, India, and Pakistan, ACDIS Occasional Paper, Juilliet 1997, p. 5.

37 According to Sophie HEINRICH-AGOSTINI, The triangular relation between China, India and US after the end of the Cold War, http://www.afri-ct.org/IMG/pdf/19_Heinrich-Agostini.pdf, p. 298.

38 Jaswant SINGH, Against nuclear apartheid, Foreign Affairs, vol. LXXVII, n° 5, September-October 1998, pp. 41-52.

39 Remarks by the President Clinton to the Joint Session of Indian Parliament, New Delhi, 22nd MArch 2000.

40 Christophe JAFFRELOT, India, the new Asian ally of the US, <http://www.cairn.info/revue-etudes-2005-10-page-309.htm>, pp. 1-6.

41 Christophe JAFFRELOT, p. 7.

42 According to Sophie HEINRICH-AGOSTINI, p. 304.

Lieutenant-General Professor Teodor FRUNZETI (tfrunzeti@unap.ro), PhD, is the rector and commandant of “Carol I” National Defence University. Having one doctorate in military sciences and another one in political sciences, he is a remarkable researcher, author and co-author of numerous books related to military, security and defence topics, and also of over 100 specialty articles.



THE ANTI-MISSILE SHIELD BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE

Constantin MOȘTOFLEI, PhD

The approach of the problematic also known under the metaphoric name of anti-missile shield was made on the basis of two principles: of causality and temporality. The analyzed phenomena and principles were followed on their pursuit cause – effect trail, respectively, were studied from space and time perspective. Starting from the quantitative and qualitative evolution of nuclear weapons, of means used for their transport to the target and the anti-missile defence means, our aim was to find responses to a series of questions as follows: against which missiles, who owns them and what means of defence can be used; what resources suppose the accomplishment and maintenance in function of anti-missile shields; how efficient is the anti-missile shield implementation in the balance of powers and in regional and global security assessment?

Key-words: anti-missile; anti-missile defence; nuclear weapon; intercontinental ballistic missile; powers polarization; regional security; global security.

1. Premises

Nuclear weapons development preoccupied both the USA and USSR. After 15th of July 1945, in Los Alamos Polygon, happened the first nuclear explosion, less than a month, the USA used two atomic bombs and this event determined Japan's surrender and the end of World War II. At the same time, Russians were also working to develop nuclear weapons and the first soviet test was fulfilled on 29th of August or 22nd of September (according to other sources) 1949. The five victorious powers from the World War II and, since 1946, the only permanent members of the

Security Council with veto right were candidate to the nuclear arming race. From the start, were advantaged the USA and USSR, first and second big powers and also the Great Britain (co-participator to the Manhattan Project with the USA; in fact, the British researches started in 1947 and the first test was done in 1952 when they detonated their first atomic bomb). Afterwards, was created the selective club of nuclear weapons' possessors, France (1960) and China (1964) joining it too. Later, other countries as Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea became nuclear powers, Iran being also susceptible of developing this kind of weapons.

The atomic bombardments from Hiroshima and Nagasaki were done by the launch of two nuclear bombs, produced in the United States of America, and using B-29 bombardier. On 6th of August 1945, the atomic bomb known as "Little Boy" was launched over the city of Hiroshima by "Enola Guy" bombardier with a 260 m error and, on 9th of August 1945, over the city of Nagasaki was launched, with 2 kilometers error, the bomb known as "Fat Man". Militarily speaking, probably there were some conclusions marking the future evolutions as regards these means use and counteraction concerning the nuclear charges and the vectors to transport them to the target. We think about the bombardiers' warring, which imposed a lasting and expensive preparation to bombardment aviation's re-deployment of and to assess the air supremacy. Also, were probably regarded other aspects as the relative reduced bombardier speed and the possibility to be pronged along its fly to the target and the psychological effect over the personnel directly involved into attack's effectuation.



Furthermore, we analyzed the anti-missile shield concept from three aspects: nuclear charge, the means used for the transport to the target and the means of anti-missile defence.

2. The nuclear weapon

Some states' nuclear weapon possession changed the power relations especially after the awareness that through its mutual use, the possibility of humanity self-destruction became more obvious. It practically divided the world in two power categories: the two biggest superpowers having the most part of the nuclear weapons and the others. Another result consists in the fact the nuclear superpower avoided a direct war between them. Another result was that the discussions referring to the nuclear weapons control became a continuous process. The decades of speeches about the nuclear weapons had a limited success. There were few agreements restraining the USA and USSR (afterwards, Russian Federation) nuclear arsenals as follows:

- Partial or Limited Test Ban Treaty – PTBT/LTBT signed in 1963 and designed to prohibit the tests of the nuclear armament in the atmosphere, underwater and into the space;

- Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty – NPT signed in 1968 by USA, USSR, Great Britain, France and China and also by other 182 countries. This treaty's goal was to interdict the possession, fabrication or acquisition of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

- Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty – SALT I and SALT II signed in 1972, respectively 1979, by the both superpowers which limited their missile arsenal growth;

- Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement – signed in 1973, provided that the USA and USSR should mutually consult if a nuclear confrontation occurred;

- Threshold Test Ban Treaty – signed in 1974, limited the quantity of nuclear testing to 150 kilotons;

- Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty – INF – signed in 1987, eliminated the ballistic and cruise missiles, nuclear and conventional with intermediary action range;

- Mutual De-targeting Treaty – MDT – signed in 1994, provisioned that the American and Russian missile shall not automatically target each other's

territory in order to eliminate the preconception that the nations are enemies;

- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty – CTBT – signed in 1996 by 180 states, but ratified by only 148 (even USA didn't ratify it), designed to forbid all the nuclear tests in any environments.

In 1991, after the Iron Curtain fell down, in conformity with the project called Global Protection against Limited Strikes – GPALS, the Soviet nuclear threat was replaced with the one of an attack involving utmost 200 nuclear warheads. The system's impact was reduced more along the '90s, concomitantly with the USA attention moving from the weaker Russia's threat toward the ballistic technology proliferation growth among the Asian states with instability potential¹.

The both superpowers signed START I (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks), on 31st of July 1991, at Moscow, entering into force on 5th of December 1994. This replaced SALT agreement (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), signed in 1972 and 1979, by the United States of America and USSR where was provisioned the armament's development limitation. Considered the most ambitious effort of nuclear disarmament from the both superpowers, START I provisioned the American nuclear ogives' number reduction from 9,986 to 8,556 and the Soviet ones' from 10,236 to 6,449. The diminution process was forecasted to last seven years.

On 3rd of January 1993, the American president, George Bush Sr., and the Russian one, Boris Yeltsin, – the former Soviet Union disappeared in December 1991 – signed START II Treaty, provisioning the reduction with two thirds of the American and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals. More precisely, in the seven years after the treaty's entering into force, the total number of nuclear warheads of both signatory parties had to be comprised in-between 3,800 and 4,250 and, on 31st of December 2007, their number had to be comprised in-between 3,000 and 3,500. From this total, the number of missile on submarines, wasn't supposed to exceed 1,750, on 1st of January 2003, while, on this date, land missiles with multiple and independent warheads had to have permanently disappeared from the strategic forces use of these countries. This treaty hasn't entered into force due to the Russian protests against NATO bombardments over Yugoslavia.

Beside START, both countries reduction of




Figure no. 1

strategic nuclear potential is regulated also by the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT or Moscow Treaty), signed in 2002. This provides a limit of 1,700 to 2,200 nuclear warheads mobilized and operational for every state. But, this treaty leaves the possibility to the both states to store up the unused warheads².

On 6th of March 2009, Washington and Moscow engaged to sign in another agreement until the end of 2009 because, on 5th of December 2009, START I expires without the two powers giving closed the negotiations. Therefore, START I provisions were

temporarily prolonged.

At the end of 2009, were retaken the discussions for START and the new form of the Treaty was signed by the American president and the Russian one, on 8th of April 2010, at Prague. The new Treaty, in force for 10 years from the signing date, provides that every signatory party shall reduce, in the following seven years, the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles and their corresponding launchers, of ballistic missiles launched from submarines and their corresponding launchers, of heavy bombardiers, of intercontinental ballistic missile warheads and heavy nuclear armament as follows:

- the limitation to 1,550 of USA and Russia nuclear ogives number, with 74% under the limit provisioned by START I and with 30% less than the maximum limit provisioned in the Moscow Treaty from 2002;
- the limitation to 800 of the launchers on intercontinental ballistic missiles, of the launchers on submarines and bombers equipped with nuclear armament;
- the separate limitation to 700 for the intercontinental ballistic missiles of submarines and bombardiers placed into field.

These limitations reduce to more than a half the restrictions provisioned in START I as regard the strategic nuclear delivery vehicle³. Following the ratification by the USA Senate and the Russian Federal Assembling, the Treaty entered into force on 26th of January 2011.

Presently, there are appreciations that, quantitatively, the situation of nuclear warheads possession as well as regards the strategic means to transport them to target and to the needed distance is conform to the *Figure 1*.

3. Ballistic missiles

If, initially, the nuclear weapon was presented as atomic bomb transported and launched to the target using strategic bombardiers, afterwards, new vector imposed itself: missile – nuclear weapon with one or more nuclear loads (warheads).

The missiles with or without nuclear load can be with ballistic or non-ballistic trajectories. The ballistic missiles represent the missile category which, when the fuel designed for propulsion is consumed after the launch, goes inertial under gravity force and air resistance influence⁴,



inclusively to the upper limit of atmosphere. Such a missile can be launched from the ground, from a missile bunker, from mobile platforms, from submarines or ships and even from an airship. The missiles with non-ballistic carry that can have nuclear warheads evolve on a low height carry in order to avoid their detection by radio-location stations. Moreover, the development of these types of missiles is considered as being more difficult because their speed and range of action are inferior to the ones of intercontinental ballistic missiles, therefore, their interception is, as it was proved in the Iraq conflict, somehow easier (for example, the Tomahawk missiles have 900 km/h speed compared to 20,000 km/h Trident 2 missiles).

As regards their range of action, the ballistic missiles can be classified in:

- Battlefield Short Range Ballistic Missile – BSRBM with a range under 150 km;
- Short Range Ballistic Missile – SRBM, with a range in-between 150 km and 1,000 km;
- Medium Range Ballistic Missile – MRBM with a range in-between 1,000 km and 2,750 km;
- Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile – IRBM with a range in-between 2,750 and 5,000 km;
- Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) with a range over 5,000 km, but using only land launching systems;
- Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), called this way because of their launching way, but not because of their action range which, usually, exceeds 5,000 km².

The threat becomes valid for a country when another state, coalition or alliance even it isn't a possible enemy have or there are premises to have ballistic missiles with a range of action comprising regions of its own territory. The simple fact a state is interested in acquiring ballistic missiles, in producing them on national level, or in perfecting their range of action, their loads increase constitutes a risk factor which, at the end, can transform into threat.

In the world, in the 2002-2005 period of time, were inventoried 32 countries with ballistic missiles with range of action under 150 kilometers at over 5,000 km. Many of these states were part of ex-Soviet area, the former Warsaw Treaty, and others were in the interest areas of the big powers from which they acquired such missiles but without passing to their production on national

scale. In our analysis, we didn't consider the older Scud kind of missiles with the functioning period overdue or about to overdue and also the ones with action range less than 500 km, at least from self-protection reasons, if it would be endowed with nuclear ogives. Therefore, it results that there are 10 countries that have nuclear loads (Iran included) as well as ballistic missiles and their range of action (are excluded the ones launched from submarines, ships or with the help of bombardiers that are the property of the five member states of the UN Security Council) as are represented in Figure no. 1.

Ballistic missiles improvement preoccupied all their possessors. Since the end of the '60s, consequently with the introduction of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle technology, it is possible for a single missile to carry more (2 – 12) nuclear warheads and to assess many targets hitting. Moreover, along the nuclear warheads, the MIRV-type missiles can carry loads creating fake targets for the defender. The direction in which the countries acted and will act in the future, especially, the ones with limited technologic level is represented by the trials to increase the action range for their own ballistic missiles.

The zonal powers as North Korea in the North-Eastern Asia and Iraq in the Middle East have ballistic missiles with short, medium and intermediary range of action and continue to develop their missiles with long range of action.

4. Anti-missile defence

The anti-missile defence represents the action by which somebody designs, realizes and uses means against one opponent's hostile manifestations that can be seen directly as threats but also as preceding forms: risks, dangers, and challenges, presuming the acquisition, fabrication of ballistic missiles or components of them, especially of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological type. The anti-missile defence known more under the anti-missile shield metaphoric name describes, in fact, an anti-ballistic shield designed for missiles' interception with a ballistic carry.

From the perspective of an anti-missile shield construction, security is associated not only to states and state alliances but also to the population and its institutional and technical structures providing



their existence and function disposed into a certain territory against any factors able to affect their normality situation. Here, we regard all the states no matter their size or economic or military power considered individually or as parts of a political-military alliance. Also, security regards the respective countries' inhabitants as a whole or the ones living into a certain geographical area as well as the political, economic, military, infrastructural etc. objectives of strategic importance.

Mainly, the anti-missile shield is constructed against the ballistic missiles in order to counteract their destructive effects in the impact area with the regarded targets. Also, will be regarded the case of those ballistic missiles' interception and their destruction on their travel when their components could damage territories with their afferent population and the objectives of other states situated in-between the launching place and the impact place with the presumed target.

The anti-missile defence supposes that a state is preoccupied to dispose of its own defence means or to benefit of other states or alliances ones, deployed or not on their national territory.

5. Preoccupations for anti-missile systems construction

The preoccupation for anti-missiles systems' design, construction, experimentation and use against the ballistic missiles appeared consequently with the latter's apparition. The principle marking such defence systems development was that their accomplishment has sense as long as an anti-ballistic missile cost is less than the one of the intercontinental missile it has to destroy. The United States of America and the Soviet Union (afterwards Russia) developed programs to intercept the ballistic missiles in the atmospheric space and outside it. There were also interested in developing such anti-ballistic systems Israel, China, India, Taiwan and Japan. By the adoption of NATO Strategic Concept, on the occasion of Lisbon Summit, from 28th-29th of November 2010, the list of the ones interested in the achievement of such a shield is completed with the North-Atlantic Alliance, implicitly, with its member states.

In this sense, the United States of America have many programs⁶:

-Ground-Based Midcourse Defense GMD. This system consists in 30 interceptor-missiles

situated at Fort Greeley, Alaska (26 ground interceptors), and 4 interceptors at the Vandenberg Airbase, California. In order to allow those systems to intercept successfully the enemies' missiles in the median part of their travel, USA use early warning radars placed in Alaska, California, Greenland and in the United Kingdom, radar systems situated on naval basis (Aegis destroyers, Aegis cruisers and radars operating in X rays sub-band) and also a sophisticated command and control infrastructure⁷;

-Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System is developed by U.S. Navy and installed on military ships. This system is an improvement of classical Aegis system and SM3 missile is the descendent of SMI anti-air missile. In the future, the system will be able to be also placed on the ground. This system components (SM3 missile launchers) will be also installed in Romania;

-Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), operational system developed by U.S. Army. THAAD completes Patriot, older American defensive system; still, by contrast, can intercept ballistic missiles at a higher altitude being the only interceptor able to destroy ballistic missiles with medium and short action range inside or outside the terrestrial atmosphere. The anti-missile defence system includes components able to intercept ballistic missiles in all its fly phase inclusively in the first moments of its launching, in the phase when it reaches its maximum altitude or even in the phase when it loses altitude going to the target⁸;

-Boeing YAL-1 Airborne Laser is a laser set on a Boeing 747 airship, developed by the U.S. Air Force and being in its experimental phase;

-Patriot PAC-3 Program is an improvement of the classical Patriot anti-air missile.

In Europe, the USA Administration is determined to implement into NATO framework the European Phased Adaptive Approach – PAA, which was brought into the open in September 2009.

According to the new Approach, under Phase 1 (until 2011), the actual anti-missile systems will be deployed to assess the protection against the ballistic missiles with short and medium range of action. Phase 1 will focus on the protection of some Southern Europe parts using some maritime



ships endowed with Aegis anti-missile systems and some interceptors (Standard Missile-3 Block IA). This first phase will also include outpost radar which, by providing early data, will strengthen Europe's defence and will contribute to the American territory's defensive capability together with Alaska and California basis.

In Phase 2 (until 2015), the American capabilities will be consolidated by the use of an advanced interceptor (Standard Missile-3 Block IB) and some additional sensors. Phase 2 will include SM-3-typed ground interceptors in the Southern Europe together with the ones situated on maritime bases and this will extend the coverage over other NATO allies too.

In Phase 3 (until 2018), the coverage regarding the threat of short and medium range missiles will be improved by the deployment in the Northern Europe of a second ground base with SM-3 interceptors and also by the up-gradation of the existent bases with SM-3 Block IIA (being in the developing phase). These evolutions will lead to the protection of all NATO allies from Europe.

In Phase 4 (until 2020), will start to work a new capability against a potential intercontinental missile launched from the Middle East. This Phase will benefit of another up-gradation of SM-3 interceptor called Block IIB. All the four phases will presume up-gradations of command and control missiles' systems.

USSR developed projects for anti-missile defence since the '60s installing such system around Moscow, in 1971. As regards the negotiations between the two superpowers, the signing, in 1972, of the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty, allowed each party to built only two anti-missile defence systems, one around their capital and one to protect a basis of intercontinental missiles. By the protocol signed two years later, their number was reduced to one, USSR keeping its defence system around Moscow which, afterwards, improved being operational even today. Russia has S-300 type anti-ballistic missiles which, as Russian experts claim, is able to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles and is more efficient than THAAD and Patriot MM-104 American systems designed to bring down short and medium range missiles without warheads basing on the energy of target impact. From the same sources, we found out that Bulgaria already has got many un-modernized S-300 systems. Also, at the end of 2010, Russia got S-400 anti-

missile systems with long range of action with two operational batteries in the Far East to the border with North Korea. The same Russian experts, referring to the anti-missile shield from South-Eastern Europe, advanced a counter offer to set, in Romania and Bulgaria, more modern Russian S-400 and S-500 type anti-missile systems.

Israel was the first country succeeding in constructing at national level a modern anti-ballistic system designed to intercept missiles with short range of action by Arrow system, being operational. The Gulf War experience confirmed Patriot anti-air missiles were efficient against the Scud missiles even if they weren't designed to fulfill such missions.

Japan, after the USA gave the tone, has had among its priorities the endowment with anti-missile defence systems with the declared goal of regarding only the Nippon territory's protection as they won't intercept the missiles launched toward the United States. Declaratively, Japanese authorities justified these efforts by their will to improve country's defence against potential enemies as North Korea. Analyzing what they intended to accomplish until 2010, it results the Japanese system corresponds to a defence including a wide range of missions, from the air-defence to the anti-ballistic defence, into a circular defence but also for punctual objectives. The Japanese placed interceptor, first, on a basis situated to North from Tokyo and, afterwards, on an another basis to the East of capital and followed that until 2010 to be placed around 30 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC) mobile launchers on 10 military bases from all the country's regions able to get down missiles in the last phase of flying. There were forecasted to be done works to allow the deployment and installation of missiles interception equipments in capital's centre too in emergency situations in order to protect financial and political objectives with interceptors with relatively short range, about 20 km, of action.

6. Conclusions

Analyzing the evolution of anti-missile systems, it can be accepted the idea we confront to an inflation of anti-missile shields on the globe. At the basis of this escalation, in our opinion, lie the conclusions of the Report, elaborated by the Pentagon, following the detailed analysis of



Ballistic Missile Defence undergone in March 2009 – January 2010 and brought into the open on 1st of February 2010⁹.

In conformity to the facts stated by the American Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, in the Report's foreword, it is shown that: "United States protection against a possible attack with ballistic missiles is an essential priority for the homeland security. We deal with an emerging threat against our troops, allies and partners". As soon as the respective analysis was made official, the Obama administration acted. It was considered that only Russia and China have the capability to launch an undertaking attack with ballistic missiles over the American territory but this fact is less probable and doesn't represent an objective for the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). As regard Russia, the American administration intends to reach to a military status in accordance with their relation after the Cold War.

USA have begun from area's threats from some powers as North Korea, Iran and Syria which can't be efficiently counteracted by threatening them with a strong American attack but through deterrence policy. We also agree that "deterrence" term is, in Romanian language, more comprehensive, more profound than the discouragement one. Under these circumstances, USA, considering that they could not accomplish a global architecture for anti-missile defence, could be more advantaged by opting in for strengthening of the area's deterrence architecture in regard to its potential adversaries and by basing on the solid relations of cooperation and task-sharing between USA and its allies. From this philosophy, it results some interesting conclusions for the ones more or less directly involved, among which are:

- the principle stating the anti-missile system construction has sense as long as an anti-ballistic missile cost is less than the one of intercontinental missile it has to destroy isn't applicable anymore. In this balance of costs, there are also included the expenses provisioned for the radar systems needed for anti-missile systems function or for the movement of installations from a location to the other, or for accomplishing the interconnection between the relatively compatible technical system;

- the American anti-missile defence regards, outside USA territory, and the territories are deployed its troops, into the alliances or the signed

partnerships frameworks. It results that here there are included NATO's member states' territories, other alliances' territories the USA are part in, as well as other countries the United States have partnerships, too. The needed condition but not compulsory that every one of these countries accepted the American troops deployment;

- the costs necessary to construct and maintain in function the anti-missile defence systems come to USA and allies/partners, in conformity to the tasks settled commonly with the allies or eventual partners.

Near these conclusions, there can be added some more, as follows:

- the simultaneous existence in space and time of two or more technical systems doesn't have real possibilities to combat commonly an attack with ballistic missiles; an eventual cooperation regards only the information over the perceived image concerning the adversary's attack and, perhaps, the decision taken for targets' destruction;

- the proposed solutions to construct the anti-missile shields taking into account the afferent costs, even they have deterrence goals, regard means of potential adversaries with features incompatible to their combating, or they aren't yet part of their endowment;

- the anti-missile shields, wherein there are analyzed the possibility of action over the European territory with ballistic missiles, don't include the real possessors of such means (the five great nuclear powers and Israel), but take into account Iran which doesn't have yet any nuclear load.

The anti-missile shield stepped from the design stage to a concrete materialization. In our opinion, its future depends on the repercussions generated by the global financial crisis affecting also the engaged countries in its accomplishment and also on the disaster from Japan and its consequences.

NOTES:

1 YOUNGS, Tim & TAYLOR, Claire, Ballistic Missile Defence, Research paper 03/28, March 2003, International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library, UK.

2 <http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/principalele-prevederi-ale-tratatelor-de-dezarmare-nucleara-start-i-si-start-ii-5780666>.

3 Ministry of Foreign Relations Press Bulletin, 24.12.2010.

4 YOUNGS, Tim & TAYLOR, Claire, p. 9.



THE POLITICAL-MILITARY PRESENT

- 5 **Ibidem.**
- 6 <http://www.focusblog.ro/2010/02/scutul-anti-whatever/>.
- 7 <http://mihneamaruta.ro/2010/02/07/strategia-anti-racheta-a-pentagonului-ce-trebuie-sa-stim/>.
- 8 http://www.financiarul.com/articol_37353/scutul-antiracheta-din-dobrogea-are-componente-din-programul-razboiul-stelelor.html.
- 9 **See the full text of the Report on** http://www.defense.gov/bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_for%20web.pdf.

Constantin MOȘTOFLEI (c_mostoflei@yahoo.com), PhD, is the Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, from “Carol I” National Defence University.



CONSIDERATIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WESTERN BALKAN STATES

*Gheorghe IORDACHE, PhD
Cristina BOGZEANU*

The present paper sets itself to identify the main evolutions which have taken place in the Western Balkans recently. The analysis is realized by taking into consideration the tendencies which characterized the regional security environment as well as the progresses and the obstacles registered by the states encompassed in this region. At the same time, the cooperation between these countries and the European Union play a central role in this analysis not only because of the proximity of this region, but also due to the increased role assumed by the EU in building a culture of cooperation between the Western-Balkan states, in sustaining them in their way to euro-atlantic integration, in creating the conditions for reconciliation on ethnic issues which have marked their recent destiny. Also, by this article, we want to highlight both the successes and the difficulties in managing disputes, crises and the process of democratization. Under these circumstances, security will be a central issue as, depending on the manner in which these states manage their relations, they could enjoy a higher or lower degree of security. We also set ourselves to pay a special attention to the implications of the opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding Kosovo's status on the regional security environment. This because we consider that the way in which Kosovo and Serbia will choose to negotiate the end of their dispute may trigger major consequences on the security environment in Western Balkans.

Key-words: security; integration; cooperation; progresses; inter-ethnic conflicts; territorial

disputes; crises; regional cooperation; compromise.

1. General considerations

Western Balkan space remains a space of crises, tensions, divisions between states, peoples, ethnics, between verbal declarations and actual attitudes. Although one couldn't speak about the possibility to emerge a new armed conflict between Western Balkan states, similar to the one which marked the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, we could neither speak about a stable and predictable security environment. Of course, all the states in the region are enrolled at a certain extent on the way of democratization and of euro-atlantic integration, which is both the merit of the international community's intervention in ending the wars mentioned above and of the states themselves as they have constantly manifested the aspiration to accomplish an euro-atlantic destiny as the other ex-communist countries.

Nevertheless, analyzing the behavior which these states have one towards the other, towards the actors of the European or international scene or even towards themselves, one could conclude that they are in a transition period, in a moment when the remembrance of recent or ancient history collide with their pro-European ambitions. We refer, of course, to the persistence of the inter-ethnic conflicts which are not developed anymore by means of armed conflict as they have been transposed in the political dimension and in the peoples' mentality. Or, better said, if



we were to focus on the theoretic approach of war, in the peculiar case of the states which once composed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, political objectives are not pursued by armed conflict anymore, but by other power means and instruments. From the point of view of the international relations of these states, of the way in which they behave as actors on the international area, this conflict is materialized by a striking difference between political declarations and actual attitudes. The concessions are often made for the sake of some short-term advantages, without relying on sincerity or on a genuine peace-making attitude. Compromise is often the result of the pressure coming from the outside, especially, from the EU, which can use the lever of integration to get some changes. Basically, the hope of the General Secretary of the Council for Regional Cooperation, Hido Bišćević, that the current economic and financial crisis could be used by the states in this region as an opportunity to develop a culture of cooperation in order to overcome the economic difficulties¹ has materialized only at a very small extent.

What one could notice, as a general evolution tendency of the relations between the Western Balkans states and the EU, is the fact that there is a category of states which, mostly, have a constant evolution towards the ideal of integration and their ethnic dissensions, in spite of their evident existence, may be overcome because the compromise they suppose is not a very ample one. We are speaking, in this case, about Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro. As well, they represent the peculiar part of the Balkans that is clearly enrolled on the way of integration. On the other hand, one also could speak about a series of states in which the ethnic dissensions are much graver and constitute a substantial obstacle in the way of integration. This time, we refer to Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2. Constant evolutions toward integration – Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro

As far as the recent regional evolutions are concerned, there is a range of states which may be considered closer to the ideal of integration such as Croatia, Montenegro and the Former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Among these, Croatia is the most clearly enrolled country on the road of adhesion and its progresses are considered a token of the fact that EU's approach on Western Balkans (the stabilization and association process) is a manner by which the states in the region may be brought closer to adhesion². However, Croatia still has to make progresses in the area of the fight against the corruption and the organized crime, the respect and protection of minorities, the trials for war crimes and the thorough cooperation with the International Crime Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Continuing the fight against the corruption is still on the European Commission's recommendation list, although Croatia is one of the states in which these efforts seem to materialize concretely as it has recently been marked by several arrests of high level officials.

At the same time, one could easily remark the different evolution of the states which, in 2009, achieved NATO membership – Croatia and Albania. Thus, if the first one is at an advanced stage on its road to EU integration, the second one is the first state which, after having applied for adhesion in April 2009, received, in November 2010, a negative opinion from the Commission. As a consequence, Albania hasn't become a candidate country of the EU, keeping its previous status as a potential candidate country. The document elaborated by the European Commission³ analyses the progresses made by Albania relying on the three fundamental criteria – political, economical and of the capacity to assume the membership. It also mentions that, in spite of the progresses registered by this state, Albania has to continue implementing reforms in some key-areas⁴ in order to become a member of the EU.

FYROM is also a candidate country and the perception on its progresses is positive as well. Nevertheless, one of the greatest obstacles for reaching this desideratum is related to finding a solution to the conflict with Greece on the country's name. High level discussions between these states, mediated by the UN, haven't yet resulted in adopting a compromise decision. Thus, besides the negotiation files which are still opened, FYROM also has to strive to build good relations with the neighboring countries and this even more as Greece is already an EU member state. At the same time, another serious problem is represented by corruption.



As far as Montenegro is concerned, the year which has just ended meant, first of all, the year in which it became an EU candidate country⁵, which indicates that it meets the necessary criteria to obtain this status. Yet, one shouldn't omit that integration represents a long term process and implies the implementation of a complex set of reforms meant to create a concordance between the organization and functioning of Montenegro and the European standards.

3. The implications of the opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo's status

One could consider that the most relevant events were registered in the relation between Kosovo and Serbia, on the one hand, and, on the other, in the internal evolutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However the observed of all observers was the relation between Kosovo and Serbia. In this sense, we consider that it is useful to recall that, in February 2008, Kosovo adopted its declaration of independence, which contributed considerably to the exacerbation of the tensions between the two political entities, Serbia considering that "the unilateral declaration of independence"⁶ violates international law's rules. Nonetheless, the act adopted by Kosovo's legislative triggered a wave of recognitions of the new state, being supported inclusively by the US and by many EU member states (from the 27 members of the EU, 22 recognized Kosovo as an independent state). On the other hand, Serbia's position is supported by Russia and China, both permanent members in the UN Security Council, which makes that, as long as these two don't recognize Kosovo as an independent state, it won't become a UN member.

A feature of the new approach of inter-ethnic or inter-state disputes which characterized the relations between Serbia and Kosovo is the fact that their different interests are not promoted or defended by the military instrument of power, but by using the diplomatic one as both states have acted in this sense. The most obvious of these acts is Serbia's solicitation of an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), opinion which was adopted and made public in July 2010. The issue subjected to ICJ analysis was whether "the unilateral declaration of independence by

the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo is in accordance with international law"⁷. Both entities expected the advisory opinion to be in their advantage and to facilitate their road towards the European integration. However, ICJ conclusion – "the adoption of that declaration did not violate any applicable rule of international law"⁸ – seems to have failed in meeting their expectations as the problem of the two regional actors will be resolved within the future bilateral negotiations. This conclusion was very suggestively said to be "a defeat for Serbia but not a victory for Kosovo"⁹. The reason for this was that neither the expectations of Kosovars materialized as they hoped that, after an ICJ positive advisory opinion, their state should enjoy a large number of new recognitions. Although, overall, ICJ advisory opinion is favorable for Kosovo, the negotiations between the two parts turned out to be difficult because ICJ responded precisely to Serbia's question. Yet, the central issue – the balance between states' right of self-determination and the right of the inviolability of national territory integrity – was not addressed. In brief, in order to reach their wish of European integration, Kosovo and Serbia have to identify a way to negotiate their relations. The compromises are difficult to be made in matters of territory, but they are indispensable for ensuring a predictable security climate in the Western Balkans, on the one hand, and, on the other, for enabling the two states to continue their road to European integration. In this respect, it could be useful to mention that one of the fundamental conditions for EU adhesion is the absence of conflicts with the neighboring countries of the candidate state. The case of FYROM which is in a standstill, from this point of view, because of the conflict with Greece on the country's name, could be considered relevant.

ICJ advisory opinion which established that Kosovo's declaration of independence is a legal act has a series of implications for the relations between the two states and, implicitly, for the security environment of the Western Balkans and of the EU. Concluding that Kosovo's act doesn't violate any rule of international law, ICJ re-opens a range of efforts of bi-lateral negotiations which materialize with difficulties because of the reticent, trustless attitudes of the parts and because of the sensibility of the negotiations' subject. The main argument of Kosovo's representatives



THE POLITICAL-MILITARY PRESENT

for the declaration of independence was the fact that Serbia lost its right to govern Kosovo after having violated Kosovo Albanians' human rights. Plus, they consider that Kosovo's independence is an irreversible and definitive act, even arguing that, if Serbia decides not to recognize Kosovo, this issue might give birth to new tensions and even create a new conflict in the region¹⁰. On the other side, Serbia's argumentation was focused on the fact that Kosovo's act violates the rules of international law, especially those referring to the integrity and sovereignty on national territories. At the same time, the respect for human rights was included in this motivation too, but it was approached from another point of view, as the Serbs mentioned that Kosovar Serbs' rights as well as the rights of other non-Albanian minorities are threaten as they have been pressed to move away from Kosovo. Moreover, Serbia also laid emphasis on the fact that Kosovo may represent a dangerous precedent for other regions confronted with secessionist trends¹¹.

As one could remark from the above information, the relation between Kosovo and Serbia is marked by a dispute on territory and minority's rights respect. If we take in consideration Kosovo as a Serbian province, then one could identify an Albanian minority's problem; but, if we consider Kosovo as a state, then we could speak about a problem of the Serb minority which is concentrated in its northern part. Even more, Northern Kosovo was also the scene of the most recent internal security issues caused by the violent acts perpetrated by Kosovar Serb against Albanians or the representatives of international missions, mass media declarations sustaining that EULEX declared this area dangerous for its members.

Additionally, the territorial component of the dispute has also a special importance as, because states treasure their national territory almost fanatically, they rarely tend to accept compromises when it comes about conceding territories in exchange for other recompenses. In the peculiar case of Serbia, one couldn't speak about an economical attachment on Kosovo, but about an attachment founded on ethnic, cultural and historical bases. Serbia's argumentation at the ICJ may be eloquent in this respect – Kosovo is the historical cradle of Serbia and one of the major pillars of its identity¹²; Serbian orthodox

churches¹³ situated on Kosovo's territory were the object of some extremely violent attack which took place in 2004, being, at present, the only cultural monuments in Europe which need international military protection¹⁴. In other words, Kosovo is for Serbia, first of all, an aspect of its national identity. This becomes even more important as the violence of the recent history events of both political entities had a strong ethnic and religious fundament. At the same time, even if the Serb government refused to recognize the "unilateral declaration of independence", now, especially after the ICJ opinion, it seems that the possibility of a mutually agreed independence is under discussion as there are more and more voices wondering about the actual possibility and chances of integrating two million individual that actually hate them¹⁵.

Basically, after a long period of time which confirmed Martti Ahtisaari words – "Belgrade accepts everything but independence and Prishtina nothing less than independence", the two parts seem to make some progresses towards accepting a compromise solution, confirming again Ahtisaari's words – "the reintegration in Serbia is not a viable solution"¹⁶. The affirmation of the UN Special Envoy for the settlement of the future status of Kosovo was based not only on the relation between Serbs and Albanians, marked by mutual hate, lack of trust, which were augmented by the events which took place in the late '90s, but also on the fact that Serbia hasn't governed Kosovo since the end of the war. Plus, Serb governance would be unacceptable for the Kosovar Albanian majority.

If, from Serbian perspective, Kosovo issue is a matter of keeping national identity, of the integrity and sovereignty of the territory, from Kosovar perspective, the declaration of independence represents a natural evolution, justified by the fact that Serbs lost their right to govern Kosovo after having violated Kosovar Albanians' human rights. Even more, the fact that this province is mostly inhabited by Albanian ethnics constitutes another justification. For Kosovars, recent history and the ethnic and religious majority represent enough reasons for creating their own state.

As a consequence, the relation between the two states entered a stage which determines them to negotiate. Nevertheless, the effort to dialogue often comes across the mutual lack of trust. Like in the



case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international community also tends to place the mediation and facilitation of the discussions between the parts under the EU auspices. This happens because of a range of reasons, among which we shall mention:

a) The EU has been a constant presence in Kosovo after the end of the conflict with Serbia. **EULEX** (EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo), a civilian mission developed with the Common Security and Defence Policy, is meant to support Kosovo's authorities in the areas of rule of law, especially, in justice, police and customs and has a mandate until 2012. At the same time, **EU Special Representative in Kosovo** represents an authority through which the EU supports the whole political process, coordinates its entire presence in Kosovo and contributes to the development and consolidation of the respect for human rights. Additionally, **European Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo** is the authority which manages EU's instruments in matters of enlargement, especially the Stabilization and Association Agreement, directs Kosovo's authority in reforms etc. Therefore, one could consider that the EU has built a complex institutional apparatus meant to sustain and guide Kosovo on its way to democratization and European integration.

b) EU integration and accession constitutes a desideratum of both parts. In spite of the decrease of citizens' interest in EU integration, both Serbia and Kosovo are required to have good relations with their neighbors. From this perspective, ending their dispute is a common interest. Because integration is a mutual interest, the EU has the ability to coordinate their evolution; the expression "carrot and stick policy" has been often used to describe EU's levers to contribute to the management of this conflict¹⁷. By the pre-accession instruments held, the EU can pressure the resolution of the situation not only by recompensing a behavior perceived as positive, but also by sanctioning unwished behaviors of Serbia or Kosovo. For now, they have the status of potential candidate countries and their evolution towards the status of candidate countries and then towards full membership is conditioned, among others, by the resolution of their common problem.

c) An EU success in the Western Balkans would also contribute to its confirmation as a relevant international actor, fact which has often been brought in question. This is the reason why,

as soon as ICJ made its advisory opinion public, the Union offered to facilitate the dialogue, to promote cooperation and to obtain progresses in the area of integration for enhancing the quality of people's life¹⁸. Even more, a stable and peaceful security environment in the Western Balkans would also mean more security for EU's member states. At the same time, one could also consider that the Western Balkans have another importance for the European construction. Besides the obvious security component and the confirmation of the EU as a relevant security actor, there are also tokens about another signification of the Western Balkans for the EU – Bernard Kouchner asserted that "EU's foreign policy has begun in the Balkans and it must not fail in the Balkans"¹⁹.

Thus, since the European Council at Thessaloniki, in 2003, the EU has constantly reaffirmed its engagement in sustaining Western Balkan states in the integration process. In June 2010, at Sarajevo, took place an EU-Western Balkan conference which had the same aim. Plus, it also represented an opportunity to recall the necessity to accomplish all the accession criteria. Additionally, beyond this, the same importance is carried by Serbia's attitude regarding the participation in this high-level meeting as it constitutes a clear token on the nature of the obstacles in the way of the negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo. Thus, the Serbs required the respect of their national sovereignty by ensuring that Prishtina delegation would not violate the provisions of the UN Resolution 1244 (1999) (this implied that it should have been accompanied by UN representatives). At the same time, it was also an opportunity for the EU to demonstrate its capacity to find compromise solutions. Thus, the failure of the whole meeting was avoided by the proposition for the meeting to take place in the Gymnich format²⁰, implying that the participants would not be represented by national flags or signs.

Nonetheless, in spite of EU's involvement in building in the Western Balkans self-governing states, in spite of its capacity to use the enlargement policy as a lever to determine the normalization of the relations between Belgrade and Prishtina, one shall also consider a factor which may represent a serious impediment in formulating a coherent and efficient EU approach in this respect – from the 27 member states, only 22 recognized Kosovo



as an independent state. Thus, even if, overall, the EU is one of the international actors which support Kosovo's independence, the fact that Greece, Cyprus, Spain, Romania and Slovakia sustain Serbia's position represents a considerable obstacle in formulating a sole European position, as well as in clarifying the expected results of its involvement in the region. This is also the reason for which, as far as the European declarations are concerned, the expectations are formulated in general terms, requiring just good relations with the neighboring countries.

4. Regional security implications of Kosovo-Serbia bilateral negotiations

The way in which Kosovo-Serbia relations will evaluate will have major implications on the Western Balkan and European security environment. This happens because the regional security environment's characteristics depend on the options that Serbia and Kosovo will adopt after the negotiations. In this respect, we consider International Crisis Group²¹ description to be very useful. According to them, one of the most acute problems in Kosovo-Serbia dissensions is represented by Northern Kosovo, where most of the Kosovar Serbs live. Thus, the parts may choose to stick to the implementation of the Ahtisaari plan, which gives to the Serbs in Northern Kosovo a higher degree of autonomy and control on their domestic affairs²². At the same time, Serb municipalities established by the above mentioned document have financial connection with Serbia and Prishtina has little interference with this zone due to the decentralization process. Yet, one shall note that, even if Northern Kosovo has an increased autonomy inside Kosovo, the issue wouldn't be completely resolved as most Kosovar Serbs would rather live in Serbia than in Kosovo. Additionally, Kosovar Serbs have repeatedly tried to hinder the development and functioning of the newly created state's democratic institutions. Moreover, in this region, violence against Kosovar Albanians or against the representatives of the international missions is not rare and it is a relevant token that one could easily identify nationalist movements inside Kosovo. Therefore, one of the solutions reached by the negotiations may be keeping Northern Kosovo's status as it is mentioned in Ahtisaari's plan.

Another possible result of the future negotiations might be the increase of this zone's autonomy, fact which is already taken into consideration by Kosovo's authorities which sustain that, in exchange for the normalization of the relations with Serbia and for the cease of its opposition to accepting Kosovo in international organizations, they would create a separate police and would give Northern Kosovo's authorities a part of the customs revenues. However, this fact would imply that Serbia recognized the new borders and, even more, Kosovar Serbs themselves disagree this option as they consider it to be just an improved version of Ahtisaari plan.

The third solution on Northern Kosovo is the territorial exchange, which may be the solution with the great destabilizing potential for the Western Balkan security environment. It would imply an exchange of territories between Serbia and Kosovo, by which Northern Kosovo, mostly inhabited by Serbs, would be included in Serbia and Presevo Valley, a region from the East of Serbia inhabited by an Albanian majority, would be included in Kosovo's national territory. This option is also difficult to be accepted by the Serbs as it would imply recognizing Kosovo as an independent state. Additionally, we shall also take into consideration that the increased autonomy of the Northern Kosovo meant not only a greater degree of independence from Prishtina, but also from Belgrade. At the same time, this option is contrary to Prishtina's interests too as it would rather make more efforts to integrate the North within its national territory, because it has an economic and energetic strategic value – Gazivode Lake, built on Ibar River, represents the main source of energy for the plants that supply Prishtina.

We reckon this solution to have the greatest destabilizing potential for the regional security environment because of the existence of other secessionist tendencies in the Western Balkans. We refer, first of all, to Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the officials of the Republic of Srpska have often announced their intention to quit the federation. Even more, because of the increasingly acute internal political crisis, this option, along with the favorable advisory opinion of the ICJ on Kosovo's status, could contribute to the augmentation of the political impasse and to the aggravation of this crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina²³. Moreover, we shall also take into consideration Serbia's attitude



on Bosnia and Herzegovina; while waiting for the ICJ answer, Serbia supported the territorial integrity of Bosnia, as we know it, opposing to the secessionist intentions of the Republic of Srpska, in spite of its cultural and ethnic affinities with it. Under these circumstances, if Serbia and Kosovo reached a compromise, the two entities of the federation would have a good example of the modality in which historical foes may find solutions for a good relation.

At the same time, there are opinions according to which an exchange of territories between Belgrade and Prishtina could determine a new outburst of the inter-ethnic conflict in FYROM²⁴. However, we consider that, in spite of FYROM Albanian minority's discontents, in spite of the incomplete implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, this is a little probable consequence, first of all, because Albania would not support such a movement from the Macedonian Albanians and, then, because they also wish the EU integration.

Overall, if the dispute between Kosovo and Serbia will end with a compromise acceptable by both of them, one could speak about the existence of a positive example in the Balkans, an example which might be followed by the other states too. On the other hand, if the negotiations between them stale or, on the contrary, determine the aggravation of the tensions, then one could speak about a climate of instability in this region. This because, in almost all the states composing the Western Balkans, there is an ethnic minority issue, an issue which was emphasized by the conflicts which led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

In this context, EU's involvement and the success of its actions may be decisive. The integration perspective seems to be attractive for all the Western Balkan states and may represent a consistent stimulus for accepting some compromise solutions.

5. Cross-cut security aspects

Beyond these striking events and trends for the regional security environment, one could also identify a series of common phenomena. Most of them were concluded from the annual reports of the European Commission on the progresses registered by these countries in fulfilling the accession criteria²⁵. It is obvious that all of the Western Balkan states have serious gaps in

good governance and that they are confronted to security risks such as organized crime. Also, another common characteristic of these states is the necessity to continue their cooperation with ICTY.

Good governance continues to be a desideratum to be achieved for the Western Balkan states. Corruption²⁶, especially high-level corruption, represents an acute and actual problem which, on the one hand, hinders the transition of these states towards modern democratic systems or towards self-governing states and, on the other hand, hinders the implementation of the reforms required by the EU accession. In this respect, one could easily note that we are confronted with a vicious circle – high-level corruption, spread in all the sectors from health system to parliaments, constitutes a serious obstacle in developing solid democratic systems, in accordance with the principles of good governance; the permissive character of laws, inadequate investigations of the police, corrupt judges and politicians hinder the implementation of an efficient anti-corruption policy. This problem's resolution before the EU accession is even more important as the recent evolutions have demonstrated to the EU that membership doesn't necessarily equal with the opportunity or the will to solve this endemic issue affecting South-Eastern Europe²⁷.

At the same time, in close connection with this flaw of good governance, there is the problem of organized crime, whose development and evolution is favored by corruption. Thus, 2010 represented a year when the entire Western Balkan political scene was faced to this security risk. In this respect, the case which was paid the largest attention was the report elaborated by Dick Marty on the inhuman treatment and human organ illicit traffic in Kosovo²⁸, although high-level corruption scandals have been a constant feature for all the states in the region. This report's consequences may be even more serious as one of the names mentioned in the report is the one of Kosovo's prime-minister, Hashim Thaqi, accused of fraud, human organ harvesting and drug traffic, which may turn into an obstacle in Kosovo-Serbia negotiations on Kosovo's status. Moreover, these accusations also raise the problem of human rights respect. The grave flaws of good governance as well as the obvious presence of the organized crime risk affect the regional security environment.



Conclusions

In the Western Balkans, one could speak about the lack of trust between the ethnic communities and between states, with difficulties in cooperation, even when they should be united by a common aspiration – the European integration – or by the confrontation with a common problem – the economic and financial crisis. Yet, the future of the states from this region seems to be inside the EU, fact which may be concluded from the declarations of the European officials and of the national authorities. But the moment of adhesion depends on how fast these countries will succeed in overcoming the historical dissensions and good governance flaws.

Western Balkan states are in a period of transition from conflict to dialogue, from raising obstacles in each other's way to constructive critics, from confrontation to cooperation. The driving force of this transformation, of this transition is nevertheless constituted by the international community, which is also passing through a period of transition, as it has renounced to the armed intervention and is now undertaking post-conflict actions, actions of nation building. Also, the instruments which are operationalized are different as one could identify the exertion of soft power in this region. In this regard, EU's "carrot and stick" policy may be eloquent.

International community's intervention is made through the attractiveness exerted on the Western Balkan states by the inclusion within these economic and political inter-governmental, international organizations. Yet the fact that the remembrance of the atrocity of the conflicts that led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia is still alive in these nations' collective memory, ethnic communities' mutual aversion makes this region to have a divided aspect from the perspective of the attitudes between states, between ethnic communities, between official declarations and actual facts; a break between a culture of confrontation and a culture of cooperation which the EU, US, NATO and the other members of the international community are trying to develop in this region. Therefore, for now, the steps taken in the direction of regional cooperation may be considered the result of the international actors' soft power. An example in this sense may be

Srebrenica Declaration of the Serbian president, made in July 2010, by which there are condemned the war crimes committed in this town against the Bosnian population and by which there is reaffirmed Serbia's engagement in cooperating with ICTY for arresting the perpetrators of these crimes. However although Serbia's act was saluted by the international community as an important step taken in the direction of the reconciliation between Western Balkan states and ethnics, it also raised resentfulness in Bosnia and Herzegovina as this act was initially supposed to be a parliamentary resolution, on the one hand, and, on the other, because of the fact that it invites the other parts which participated in the conflict to recognize their war crimes committed against the Serbs²⁹.

Thus, we can conclude that, recently, the Western Balkans have been marked, first of all, by the preoccupation to resolve Kosovo's status issue and its relations with Serbia. Nonetheless, increasing the security by overcoming the mutual lack of trust that characterize the Western Balkan states, by developing regional cooperation, by identifying compromise solutions, by maintaining EU's involvement, by overcoming good governance flaws constitute the coordinates on which Western Balkan security environment has been built.

NOTES

1 Hido BIŠČEVIĆ, *South East Europe at crossroads: facing future challenges together*, in *Crossroads – The Macedonian Foreign Policy Journal*, no. 1/2009, pp. 51-55.

2 According to the European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010-2011, COM (2010) 660 final, p. 16, accessed at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/strategy_paper_2010_en.pdf.

3 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Commission Opinion on Albania's application for membership of the European Union, COM(2010) 680, Brussels, 9.11.2010, accessed at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/al_opinion_2010_en.pdf.

4 Among these, according to the Commission Communication, there are the following: a) ensuring Parliament's proper functioning relying on the



constructive and continuous political dialogue between the political parties; b) the modification of the electoral legislative framework according to OSCE recommendations and the ensuring that the elections are conducted in accordance with the European and international standards; c) taking some essential steps in reforming public administration; d) the consolidation of the rule of law by adopting and implementing a reform strategy in justice; e) the efficient implementation of the strategy and action plan on the fight against the corruption and the removal of the obstacles to investigations; f) enhancing the fight against organized crime based on threat assessment and proactive investigation, on the increase of the cooperation with the other regional actors and with the EU and on a better coordination of the law enforcement agencies; g) adopting concrete measure for enhancing human rights, especially for women, children and Roma and the effective implementation of anti-discrimination policies; h) adopting additional measures for improving the treatment of detainees.

5 The Conclusions of the European Council of 16-17 December 2010, 25th of January 2011, Brussels, p. 3, accessed at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/118578.pdf.

6 This expression is used especially by the Serb authorities in order to underline the fact that Kosovo is part of Serbia's national territory and that the declaration of independence represents a trial to create an "artificial state" inside Serbia. In other words, Serbia considers Kosovo to be an integral part of its national territory, which is under UN administration for the time being.

7 International Court of Justice, *Accordance with the international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo*, 22 July 2010, p. 19, accessed at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf>.

8 *Ibidem*, p. 43.

9 International Crisis Group, *Europe Report no. 206, Kosovo and Serbia after the ICJ Opinion*, 26 August 2010, p. 1.

10 International Court of Justice, *Public Sitting held on Tuesday 1 December 2009, at the Peace Palace on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo*, Verbatim Record, p. 9, accessed at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15712.pdf>.

11 International Court of Justice, *Public Sitting held on Tuesday 1 December 2009, at the Peace Palace on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo*, Verbatim Record, p. 31, accessed at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15710.pdf>.

12 *Ibidem*, p. 32.

13 They constitute another subject for the future

negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo. Due to their cultural and identity relevance for Serbia, it is probable for the Serbs to negotiate at least an extraterritoriality status for them, which shall give them self-governance right (similarly to Vatican). Nevertheless, one shall also take into consideration that these Serb orthodox churches are in those part where the Albanian represent the majority and extraterritoriality, although less offending than Serbia's presence, may attract their hostility and even trigger violent act perpetrated by them. Prishtina's position in this peculiar case is also contrary to Belgrade's position, considering that extraterritoriality may be used by Serb churches and monasteries to extend their territories, leading to the creation of a state within a state. From their perspective, the presence of the international forces which are guarding these churches is sufficient.

14 International Court of Justice, *Public Sitting held on Tuesday 1 December 2009, at the Peace Palace on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo*, Verbatim Record, p. 34, accessed on-line at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15710.pdf>.

15 International Crisis Group, *Europe Report no. 206, Kosovo and Serbia after the ICJ Opinion*, 26 August 2010, p. 4.

16 United Nations, Security Council, *Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo's future status*, S/2007/168, p. 3, accessed at <http://www.unosek.org/docref/report-english.pdf>.

17 See Jovan TEOKAREVIĆ, *Is the EU capable of making Serbs and Albanians finally reconcile?* Opinion, October 2010, European Union Institute for Security Studies, available on-line at http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Is_the_EU_capable_of_making_Serbs_and_Albanians_finally_reconcile.pdf.

18 Declaration by High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the European Union on the ICJ advisory opinion, press release, Brussels, 22 July 2010, 12516/10, available on-line at http://www.eutrio.be/files/bveu/media/documents/07-22_Statement_ICJ_CA_EN.pdf.

19 Speech by Mr. Bernard KOUCHNER, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., 20th of September 2007, available on-line at <http://ambafrance-us.org/spip.php?article662>.

20 Gymnich is the name of a castle in Germany, where the first informal meeting of EU minister was held, in 1974.

21 International Crisis Group, *Europe Report no. 206, Kosovo and Serbia after the ICJ Opinion*, 26 August 2010.

22 United Nations Office, of the Special Envoy for Kosovo, *The Comprehensive proposal for Kosovo*



THE POLITICAL-MILITARY PRESENT

Status Settlement, available on-line at <http://www.unosek.org/docref/020707%20Decentralization-F.doc>.

23 For more details on the causes, the evolution and the implications of the political crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Cristina BOGZEANU, *Bosnia and Herzegovina – political impasse and security issues. Repercussions on the relation with the European Union*, in *Strategic Impact*, no. 3 [36]/2010, pp. 48-61.

24 FYROM was, in 2001, the scene of an armed conflict between Albanian minority's armed forces and the government. This conflict ended by NATO's intervention and the signing of Ohrid Agreement which increased the rights of the Albanians (Albanian became the second official language in FYROM, increased the Albanian minority participation in public institutions, government, armed forces and police) and the Albanian part accepted to give up separatist request. At the same time, the provisions on decentralization are equally important.

25 The reports are available on-line at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2010_en.htm.

26 Corruption was defined as the abuse of public

power in order to achieve some private advantages and the fight against the corruption is looked upon as a key-indicator for the engagement to good governance. For more details, see Sam AGERE, *Promoting Good Governance. Principles, Practices and Perspectives*, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 2000, pp. 6-8.

27 Gordana IGRIC, *Lack of Political Will towards Anticorruption Efforts*, in *Accession of the Western Balkans to the EU*, Workshop held on 11th May 2010, Paris, France, Association Bourgogne Balkans Express, pp. 18-19.

28 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, AS/Jur (2010) 46, 12 December 2010, Committee on legal Affairs and Human Rights, *Inhuman Treatment of People and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo*, Report, Rapporteur: Mr. Dick Marty, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, available on-line at <http://www.assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2010/ajdoc462010prov.pdf>.

29 Jelena OBRADOVIC-WOCHNIK, *Serbia's Srebrenica Declaration: A small step, but in the right direction*, in *ISS Opinion*, European Institute for Security Studies, Paris, August 2010, pp. 2-3.

Colonel Gheorghe IORDACHE (iordache65@yahoo.com) has a PhD in military and information sciences and is head of office within "Carol I" National Defence University.

Cristina BOGZEANU (cristina_bogzeanu@yahoo.com) is a scientific research assistant at the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, at "Carol I" National Defence University.



DURING ALL WARS THE MOST DANGEROUS ENEMY WAS AND PROBABLE WILL CONTINUE TO BE FROM AND AMONG US

Mihail ORZEAȚĂ, PhD

Unconventional confrontations, especially asymmetric ones, no longer have demarcation lines between belligerents.

Internal and terrorist confrontations tend to amplify, as long as the dissatisfaction of a part of states' population related to their own government, caused by the diminishing of the level of life and culture and by the economically unsustainable population growth and the increasing level of illegal immigration.

Armed defense is not the most important part of state's security but it is one of its basic components, this being the reason why it must not be neglected.

Fear of direct and potential enemies has never been a good adviser.

The power of a state is build on the basis of a strong internal cohesion, real and consolidated democracy and of a developed and competitive economy.

Education is one of the ways that could reduce the number and the intensity of conflicts by increasing knowledge and understanding of other people.

Key-words: moral crisis; terrorism; internal enemies; armed defence; security; education.

1. The United States Experience

The 1986 terrorist attack from Oklahoma City involved two American citizens among authors¹. One of them declared that he wanted to kill as many people as he could. After that attack, one analyst had prognosticated that some other American citizens may do such attacks as revenge or in order to get their protest against the government heard.

Officially, the worst terrorist attack from 09/11/2001 against New York's twin towers and the Pentagon was produced by some Muslim terrorists. Some independent investigators raised suspicions about the possible involvement of some American citizens². When I saw those aircraft penetrating the twin towers, I said **the enemy is from us and among us**. This hypothesis was confirmed by the terrorist attack from Fort Hood, Texas, produced by US Army Major Nidan Malik Hasan, on 5th of November 2009³. That tragedy should give us all some food for thinking, not only to the Americans! Neglected weaknesses, negligence or even bad intentions manifested into the process of knowing and evaluating people could have terrible consequences. The tragic event from Fort Hood reopens the issue of people's selection. To avoid unpleasant situations selection has to be permanent and has to include tests for checking people's abilities to deal with extreme situations because that way we can get the right answers about real human qualities. Everybody knows or should know how devastating effects tolerance poses in such domains and situations in which tolerance must not be admitted. The Fort Hood killer seems to be tolerated by his colleagues and superiors despite the fact that he was assessed as a "mediocre student and lazy worker"⁴. Also, medical personnel from Washington's Walter Reed Medical Center, where Major Nidan Malik Hassan worked as psychologist for 6 years, had declared that his behavior was extremely zealously religious and he "met repeatedly with a radical Muslim priest in Yemen, who used to encourage Muslims to kill American military personnel in Iraq"⁵. It is possible for that killer – son of some Palestinian immigrants – to pretend being



discriminated in order to influence his superiors' decision and to avoid sanctions when they drew his attention because of some unaccomplished professional responsibilities or his unfair behavior. It is well known the growing feeling of dissatisfaction against unfair allegations of discrimination because everywhere in this world seems to be considered the logic of "there is not smoke without fire". As a consequence, Hassan's superiors may cease to punish him fearing of being sued for discrimination. As I know, there are situations in which some American officers suffered because of discrimination allegations, although the accusations were not properly proved.

Going back to the point, it is difficult to believe that the killer from Fort Hood is the only one guilty. There are many questions without answers, although the US Army started an inquiry for finding the causes of the tragedy and to take the appropriate measures for eliminating deficiencies that led to that unhappy event. It might be possible for that killer to be the beneficiary of a tolerance that turned, indirectly, against the whole Armed Forces and directly against those unhappy people who paid with their own lives (13 killed) or their own health (30 wounded).

Certainly many people ask themselves: What is the cause of this tragedy? I do not believe that there is a sharp and clear answer for this question. I do not even believe there is a person who can tell us when and why a man decides to kill his fellows. I do remember another similar case to the one from Texas, which took place in the USA too. In that case, a Korean as origin student killed many other students because he felt discriminated and not accepted by his American colleagues. These and many similar other cases seem to confirm the supposition of Francis Fukuyama, according to which immigrants' descendents could become terrorists because they are not able to integrate into the adoptive countries and communities⁶.

Bad treatment supported by the Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib⁷ military prison because of some American military guards would not have been occurred if the ones that produced them had been stopped from the beginning or had been excluded at the right moment from the Armed Forces.

After September 11th 2001, USA adopted *The Patriotic Act*, elaborated the concept of *Homeland Security*⁸ and built the adequate structure for

implementing them. At that time, many people thought and some still think that these legal acts of the Congress are meant to reduce the citizens' rights. In other words, these legal acts are designated to increase government's control over the citizens. Taking these legal acts, the USA wanted to complete its defensive system which was vulnerable against any enemy that could be from the interior not only from the exterior of the country. However, security measures encompassed by the law reduce citizens' liberties through restrictions and ways of surveying and verifying them.

The Fort Hood attack proves, once again, that uncovered breaches still exist inside the defensive system of the USA. It is notably that those breaches exist inside of a part of the system that has the mission to be the first defensive line. Also, the Fort Hood tragedy confirms the prognosis of the former Chief of the Joint Staff of the US Armed Forces – General Myers – who said that "war against terror will be long and harsh".

2. Situation from Ukraine

Like the majority of medium and big dimension countries, Ukraine is composed of more ethnic and religious communities. In the last period of time, some of these communities were stimulated by the world evolution towards democratization and some external groups of interests to express their discontents against Ukrainian political leadership, rising flag of self-determination and even of secession. All these actions were meant to obtain a privileged status or to impose their representative leaders into the country's leadership structures. Disappeared, decreased and covered by the ash of the history, frictions were dug up or invented by different leaders who desire to increase their power, influence and personal welfare. Pretending to represent their ethnic or other type of communities, they try to gain as much as possible supporters using the card of nationalism with extremist flavor. It is a confirmed recipe that brought the expected success to the authoritarian leaders from almost all states confronted with social and political instability, on the basis of developing democracy, preexisting underdeveloped economy or economic decline produced by the world economic and financial crisis.



Within the context of political and social instability, insufficient strengthened democracy and economic recession in Ukraine, we should not be amazed that one of the candidates to presidency elections from last year – namely Sergey Tighilenco – assessed as outsider prior to the first tour, managed to come the third, using a discourse based on the ways to overcome economic crisis and underlined with nationalist-chauvinistic accents. More specifically, Mr. Tighilenco reactivated an old dispute between Ukraine and Romania considering double citizenship for Ukrainian citizens conferred by Romania. He considered that decision as unfriendly and a sign of territorial claims on his country. The former presidential candidate is similar to other officials from neighboring country, out of which a former defense minister is one of the most important. That individual declared that Romania is one of Ukraine's enemies. It is difficult to understand and even to accept these attitudes, within the context of Romania's constant openness for dialog, cooperation and good neighborhood. Perhaps this approach is a new confirmation of understanding international relations, "established" by lord Palmerton of United Kingdom who said that "Great Britain never has permanent friends but only permanent interests"⁹, that is used within the theory of International Relations as "states have never permanent friends but permanent interests." It might be possible for The Hague International Court's decision, considering the continental plateau of the Black Sea, that was in Romania's favor, and the stopped perspective of Ukraine's accession into NATO, that happened during the Bucharest Summit, to weight a lot in shaping the anti-Romanian attitude of some Ukrainian political leaders.

There are several disputes among various communities that form Ukraine's population. These disputes oppose mainly the East and the West of Ukraine on the subjects of NATO accession; contradictions regarding self-determination and usage of Russian language within the administration¹⁰ and the status of the Russian Fleet based on the Sevastopol harbor.¹¹

The above mentioned controversies could amplify or, at best, will not help that much strengthening the political and social stability. If this prognosis will come to effect, then it will be another risk for regional security, added to the already existing ones consisting of hot beds from

Transnistria, Caucasus and Kosovo. We do not desire to have a hostile Ukraine. If Ukraine will decide to be hostile, then it is not recommendable to fall into the trap of directing the majority of the resources – political, diplomatic, economic, financial, social and the one designated for defense – for countering risks and potential threats against Romania. A strong nation is not built on the basis of fear of external adversaries!

3. The situation of Romania

3.1. The economic and financial crisis is a consequence of the moral crisis of the society

It seems to me that an important part of new generation is more or less oriented towards knowing how to impose its requirements than to learn how to produce goods and solutions for nowadays and for our common future. Their teachers are not only the ones from their schools and universities that go on the street for so many times but "the street itself," which is so populated with people who protest against many unpopular decisions. Protesters want to be heard and their request to be solved. It is their right! However, it seems that all of us learnt very well how to protest and it looks like we do not pay the right attention to the others with whom we have to harmonize our rights. Strike is or, at least, it has to be an extreme way of protesting against unfairness in order to make up the minds of those empowered with the right authority to correct it through appropriate measures. Recently, strikes have been chained, especially the "spontaneous" ones having the declared intent to solve some problems. Unfortunately, these actions interfere and alter other citizens' rights – for being transported to their work and back to homes; to receive medical assistance etc –, irrespectively of the fact that they do not have any authority to solve strikers' problems. So what!? Some people want to appear on TV or on journals picture because they might be noticed and could change their position from the protesters rows to the ones that share resources. There are enough precedents and I do not believe that these ways of doing business will stop soon.

Again and again, leadership at all levels of the society looks for people with ideas and enough audacity and strength to implement them. Although there were and there are solutions, just



a few of them were implemented and decision makers use to blame the predecessors from other post-Decembrist governments for “lack of will.”

More and more people are interested by their image built from words – especially at TV. The stimulus like “pretend to work”, used during 1989 Revolution in a TV program, seems to be contagious for more and more fellow countrymen. Everybody wants to have a better salary and a higher level of life but it is decent to report ourselves to both legal and moral common norms. We have “luxury unemployed”, who receive more money than monthly payment for most of the employees who work hard in almost permanent risk conditions and are responsible for the entire society. It does not matter that many ordinary citizens cannot live in decent conditions!

Notorious economist international experts have indicated greed and the lack of foresight as the main causes of the world economic and financial crisis. Despite of these assessments, the diagnosis does not seem to have a strong echo among Romanian citizens. We complain that the budget is insufficient, the economic growth is negative or zero and so many other bad things but the ones empowered with the responsibility to eradicate fiscal evasion we do not see how “private entrepreneurs” sell false financial invoices, trade cigarettes and other smuggled merchandises in markets, at the corners of the streets, into buses etc. and... they have economic growth.

We criticize others but we do not see how the negligence's “garbage” is gathering in our own eyes. We laugh on troubles... to pass the emotional impact and even detach ourselves from undesirable situations, like pushing garbage under the carpet, instead of shacking ourselves from all bad habits that transform us in losers. More than that, our followers and children may became losers too if we continue to live in this style because we are supposed to be their role models.

Do we really care if young generation will curse us for the heritage they will receive? Do we realize that we are guilty for our own future as well as for theirs too?

3.2. God helps us but no more that we are supposed to help ourselves

I continue to sustain that the economic as well as the financial crisis are caused by the moral crisis of our society. Also, the dimensions of the

crisis have been amplified because the chosen approach was the incorrect one. Too many of our fellow countrymen, belonging to all political orientations, engage themselves in personal battles – for positions, privileges, salaries – because they do not understand that finishing crisis is the best solution for everybody. I mean better economy will create better opportunities for all of us. In other words, instead of building a common defense against our common enemy, namely the crisis, we fight against each other and prolong the society's vulnerability, that is to say we have been extending too much and in an impermissible way the negative effects of the economic decline.

Recently, one entrepreneur from wood industry was saying that, even during crisis, he has many contracts and, in order to cover them he asked his employees to work in week-ends. His employees have accepted and everybody is satisfied but with greater efforts. I hope to be wrong, but I feel that many of my fellow countrymen wait for help from the European Union. I am not convinced that the EU will help us more than we are supposed to help ourselves. It does not make any sense and it is against the free competition spirit as well as against free initiative. The Greek's situation is – geographically, temporally and attitudinally – similar to ours. Some EU members offer to buy some uninhabited Greek islands in order to reduce the level of debts. Greek government did not accept and continue to use proper solutions for finding a way out of the crisis. It seems to me that those experts and decision-makers who have negotiated the admission in the EU and NATO have forgotten or neglect the warning given by the officials of the two Euro-Atlantic organizations, during negotiations: “There is no free lunch in this world.”

The end of the economic crisis will be possible when we will rediscover that need teach us or that “God helps but he does not put anything in our bag”. In other words, we will not succeed in our efforts to find a way out of this crisis, unless we help ourselves. I mean to find solutions for fostering morale, for stopping this type of “war” all against all in which we are engaged and to work hard for rebuilding our society and economy.

3.3. Is Defence the Cinderella of our Society?

The decision for acquiring multi-role aircraft that has to replace the old MIG-21 Lancer was



supposed to be taken at least until 2006. This deadline was necessary for creating adequate conditions for a normal transition from MIG-21 Lancer to the new aircraft consisting in training for personnel (pilots, technicians, air traffic controllers; logisticians etc.); preparing infrastructure; taking the appropriate measures for assuring flights safety etc., until the end of lifetime-cycle of the aircraft that will be replaced – 2011 (2012). Prior to the acquisition, the market offers were studied by the experts. Offers' analysis have revealed a budgetary effort of many billion euros, which might spend all defense budgets for several years. Taking into consideration that other services of the Armed Forces were in a similar situation to the Air Force one, that is to say to modernize and replace an important part of their assets, the decision was postponed until the economic conditions will allow this expenditure. There were some prerequisites, announced by the growth of GDP, right before economic recession.

The impact of economic crisis was tough for defense. The defense budget suffered more cuts, especially on the domains of acquisition, investments and modernization. Considering the economic-financial crisis, many politicians ask questions like: Why now? Why so many aircrafts? Why not postponing the decision again? Is the defense a priority? Who would dare to attack us? The answers should be easy to be given by any responsible citizen of this country. In my view, it is less probable to be attacked by somebody but it does not mean that we have to wait until somebody will attack us and then to begin preparing our national defense. If the national defense is not prepared from the peace time, then we will get unprepared into confrontation as our ancestors did in the past.

Going back to the point, in the multi-role aircraft acquisition case, the decision shall not be postponed again! Any postponement is equivalent to disbanding for about 10 years of combat aviation, which is the main discouraging element of the Air Force. The consequences for such undesirable situation are great and some of them cannot be assessed right now because we do not know how our allies will react when Romania will become almost entirely a security consumer. Disbanding of combat aviation will imply impossibility for Romania to defend its air space and for NATO to decide whether to cover our air space with other

allied state forces, as it does for Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Island, Luxembourg and Slovenia. Another solution could be the acceptance of some uncovered parts from NATINADS. Any of the two solutions presented above will lead to an important reduction of our country's credibility within the Euro-Atlantic structures as well as the diminishing of their defensive potential in South-East Europe.

Some speculate on the connections between decisions for acquiring multi-role aircraft and the possible settlement of American antimissile interceptors on Romania's territory. From a technical point of view, there could be identified some logical arguments for this possible inference. More precisely, it is about the necessary compatibility between terrestrial and aerial systems meant to destroy the missiles. One of potential reasons that may lead to associate the settlement of antiballistic shield elements in Romania and the acquisition of multi-role aircraft produced in the USA could be the defensive system built during first Gulf War against SCUD missile launched by Saddam Hussein Armed Forces towards targets of Multinational Coalition and Israel territories. Then, the antiballistic missile system was complex and consisted of Iraq and adjacent air space surveillance subsystem and a subsystem for destroying Iraqi missiles. The air space surveillance subsystem was composed of terrestrial radars, satellites, aircraft for early warning (AWACS) and it has the mission to detect any surface-to-surface missiles launched by the Iraqis. The subsystem for destroying Iraqi missiles consisted of soil to air missiles with antiballistic capabilities – namely PATRIOT –, and fighting aircraft type F-15 and F-16¹².

Another speculations on the strategic partnership strengthening between Romania and USA begun to produce effects – so far negative ones – consisting of SAAB and EUROFIGHTER firms refuse to participate at International Exhibition and Defense Conference – namely Black Sea Defense & Aerospace Exhibition Conference or BSDA – held in Bucharest, in the autumn of 2010. Also, Russian Federation made known its dissatisfaction, not only verbal, for Romanian Defense Supreme Council's decision to accept settlement of antiballistic missile interceptors on our country's territory.



3.4. We do not have to fear of our weaknesses but to know and eliminate them

The experts use to analyze strategic situation and security weaknesses of our state and submit to the decision-makers solutions for eliminate them and to foster national security. There are multiple possible solutions. The wisest is to focus on the elimination of our weaknesses through building those pillars that give force to any nation – political stability, consolidated democracy, prosperous economy, social cohesion and capable armed defense to deter aggressions.

The outrun of the current economic and financial crisis, along with the reach to a level of prosperity for any Romanian citizen, comparable with the ones from developed countries of NATO and EU, will decisively contribute to fostering political stability and increasing of social cohesion. These achievements will implicitly lead to consolidation of Romania's status as promoter of stability and democracy within international relations domain.

As long as a country is internally strong, it does not have to fear of potential enemies, but to face them with wisdom and decisiveness to sustain its national interests. An attitude of fear will be promptly exploited by any adversary once the warlike attitude will generate an escalation of tensions and even an armed conflict because "hatred and misunderstanding give birth to cruel wars"¹³. The openness towards dialog, along with a declared and firmly sustained decision by both the political class and the public opinion to defend national interests will produce a strong restraint effect over any enemy.

There were many situations when great and powerful nations, but undermined by internal tensions such as split between political leadership and people; split among social classes and so on, had to bend against modest adversaries but strong in terms of internal cohesion and nation's morale. The Vietnam case¹⁴ is one of many examples history offer us for studying.

4. What has to be done?

First, terrorism will not be erased from people's minds until hundred millions of human beings who live, in fact survive, with less than one US dollar per day¹⁵ will have the perspective of a decent life. Underdevelopment generates

unemployment, poverty, lack or insufficient and inefficient education and healthcare systems. In these conditions, people get sick and die since they are young, emigrate looking for a better life or enroll into terrorist and international crime organizations. Some of the emigrants end their trip in refugee or asylum camps, being very vulnerable and tempted to enroll into criminal or extremist organizations. Other emigrants are lucky and reach European developed countries or North America and begin a new and normal life.

Second, the massacre's morale from Fort Hood is easy to be stated, but difficult to be implemented: we have to be very careful with unknown people and the ones we do not know enough. This conclusion does not have to lead us to a paranoiac attitude to be suspicious against everybody or to be less cooperative or kind with other people. Simply put, we have to act in accordance with legal as well as common sense norms when we are accompanied by strangers. The wisdom of our ancestors advises us "to clean our cloths inside of the family". It means to solve any dispute among us and to make a very precise distinction between family, organization, community, country's issues and problems and the ones that are common with the others.

Third, education is the most important way for solving existing national, regional, and world problems. It will help people to renounce to their bad habits which will negatively affect them as well as the next generations. Widening his knowledge horizon will allow every person to understand the effects of his and other people's behavior over the environment, over the human interrelations and communities as well.

Through education, people will build and develop their personality and, on this basis, will raise the necessary moral support for fighting against any obstacles and to overreach them. A well educated man has to possess not only knowledge but skills of good professional and moral qualities too. Such a man has to be a good team member who does not run if he meets unavoidable obstacles in our day to day life, he does not leave his community in difficult situations saying or thinking "My country is there where is good for me!"¹⁶ or "Après moi, le déluge! (After me the deluge!)"¹⁷.

Education is "the best weapon" that could defeat terrorists and extremists who base their



concepts on confrontation and on the existing differences between races, sexes, ethnic origins, civilizations and religions. The most prominent part of the confrontation environment is the psychological one and the primary target is people's minds – ordinary, political as well as religious moderate leaders. These people have to understand the advantages of peaceful coexistence within multiethnic, multiracial and multi-religious communities. It is important that “nonviolent activism”¹⁸ would help public opinion to perceive the difference between the life based on permanent confrontation, offered by terrorists and the one in which peace, negotiation and good understanding constitute the basis for solving all individual and collective problems too. Understanding the other instead of “Divide et impera (Divide and lead)”¹⁹ has to be the concept to govern nations and the world. This is the way that could lead to building a culture of good understanding among people and using this culture should allow to build unity in diversity. This old concept could be considered obsolete and even utopist by some people but this is the way for building civilizations melting through peaceful coexistence and acceptance of a common set of humanity's values.

Through permanent education, not only the one from specialized institutions, people will manage to acknowledge that many of their today unwise actions will produce disastrous effects in the future against the initiators as well against their descendents.

NOTES:

1 Douglas O. LINDER, *The Oklahoma City Bombing & Trial of Timothy McVeigh*, <http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mcveigh/mcveighaccount.html> (accessed 01/19/2011).

2 Giulietto CHIESA, *Zero: Why Official Version about 11th September Is a False One*, Litera International Press, Bucharest, 2008, pp. 7-25.

3 Angela K. BROWN, *Fort Hood Suspect Ordered Held until Court-martial*, Associated Press, November, 21, 2009, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20091122/ap_on_re_us/us_fort_hood/ (accessed 01/17/2011).

4 ***, *Reports: Army To Probe Alleged Shooter's Career*, Associated Press, 17.11.2009, http://news.yahoo.com/ap/20091117/ap_on_go_out/us_fort_hood/ (accessed 01/17/2011).

5 Pauline JELINEK, *Military Planning Policy Review after Shooting*, Associated Press, 17.11.2009.

6 Francis FUKUYAMA, *America la răscruce*. Antet, Filipeștii de Târg, Prahova, 2006, p. 64.

7 Seymour M. HERSH, *Torture at Abu Ghraib*, The New Yorker, May 10, 2004, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/10/0405fa_fact (accessed on 01/17/2011).

8 ***, *Homeland Security Act*, <http://whitehouse.gov/issues/homeland-security> (accessed on 01/19/2011).

9 G Gwyn PRINS, *Strategy, Force Planning and Diplomatic/Military Operations (DMOs)*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chameleon Press, Great Britain, 1998, p. 19.

10 Marychka NABOKA, Sashko LASCHENKO, *Lets study in Ukrainian Language*, <http://radiosvoboda.org/article/2008/3/7C877677-F897-49EB-B94D-22480254E3E6.html> (accessed on January, 18, 2011).

11 I Iulian CHIFU, Oazu NANTOI, Oleksandr SUSHKO, *Societal Security in Trilateral Romania-Ukraine-Republic of Moldova*, Curtea Veche Press, Bucharest, 2008, p. 273.

12 Thomas A. KEANEY and Eliot A. COHEN, *Gulf War Air Power Survey. Summary Report*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1993, pp. 85-89.

13 Virgil MATEI, *Dictionary of Maxims, Reflections, Latin Expression Commented*, Didactic and Pedagogic Press, Bucharest, Bucharest, 2005, p. 27.

14 Donald J. MROZEK, *The U.S. Air Force After Vietnam*, Maxwell Air Force Base, Air University Press, Alabama, 1988, pp. 53-66.

15 John FARNDON, *India: Rising of a New Global Superpower*, Litera International Press, Bucharest, 2008, p. 115.

16 I. BERG, *Dictionary of Words, Expressions and Famous Quotations*, Vestala Press, Bucharest, 2004, p. 333.

17 F. Francois BLUCHE, *From Caesar to Churchill*, Humanitas Press, Bucharest, 1992, p. 100.

18 Samir AMGHAR, Amel BOUBEKEUER, Michael EMERSON (editors), *European Islam. Challenges for Society and Public Policy*, Center for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2007, p. 17.

19 I. BERG, *Dictionary of Words, Expressions and Famous Quotations*, p. 100.

Mihail ORZEATĂ (morzeata@yahoo.com) is a retired general, he holds a PhD in military science and information, is a visiting university professor at “Carol I” National Defense University and he teaches students for obtaining doctoral degrees.



NEGOTIATING ON SOCIAL SPACE IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

Vasile Iulian ALISTAR

International military forces' withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq, although announced and anticipated in the near future, would be complete only after having evaluated the conditions in the field (condition based) and after having obtained firm guarantees on democracy and on the existence of an appropriate security environment.

As this represents a strategic request and objective, at operational level, post-conflict negotiation of social space has become a challenge and the first priority of military commands on the ground in respect to their mission and interest in security. In a comprehensive approach, security interests are closely related with the provision of a certain level of social and economical development of the society and an efficient management of the communication of the responsibilities and tasks that should be taken by the local governments and institutions, by communities and individuals.

From a pragmatic and functional perspective, the military actions in the two operation theatres are now coordinated by an overarching communication policy that includes all structures and military functions and all the levels command. The stabilization and reconstruction strategy is now based on communication, on a fruitful exploitation in the advantage of local governments and communities of the results achieved by reconciliation, cooperation, firm and responsible affirmation of progress and stability. The training of national security forces (by NTM-A and NTM-I), the economic relations between countries and different local communities as well the strategic diplomacy conducted by political and military leaders are shaping, in this respect, a complex action puzzle aiming at creating the necessary withdrawal conditions and the international integration of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Social space negotiation in Afghanistan and Iraq is a difficult process that doesn't take place

in very clear terms, but the success of a military mission and the hopes for a future peace are depending on its results.

Key-words: negotiation; strategic communication; social space.

1. Introduction

“While working on this study, the United States, Britain and other Coalition forces strive to govern post-war states apparently un-governed in Afghanistan and Iraq, and, at the same time, confronting simultaneously with the Islamic insurgencies which grow in each of these countries - a state of things that our leaders call victory”¹.

Quoting from Michael Scheuer, a former C.I.A. analyst who described that way the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2004, I want to draw attention to a state of things that have perpetuated for 7 years now, up to the present. This stand off still brings together analysts and institutions in a joint effort to define causes of the conflict and to implement an effective and appropriate response strategy. Military forces on the ground as well as political leaders are yet to find solutions, ideas, new concepts and lines of action to bring an end to the lasting conflict.

In Afghanistan, international military forces are far from completing their mission mandate and the Taliban's insurgency, at its peak in 2007², continues: “new violence suggests an expanded presence in Afghanistan north, west”³. Forces who oppose Karzai's government and its allies now are not only the Taliban and Al Qaeda but also represent a broader category of the people who are against any military presence on their national territory. In Iraq, given the division represented by sectarian Sunni and Shiia and the perennial fight for power, things are even more complex and, late in 2010, we still witness street fights, in-



discriminant attacks on civilians, security forces, infrastructure and US soldiers⁴. Under these circumstances, the situation is problematic with major implications and interferences reflected on all plans, be it political, military, economic or social and draw analysts', political and military leaders' attention as well as the attention of NATO's population from the perspective of what Ayman Zawahiri, Taliban leader, said even since 2003: "thank God for what our satisfaction was given with the dilemma in Iraq and Afghanistan. Americans face a delicate situation in both countries. If they withdraw, they will lose everything and if stay, they will continue to bleed to death"⁵.

Currently, notwithstanding in the both theatres of operation a timetable for troops' withdrawal is shaping, the message is clear and unequivocal. In Afghanistan, "transition does not mean the departure of international forces – they will move into a supportive role"⁶ and, in Iraq, American president Barack Obama firmly said: "our combat mission is ending, but our commitment to Iraq's future is not"⁷. The military forces withdrawal although announced and forecast in the near future is not to be completed until the evaluation reports from the field will indicate and assure on a steady governance embracing a democratic political way, a resolute approach on condemning terrorism and establishment of an acceptable state of security.

In this perspective, post conflict negotiation on a peaceful social space in Afghanistan and Iraq, a *sine qua non* condition to obtain security and stability in a durable settlement, represents nowadays a challenge and a priority of both military commands in the respective areas of operations.

"Negotiation is a process through which two or more parties, having common and conflicting objectives, debate over a possible agreement"⁸ and involves the appeal to a series of abilities, competencies and communication techniques of various social actors from which the whole process without being immanent but contrary, cannot be achieved.

2. General background of social space negotiation in Afghanistan and Iraq

Whatever the level negotiation is taking place, political leaders or ordinary individuals, the process is prejudiced by the "collateral damage" effects of war and the procedure soar following more on the

"lose-lose model" than the "win-win" one (Alan C. Filley, 1996) in tense atmosphere, marked by lack of clear prospects for the future.

At almost ten, respectively, eight years after the military intervention (Afghanistan, 2001/Iraq, 2003), thinking about a continue state of conflict in the two regions and the revival of terrorist attacks committed by Muslims against West⁹, we noticed beyond political and economic interests a more subtle motivation manifested in the present conflict, psychological by nature, deeply engraved in the mindset of the Islamic world which fuels the actions' engine at the societal level¹⁰. Both in Afghanistan and Iraq, the growing number of collateral victims caused by the clashing between NATO (ISAF) and international coalition forces, on the one hand, and terrorists, insurgents and Talibans, on the other hand, claims and accuse continuously, like in a vicious circle, an imperative desire of revenge. As a consequence, the communication between soldiers and civilian population is constantly alienated by emotions and different feelings, caused by errors on the ground or produced far from its reality¹¹, on the background of miscommunication and lack of communication culture in conflict management. The relationship between military power and population is vitiated by live feeling and perception of a military occupation that stems the naturally desire for self-determination and independence. "Aren't we Muslims? Aren't we from Afghanistan? Infidels are here and they are ruling us. Why?"¹², expressed a 25 year old student of Kabul, underlying in this way the possible perception of one generation.

With the intention to repair the image deficit and to diminish as much as possible the military intervention's effects, negotiation, considered as a communication relation, is used on the both the "trenches" in Afghanistan and Iraq. Following several plans at different levels, applied by different structures and within a spectrum of multiple techniques, the process in itself is a difficult one with political, military, economic and social implications and, in spite its concrete terms are not very clear, besides the difficulty of the process, we may note some strategic plans for action.

3. Military strategies within negotiation context

Following in the chronology of events on how various approaches managed to soothe the state



of war away, we may see, in mid 2010, a new guideline that seems to shape a success strategy with promises to offer long-term and sustainable social peace. After the so called “small footprint and surge operations”¹³ strategies implemented consecutively in the two theaters of operations, whose early effects are still debatable, under a relatively new military concept, strategic communication (StratCom)¹⁴, there is now in the primary emphasizes, complementary of a military disposition of forces, the intention to communicate in a comprehensive manner with an indigenous population, which is cause and solution in the conflict.

Strategic communication which currently defines the sense of combined political-military actions, in its’ actionable dimension represents a negotiation instrument on the social space more important now, as supported by means of communication offered by the knowledge based society is subtly today covering in all media and may have a decisive influence on the final result of a military campaign. What it has not been understood in all these years of dramatic confrontations was the lack of a dimension of communication necessarily integrated in every conflict management strategy. Communication is understood now as the main factor in negotiating the social space in Afghanistan and Iraq in the wider context of establishing stability and security in the region.

As a result of complex analysis efforts (PMESII)¹⁵ and based on a deep understanding of the socio-human reality in a geopolitical context, StratCom proposes a comprehensive action on various audiences and empathic adaptation of political-military decisions to the perspective of mentalities, beliefs and cultural norms relevant for a population of a certain area of local, regional or international interest. Strategic communication establishes maps for action in the conflict using less force of arms and more the one of persuasion for achieving the political-military objectives. This new political military vision relies on the contemporary reality where one can notice an increased and more decisive role of public opinion, which can support or not the acts of imposing the will into a conflict.

The new concept proposes a change in the way of thinking and conducting military operations reflected from the level of NATO Allied Command

Operations (ACO) where, as we note through the establishment of strategic priorities for 2010, the imperative of “establishment of coherent strategic communication capability across ACO”¹⁶ sets up the lines for action to downrange operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In August 2009, the report on the evaluation of the situation in Afghanistan, submitted to the United States Secretary of Defense, general Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander of the United States Forces in Afghanistan and of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), underlined the fact that “our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces; our objective must be the population. In the struggle to gain the support of the people, every action we take must enable this effort”¹⁷.

Even if, traditionally, this is a basic principle in counterinsurgency operations¹⁸, in the StratCom context, McChrystal basically proposes a change of paradigm in the military planning and execution of operations emphasizing now, complementarily to the traditional conception expressed in terms of *find, fix and destroy the enemy*¹⁹ the modern design – *find, fix and influence the enemy*. The new strategic approach does not invalidate the previous one; it only changes the center of gravity and the main effort direction of the main effort – from annihilation and physical destruction of an opponent to positively influencing him and his supporting audiences. Under this new strategic doctrine, resources, which will be priority used, consist in specialists in information operations, psychological operations, public information and public diplomacy, who, from the role of military operations support offered in the past, become now the leading actors who should direct the way, necessity and opportunity of physical actions on the ground.

Getting public support, the population’s cooperation and active engagement in the common effort to provide security represent sine qua non conditions for stability and durable social peace. The strategy to get this is complex both in theory and practice but could be realized through the unity of effort and synergic actions performed at tactical, operational and strategic levels. Military commands direct the actions on the ground by reinforcing the need for stronger civilian-military cooperation and continuous education to grasp on the local culture, social dynamics and social



transformations within a larger context of peace negotiation.

On this pattern of reflection, General David Petraeus, the new commander of military forces in Afghanistan (2010), developed a new *modus operandi* and addressed in the following statements his direction and guidance to the regional commanders: "Secure and serve the population. The decisive terrain is human terrain. People are the center of gravity. (...) Live among the people. Position joint bases and combat outposts as close as possible to those we're seeking to secure (...) fight with discipline. We can't win without fighting, but also cannot kill or capture our way to victory (...) Be a good guest (...) Consult and build relationships (...) listen to what they are saying (...) spend time, listen, consult and drink lots of tea"²⁰. More or less aware, in the recent years, there has been produced an alienation between the international military force (ISAF) and the population, as currently one can find NATO soldiers preoccupied exclusively by their own measures of protection, raising symbolically walls in front of what it should be a partnership with local security forces, administration and the Afghan population.

When a part of a military contemporary strategy is constituted by the transition from classic offensive and defensive to post-conflict military operation, military action is more complex, requiring flexibility in commands, development of new capacities and new cadres of action necessary in the transition from high-intensity combat operations to stabilization and reconstruction. In this modern but quite old now dynamics, the actions engaged by soldiers in the two operational theatre extend to a wider range of competencies that should match more abilities to communicate in correspondence to a mission which is expressed *sic et nuc* in terms as: "Win people's confidence, talk to them, ask them questions, and learn about their lives. Inquire about social dynamics, frictions, local histories and grievances"²¹.

All these orders have not been addressed to particular specialists thinking, for example at HUMINT, specialized structure to collect information, PSYOPS or CIMIC that, by their relation with the local population, can also provide additional information. These orders are meant to shape a radical change in the attitude which military must take in relation to the population,

aiming at cradling new perceptions, a new start, to open a new dialogue that may "determine the agenda and create a political context favorable to perform our military objectives"²².

In this respect, communication is at hand and is part of a general negotiation strategy where the actions are undertaken at all three levels of military actions.

At the strategic level, in Iraq, significantly in this spirit, beginning with 1st of September 2010, operation Iraqi Freedom, that marked the intervention of the military international coalition against terrorism, ended being replaced now by a new operation suggestively called New Dawn. "Aligning the name change with the change of mission sends a strong signal that Operation Iraqi Freedom has ended and our forces are operating under a new mission. It also presents opportunities to synchronize strategic communication initiatives"²³. Following the withdrawal of combat troops, operation New Dawn suggests a new approach meant to facilitate a better communication and cooperation with various actors of the social space aiming at achieving a common objective – security and stability.

In the same way, in Afghanistan, at strategic and political levels, major efforts are focused on maintaining the *statu quo* of NATO member states' troop commitment, in particular of the United States, in a "war that, in fact, has been neglected for eight years, six years, at least"²⁴. At this moment, there is a revival of actions in theatre where the center of gravity is "to maintain Afghan and international public support for the new approach - and by extension, for the overall mission"²⁵. In this context, the new approach represents a main direction of effort concentrated on building the social space expressed through "build accountable governance (...) confront the culture of impunity (...) identify corrupt officials – and – promote local reintegration"²⁶, that should also help to solve an enduring political crisis determined by the lack of confidence in the central government in Kabul and bad governance particularly of the south's provinces, the main bastion of the Taliban, Kandahar and Helmand. In a comprehensive approach, security is closely linked to the social and economical development and an effective communication management to convey in this sense the responsibilities and tasks that ought to be taken by government and



its institutions, by local administration up to the individuals.

At the strategic and operational level, *reconstruction and stabilization strategy*²⁷, a post-conflict strategy developed by military coalition both in Afghanistan and Iraq, can be seen as an effort to rebuild on new bases two transitional societies, reconstruction which gives the possibility to build not only physically but also in psychologically, new symbolic and cultural identities in an once forbidden space.

Viewed in a broad sense as a negotiation process, the reconstruction is done not only empirically, starting from the current assessment of people's needs and construction of various projects of local infrastructure, but also scientifically, by the analysis, the proposal and endorsement, at the level of state and government, of policies and projects for local, regional, state or departmental development. Part of the same construct, at the same time, the reconstruction gives possibility of participation in the education process of a new generation where both in theory and in practice, negotiation's techniques are aimed at reducing the wrong perceptions, to foster a mutual trust, correct communication and develop feelings of confidence with the members of the opponent group²⁸.

The induction of positive feelings for the presence of multinational forces in the region and implicitly for the secular system they represent are realized simultaneously, by exploiting, on the one hand, the amount of various social projects developed by the soldiers in the region (renovation of buildings, kindergartens, schools, hospitals, facilitating the out of and in country medical care service, organization of local administration projects for regional economic development, improve sewage, electricity etc.) and, on the other hand, by working on education, seen as a valuable repository from which new ideas and values may be spread out, in the process of training of possible new leaders. NATO training type missions such NTM-A in Afghanistan or NTM-I in Iraq or programs like "Hamkari Baraye Kandahar"²⁹ (Cooperation for Kandahar, 2010) provide, in this respect, at the strategic, operational and tactical level, the training of national security forces in parallel with the one of local administration. In terms of negotiation, this means to try to surpass cultural differences or old rivalries (Shiia vs. Sunni

vs. Kurd; Pashtun vs. Hazara vs. Tadjik) and train the new leaders in the spirit of understanding and unity, to accommodate them not only with a modern military doctrine but also with the provisions of human rights, laws of the armed conflict, elements of culture and military leadership presented in the context of meritocracy principle, separation of powers and democratic principles.

On the other hand, "Hamkari Baraye Kandahar" brings together specialists from various fields of civil life, representatives of international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), who, together with the soldiers, offer guidance and assistance in order "to connect better the Government with its people; to listen and respond to their needs; and to deliver improved security, governance, and economic opportunity to the people (...) Hamkari is a combined Afghan and international civil-military effort to improve the political situation, to gradually enhance security (...) and deliver a major blow to the heartland of the Taliban insurgency"²⁹.

Because of a temporal stagnation of Islam when compared to the Western progress, all these actions are now carefully tailored to the degree of understanding Afghans' cultural diversity as a part of a complex equation that represents a practical form of negotiation channeled on increasing the quality of life, the level of security and the degree of integration of Afghanistan in the international community. On an emotional-affective level, the NATO media campaigns try to prevail over a state of permanent tension and conflict caused by the systematic and coordinated attack of fundamentalists, corruption, and manipulation which generate and develop feelings of frustration and conflict at the level of the general society. Media operations are carefully synchronized and coordinated towards this mean with the realities in the field and are conducted consistently and consecutively to the actions accordingly to what Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the USA, emphasized correctly: "let us not worry much less on how to communicate our actions and much more on what our actions communicate"³⁰.

The training of national security forces by NTM-A and NTM-I, the economical relations established with the countries and different local communities inside and the strategic diplomacy



conducted by political and military leaders are shaping in this respect a complex puzzle aiming at matching the military withdrawal conditions and the international integration of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Essentially, the *reconstruction* tries to build a context similar to a type of collective acceptance of the values of the occidental space, after the model of Saudi Arabia, Turkey or Qatar. The process as whole doesn't seem to be one which lacks logic and has the potential for success, but most of the times, it is vitiated by the inconsistencies of actions and by the cultural ignorance revealed in the communicational relationship of the West with the East; all these things are carefully speculated and are orienting the Taliban/fundamentalist rhetoric.

4. The cultural influence on the military process of negotiation

Afghanistan and Iraq are two traditional societies which bear the signs of cultures with a religious foundation and which sustain the prominence of the group as compared to the individual. From this point of view, they are perfectly aligned to the homogenous communities of Islam, where religious leaders, wherever they may be situated, can exercise a certain authority and influence. In this sense, the success of any military presence can only be a partial, local one, corresponding to the restrained geographic areas and, more important, limited in terms of effects in time and space, if it neglects the role and importance of the religious factor. Not just occasionally, the manifestations and rhetoric of religious leaders in Iran, Pakistan or Lebanon have influenced the course of actions and events in Iraq or Afghanistan. A religious order (*fatwa*) has no border in the Islamic world. At the level of the general population, there have been constant changes in attitudes and behavior against the coalition forces, as a follow-up to echoes of ideas promoted by different religious authorities in the Islamic world, which did not necessarily originate in the above mentioned spaces; the example of Bin Laden's rhetoric, the ayatollah of Khomeini or his protégée Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah, are the most eloquent.

In both countries, radical elements of Islamic activism are fiercely fighting nowadays for the universities' space dominance, source both for

the religious fundamentalism and reform ideas. Remember that Taliban ideology has been developed at the beginning as a student movement (Peshawar, Pakistan 1996), and only after having reached the political and state level from which position blamed officially and violently (see, the destruction of statues of Buddha, 1999) any other form of knowledge. The *reconstruction* brings face to face, on the one hand, the religious leaders and/or Taliban elements trying to preserve and protect supremacy in space which once was exclusively under their control – *the school* and, on the other hand, moderate and modern movements, more or less supported and sustained by West representatives, being in search for a new and more "Occidentalised" identity. The stake is clearly a giant one and one could hardly predict the final result. Being in a current and irreversible process of transformation, Iraq and Afghanistan, either will facilitate and ensure conditions for the development of a modern and democratic society or will follow the Iranian Revolution model and block any initiatives of development with West participation.

The fundamentalists accept the benefits offered by *reconstruction* but rarely they use and speculate them by their own interest. Here, manipulation using religious terms is dissociated at tribes' and political level. While in rural areas, Taliban elements or Shiite fundamentalists used to install by force the Islamic law "*Sharia*", in order to maintain their influence and local power at the political level, the same actors agreed to bargain on the positions in the parliament, government and other secular institutions of a new state negotiating in this way the religious beliefs.

If, on the one hand, in the process of reconstruction, local mullahs denunciate the so-called blackmail of the West accusing it of manipulation, on the other hand, the same mullahs often blackmail, in their turn, the population using even means of extreme violence. For instance, in Iraq, the *reconstruction* has initially favoured the Shiite leaders oppressed under the Saddam's regime and his Ba'ath party and, when this had ceased to happen and was outcast in his relationship with the provisional administration, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)³¹, for his exclusively personal power Muqtada Al-Sadr took advantage and exploited the symbolic image and sacred religious texts when set up the so-called



Mahdi Army³² which generated afterwards a state of terror, terrorism and high violence in Baghdad, Al Kut, Najaf and Karbala (Iraq, 2004).

From this point of view, actions do not come to solve problems but they are reinforcing them. It is considered that the perverse effects which are well known and currently analyzed by the specialists will decrease in intensity when the troops would withdraw and when the premises of good governance would be created. The reason for this is the fact that they are related with the local phenomenon of corruption, the lack of strong governance and, not less true, with a culture of dependence created by the “wealthy foreign military” presence.

If, at present, in Afghanistan, under the command of general Petraeus and his staff, credited with halting the insurgence in Iraq and fostering negotiation among all representatives, actions are carefully coordinated in this respect, as the Governor of Kandahar province expressed, the results are expected only after a ‘sustainable progress in this direction which will need at least twelve years to become irreversible³³.

At this point, analysts believe that mediation will replace negotiation in the process of the social space adjustment and regional policies regarding the Orient-Occident relationship, Afghanistan and Iraq in particular.

“Mediation involves the intervention of a third party, neutral in report to the disputing parties, in the settlement of the conflict, by facilitating communication and offering suggestion”³⁴. At the international level, the process is under U.N. responsibility, organization that, in future, will have to revalorise its mediation status from the perspective of maintaining global peace and security. The ultimate objective under the aegis of U.N. mediation could be beneficial and visionary, represented by forging a global community truly cooperative based on authentic communication, adapted to the cultural differences and fundamental interests of humanity.

With regard to the duration and chances for success of the negotiation of social space in Afghanistan and Iraq, presently, there are strong pace fluctuations of foreign influence in the two countries, state of things that affects success or failure in attaining security and stability in the region. Divergent interests of nations such as Pakistan, Iran, Syria or Lebanon and different lines

of influence exercised by them in Afghanistan or Iraq support differently and in accordance with their own agenda the objective of a regional peace.

Recently, peace negotiations between Palestinian Authority and Israel initiated at the request of S.U.A. (August, 2010)³⁵, whether coincident or not, they held the value of a message addressed to the Islamic world leaders, possibly marking, at the same time, the giving up of force policies in the region in the favour of concession and dialogue ones.

Conclusion

The social space negotiation in Afghanistan and Iraq is a difficult process whose result depends on the decision of the military coalitions to withdraw and the hopes for a future peace.

In a changing world marked by a geopolitical and complex landscape where the struggle for resources influence and generates a complicated architecture in international relations, the *negotiation* of a non-conflict social space is a long term process, but if its success could write a new page of history and positively influence the developments in the future of a new, reformed and more peaceful geostrategies.

Negotiation developed mainly by political leaders but having lately in the first plan the soldiers as well – “in his first three weeks in Afghanistan, Petraeus met President Karzai at least twenty times”³⁶ – challenges and requires an adapting role of the armies and their leaders.

The military policies currently are focused on the process of transforming old military structures to effectively confront new risks and environmental hazards on stability and security and, not less important, part of the process, there are more records and awareness on the fact that, in the information age, the technological progress and dominance represents a necessary condition, but it is not enough to win and impose a long-lasting peace.

The implementation of a functional strategic communication and negotiation strategies can equally serve to an overall long-term and international interest related not only to ensuring peace and security but also to facilitating success of military policy in a mission or operation.



Note: *Nothing in this work implies the fact that a political, military or other empowered authority will negotiate with terrorists.*

NOTES:

1 See Anonymous, *Imperial Hubris, Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror*, Brassey's, 2004, translation from Romanian Edition, Antet, 2006, p. 13.

2 Stars and Stripes - Mideast edition, Friday, January 4, 2008, p.3.

3 Stars and Stripes, Friday, August 27, 2010, p. 3.

4 In August, 2010, there are only US military (50,000) in Iraq, all other nations having withdrawn their military contribution. See, Iraq War Facts, Results & Statistics at August 23, 2010, at <http://usliberals.about.com>.

5 Recorded statement of Ayman Zawahiri, broadcasted by Jizirah Satellite Chanel Television, September 10, 2003.

6 Afghanistan Rolling Brief, NATO HQ Brussels, 26 July 2010.

7 See the US President speech on August 31, 2010, at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/31/remarks-president-address-nation-end-combat-operations-iraq>.

8 HELLRIEGEL, D.; SLOCUM, J.; WOODMAN, R., *Organizational Behaviour*, West Publishing Company SUA, 1992, p. 478.

9 Referring to Fort Hood event, SUA, November 5, 2009 (12 US military were killed by Nidal Malik Hassan, major and American citizen of Palestinian origins) and Little Rock, Arkansas, SUA, June 1, 2009 (1 US military was deadly shot and one wounded in front of an army recruiting centre by an American citizen recently converted to Islam, 2004) and, to the more recent United States' general travel alert for American citizens in Europe amid concerns that Al Qaeda or related groups planed terrorist attacks (3 October 2010).

10 In this respect, Scott Stewart, political analyst, described the emerging phenomenon of authority derogation in fighting against America/Occident, phenomenon that goes from the freedom of action given to Al Qaeda's members to the various Muslim countries of whose governs are tolerant and even encourage actions in that direction. See Scott STEWART, *The Devolution of Jihadism: From Al Qaeda to Wider Movement*, Stratfor, January 2010.

11 With reference to Abu Ghraib event, Iraq, 2004, or the large protest manifestations in the Muslim world when, for instance, the Danish publication *Jyllands Posten* used the image of Prophet Mohammed in a cartoon series (September 30, 2007).

12 Stars and Stripes, Saturday, July 31, 2010, p. 3.

13 In the context of the two military operations, "surge operation" refers to increasing militaries' number in order to realize the military objectives. Both in Iraq and Afghanistan, as a part of this strategy, the US deployed an additional number of militaries of almost 20,000, respectively, 30,000 (see Operation *Phantom Thunder* in Iraq, June, 2007, and Operation *Moshtarak*, February 2010, in Afghanistan).

14 See NATO Strategic Communication Policy, September 29, 2009, PO (2009) 0141.

15 PMESII – Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure.

16 See Strategic Focus for Allied Command Operations, SACEUR's Commanders Conference 01-2010, 23 March 2010.

17 Stanley A. McCHRISTAL (General US Army), COMISAF'S Initial Assessment, International Security Assistance Force Headquarters, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2009, 30 August, pp. 1.

18 See David GALULA, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, Westport, Connecticut, Praeger, 1964.

19 See in Field Manual, *FM 71 – 100 – 3*, Chapter 3, Offensive Operations, USA, Headquarters Department of the Army, 2005.

20 David H. PETRAEUS, General US Army, COMISAF/CDR USFOR-A, *COMISAF's Counterinsurgency Guidance*, ISAF HQ, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2010, 1 August, p. 1.

21 *Ibidem* 20.

22 William SCHNEIDER, Jr., *Memorandum for Acting Under Secretary of Defence*, Final report of the Defence Science Board on Strategic Communication, 2004, 23 September.

23 U.S. Central Command, Feb 17, 2010, Request to Change the Name of Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation New Dawn (OSD 08144 – 09).

24 By the US Vice President, Joe BIDEN, quoted in Stars and Stripes, Friday, July 30, 2010, p. 2.

25 North Atlantic Council, Afghanistan Strategic Communication Approach, 16 July 2010, p. 1.

26 David H. PETRAEUS, General US Army, COMISAF/CDR USFOR-A, *COMISAF's Counterinsurgency Guidance*, ISAF HQ, Kabul, Afghanistan, 1 August 2010, p.1, 2, 3.

27 This strategy was successfully implemented in SFOR (Stabilization Force, Bosnia and Herzegovina 1996 - 2004), in Afghanistan (2002 - 2010), under ISAF mandate, and in Iraq (2004 – 2010), where the International Coalition forces' military mission took place in successive phases within the framework of Iraq's reconstruction and stabilisation program.

28 M. VLĂSCEANU, *Psychology in leadership and organisations*, Paideia Edition, 1993, p. 191.

29 HQ ISAF, Lines to take for "Hamkari Baraye Kandahar, Kabul, Afghanistan, 18 May 2010, p. 1.



30 Admiral Mike MULLEN, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, quoted in *Strategic Communications: Getting Back to Basics*, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 55, 4th Quarter, 2009.

31 The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was established as a transitional government following the invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies members of the multinational force in Iraq which was formed to put an end to the government of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

32 Al-Hujja al-Mahdi, the twelfth imam in the succession order after Mohammed prophet, is considered to be alive and expected to come to make justice in the

world and to save it. Muqtada al Sadr exploited the religious beliefs and called his paramilitary militias, *Mahdi Army*, to get popular support. See Imam Shirazi, Muhammad, *What is ISLAM?*, Fountain Books, 2002, p. 20.

33 HQ ISAF, *Lines to take for "Hamkari Baraye Kandahar"*, Kabul, Afghanistan, 18 May 2010, p. 1.

34 MYERS, D.G., *Social psychology*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1990, p. 506.

³⁵ See on web, *US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton invited Israel and the Palestinians to hold direct negotiations*, August 20, 2010.

³⁶ *Stars and Stripes*, Friday, July 30, 2010, p. 3.

Major Vasile Iulian ALISTAR (iulianalistar@yahoo.com) has graduated "Nicolae Bălcescu" Military Institute in Sibiu (1993) and the Faculty of Psychology and Social Assistance of "Petre Andrei" University in Iași (2001) and, in present, is a PhD candidate at "Carol I" National Defence University from Bucharest. He specialized in psychological operations (PSYOPS) and was deployed in Afghanistan (2002, 2005) and Iraq (2006), afterwards (2007-2010) being posted as PSYOPS officer within NATO JFC Naples, Italy. He is also the author of various articles and studies on terrorism, strategic communication, globalization and social conflict.



CONSIDERATIONS ON ORGANIZED CRIME IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

*Marius HANGANU, PhD
Ion CHIORCEA, PhD*

The present paper sets itself to realize a picture of organized crime evolution in Central and Eastern Europe, analyzing the development of this security risk especially in the period which followed the fall of communism in the states encompassed in this region. At the same time, there are identified the main characteristics of this phenomenon and its actual forms of manifestation. Moreover, a special attention is paid to the evolution of this phenomenon in Romania.

Key-words: organized crime; Central and Eastern Europe; mafia; corruption; globalization.

In the government statistics and official announcements, it is easy to see that in Central and Eastern Europe, crime has reached alarming levels, especially in the area Russia - Ukraine - Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria. The force of organized crime is especially highlighted by its influence in terms of special internal instability, which has undergone essential changes: the shift from centralized to market economy, from authoritarian to a democratic political system and a centralized security national security system independent.

The western media has paid attention lately to extending the authority mafia organizations in Europe, stressing that the collapse of the „Iron Curtain” has facilitated not only the liberalization of connections between individuals and legal organizations in the East and West, but also of the illegal ones.

According to British daily The Times: „In 2010, the Czechoslovak police revealed that the organizations of the Russian mafia and Italian mafia, would have done an act regarding the trafficking in narcotic drugs and sub-

stances used to manufacture nuclear weapons.” A senior official at the Federal Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic, specialized in international narcotics trafficking, claimed that „heads of mafia networks in Italy and Russia staged a deal that would extend control over 20% of all smuggling operations in world, a goal set to be achieved in 2012!”

Across these areas, inflation worsened, civil order could not be stopped, crime has increased alarmingly, and the black market is a daily open presence. The opening of borders in Europe has facilitated the movement of people and goods, driving the free market and crime. Using available financial strength, the organized crime groups have penetrated very rapidly in early democracies, political and government officials are corrupt, usually represented by proactive people, poorly trained to manage, easy influential.

A highly unbalanced state has installed and deepened without the authorities to intervene, supporting criminal groups, which had implemented the entire arsenal, more refined or brutal means and methods of action.

The privatization process which began in the absence of clear regulations and a minimum strategy was beneficial to the underworld, ordering produced by the communist, and former nomenclature, which was available from the financial strength necessary to start cover the important parts of the capital brought to privatization.

Each of the countries of Central, Southern and Eastern Europe has its own history of this period, dominated by a strong instability and a real offensive against organized crime. There are many elements common to all these countries, but each acquires the characteristics and features to individualize trajectory in areas very close



to the epicenter of traditional organized crime. The gap between the CIS and Germany is called „common market of crime” whose epicenter is located in Germany.

It is enough to have remembered that Albania, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, are geographically close to Italy, named or recognized as a „Mafia University” and that in Italy there are strong communities of Albanians, Croats and Serbs, as the territories Western Europe, for decades (Germany, Austria, France, Netherlands) were established citizens of south-eastern European area. Analyzing the evolution of organized crime in Europe, several conclusions can be drawn. *The Albanian Mafia* is recognized as the most violent and best organized criminal group, with a capacity for action since 1997. After „having been schooled” in Italy, from professionals Cosa Nostra and Sicilian mafia, the Albanian groups have returned to home territory initiating and developing a heavy drug trafficking, a veritable industry of prostitution, illegal immigration of Albanians in Italy and Greece, trade in arms and ammunition intended for theaters of war with Yugoslavia, a massive contraband with alcohol, tobacco, petroleum. It was the financial consolidation phase of the Albanian Mafia, which has enabled it to penetrate and subordinate the highest areas of politics, army, police and judiciary.

Bulgaria, the country which promised between 1992 - 1994 that would quickly overcome the shock of transition to democracy, has entered into a generalized crisis, reflected the decrease in economy and finance, together with banditry and violence flourishing.

The organized crime in Bulgaria is red: the tens of thousands of Soviet socialist-minded people have set up a genuine industry of crime. In the first stage, and here was the classic scenario: smuggling, drug trafficking massive, prostitution, illegal migration, theft of state property. The Bulgarian mafia consolidation period was the period of application of the embargo on Yugoslavia. Violations of the embargo were imposed by the local mafia and Russian mafia. Political power has accepted, and thus put up a whole industry of embargo violations. The organized crime, mafia already, divided strictly specialized areas creating channels for selling arms, fuel, construction materials, military equipment and food and industrial goods.

Referring to Russia, it can be said that the year 1992 marked the beginning of the expansion of Red Mafia. Since then the United States and West European have been living a real nightmare - the expansion of red Mafia - meaning by this all that occurred in the former Soviet empire in criminal matters, whether they were republics, autonomous regions or hardly known areas (Chechnya, Caucasus, Armenia, Dagestan).

The Russian Federation, understood as a state entity, is the Red Mafia staff. Many analysts compare Moscow today with Chicago of the '30s, dominated by battles between criminal groups. Germany's Federal Criminal Office admitted in 2005 that „one third of all organized crime offenses belong to the Russian Mafia.” The fact is that criminal organizations have created a common market of crime and develop business both legal and illegal.

It is estimated that organized crime has reached 40% of GDP in Russia and Eastern Europe (Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland), 30% of GDP in China, 30% of GDP in Japan, 28% of GDP in France, Germany 20% of GDP and in Sweden 15% of GDP.

In the „Table of conventional crime”, according to statistics provided by INTREPOL, almost all countries of the continent experienced a real explosion of crime and its steady growth rate. Also significant are the data from 178 European countries. Countries such as Bulgaria, France, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Hungary and Ukraine have experienced a growing crime rate, and other countries where the phenomenon, after the initial explosion, suffered a setback as Sweden, Spain, Greece, Belgium, Germany in serious crimes, face special problems (drug trafficking, fake currency).

The crime rate for robbery offenses committed in the European area shows that the first five places are occupied, along with Estonia, Croatia, Russia, and countries with strong democracies, the European Union member states such as Spain and France, followed by Portugal, Denmark, Luxembourg, Germany, Sweden, Austria, Belgium and Italy, which shows that violence is spreading across Europe.

In the context presented, the rising crime rate in Romania in recent years is no exception. In general, in Europe there is a high level of professionalism of criminal groups that have



adopted and refined the principles of organization and rules of action of mafia structures. It is also apparent the tendency of criminal groups of intellectualization, of people within their official positions in finance, trade, banking, government, justice, and of reputable lawyers, experts and technicians in communications, logistics.

By analyzing the public documents we can notice several characteristics of organized crime, such as internationalization, involvement in such activities to politics, drug development and enhance market economy.

Internationalization Scale illegal business, smuggling, tax evasion, smuggling weapons, drugs, radioactive materials, and protection fee „debt collection” – cannot run and complete without a partnership between local criminals and those acting on the territory of other states.

Regarding **the strengthening of the merger between the criminal groups and political world**, one can say that there is the present trend of „using public office for doing business, behind, or behind those who did business.

In terms of market development and drug traffickers, at least in regard to Romania, one can say that we can already speak of „drug market” in large urban centers and universities (Bucharest, Cluj, Iasi, Constanta, Timisoara etc) and that almost daily are found drug traffickers, most of them foreigners or Romanian citizens, especially students.

The economy, as a parallel economy, feeds and develops a wide variety of illegal business, producing huge money and leading to uncontrolled proliferation activities involving „money laundering”.

The main food sources are: smuggling, tax evasion, illegal employment, tax protection, etc.

Expressions of organized crime in Romania

In Romania there are:

a) Red Mafia. The collapse of the former USSR has generated many social phenomena, some with very serious effects. Amid the free movement of persons, since 1991, Romania has recorded crimes in which have been involved both as perpetrators and as victims, citizens of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). A particular resonance had a group of criminals of „Raketa” consisting of citizens of the CIS. These groups have acted,

usually allied against the fellow countrymen for business or tourism in Romania.

The radiography of cases reveals that organized criminal groups, studying the travel routes of the victims, tourists from CIS countries and their cars, or of some Western citizens, stranding them in some respects favorable to ambushes where the exercise of violence and threats of reprisals on life - including firearms, are leading passengers to hand over large sums of money or property. More recently, the enforcement action is designed in the country of origin and refers to the duty of protection, rapid recovery actions, acts of robbery, robbery, etc.. A case is reported in the press in October 1993 when at the border crossing point of the Siret, was a group of Lithuanian tourists, who complained that while they were traveling towards the border between the towns Iasi and Drăgușeni, Suceava County, were attacked and robbed by gunmen. The tourist bus was blocked by two cars with registration numbers in Moldova, which have dropped several individuals, one of them opening fire on the bus. The authors were identified and arrested, eight men respectively, around 45 years old from Moldova. The group leader was part of the group „MALS” (Little) led by Oleg Kortusov, 25 years old from Tiraspol.

b) Chinese Mafia

A specific note in the register of crime in our country to increase the risk of dangerous on the principles of „Mafia” is the Chinese people, arrived in Romania after 1990. *X-raying* the 250 cases that have been reported to police until 2010, Chinese citizens who were involved both as perpetrators and as victims, a large proportion of them came to Romania for various purposes and illicit interests.

An example is reported in the press of 11 February 1996, when Bo Huang citizen, resident in Bărcănești, Prahova County, was dispossessed by violence and extortion, of money, clothing and personal car by four compatriots led by Ms. Zang Huemes.

Also, the ten bodies found in abandoned suitcases on the shores of lakes in recreational parks, suggesting the size and ferocity of the struggle for power.

c) Drug trafficking. If before 1990, Romania was considered a country in drug trafficking route, now, Romania is included in the drug trafficking



route and has even become an area of storage, delivery and consumption of drugs.

Statistics facts found and the quantities discovered fully demonstrated this in the sense that from year to year, the number of people involved in drug trafficking has increased. However, consumers have increased among teenagers, a phenomenon reported in many schools in the country. The main drugs used are: hashish, cannabis, opium, heroin, cocaine, morphine, amphetamine and LSD.

d) Trafficking in counterfeit currency.

Forgery of money and other securities as well as trafficking in counterfeit payment means, know an alarming resurgence, which is why police and specialized banking services are constantly alert, constantly seeking new ways to counter the phenomenon.

In the period 1992-2010, in Romania, were discovered more than 18,000 cases of recruitment and placement test false currency.

It is well known the case of a group of Italians, wanted by Interpol to join a mafia group led by Berton Silvano, who circulated false and DM 142,200 10,000 false \$. Also, those who have counterfeited using a color copier, 360,000 shillings to be placed in Hungary and Austria and other 107,000 dollars and 147,000 counterfeit German marks by the same method was found.

e) Trafficking in persons, human beings, prostitution and pimping. Many prostitutes and pimps exploiting the „offer” of agents and service sector companies, moving their territory in other countries, notably Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, Austria, Germany, France, Spain etc. The phenomenon to attract minors has grown, those from broken families or the indigent of subsistence, to engage in prostitution in different places and ways, in many cases, recruitment is forced by blackmail and determination.

It becomes obvious the increase in the activity of criminal networks that deal with traffickers crossing our country illegally by some groups of immigrants from Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, who are recruited from their countries on the route Singapore - Moscow - Chisinau and search to reach Western Europe.

The participants in the pathway of introduction in Romania of Asian citizens and sending them toward the western neighbors receive large sums of foreign currency, which in

some cases are laundered through businesses and private agencies set up in our country. The reported networks show concerns to clandestine organizations and as accurately as possible by establishing solid support points (buildings, businesses, hosts) and trusted people in many countries undergoing transition on the line, able to ensure the safety of this activities where enormous amounts of money circulate in domestic and foreign.

Only in the years 2003 - 2010 have been found in illegal border crossing and returned to the border of neighboring states, over 50,000 foreigners being Sri Lankan citizens, the numerical preponderance being Pakistanis and Chinese.

An example to combat this activity is that when the collaboration with the Romanian Police in Moldova, the groups succeeded in annihilating instructors, led by Mohamet B. A. Akmad, who facilitated the passage of over 300 citizens from Sri Lanka and Pakistan to the Western countries.

Another worrying phenomenon is the child trafficking and illegal adoptions. There are known cases of illegal adoptions by means of which were removed from the country more than 6,000 children. Children are out of the country with false documents or by adoption, either by falsifying documents or passports. In the passport, the Romanian or foreign citizen is accompanied by the child with the real photo applied and the photo is in reality that of the child removed. It should also be noted that there also is an international network of organ trafficking.

f) Trafficking in weapons and radioactive materials. The officially published statistics and documents show a disturbing upward trend in the trafficking of arms and radioactive materials particularly harmful to human health and the environment.

In connection with the trafficking of arms should be noted that it takes place in institutional system, sale of arms between countries, groups of insurgents or terrorist groups, wholesale and retail by organized groups of criminals.

Trafficking of arms and ammunition has become a common crime. Only in 2010 more than 1,500 weapons a large quantity of ammunition were seized. In terms of smuggled radioactive materials, there is evidence of establishing criminal structures, with multiple links abroad, very knowledgeable and eager to gain, those involved not hesitating



to risk in this respect, even their own health, by marketing particularly uranium.

g) Intentional crime against the person (fee protection, ordered murder, attacks)

In terms of crime axes, our country is situated on the connecting lines between East and West, facing both to the influx of thousands of Orientals trying to penetrate the rich Western Europe, and the „not accomplished ones” in this part of the world, which spread their tentacles to us. Under current economic conditions, more and more crimes are proliferating like theft control, at the expense of private assets or public demand for protection tax on businesses; attention to the order or the application of corrective measures to accept protection.

The first organized group according to strict regulations by the mob was made up of Roma, led by three „heads” that, together with 13 other „lieutenants”, by force or threat of death, have been stripped of several private companies’ goods, currency and goods more than 2.3 billion in 1995.

Then there were many cases of criminal groups who have made ordered killings, kidnapping, and more violent recoveries.

To these types of crime can be added on-line financial and economic areas requiring further work, because there are more problems.

In conclusion, we can say that today we are witnessing a phenomenon of the globalization of trade, financial markets, protect the environment, human rights etc. This trend has led to two results simultaneously: first, the loss largely to the limits of national, regional and international levels and second, the interpenetration of political, economic and social, to the point of no longer be possible to separate. Within this trend, the globalization has expanded the scope of crime. Thus transnational and transcontinental organized crime emerged. This type of crime has turned its attention to certain areas favored by the climate of globalization, such as drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, trafficking in nuclear materials, terrorism, prostitution, pedophilia, money laundering, theft and smuggling expensive cars, theft and smuggling of cultural heritage objects, kidnapping businessmen and celebrities in order to blackmail and extortion of funds, corruption in multinational companies, government leaders perversion piracy trucks and marine vessels,

environmental pollution and theft of money through computers. The organized crime has donned a globalized issue, affecting public safety, clouding the sovereignty of states and agitating the effective exercise of economic institutions, political and social.

From day to day, the manifestations of organized crime have diversified, moving from traditional areas such as gambling, usury and prostitution, international trafficking in stolen cars, theft of art objects and archaeological fraud Credit cards, rare animal trade, etc., leading to the organization of criminal activity (reception areas, production, transport, recovery, protection). In recent years, as a result of national conflicts, ethnic and even interstate, a large number of military stores fell under the control of criminal gangs, which makes the traffic in arms, toxic and radioactive substances to know an unprecedented, almost out of control increase. The electronic communication systems can not be classified exactly, are vulnerable to criminal activities committed through computers. The damage is enormous, and the authors have very high chances of not being discovered.

And, as a consequence of the development of criminality is that, through corruption, the organized crime goes up to the tops of society, including the vital institutions of the state, affecting its freedom and safety.

Bibliography

1. ASMUS, Ronald; DIMITROV, Konstantin; FORBRIG, Joerg, O nouă strategie euroatlantică pentru regiunea Mării Negre, Editura IRSI „Nicolae Titulescu”, 2004.
2. BLANK, Stephen, Studii de securitate, www.nato.int.
3. CONSTANTINESCU, Laurențiu, Marea Neagră: un lac prea disputat, Revista Cadran Politic, Nr. 39.8.
4. FRUNZETI, Teodor; ZODIAN, Vladimir (coord.), Lumea 2009, Editura CTEA, București, 2009.
5. FRUNZETI, Teodor, Geostrategie, Editura CTEA, București, 2009.
6. HANGANU, Marius; STAN, Ion, Transcaucazia în ecuația securității din zona Mării Negre, Editura CTEA, București, 2009.
7. HUREZEANU, Emil, Aventuri la Marea



NATO AND EU: POLITICS, STRATEGIES, ACTIONS

Neagră, Cotidianul România Liberă, din 5 iulie 2007.

8. SECRIERU, Stanislav; CIOCULESCU, Șerban F., Zona extinsă a Mării Negre – noua frontieră a Uniunii Europene, în Cadrul Politic (Revistă de analiză și informare politică), Nr. 21, 2007.

9. SMFN, Marea Neagră – Spațiul de confluență a intereselor geostrategice, Editura CTEA, București, 2005.

10. ***, Securitate și Stabilitate în Bazinul Mării Negre, a V-a sesiune internațională de comunicări științifice, 21-22 noiembrie 2005, Universitatea Națională de Apărare „Carol I”, Centrul de Studii Strategice de Apărare și

Securitate, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, București, 2005.

11. Comunicarea Comisiei Europene către Consiliul și Parlamentul European, COM (2007) 160 FINAL, Bruxelles.

12. Președinția României, Strategia Națională de Securitate a României, București, 2007.

13. Guvernul României, Carta albă a securității și apărării naționale, București, 2004.

14. <http://www.antiterrorism.org/articolemain.php>.

15. www.generatieauropeana.ro/home/article/ro/intro/eseuri/geopolitica_siguranta/securitate_prin_.

16. www.presamil.ro.

Rear Admiral (r.) professor Marius HANGANU (mhanganu@unap.ro), PhD, is the Deputy Commandant for Scientific Research (pro-rector) at “Carol I” National Defence University.

Commander associate professor Ion CHIORCEA (chiorcea44@yahoo.com), PhD, is dean for education at the Faculty of Command and Major Staff from “Carol I” National Defence University.



THE IMPACT OF NATO SUMMIT AND NATO-RUSSIA HIGH LEVEL MEETING OVER THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM

*Petre DUȚU, PhD
Ioana Valeria ALEXE*

World's states concert their efforts on security matters concerning their citizens and countries. The strategic orientations are settled at the organizations' summits wherein they participate or cooperate. At the Lisbon Summit from November 2010, was adopted the Alliance's New Strategic Concept for the following ten years. In their turn, NATO-Russia and NATO-European Union Summits from Lisbon revealed the active roles assumed by the EU and Russia as regards, on the one hand, the European and global security and, on the other hand, their responsible cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic Alliance.

Key-words: strategic concept; NATO; European Union; Russia; treaty; security risks and threats; continuity; novelties.

1. Essential objectives of NATO Lisbon Summit from 19-20 November 2010

Into the NATO Lisbon Summit's framework, from 19-20 November 2010, crucial decisions were adopted. In this regard, we mention:

✓ *NATO will continue to defend and promote the common democratic values enounced in the Washington Treaty and also the goals and principles of the UN Chart. In this concern, the Alliance has the duty and the will to continue to fulfil efficiently and with the continuous respect of international law the three essential basic tasks – collective defence, crises management and cooperative security – all contributing to its members protection;*

✓ *The calendar of troops' withdrawal since now until 2014 from Afghanistan without aban-*

doing this country. For this goal, the combatant troops' withdrawal will be done step-by-step starting now until 2014. Also, consequently, there will take place a transfer of responsibilities and operations to the Afghani forces which will be formed with NATO member-states support;

✓ *Europe's protection with an anti-missile shield for which implementation NATO will cooperate with Russia;*

✓ *NATO Strategic Concept redefinition in regard to the new security threats. The threats emphasized into the Summit's framework are: international terrorism, cyber-attacks able to paralyze at distance the essential infrastructures for state's economy, biological or chemical aggressions able to spread panic to urban population or the emergency of super-armed failed states candidate to nuclear weapon and unpredictable dangers, security of energetic supplies; also, there were discussions about technical, human and financial means NATO should engage in order to protect its member states' citizens from these new threats;*

✓ *NATO renewal by its structures' diminution in order to make it more efficient, more adaptable. In fact, it can be stated that the more general objective of the Summit was to define "the direction the Alliance will follow for the future 10 years to become more efficient, more engaged in the world then it was before"¹.*

Consequently, the Summit created the opportunity for organizing some high level meetings between NATO and Russia and also between NATO and the European Union.

In our opinion, these Summits' organization allowed the resolution of some basic problems



concerning, on the one hand, the relations between NATO and Russia and, on the other hand, the ones between NATO and the European Union. By the settlements between the mentioned actors especially in matter of European security, we consider it was recognized the significant and consistent role of NATO, Russia and EU in ensuring and maintaining the European security and also for maintaining world peace and stability.

Concurrently, NATO Summit, NATO-Russia Summit and NATO-EU Summit contributed to the relaxation/amelioration of the relations between these actors. And, it also was offered, to world's states and to non-state actors with vocation and/or important role in security matters, an example of former enemies renouncing to the things dividing/disuniting them and, now, cooperating to counteract new threats everybody should confront at present and in the future.

2. Definitive elements of the NATO's New Strategic Concept

In our regard, the text analysis of NATO's New Strategic Concept content emphasizes two main aspects as showed below:

1) **The continuity** of North-Atlantic Treaty Organization's activity on all its dimensions. Here, we regard the following:

✓ *NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role, to guarantee the common defence and security for its member-states;*

✓ *The Alliance will provide the defence of its member-states' citizens against the new security threats (here, there are also included the risks and threats coming from the virtual space);*

✓ *Crises prevention, conflict management and stabilization of post-conflict situations, by acting together with its international partners, and mainly with the UN and the European Union;*

✓ *Offers its partners from the whole world a political engagement of the Alliance and as well as a substantial role in the orientation of NATO-led operation they contribute to;*

✓ *NATO will continue to support the EU activities to prevent crises and conflicts outside this organization's frontiers;*

✓ *NATO engages to create conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but the Alliance reconfirms the fact that as long there will be nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain*

a nuclear Alliance;

✓ *The maintenance of NATO's "open door" policy for all the European democracies meeting the admission criteria because enlargement contributes to fulfilling the objectives of free, unite and peaceful Europe;*

✓ *The Alliance remains open to reform and continue transformation to become more efficient, more effective and more adaptable and the contributors would obtain the maximum of security for their investment in defence;*

✓ *NATO remains the only and indispensable forum for transatlantic consultation for all the matters that infringe member states' territorial integrity, political independence and security;*

2) **The novelty elements of NATO's activity.** Among those, in our opinion, there are the following:

✓ *Cooperative security.* The Euro-Atlantic area abode, abide and will abide the influence of events, phenomena and processes in security matters produced outside it. Herein, we regard the international crises and conflicts. To counteract or limit the unwanted effects of those, the Alliance will build political and security developments intervening beyond its frontiers. It will actively contribute to international security strengthening, engaging a partnership with the adequate countries and organizations, consequently, acting to arms' control, non-proliferation and disarmament;

✓ The appreciation that *the terrorism is a direct threat* for the security for NATO states' citizens' security but also for international stability and prosperity. Today, terrorism has new forms of manifestation by the recourse to modern technologies and by the possible acquisition of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological capacities. Also, cyber-terrorism experiences an amplification;

✓ *The inclusion of risks and threats coming from the virtual space in the range of security threats².* At present, is seen the increase of cyber-attacks frequency which are also better organized and producing more costly damages to administrations, enterprises, economies and, potentially, also to transport and supply networks and to other critical infrastructure. There are appreciations that these attacks from the cyber-space risk to reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability. Foreign militaries and intelligence



services, organized crime, terrorist and/or extremist groups can be the source of such attacks;

✓ *The Alliance's engagement will also be active, responsible and efficient in energetic security matters.* In this concern, NATO will act firmly, inclusively as regards the protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, by cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning;

✓ *The Alliances involvement when it's possible and necessary to prevent or manage a crisis, to stabilize a post-conflict situation or to support the reconstruction.* This is needed because crises or conflicts can emerge beyond the Alliance's frontiers, posing direct threats for the member states' territory and for populations' security;

✓ *The constant surveillance and analysis of the international environment by NATO* to anticipate the crises and intervene with active measures to hinder them from transforming into conflicts;

✓ *Alliance's active, responsible and consistent involvement in conflicts' management* when these couldn't be prevented. In this regard, NATO disposes of unique means for conflicts' management including an unparalleled capability to protect and deploy robust military forces in the field. Thus, NATO proves its contribution to international conflict management efforts;

✓ *NATO offers its services to contribute to the stabilization and reconstruction* constantly cooperating and consulting with the other international actors interested in solving conflicts;

✓ *The promotion of a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organizations around the globe* for Euro-Atlantic security, and not only, to be provided the best. In this concern, the Alliance will strengthen its partnerships through flexible formats that bring NATO and partners together – across and beyond the existing frameworks;

✓ *The appreciation that NATO and Russia security are indissolubly connected* and a solid and constructive partnership sustained on mutual confidence can best serve both entities' security. Among the NATO-Russia partnership's shared interests there are: missile defence, counter-terrorism, drugs traffic and maritime security. Therefore, is envisaged the organization of military

exercises for all the allies to feel secure and for proving the Alliance becomes more polyvalent in order to be able to confront dangers coming from sources representing a great geographical and technological diversity;

✓ *NATO renewal in order to handle the security challenges of the 21st century.* Thus, are regarded its efficiency preservation as the most successful political-military alliance in the world and NATO's prosperity as a source of hope because it is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and rule of law and because its common essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members;

✓ *The recognition of fact that past experiences proved that the military means alone, even if they are essential, aren't enough for an adequate answer to the new security provocations³.* Hence, the necessity of the efficient combination of the political, civil and military instruments for crises and conflicts management in the Euro-Atlantic space or beyond it.

In its ensemble, NATO's New Strategic Concept's text shows the image of a robust, flexible, determined and capable political-military organization to fulfil, on the one hand, its assumed objectives and responsibilities in collective defence and security matters and, on the other hand, in international security. Thus, the Alliance has sufficient resources – financial, military and human – to carry out its missions. Moreover, NATO maintains and even emphasizes the active attitude related to collective and international security, constantly based on the knowledge of realities from the Euro-Atlantic and global space, on risks' and threats' anticipation and prevention as well as on the member or partner state and non-state actors efforts to provide the stability and sustainable development of humanity.

3. Russia's expectations regarding NATO's Summit and its high level meeting at the Lisbon Alliance's Summit from 19-20.11.2010

The analysis of the documents concerning the both high level meetings – NATO Summit and NATO-Russia Summit – and the declarations of the two presidents, Obama and Medvedev, (after their unanticipated meeting in Lisbon, in



November 2010) emphasizes a series of important aspects regarding the evolution of the relations between USA and Russia, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, between NATO and Russia.

In our opinion, mainly, on the occasion of the three mentioned activities, were approached, equally realistic and constructive, by the involved actors the following issues:

- the situation concerning the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) which ratification is constantly reported by the USA Senate. Both USA and Russia hope to overlap the actual moment of deservedness owed to the American Senate which hasn't yet ratified the respective treaty⁴;

- Russia's active involvement by a close cooperation with NATO in problems related to the numerous countries' nuclear programs. Referring to Iran, the Russian president mentioned "this state must prove the civil character of its nuclear program"⁵. Thus, through Russia – USA cooperation on countries' nuclear programs, it is possible for the tensed situation between USA and Iran due to the latter preoccupations to develop many nuclear programs, seen by USA as aiming military goals, to come back to normality;

- Russia's cooperation to put in practice an anti-missile defence system for the European region. President Dmitri Medvedev stated Russia wants to realize this cooperation on bases of equity in rights, technologies and responsibility principles. This cooperation must take the shape of a partnership. "Either we fully participate by exchanging information, by assuming responsibly the solution for some problems or we don't participate at all. If we don't participate, it is easily understood the fact we will be obliged to defend ourselves"⁶". NATO response against the Russia's exigencies concerning the anti-missile shield was a constructive and responsible one. In this regard, the Alliance officially invited Russia to cooperate for putting into practice an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence system for the Euro-Atlantic region. "We decided to develop the anti-missile defence capabilities to protect the population, territory and troops of NATO European countries and we invited Russia to cooperate", affirms the final statement of Lisbon Summit⁷. But, as the Russian president appreciates, in first, NATO should precise its own conception on Russia integration into the European anti-missile defence

system. "Now, we evaluate the European ABM concept. Still, I think the Alliance should state how it sees the Russian adhesion to this system. After analyzing this proposal, we will be able to decide over the future means of work starting from the European ABM concept"⁸. Also, the American position concludes "Russia will participate in NATO's anti-missile shield only after it would become operational. When the anti-missile shield will be fully operational, it will protect 28 allies of NATO". Then the anti-missile shield protection could extend to other countries and to integrate Alliance's partners for which the ballistic missile poses a threat to assess their security and to improve their own system of protection. In this regard, NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, evoked many times the need to expand a shield to cover all the territory from Vancouver to Vladivostok integrating the American ABM, the future European system and the Russian anti-missile formations⁹. Still, presently, isn't taken into account the creation of an integrated system with Russia but a connection between its own anti-ballistic system and Moscow's one which will consist into a mutual exchange of information and alert procedures;

- Russia's relation with NATO, at present and for the future. As regards the obtaining by Russia of NATO member status, the Russian president appreciated as "this isn't a priority for Russia", but he doesn't exclude "a closer cooperation in the future"¹⁰;

- Russia's involvement in the Alliance's materials withdrawal from Afghanistan. So, Russia and NATO ended the negotiations regarding the elaboration of an agreement over Alliance's materials withdrawal from Afghanistan through Russian territory. "I'm happy to announce we finished the elaboration of a mechanism to perfect the materials' transit through Russia's territory for International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan", declared NATO Secretary General in the Russia-NATO Council session opening¹¹;

- NATO doesn't pose "any threat" for Russia, affirms the Alliance's New Strategic Concept approved at Lisbon by the 28 allied states' leaders. On the contrary, in conformity with the final declaration of NATO Summit, it is desired an authentic strategic partnership between the Alliance and Russia and will be actions in this sense



waiting reciprocity from Russia. It is needed to be underlined that the explicit mention that NATO **doesn't pose threat for Russia** appeared for the first time into the Alliance's concept. Therefore, NATO wants to build a strategic partnership with Russia, announced NATO Secretary General, on 18th November 2010. "Our relations with Russia will have a new turn to build a strategic partnership with this country", declared NATO Secretary General, opening the first plenary session of Alliance's Summit at Lisbon¹².

Lisbon Summit and NATO-Russia Summit by their discussions' and the final adopted documents' content led to the improvement of the direct relations, on the one hand, between Russia and NATO and, on the other hand, between Russia and the USA. It is well known they got through "a tough tensioned period of time" following the Russian-Georgian war from August 2008. Practically, NATO Lisbon Summit allowed the conciliation of the North-Atlantic Alliance with Russia and the improvement of Russia and USA relations.

Conclusions

Lisbon NATO and NATO-Russia Summits, from November 2010, adopted important documents for the ascendant evolution of North-Atlantic Alliance and also for the improvement of USA-Russia and NATO-Russia relations.

NATO's New Strategic Concept underlines the continuity and the novelty elements of the Alliance's activity in matters of collective security and defence but also of international security assessment. Also, it was emphasized the need for NATO, for its partner states and organizations, and also for the other global non-state actors to efficiently combine the political, civilian and military instruments to solve the crises and conflicts from the Euro-Atlantic and international space.

Consequently, NATO Summit allowed *the elaboration of the first common report of NATO and Russia over security threats (terrorism, piracy, nuclear and ballistic proliferation etc.) the both are confronted to.*

Russia expectations related to NATO and NATO-Russia Summits can be appreciated as realistic and, therefore, achievable. The impact of the both high level meetings, taking place on 19-

20 November 2010, at Lisbon, over the relations between NATO and Russia and, concomitantly, between the USA and Russia can be appreciated as significant and strong, with positive effects on matter of European and international security.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ABM: l'Otan invite la Russie à la coopération (déclaration), <http://fr.rian.ru/world/20101120/187918892.html>
2. ABM européen/Russie: Medvedev veut plus de précisions de la part de l'Otan, <http://fr.rian.ru/world/20101019/187666534.html>
3. Bouclier antimissile européen: Moscou prône l'équité, <http://fr.rian.ru/world/20101121/187921117.html>
4. Bouclier antimissile otanien: Moscou intégré après la mise en service (officiel US), <http://fr.rian.ru/defense/20101117/187889137.html>,
5. Déclaration du sommet de Lisbonne, http://www.nato.int/cps/fr/SID-FA0D35D5-B78120E9/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease,
6. Engagement actif, défense moderne, http://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm
7. Nucléaire: Moscou est prête à coopérer avec l'Otan, <http://fr.rian.ru/world/20101121/187921253.html>
8. OTAN-Russie: vers un partenariat stratégique (Rasmussen), <http://fr.rian.ru/world/20101119/187913653.html>
9. Russie-OTAN l'intégration à l'Alliance n'est pas une priorité (Medvedev), <http://fr.rian.ru/world/20101121/187920919.html>
10. La Russie accepte le projet de bouclier antimissile à condition d'y participer vraiment, <http://fr.euronews.net/2010/11/21/la-russie-accepte-le-projet-de-bouclier-antimissile-a-condition-d-y-participer-/>
11. Sommet de l'Otan: changements stratégiques en vue, http://www.lexpress.fr/actualites/1/sommet-de-l-otan-changements-strategiques-en-vue_938171.html?actu=1,
12. Transit afghan: l'accord Russie-Otan sur le retour des frets élaboré (Rasmussen), <http://fr.rian.ru/world/20101120/187918727.html>



NOTES:

1 Sommet de l'Otan: changements stratégiques en vue, http://www.lexpress.fr/actualites/1/sommet-de-l-otan-changements-strategiques-en-vue_938171.html?actu=1, p. 1.

2 Engagement actif, défense moderne, http://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm, p. 4.

3 Déclaration du sommet de Lisbonne, http://www.nato.int/cps/fr/SID-FA0D35D5-B78120E9/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease, p. 3.

4 In December 2010, US Senate and the Russian Duma ratified the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

5 Nucléaire: Moscou est prête à coopérer avec l'Otan, <http://fr.rian.ru/world/20101121/187921253.html>.

6 Bouclier antimissile européen: Moscou prône l'équité, <http://fr.rian.ru/world/20101121/187921117.html>.

7 ABM: l'Otan invite la Russie à la coopération (déclaration), <http://fr.rian.ru/world/20101120/187918892.html>.

8 ABM européen/Russie: Medvedev veut plus de précisions de la part de l'Otan, <http://fr.rian.ru/world/20101019/187666534.html>.

9 Cf. Bouclier antimissile otanien: Moscou intégré après la mise en service (officiel US), <http://fr.rian.ru/defense/20101117/187889137.html>.

10 Russie-OTAN l'intégration à l'Alliance n'est pas une priorité (Medvedev), <http://fr.rian.ru/world/20101121/187920919.html>.

11 Transit afghan: l'accord Russie-Otan sur le retour des frets élaboré (Rasmussen), <http://fr.rian.ru/world/20101120/187918727.html>.

12 OTAN-Russie: vers un partenariat stratégique (Rasmussen), <http://fr.rian.ru/world/20101119/187913653.html>.

Petre DUȚU (dutupetre@yahoo.com), PhD, senior scientific researcher at the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from "Carol I" National Defence University, author of numerous articles, studies and specialty paperwork on security issues.

Ioana Valeria ALEXE (alex_ioana2000@yahoo.com) is a PhD candidate in Military Sciences and Information at „Carol I” National Defence University; she is also university lecturer at the Faculty of Political Sciences, Sociology and International Relations from Hyperion University, Bucharest.



SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF NATO AND EU ENLARGEMENT IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

Gheorghe CALOPĂREANU, PhD

After the events of 11th September 2001, the importance of the Wider Black Sea Area has been reconsidered in order to increase it. By default, the security in the area has begun to be seen and perceived not only from transatlantic perspective but also under regional side.

The lack of a common vision on the area is not the exclusive issue of the countries in this region. The Euro-Atlantic actors have not prepared a strategic plan to develop the region, which continues to face several unresolved secessionist conflicts, organized crime on international scale, the existence of terrorist groups and, last but not least, military threats from the Russian Federation.

Key-words: The Wider Black Sea Area; EU; NATO; security; interests.

Introduction

The Black Sea region has been for millennia the link between Europe and Asia, and the stability of both continents has equally influenced the region's security.

In its turn, the security level of the riparian countries in the Black Sea region ensure the security of the entire Europe, which is the reason why the Black Sea region is more and more regarded as one of the fundamental components of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, both present and future.

The fall of the Soviet Union has allowed direct access of six countries to the Black Sea – Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia. For the last four, the only maritime access is “the Pontus Euxinus’ path”.

There are also countries with indirect link to Euxinus Pontus. These are the states whose maritime access is exclusively made through the Danube, the largest river from the Black Sea basin. Because of its location in the depth of the continent, the Black Sea has such a connection. Thus, Republic of Moldova, through the maritime Danube, which is its neighbor on a 1.8 kilometers length, is considered to be a riparian country of the Black Sea.

NATO enlargement to the east of the continent, by including Romania and Bulgaria too, ranks for the first time the six Black Sea riparian countries in a position of numerical parity 3/3, which, in conjunction with the Alliance's special partnership relations with Russia, Ukraine and Georgia, should lead to the achievement of a certain balance and to the cancellation of the former Soviet countries' influence in the region.

Implications and security interests in the region

Europe's political and administrative geography has undergone serious changes since 1989, with implications whose effects are highly visible and which are likely to have strong echoes in the future too. The changes were possible in an European context often predetermined, requiring the intervention of certain international bodies and organizations, evidenced by increasing the control of the United Nations Organization in the region, by the clear definition of NATO's security and defence interests, through the extension towards East and a stronger and institutionalized involvement of the EU, as well as other measures and actions.



Romania's admission to NATO resulted in bringing closer the borders of this political and military alliance to Russia's Western border. Despite this Romanian success, and considering the existence of a certain convergence area of the interests of the Russian Federation and the US (connected, on the one hand, to the common desire to limit the terrorist phenomenon, which threatens directly the two countries and, as we have already seen, can be a very dangerous enemy with whom even a great military power, in spite of its offensive potential, can have serious trouble, on the other hand, to the tacit agreement reached by the two superpowers to not disturb each other, in the regions of direct influence or in their proximity), it can be stated that Romania's accession to NATO would not have been possible without Russia's agreement.

As a NATO member, Romania benefits from guaranteeing its security by the organization in the case in which it could be, at some point, the victim of an aggression. In relation to NATO, the Black Sea region now has three members of the Alliance – Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria, three countries that want to enter NATO, namely Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan, two countries that have developed actions plans - Ukraine and Moldova and Armenia, Partnership for Peace member, but which has a strong partnership with Russia, while Russia has a special relation with the North-Atlantic Alliance in NATO Council-Russia.

This entire Alliance's complex of relations unequivocally points out the fact that NATO is an important actor in the Wider Black Sea Area, with all the costs, responsibilities and consequences this status involves.

For many reasons, the Wider Black Sea Area is a challenge for the EU, but also an opportunity for an eventual success. On one hand, the risks and threats listed in the European Security Strategy, launched in June 2003, are entirely characteristic to the Black Sea region. On the other hand, however, the Black Sea has a positive potential, such as the existence of a market for the EU products or facilitating the oil and natural gas transportation from the Caspian Sea to Europe, which diversifies the imports of natural resources of the European countries.

The new neighborhood policy generously gives to the EU the tools it needs to be able to neutralize

the threats from this region and to capitalize the regional economic opportunities.

However, success involves a series of steps, such as active involvement in solving frozen conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and in Nagorno-Karabakh, which should be top priority. All these conflicts are latent, but they can recrudescence at any time, destabilizing the entire region. Preventing such a disaster, which would affect not only the region in question, implies the EU efforts focus on the internalization of the peacekeeping forces and on extending the negotiation format. However, achieving this goal is directly connected to the evolution of EU-Russia relations, which have a strategic importance for the EU. Statistics show that over the next decade, natural gas and oil imports in the EU will record spectacular growth. It is believed that, Russia will become more and more important for the EU countries, in terms of energetic security, and the Union has a strong interest in diversifying supply sources.

The need to align the interests of the big players in the Wider Black Sea Area could be the support that the EU needs to become the engine of the intraregional integration in this region. The EU involvement in the area can take many forms, from the launch of joint projects of economic reconstruction or modernization of the communication and transport infrastructures, to effective border control cooperation, by introducing new information technologies and information exchange between competent services in providing border security.

Thus, being in the middle of a foundation process of its own external and security policies and, with a new Reform Treaty, entered into force at Lisbon, at the end of 2009, with an European Foreign Minister, supported by a common diplomatic service, the EU is the most suited actor to participate in the stabilization, development and modernization of the Wider Black Sea Area.

But, for all these to be accomplished, the European and transatlantic organizations should develop complementary policies for the settlement of frozen conflicts and the consolidation of democratic values in Ukraine and Moldova, thus showing that the mentioned organizations understood the importance of involvement and, as such, they respond positively to these security challenges.



However, in order to win, in the security field, a price must be paid. This mainly refers to democratic reforms, which are related with the EU, NATO and Washington interests in terms of enlarging the transatlantic and Western security community. Although it seems high, the price is worth paying. Both NATO and EU have well-developed tools, the so called “acquis”, with which they can induce or compel the concerned governments to comply with organizations’ standards, as a membership condition.

These “acquis” are very important for the new Eurasian security order which is under development. They provide a formal structure in which democratization is much more than the mere acceptance of free elections, run in democratic ways and whose results are mandatory. Democratization equally requires respect for civil liberties and human rights, separation between church and state and, not less important, the overall scaling of the armed forces as a center of power that establishes priorities and agendas for national security. In turn, such changes make possible exerting a genuine civil and democratic control over the use of force, as well as the suppression of paramilitary or non-state armed groups. Restoring a legitimate state monopoly on the use of force field does not create democracy. But, as Joseph Nye wrote, security is like oxygen, without which it is impossible to achieve anything else. Since many regional conflicts are caused by the weakness of countries that can not control their own force instruments available, the measures taken to help strengthening and legitimizing such control should be generally accepted.

All security organizations bring different strengths to the table, but they must fundament their operations on a joint assessment of threats and a shared strategy. When the priority is to solve conflicts, we need a much bigger effort in order to determine Russia to keep the commitment taken through the Istanbul Agreement, in 1999, to withdraw its bases from Georgia and Moldova and to unlock the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in Nagorno-Karabakh. Efforts must be directed towards Russia, meaning it should partake of any regional settlement, without leading towards the establishment of a Russian protectorate over the region. In fact, it is strongly believed that Russia should understand that it can not ensure its own security protection by

destabilizing neighboring countries and sowing insecurity around its borders.

The ways and solving initiatives of some of the conflicts in the Black Sea region should occupy a prominent place in all forums and debates that aim the Euro Atlantic security region.

Time factor is crucial because in the region it shows, apart from the positive trends (Moldova call to OSCE for help to be saved by an underway intervention, supported by Moscow, Russia may accept the European conditions as a way towards a political settlement in Chechnya, the signals of a security organization from Europe showing an increased interest towards the frozen negotiations on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and in Caucasus, Armenia’s efforts to strengthen its ties with the West), and, negative trends that, if neglected, could undermine any significant progress in the region (frequent clashes between the Azeri and Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh enclaves are, most probably, the best example of such threats).

The prospect of increasing stability in the Wider Black Sea Area should determine Washington, EU and NATO to work together, if possible, even with Russia, to launch an initiative that is comprehensive, multilateral in order to improve security in the region.

North-Atlantic Alliance is starting to play a key role in stabilizing and defending the Black Sea region. The importance of the Black Sea region was acknowledged by choosing Istanbul for the 2004 NATO Summit.

No matter the position towards the Alliance of the Wider Black Sea Area countries (full member, partner), the presence of NATO in the area could help improve the business environment in the region because improving security conditions usually leads to stronger economic conditions. At the same time, NATO can contribute to environmental preservation and regeneration by supporting local implementation of international local scientific and technological programs.

In recent decades, Caucasus countries have used programs such as Partnership for Peace as important tools in cooperation with NATO.

NATO enlargement towards Eastern Europe places for the first time the six Black Sea riparian countries (Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria) in a numerical parity: three member states (Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria)



and three non-member states (Georgia, Russia, Ukraine).

Several years later, the EU enlargement has introduced a new strategic element in the region, by including three countries bordering the Black Sea region in the prosperity area of the single market and in future arrangements concerning foreign policy, security policy and common defence policy. The approval by the EU of the conceptual framework of the relations with the Eastern neighboring countries, which participated in the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), is a clear indication of the European interest rise towards the Black Sea region.

The EU commitment to take over the main responsibility in the Balkans through the Stabilization and Association Process, envisaging including the countries in the region through enlargement processes, gives a new dimension to the efforts to crystallize EU foreign policy, with a significant component of sub-regional security.

Essential element of ensuring security, regional cooperation framework in the Black Sea Area includes the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, already mentioned, the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) and, last but not least, the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR).

The latter is a regional initiative that is part of Black Sea riparian countries' efforts to strengthen trust and understanding between the signatory states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine), as well as developing cooperation and interoperability between naval forces. The initiative was launched by Turkey, at the meeting of Military Naval Commanders of the countries bordering the Black Sea, at Varna, in April 1998, at which participated the following countries: Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine. They rotate in terms of managing BLACKSEAFOR, in alphabetical order. The missions of the force are search and rescue at sea (SAR Ops), humanitarian assistance (FIA), actions against sea mines (MCM), operations of protecting the environment, visits of good offices (GV), as well as other missions approved by the Agreement parties.

The status of the force is „ON CALL”. The force is activated at least once a year and consists

in minimum 4-6 ships (of the following categories: destroyer/frigate, corvette/patrol boat, dredger, amphibious ships, auxiliary ship and vessels) of the six riparian states, including a control and command vessel. The ships will stay in their permanent bases and will meet during the execution of joint drills – for up to 10 days in a port of the host country (established by rotation in alphabetical order) – or to participate in missions.

BLACKSEAFOR may be available for employment in operations mandated by the UN or the OSCE. Also, it can participate in other types of international activities in accordance with its goals and missions.

Moreover, the creation of Multinational Peace Force in South East Europe (MPFSEE) should contribute significantly to the increase of security and stability in the Black Sea region. This project was launched at the meeting of defence ministers from South-Eastern Europe (Sofia, 3rd October, 1997) and mapped out the establishment of a multinational force of Brigade value that would carry out peace missions, under UN and OSCE. The project was successful and, in order to make it happen, most countries in South-East Europe participated, regardless of their membership to the European and Euro-Atlantic security structures. In addition to member states, Slovenia, the US and Croatia participate as observers.

The existence of these initiatives provides the context of development for the cooperation in the Danube basin, which will lead to the revitalization of river communication and its conversion into a genuine European waterway thoroughfare that harnesses the maritime and river transport routes across the Black Sea area, including the connection with the Caspian Sea basin through the Volga-Don system.

If we accept the idea that there is a geopolitical need for the development of the Wider Black Sea Area identity in conditions of security and that NATO and EU will show a common interest, it becomes obvious that the two bodies should cooperate to integrate, internally and externally, the region and to carry out the local and Euro-Atlantic security objectives.

The EU has understood the fact that looking at the Wider Black Sea Area in terms of security only, is an extremely important factor, but not enough and that hidden tensions and their consequences must be addressed directly. The countries in the



region, excluding Russia, seem to be drawn by the project of getting closer to the EU, although a way of solving it is neither detected nor clearly stated.

In turn, NATO must play a leading role in developing a strategy to expand military cooperation in the Black Sea basin, which could lead to fewer problems that could affect the security in the region. In this case, and if the countries that are part of this new identified geopolitical area do not find a way to settle the existing conflicts, the probability the Wider Black Sea Area to gain its own identity, in terms of security, remains low.

NATO and the European Union should understand the differences in interests in respect to the geo-strategic space, between Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and the other riparian and adjacent countries, the importance of the geo-energetic resources in the area (gas and oil), as well as the fact that the other key players from Euro-Asian region (China and India) may become key factors in the region (particularly in the South Caucasus), in default of viable initiatives.

The two organizations are aware that without the agreement and/or the involvement of Russia and Ukraine, nothing constructive can happen in this area and that all active and “frozen conflicts” significantly reduce any coherent political success in the “small” countries, the agreement of the “great beneficiary” – Russia – being decisive. On the other hand, if not handled properly at the negotiation table, Turkey itself will be devoid of any constructive interest, being known the differences of opinion with the EU in terms of its own integration.

However, NATO enlargement to the Black Sea Area must be accompanied by a change of direction, if they want to project stability where it is needed. Many of Europe’s concerns, like drugs, weapons and human trafficking, illegal migration, terrorism and potential nuclear proliferation, can only be addressed by including the Black Sea in NATO institutional framework. Moreover, the regions where there are frozen conflicts and the recruitment and support areas of the terrorist or criminal organizations are of a real and obvious interest to NATO.

Without doubt, the two structures underpinning the transatlantic relations and that are the most important global players from a political, military, economic and financial perspective understand very well the above mentioned realities. There are

still a lot of steps to be made in order to get from understanding the issue to starting practical and viable initiatives. Are they achievable in the near future?

There is no doubt, Russia, an important key player, that, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, has acted as “the great actor”, will continue to act in the region according to its own interests, which, at this moment, are not directed towards solving regional issues and towards creating a security zone in the Black Sea Area, as insecurity and the lack of a coherent identity of the region seems to be exactly what it wants.

Although there are many pessimistic reasons regarding the success of creating a geopolitical region in the Wider Black Sea Area in the next 25 years, for the reasons stated above, through joint efforts of the neighboring countries in the region with the ones of NATO, EU countries and the US, the future can be favorable to the region, especially since it may abandon the status of eastern border of the two organizations, in the event that they will extend towards this direction.

The way the future at the Black Sea is glimpsed

As soon as some of the countries in the Wider Black Sea Area have developed an invisible relationship with the Euro-Atlantic structures, some EU member states have shown a growing interest towards this area, which means there are ample opportunities for the development of the initiatives on future integration of the region into Euro-Atlantic structures, thus becoming a new focus point of the transatlantic cooperation. Hence more efforts should be made to increase the role of programs such as Partnership for Peace, Stability Pact and the Black Sea Initiative, thus focusing particularly on actual projects and initiatives.

Against this background, NATO can continue the current cooperation programs and can influence the partner countries to initiate or continue other reform processes. More than ever they must exploit the potential given by the development of future cooperation with other international organizations, like the EU or OSCE. Russia’s strategic interest in the region is another issue that guarantees the future attention on the importance of the Wider Black Sea Area. Acknowledging that Russia is a key player in this region, it is obvious



that solutions to the existing problems, such as open or frozen conflicts, can not be found without involving Russia also. An issue that has to be solved is to make Russia to become a voice in the region, and, very importantly, a constructive voice. The solution does not seem to be very simple, especially after the last round of accession to NATO, which, finally, brought Romania and Bulgaria between the full members of the Alliance and, subsequently, led to the integration of the two countries in the EU, events that proved to be totally against Russia wishes and interests in the region. Another fact that can not be neglected is the impact of one or more outside players that are strong enough to negotiate on the same level with Russia. The United States of America have become quite powerful and, it makes its presence felt in the region, which raises the question whether or not the US activity should be reduced or taken by a multilateral presence. On the other hand, it may be said that, on the contrary, as the European Union cancels some interests, which were once convergent with the ones of the US, the latter should make its presence felt more and more in the region.

The impact of the actors outside the region involvement will be felt by countries in the Wider Black Sea Area, regardless the way in which the situation will be solved.

Conclusions

Focusing on managing the new situation, to view its potential consequences in terms of stability and security in a triple border – Romania, NATO and EU – is of utmost importance to the present.

As access path to the Caspian resources, the Black Sea continues to have undiscovered facets of a global security perspective. From this perspective, this region is considered a challenge, especially on risks or asymmetrical threats dimension, and they often forget that the Black Sea was not and it is not a confrontation area but, firstly, a synthesis area, where relations have a historical tradition, which makes it that today, the residents – either allies, partners, other countries – can extend the cooperation exercise in and for security.

Since 2004, the Black Sea issue has returned to NATO and EU attention, which is quite natural if

we consider that the European and Euro-Atlantic space has expanded and shifted its gravity center eastward. The current concerns in this area should not be interpreted so narrowly, strictly circumscribed to a negative connotation, but rather in terms of extension of the space of democracy, stability and security towards Caucasus. This is also NATO intention, whose members admitted for the first time, officially, in Istanbul, that the region is very important to the Euro-Atlantic security.

The next logical step is to identify ways to exploit the potential that the Wider Black Sea Area has and in terms of commerce, tourism, transportation of energy resources, being well known the fact that the Black Sea region is a bridge between geopolitical and geo-economical spaces, a commercial crossroad whose importance increases as the Caspian and Central Asia resources accede on the European and global energy markets.

The interest that the European and Euro-Atlantic security institutions have for the Black Sea region open up opportunities to strengthen the existing cooperation formats in the Alliance. This, in conjunction with the EU assistance and together with the successful regional initiatives, opens up the opportunities mentioned above. For the regional partners, NATO and EU border reverberations can become levers to exploit Euro-Atlantic benefits.

Some of the Black Sea riparian countries are facing difficulties in the reform process towards democracy and market economy, which impede their involvement in cooperation and regional integration and have to struggle with the heritage, to which there are added economic and domestic political issues, issues of conflict, the multitude of threats in the regional security environment, which significantly stresses regional cooperation and integration.

The existence, at the regional level, of certain mechanisms and known organizations, that have been already mentioned, for economic, political and military cooperation, which enhances the process of sustainable development and contribute to the stability and security of the countries in the region, is an extremely beneficial fact.

The Black Sea region is, at the same time, subjected to real external pressures that are international control mechanisms for drugs, weapons and human trafficking, combat of



organized crime, exploitation and transport of energetic resources to the West from the Caspian Sea area, the EU neighboring policy and the enlargement of this organization, like NATO, towards East.

The Black Sea Euro-Region project will take advantage of the beneficial effects in terms of security and the development of numerous specific mechanisms operating here, on the initiative of international security organizations: The Development Program launched by the UN, the Partnership for Peace initiated by NATO, the South-East European Cooperation Process, the Individual Partnership Action Plan with the Black Sea Area countries, the Program “Environmental security and toxic substances involved in gas and oil transportation in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions”, “Ecological Intervention Force Danube – Black Sea”, as well as other programs initiated by the OSCE, GUAM and CIS.

Also, the development of the Black Sea Euro-Region will be more and more influenced by the new cooperation forms, which are multiple, interdependent, opened in all fields, by the activity of the initiatives of the EU Commission for Communication on environmental cooperation in the Danube-Black Sea region or the Black Sea Commission, with significant effects in environmental policy, as well as those in the cultural, scientific, diplomatic and, last but not least, security area.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. BALTĂ, C; MARIN, Gh., *Marea Neagră, între necesitate și realitate*, CTEA Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005.
2. CALVOCORESSI, Peter, *Politica mondială după 1945*, Alffa Publishing House.
3. DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste; KASPI, Andre, *Istoria relațiilor internaționale (1948 - până în zilele noastre vol. II)*, the Publishing House of Social and Political Sciences.
4. FRUNZETI, Teodor; ZODIAN, Vladimir, *Lumea 2005, Enciclopedie Politică și Militară, Studii strategice și de securitate*, CTEA Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005.
5. NEAGOE, Visarion, *Vulnerabilități, riscuri și amenințări în FRUNZETI, Teodor; ZODIAN, Vladimir, Lumea 2005, Enciclopedie Politică și Militară, Studii strategice și de securitate*, CTEA Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005.
6. NYE, Joseph S., *East Asian Security: The Case for Deep Engagement*, în Foreign Affairs, July/August 1995, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/51210/joseph-s-nye-jr/east-asian-security-the-case-for-deep-engagement>.
7. PETRESCU, Stan, *Mediul de Securitate Global și Euroatlantic*, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005.
8. POSTEVKA, Maria; ZODIAN, Vladimir, *Mediul de securitate în Zona Lărgită a Mării Negre, în FRUNZETI, Teodor; ZODIAN, Vladimir, Lumea 2009, Enciclopedie Politică și Militară, Studii strategice și de securitate*, CTEA Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009.
9. ZODIAN, Mihai V.; ZODIAN, Vladimir, *Politica externă a României (2008-2009) în FRUNZETI, Teodor; ZODIAN, Vladimir, Lumea 2009, Enciclopedie Politică și Militară, Studii strategice și de securitate*, CTEA Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009.
10. SANDU, Marian; SITEANU, Eugen, *Securitatea Națională prin Securitatea Colectivă*, CTEA Publishing House, Bucharest, 2007.
11. SOCOL, Vladimir, *Security Priorities in the Black Sea – Caspian Region*, Black Sea University Foundation, 2003.

Colonel Gheorghe CALOPĂREANU (geocal81@yahoo.com), PhD, is the deputy commandant of „Carol I” National Defence University.



NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FROM 2002 AND 2006: TOWARDS MORE AND BETTER SECURITY?

*Pavel NEČAS
Blažej LIPPAY
René NAD'*

The aim of this paper is to compare the US National Security Strategy from 2002 with its modification from 2006. When elaborating on this topic, the authors applied the methodology of comparison of primary sources.

Due to the fact, that both National Security Strategies perceive the role of the US foreign policy through neoconservative lenses, the first chapter briefly elaborates on basic principles of President's G.W. Bush foreign policy, which had been implemented in reaction to September 11 terrorist attacks.

The second chapter is the core chapter and it is dedicated to comparison of both National Security Strategies themselves. The author compares major differences in text of each chapter of 2002 US National Security Strategy and 2006 US National Security Strategy.

Key-words: National Security Strategy; neo-conservatism; terrorism; unilateralism; pre-emptive war; "Bush Doctrine"; War on Terror.

1. Introduction

The International System represents a complex, non-hierarchic, and constantly changing environment, in which its elements – states, international and non-governmental organizations, as well as transnational corporations – are interfering with each other and come in to the conflict of interests. The most important role for a state in such system is guaranteeing of its own survival. This is achieved by providing its own

security and establishing conditions for its further development.

In order for a state to survive, it must possess an adequate military, political, and economic power. Therefore, each state must develop its own National Security Strategy necessary for its survival and development. National Security Strategy could be characterized as the application of the means to achieve a political objective; and consequently, as the art of using all elements of power of either a nation or an alliance of nations to accomplish a politically agreed aim, and the objectives of a state of an alliance of states in peace and war. Therefore, it must comprise the carefully coordinated and fully integrated use of all political, economic, military, cultural, social, moral, spiritual and psychological power available¹.

It can be argued that both the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) from 2002 and its modification from 2006 are comprehensive documents responding to threats to international security environment of the 21st century. Both documents materialize the "Bush Doctrine", which represents a major shift in the US foreign policy. The philosophy of this Doctrine is based on four neoconservative pillars. The first one is the US readiness to promote democracy, which is perceived as a tool to all global challenges, by all available means^{2,3}. The second pillar of NSS 2002 and NSS 2006 is the US readiness to conduct pre-emptive strikes toward states trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction and means of their



deployment⁴. The third NSS 2002 and NSS 2006 pillar is waging of global War on Terror⁵. The fourth, and the last, pillar are flexible deterrence options, which are designed to prevent the rise of a peer military competitor to the US⁶

2. Comparison of NSS 2002 and NSS 2006

Prior to comparison of NSS 2002 and 2006 itself, it would be helpful to remind the reader briefly about the time when NSS 2006 was published. Back in 2006, the US was already in the fourth year of engagement in the War on Terror, which major battlefields were in Iraq and Afghanistan. This war however was developing in a different path than originally anticipated by President Bush. Taliban was defeated neither militarily nor politically. The opposite was true. Due to incompetence of democratically elected Afghan president to fulfill basic needs of Afghan population, Taliban was gaining in strength and in numbers. Moreover, the same as during the Soviet-Afghan War from 1979 to 1989, enemy combatants have successfully enlarged their area of operation also to Pakistan.⁷ In Iraq, sectarian violence among Shia, Sunny Muslims, and Kurds had broke up, and on the territory of central Iraq a strong guerilla movement, composed of former Iraqi Army soldiers, had established itself with the aim to fight occupying troops. Terrorist group al-Qaeda was defeated neither. It continued to plan and to carry out its terrorists attacks, however one must admit that it was not in such scale as on September 11, 2001 for example. Palestinian-Israeli conflict reached a new peak as the result of Bush one sided policy toward this region. Surprisingly, after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iran has become the only state in the region that benefited from worsen development in the Middle East. These are the facts one must take into account when comparing NSS 2002 with NSS 2006.

2.1. Presidential Introduction

In his introduction to NSS 2002, President Bush highlights geopolitical and economic changes in the nations of former Eastern Bloc. At the same time, he reconfirms the US position as the sole superpower, which enjoys a position of unparalleled military strengths and great economic and political influence. According

to him, the US is eager to take advantage of its potential and to spread values of democracy and market economy into other nations around the globe. This approach became a main theme of NSS 2002. President Bush also admits that in the 21st century the US faces asymmetric security threats, which prevention will require cooperation of entire US security establishment. The primary threat for the US security lays at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. In this respect, President Bush declares his readiness to face this threat even when this would require a unilateral approach. At the same time, he openly declares the US readiness to conduct pre-emptive strikes if necessary.

The introduction to NSS 2006 is an untraditional one. President Bush declares that the US is in war, and NSS 2006 is a war strategy, which purpose is to protect the US citizens against terrorism. According to his opinion, this situation represents an opportunity for the US to lay down the foundation for future peace. This however will become true only when the War on Terror will be won and democracy will be spread. These two preconditions have become two main pillars of NSS 2006. In respect to the US foreign policy, President Bush evaluates his foreign policy for the time period from 2002 to 2006. In comparison to NSS 2002, he underlines the need to move from unilateral approach to the multilateral one. This however should be done under the leadership of the US. His opening statement is concluded by the thought that the US is idealistic in its national interests; however, it is realistic in the means necessary for fulfilling those interests.

2.2. Content of the US National Security Strategy

NSS 2002 admits that the US possesses an unprecedented strength and influence in the world, which obligates the US to spread political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity. From the US point of view, it can be stated that after the century of struggle between freedom and totalitarianism, freedom has won. However, this does not necessarily mean that the world is any safer. In the 21st century, the US is threatened not by conquering states but rather by failing ones. Therefore, the US must take advantage of its



position and to spread the ideas of political and economic freedom, peaceful coexistence with other states and respect of human rights. This should be achieved by championing for human dignity; strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism and working to prevent attacks against the US and its friends; working with others to defuse regional conflicts; preventing the US enemies from threatening the US, its allies, and its friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD); igniting a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; expanding the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy; developing agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; and transforming America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.

NSS 2006 reaffirms the core ideas of NSS 2002. The only difference in NSS 2006 is that it emphasizes on globalization where the US is eager to engage the opportunities, on the one hand, and confront its challenges, on the other.

2.3. Champion aspiration of human dignity

In NSS 2002, the US committed itself to protect the principles of liberty and justice because, in its view, these principles are right and true for all people everywhere. These principles are best guaranteed by democracy. Therefore, the US declared its ambition to strengthen human dignity and spread of freedom around the world. By doing so, the US proclaimed to speak out about violation of human rights and to support efforts to promote these values.

NSS 2006 did not lower the level of ambition in this field. Besides the count down of already achieved successes in the field of human dignity throughout the period from 2002 to 2006, NSS 2006 reaffirmed the US position to promote principles of liberty and justice. Compared to NSS 2002, NSS 2006 dealt with this field in greater details and the total number of the goals was lowered. In other words, there was a change from quantity to quality. NSS 2006 declared the US interest to end with tyrannies and to support effective democracies. The way of achieving these goals was characterized by the term "principled in goals and pragmatic in means".

2.4. Strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against the US and its friends

Authors of NSS 2002 openly stated that the US is in war with terrorism of global reach. Terrorism was defined as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents. NSS 2002 has openly declared the fundamental US approach to terrorism, which is that the US makes no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them. At the same time, it has been admitted that struggle against global terrorism is different from any other war in the US history and as thus, it must be fought on many fronts over an extended period of time. Due to the fact that the US is waging war with a new type of adversary with a global reach, the US National Security Strategy cannot solely rely on deterrence to keep the terrorists at bay or defensive measures to thwart them at the last moment. The new strategy of the War on Terror must count on an active approach, where a fight must be taken to the enemy, to keep them on the run. NSS 2002 announced two major aims. The first one was the disturbance and elimination of terrorist groups and organizations. The other one was a battle of ideas. However, it has been admitted that the US cannot stand in this War on Terror alone. It needs the assistance of its allies and friends with which help it will pursue supporters of terrorism, whether these are individual persons or states.

NSS 2006 was based on the same philosophy on the War on Terror. The first part of this chapter stated that the US was already safer but not safe, and it must continue in the War on Terror. At the same time, this chapter spelled out the successes already achieved throughout the period from 2002 to 2006, as well as setback needed to be overcome. The second part of this chapter was dedicated to struggle against terrorism in foreseen future. There was a new proclamation made that the War on Terror was a struggle of ideas and not a struggle of religions. In order for the US to be successful in this struggle, the authors of NSS 2006 listed a specific reason, which might support terrorism. For example, it is interesting to mention, that they do not consider the issue of poverty, US involvement in Iraq and in Israeli – Palestinian conflict to be the reason for terrorism against the US. The true reason for support of terrorism was in their



view the dissatisfaction with political alienation, grievances that can be blamed on others, sub-cultures of conspiracy and misinformation, and ideology that justifies murder. NSS 2006 declared that such ideas are grown only in totalitarian regimes. Therefore, the only suitable option was to spread democracy, which requires a long-term approach. From a short-term approach, however, the US must firstly prevent attacks by terrorist networks. Secondly, the US must deny WMD to rogue states and to terrorist allies who would use them without hesitation. Thirdly, the US must deny terrorist groups the support and sanctuary of rogue states, and fourthly deny the terrorists the control of any nation that they would use as a base and launching pad for terror. In conclusion of this chapter, NSS 2006 proclaims the US involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq to be the front lines in the War on Terror. In respect to Iraq itself, NSS 2006 defined a new political, security, and economic approach in this country.

2.5. Work with others to defuse regional conflicts

In respect to regional conflicts, NSS 2002 considered those to be a legacy of previous decades, which however have a severe impact on current US national security interests. The nature of regional conflicts is that these do not remain isolated but they spread quickly and create human tragedies and anarchy. At the same time, some groups take advantage of regional conflicts; such it was a case of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Despite the fact that the US does not engage in such conflicts, there is real possibility that its national interests will be threatened by such conflicts. The US is aware that, from a position of uninvolved observer, it is not possible to offer a solution to those who are not interested, however even uninvolved observer can create such conditions, which may have a positive impact on conflict resolution.

NSS 2006 mentioned that since 2002 there has been a tremendous leap forward in conflict resolution worldwide. However, there are still many regions, which require international attention. Therefore, second Bush Administration proposed three levels of involvement in regional conflicts. The first level, and the long-term one, was promotion of democracy. The second one was a conflict intervention if needed. Here, North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) seemed to be an adequate tool of such intervention solution. However, the US was prepared to assist other international and regional organizations in their efforts related to conflict resolutions. The third, and the last, level was a post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Here rose a necessity to provide especially civilian capabilities in cooperation with international community.

2.6. Prevent the US enemies from threatening it, its allies, and its friends with weapons of mass destruction

NSS 2002 stated that, despite the fact the Cold War has ended with the US victory and international security environment has underwent a profound transformation, the World is not safer. At the beginning of the 21st century, the US is facing a radically different adversary, which is represented by rogue states and terrorist groups. From the point of view of the first Bush Administration, these states are willing to brutalize their own people, to display no regard for international law, to acquire WMD, to sponsor terrorism around the globe, and to reject basic human values and hate the US and everything for which it stands. In NSS 2002, the US determined to be prepared to stop such states and terrorists groups from use of WMD and thus threatening global security.

In order to achieve this goal, the US declared its readiness to use the right of self-defense by the form of pre-emptive strikes. However, it clearly stated that such approach would be taken only as the approach of the last resort. The US always will support non-military solution first. At the same time, NSS 2002 made it clear that no nation can use the right of pre-emptive strike as an excuse for military aggression. From a long-term approach, the US recognized the need for a comprehensive strategy, which aim is to prevent the spread and misuse of WMD.

Such strategy would require not only proactive counter proliferation efforts, but also strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies, and expertise necessary for WMD. Moreover, it is necessary to put in place an effective consequence management to response to the effects of WMD use, whether by terrorist or hostile states.



NSS 2006 highlighted the seriousness of WMD use by rogue states and terrorists groups. Based upon achieved successes and reaming challenges throughout the period from 2002 to 2006, the US reaffirmed their will to prevent WMD from proliferation.

In terms of nuclear weapons proliferation, the US set its primary objective to close a loophole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty that permits regimes to produce fissile material that can be used to make nuclear weapons under cover of a civilian nuclear power program. This was especially the case of Iran and North Korea. The second objective was to keep fissile material out of the hands of rogue states and terrorists. To do this, the US was eager to actively cooperate with entire international community.

In respect to biological weapons, the US admitted that they pose a grave threat due to the risks of contagion that would spread disease across large populations and around the globe. Moreover, biological weapons do not require hard-to-acquire infrastructure or material. Countering the spread of biological weapons requires a strategy focused on improving capacity to detect and response to biological attacks.

Therefore, NSS 2006 suggested the main pillar of defense against this type of weapons to be a modern public health infrastructure, which will closely cooperate with medical and pharmaceutical industry.

As of chemical weapons, NSS 2006 admitted that these represent another serious concern for the US national security. Due to the fact that this type of weapons are actively sought by terrorist groups, the US must seek and deny them access to materials needed to make these weapons.

NSS 2006 declared that a new security environment requires new approaches to deterrence and defense. These new approaches are necessary to deter both state and non-state actors to execute their attack and, if necessary, to respond with overwhelming force. Therefore, safe, credible, and reliable nuclear forces continue to play a critical role.

The US recognized the need for strengthened deterrence by developing a New Triad composed of offensive strike systems, active and passive defenses and all bound together by enhanced command and control, planning, and intelligence systems.

2.7. Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade

NSS 2002 mentioned that the US foreign policy has always been a great supporter of free trade and market. Inspired by the assumption that economic freedom leads to the political one, authors of NSS 2002 believed that only the development of global market economy would enable the development of global political freedom. At the same time, economic freedom will lead to a greater prosperity and economic growth. Therefore, NSS 2002 introduced a comprehensive strategy on global economy growth, which should seize the global initiative; press regional initiatives; move ahead with bilateral free trade agreements; renew the executive-congressional partnership; promote the connection between trade and development, enforce trade agreements and law against unfair practices; help domestic industries and workers; protect the environment and workers; and enhance energy security. From a global point of view, NSS 2002 declares that economic growth must be accompanied by protection of environment.

NSS 2006 philosophy on global economic growth has remained unchanged. It only reflected on the global economic development from 2002 to 2006. Since economic freedom leads to the political freedom, which at the end enhances global security, NSS 2006 set three primary areas to support. The first area of support includes opening markets and integrating developing countries. The second one is opening, integrating, and diversifying energy markets to ensure energy independence. Finally, the third proposed area calls for reform of the international financial systems to ensure stability and growth.

2.8. Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy

NSS 2002 refused unjust division of global economic resources. Therefore, the US declared its readiness to help the world's poor as its strategic priority and moral imperative. NSS 2002 authors believed that economic development, responsible governance, and individual liberty are intimately connected. At the same time, they did admit that past foreign assistance to corrupt and ineffective governments failed to help the



populations in their greatest needs. Instead, it often impeded democratic reform and encouraged corruption. Therefore, NSS 2002 sets the US strategy, which should support development of open societies and democratic structures. Such strategy should provide resources to aid countries that have met the challenges of national reform; improve the effectiveness of the World Bank and other development banks in raising living standards; insist upon measurable results to ensure that development assistance is actually making a difference in the lives of the world's poor; increase the amount of development assistance that is provided in the form of grants instead of loans; open societies to commerce and investment; secure public health; emphasize education; and continue to aid agricultural development.

NSS 2006 went fully in line with NSS 2002. It declared that economic, political, and social development reinforces diplomacy and defense, while reducing long-term threats to the US national security. Therefore, it is in the US interest to help build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies. NSS 2006 introduced two major pillars necessary for executing such policies. The first pillar was a conduct of transformational diplomacy and effective diplomacy. From the US point of view, transformational diplomacy means cooperation with international partners in order to create and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. The second pillar was making foreign assistance more effective. It is necessary to admit that such strategy had been developed based on successful US experience in economic and development assistance provided to various countries.

2.9. Develop agendas for cooperative action with the other main centers of global power

NSS 2002 declared the US national security interest to maintain mutual relations with the international organizations and the other main centers of global power, which have interest on spreading freedom. Within the Euro-Atlantic region, the US considers NATO to be the most potent instrument for facing the threats of the 21st century. In the region of Pacific, the US perceives the The Australia, New Zealand, United States Security (ANZUS) Treaty do be the cornerstone

of security. In Eastern Asia, the US is closely cooperating not only with Japan and South Korea, but also with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Besides the US closest allies and friends, NSS 2002 also sets the relations with the Russia, China, and India, which the US considered to be the most important partners for promoting global security. Toward these countries, the US emphasized on the absence of conflict between them. The aim of the US was to prevent the raise of rivalry among these centers of global power, which would divide the world into different spheres of interests.

NSS 2006 perceived the period from 2002 to 2006 as the era of unprecedented cooperation of the US with its allies, friends, and partners. At the same time, it admitted that there were also tensions in its mutual relations with its closest allies, especially toward the US policies in Iraq. In response to this experience, NSS 2006 defined five fundamental principles of strategy toward other centers of global power. The first principle suggested that the mutual relations must be set in their proper context. The second principle declared that these relations must be supported by appropriate regional and global institutions, to make cooperation permanent, more effective, and wide-reaching. The third principle stated that the US cannot pretend its interests are unaffected by state's treatment of their own citizens. The fourth one declared that the US do not seek to dictate to other states the choices they make, it does seek to influence the calculations on which these choices are based. Finally, the fifth principle stated that the US must be prepared to act alone if necessary. The second major difference of NSS 2006 when compared to NSS 2002 was the change in defining US global interests. NSS 2006 did not make difference anymore between international organizations and states, but instead it dealt only with geographic regions. These included the region of Western hemisphere, Africa, Middle East, Europe, Russia, South and Central America, and East Asia.

2.10. Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century

The major argument of NSS 2002 for the transformation of the US national security



institutions was the fact that these institutions were established to function in the era when foreign and domestic relations were clearly separated. The US must react to this situation. NSS 2002 dealt with three most important institutions of the US national security institutions. These are the US Armed Forces, intelligence, and the Department of State. In respect to the US Armed Forces, NSS 2002 stated that these must assure the US allies and friends; dissuade future military competition; deter threats against the US interests, allies, and friends; and decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails. Intelligence is considered by NSS 2002 as the first line of defense. Intelligence reform crystallization should be intelligence sector integrated with the Department of Defense and law-enforcement community, which, at the same time, would closely cooperate with the US allies and friends. In this respect, NSS 2002 sets as its goal to strengthen authority of the Director of Central Intelligence; to establish a new framework for intelligence warning; to continue developing new methods for collecting information; to invest in future capabilities; and to collect intelligence against the terrorist danger. A new role of the Department of State should include, besides maintaining bilateral relations with other states, also establishment, strengthening, and supporting of relations with non-governmental and international organizations.

NSS 2006 went fully in line with NSS 2002. Based on the experience gained throughout the period from 2002 to 2006, the US defined the role of its national security institutions, especially of the Department of Defense, in four areas. The first one was traditional – to face challenges posed by states employing conventional forces. The second area was asymmetric – to face challenges from state and non-state actors. The third was catastrophic – to face challenges involving the acquisition, possession, and use of WMD. Finally, the fourth one was disruptive – to face challenges from state and non-state actors who employ untraditional methods of warfare such as cyber attacks for example. In response to these challenges, NSS 2006 announced three domestic priorities for the US national security institutions to be fulfilled. The first priority was continuation in already ongoing reform processes of the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, and the intelligence community.

The second priority was to continue in reorientation the Department of State towards transformational diplomacy. The last priority was to improve the capacity of agencies to plan, prepare, coordinate, integrate, and execute responses. In terms of foreign priorities, NSS 2006 proposed the promotion of meaningful reform of the US, enhancing the role of democracies and democracy promotion throughout international and multilateral institutions, and establishing result-oriented partnerships to meet new challenges and opportunities.

2.11. Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization

This theme was absent in NSS 2002. NSS 2006 however recognized a new point of view on the issue of globalization. The US perceives globalization as an effect, or a phenomenon, which for its national security represents not only a source of potential threats, but especially many opportunities. NSS 2006 stated that by the development of global market and investment, and information and technology access, globalization has helped improve living standards worldwide. Therefore, on the one hand, globalization has greatly contributed to spread democracy and ideas of free market economy. On the other hand, globalization has uncovered new global challenges, and it has demonstrated the need for a new approach to old challenges. An example of such challenges includes public health challenges that have no borders; illicit trade that exploits modern era's greater ease of transport and exchange; or environmental destruction, whether caused by human behavior or cataclysmic mega-disasters. NSS 2006 admits that these challenges do not represent traditional threats to national security, such as armed conflicts for example, but, if they will remain unnoticed, they will materialize to a real threat to national security.

Conclusions

The aim of this paper was to compare *NSS 2002* and *NSS 2006*, which were drafted by the administration of President George W. Bush, and which shaped the US foreign policy in the first decade of the 21st century.

In general, it can be said that both strategies have more in common than different. The root



political ideology for drafting these strategies was neo-conservatism. In this light, the fundamental argument behind *NSS 2002* and *NSS 2006* is that the growth of extremism and radicalism in combination with modern technologies poses a grave security threat to the US national security. This growth of extremism is caused by the lack of political and economic freedoms in the nations of the developing world. This situation, in combination with relatively easily accessible technologies, which may be used as tools for achieving political goals, represents a problem that cannot be dealt by classical tools of foreign and domestic policies. Therefore, *NSS 2002*, as well as *NSS 2006*, introduced a new philosophy of guaranteeing the US national security, which was based on four principles. The first one is promotion of democracy by all available tools, the second one is right for pre-emptive strikes, the third one is waging of the War on Terror, and the fourth one is exercising flexible deterrence.

The basic difference between *NSS 2002* and *NSS 2006* is the fact that *NSS 2006* reflects on the development and experience of the US in its foreign policy gained throughout 2002 to 2006. Therefore, it can be said without any hesitation that *NSS 2006* is modified *NSS 2002*. The fundamental difference between these two strategies is the fact that *NSS 2006* takes into account necessity of multilateral approach when dealing with global issues and defining globalization as a phenomenon which must be taken into account when dealing with national security.

In conclusion, it is important to mention that the aim of this paper was not to evaluate or analyze the correctness of these strategies, or taking a stand on them, but to identify what they have in common and where major differences are.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. BBC News, 2007, Mullah Omar „hiding in Pakistan“, disponibil la http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6272359.stm.
2. BUSH, G. W., 2002, President Bush's address to a joint session of Congress, disponibil la <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>.
3. BUSH, G. W., 2002, President Bush's Speech at West Point, disponibil la [339&paper=380.](http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=</div><div data-bbox=)

4. BUSH, G. W., 2002, Bush State of the Union Address, disponibil la <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.speech.txt/>.

5. BUSH, G. W., 2003, Bush State of the Union Address, disponibil la <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/01/28/sotu.transcript/>.

6. BUSH, G. W., 2005, Speech at the National Security University, disponibil la <http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/03.08.05.html>.

7. NEČAS, P., KELEMEN, M., *War on Insecurity: Calling for Effective Strategy*, The Center of Educational Literature, Kyjev, 2010, p. 157.

8. OLEJNÍK, F., SZABO, S., *Medzinárodné aspekty boja proti terorizmu, in Administracja, zarzadzanie i handel zagraniczny w warunkach integracji in Materialy konferencyjne-zarzadzanie bezpieczenstwem*, Kraków, Krakowska Szkoła Wyzsza im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego, 2002.

9. TEREM, P., *Globalisation and its Environmental Dimension*, in SIWEK, T., BAAR, V. (ed.): *Globalisation and its Geopolitical, Cultural, Economic and Ecological Context*, 8.-10.10.2003, University of Ostrava, Ostrava, 2004.

10. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, The White House, 2002, disponibil la <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/>.

11. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, The White House, 2006, disponibil la <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/>.

12. UŠIAK, J., *Bezpečnostná stratégia štátu – pojmové vymedzenie*, in LASICOVÁ, J. (eds): *Bezpečnostné fórum '09*. Banská Bystrica : FPVaMV UMB, 2009.

13. ŽÁK, M., BUČKA, P., *Information for mission success in an asymmetric warfare*, in *New challenges in the field of military sciences*, 6th International Conference, 18-19 November, Bolyai Janos Military Foundation, Budapest, Hungary, 2009.

NOTES:

1 NEČAS, P., KELEMEN, M., *War on Insecurity: Calling for Effective Strategy*, Kyjev, 2010, p. 15.

2 BUSH, G. W.: 2003, *Bush State of the Union*



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

Address, available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/01/28/sotu.transcript/>.

3 BUSH, G. W.: Bush, 2005, *Speech at the National Security University*, available at: <http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/03.08.05.html>.

4 BUSH, G. W.: 2002, *President Bush's speech at Westpoint*, available at: <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=339&paper=380>.

5 BUSH, G. W.: 2001, *President Bush's address to*

a joint session of Congress, available at: <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>.

6 NEČAS, P., KELEMEN, M.: *War on Insecurity: Calling for Effective Strategy*, Kyjev, 2010, pp. 104-107.

7 BBC News, *Mullah Omar „hiding in Pakistan“*, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6272359.stm.

Colonel (GS, ret.) Associate Professor Dipl. Eng. Pavel NEČAS (pavel.necas@aos.sk), PhD., held numerous assignments in the Air Force training and education establishments and in research and development branches during his fruitful career; in 2004, he was selected for NATO Defense College in Rome Research Fellowship Program as a Fellow. His research was focused on political-military strategic issues, particularly in defense and security policy, international relations and international security studies. Subsequently, he served as Curriculum Planning Branch Chief at the College. He is author of many monographs, books, papers and articles in the field of security and defense policy published worldwide. At present, he holds position of the Vice-rector for Science at the Armed Forces Academy in Liptovský Mikuláš.

Blažej LIPPAY (blipay2@gmail.com) pursued his graduate studies at University of Kent's Brussels School of International Studies in Brussels, Belgium, where he has received his Master of Arts Degree in International Relations. Following his graduation, he joined the civil service of the Slovak Republic where he served in various Central Administration bodies related to national security, including the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic and National Security Authority of the Slovak Republic.

Cap. Dipl. Eng. René NAĎ (rene.nad@gmail.com) served in various positions within the Air Defence of the Slovak Republic. Later on, as he finished his appointment as a Military Observer Liaison Officer in United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, he served as an officer of the Military Cooperation Department of Strategic Planning and Capabilities Development Staff at the General Staff of the Slovak Armed Forces. Presently, he holds the position of Military Counsellor for Force planning at the Permanent Representation of the Slovak Republic to the European Union.



MARITIME AND FLUVIAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY

Marius HANGANU, PhD

The present paper sets itself to identify the critical infrastructure from Romania's maritime and fluvial areas. There are identified several categories of critical infrastructures, among which the infrastructures of the economic area, air transport, railway transport, maritime transport, of Dobrogea's localities, of public order system, of the information and national safety afferent to the maritime and fluvial areas etc. Moreover, there are also identified the main governmental institutions charged with the protection of critical infrastructures at the national level as well as the main modalities in which critical infrastructures' security is realized.

Key-words: critical infrastructures; maritime area; fluvial area; national critical infrastructures; security.

Critical infrastructures have always been a most sensitive area, because of their special role in any system or process structure, stability and function. Vulnerability comes from the inability to assure adequate protection, and usually, it is directly proportional to the role played by infrastructure. Therefore, irrespective of how well they are protected, critical infrastructures will always have a high degree of vulnerability, since, usually, they are the first targeted when a system or a process is aimed to be destabilised or destroyed.

Identifying, optimizing, and securing critical infrastructures represent an unquestionable priority both for systems and process managers as well as for their opponents, namely for those seeking to attack, destabilise and destroy the concerned systems and processes. Critical infrastructures are not and do not become critical only under attack or because of that, but also for other reasons, some of it difficult to be detected and analyzed. Usually, moreover after 09.11 2001, terrorist attacks on World Trade Centre and the Pentagon,

infrastructures are considered to be or to be able to become critical in relation with terrorist attacks or other types of threats, especially asymmetric.

This is only an aspect or an identification criterion of critical infrastructures. However, there are also others concerning both systems and processes stability and functionality, as well as their relations with the outside environment. Therefore, from our point of view, analyzing critical infrastructure issues must be done according to all dimensions and implications of stability and systems and processes functionality, as well as the causal series that may generate or influence their dynamics.

1. The main maritime and fluvial critical infrastructures

Infrastructures always sustain complex physical systems, usually, within human society, with social functions and roles. Commonly, infrastructures develop according to vital necessities of normal functioning and of system stability.

After grouping these physical infrastructures on categories of physical systems positioned in maritime and fluvial areas, one can identify physical infrastructures that can be considered critical as follows:

a. Critical infrastructures of the economic sector:

- utility networks: electric energy distribution (380 volts or high voltage), distribution networks of industrial water, gas, refuelling (including lubricants), and other strictly necessary substances supplying networks;

- computer physical network – the computers and/or the network with related links, cables, protocols, software, regardless of network topology, database and so on;

- network storage of raw materials, finished



products and special materials usage (strategic, inflammable, radioactive materials, chemical substances, biological agents and other types of high-risk materials);

- communication networks, especially their physical infrastructures (relays, cables, supports, stations, switches and so on);

- road and rail networks used by business agents, car parks, equipment and facilities parks used in the production process;

- communication network (command and control);

- producing infrastructure of energy, as follows:

- o energy-heat central from Chiscani/Braila;

- o wind centrals (two) built nearby Baia/Tulcea, in 2004-2005;

- infrastructures of strategic road networks, regardless their categorization – European, national or of county interest: road maintenance bases, maintenance and moreover clearance road machinery;

b. Critical infrastructures of air transport:

- Mihail Kogălniceanu airport/Constanta county, for air traffic of European and international importance, with all its related infrastructures: the airport itself (the runway and its lighting and beacons), energy, water, and gas supplying systems; fuel storage networks; aircraft hangars and parks, including infrastructure and current control checking apparatus aircraft, control towers and air traffic control facilities: Radar stations, traffic control stations, computer networks; other infrastructure systems that depend on flight safety and security;

- Mihail Kogălniceanu airport/Tulcea, of national importance, with the afferent infrastructure mentioned before.

- c. Critical rail infrastructures:** railways from Dobrogea as well as railways positioned near the left bank of Danube; bridges, viaducts and other embankment works, on the rail or adjacent, stops / stations; electrical rail network, both the power and security, command and control; communications networks;

- d. Critical shipping infrastructures:** Black Sea Ports: Sulina, Midia, Constanta and Mangalia; harbor infrastructures with role in providing utilities: water, electricity; harbor infrastructures for cargo operation: cranes, inner rail and roads

system; operating hydrocarbons and dangerous materials (flammable) terminal and their inner transportation network; lighthouse facilities: Sulina and St. Gheorghe, Portița, Cap Midia, Constanta, Cap Tuzla; radio navigation stations; radar stations and communications systems, vessel traffic routing systems, lighting system in the Romanian responsibility area for the Black Sea; coastal protection dam systems; security and safety navigation on sea systems infrastructures; rescue systems (ships, divers, devices, etc.); shipyards for construction and repairing maritime and/or fluvial ships from Constanta and Mangalia;

e. Critical infrastructure of towns from Dobrogea, excluding those bordering the river:

transport networks and water inlet: wells, pumping stations and other infrastructure systems of water purification; electricity and gas transmission networks, especially junctions, checkpoints and distribution, substations serving Dobrogea municipalities; public transport networks (trolley buses and trams); telephone networks; relays, stations and centrals; national or local warning relays and radio and TV stations, public lighting, heat supply, hospitals and other emergency medicine and care infrastructure; laboratories and hematology centres, operating, recovery rooms and other parts of the surveillance and monitoring emergencies infrastructures; preventing and extinguishing fire protection systems infrastructures; civil protection system infrastructures, especially systems and networks for action and response to disasters, nuclear, industrial, chemical and technological accidents; networks and warehouses, etc..

f. Critical infrastructure of public order system, of informational and state safety system from Constanta, Tulcea, Galati, Braila, Ialomita and Calarasi counties:

- infrastructures of the police and gendarmerie, including of the community and rural police;

- infrastructures of Emergency Situations Committee; critical infrastructures of citizen, property and institution protection system;

- infrastructures of forces and formations of early intervention and reaction;

- infrastructures of intelligence and of other institutions depending on data protection;

g. Critical infrastructure of the health system and citizen, family and community protection:

- county hospitals and emergency networks;



- medical analysis laboratories, haematology centres;
- medicines storage;
- infrastructures of medical research centres and of the Faculty of Medicine from Constanta, etc.

Critical infrastructure specific to fluvial, lagoon, and Danube Delta

In addition to the physical maritime infrastructure, one can identify specific elements for fluvial, lagoon and delta areas that can be considered as critical infrastructure, even if their listing is not (nor should it be appropriate to have) an exhaustive character:

a. Critical infrastructures of economic operators and economic sector of (industry and the related sectors of economy):

- networks utilities in areas with high risk of flooding (especially those in the Danube Delta): electricity distribution, natural gas distribution, fuel supply network;
- computer physical networks from Delta using wireless technology (relays, switches);
- intermediate storage of food and medicine network (especially those in the Danube Delta);
- storage and food preservation technology warehouses using freezing (especially the fishery production storage), particularly in areas with high potential for natural disasters (flooding and chronic pandemic areas stemming from the specific migration of Delta);
- access routes network to ports;
- access channels (the network of channels) used in delta and lagoon areas serving economic operators;
- lakes and water surface system used in the production of fishery in delta and lagoon areas process;

b. Critical infrastructures of fluvial transport:

- fluvial ports on Danube, especially ports with high economic activity, such as: Calarasi, Cernavoda, Braila, Galati, Tulcea
- port infrastructures with insurance utilities role: water, electricity;
- port infrastructures operating goods: inner ports cranes, rail and road system;
- lighting installation and fluvial traffic regulating installed in conformity to Danube Navigation Regulations and / or COLREG;
- radio-navigation stations, radar stations and

communications systems, river traffic control systems;

- security systems and navigation safety on river infrastructures;
- bank protection levees systems, water courses improve systems;

- systems and water courses maintenance infrastructure in conformity to the Convention concerning the navigation regime in Belgrade, including infrastructure and floating dredge with role in ensuring the safety of navigation on the river;

- measuring water flow rates systems for different sectors of Danube, in order to warn in time in case of flood;

- adjusting water rate, channel of communication and excess water flow arrangements;

- locks and gates systems (both on Danube - Black Sea Channel and for the lagoon and deltaic areas);

- ships ensuring the airworthiness river (ice breakers)

- environmental control systems, water and air quality evaluation systems of the river and delta area, with immediate warning and analysis role, particularly in the following context:

- insecurity evidence in the functioning of the Bulgarian nuclear power plant from Kozloduy;
- accepted radiation norms in relation to the functioning of Atomic Centre - Power Plant in Cernavoda;

▪ oil (and/or lubricants), chemicals pollution;

- rescue intervention systems in the remote delta areas (sanitary vessels, intervention helicopters) – with essential role in case of natural disasters (floods, pandemics, chronic) or periodic ice blocking waterways (helicopters);

- naval shipyards profiled on:

• ship construction (marine and fluvial) from Galati, Braila and Tulcea;

• maritime and/or fluvial ship repairing;

- infrastructures specific to fluvial crossings (ship, ferry, pontoon systems) from Braila, Galati, Tulcea;

- passenger and cargo river transport networks, particularly in delta area;

c. Critical infrastructure in the Danube Delta localities:

- drinking water transport and inlet networks; wells, stations and other infrastructures of water purification systems;



- electricity transmission networks, with personal heating centrals for isolated localities (St. George);
- fluvial public transport networks (the linking line of Tulcea to its suburban area Tudor Vladimirescu);
- telephone, relays, relay stations and centrals, national or local alert radio and TV stations;
- public lighting;
- the emergency hospital and other medical and health care infrastructures in Tulcea and Sulina;
- fire prevention and extinction systems, civil protection systems, especially for action and response to calamities, disasters, nuclear, industrial, chemical and technological accidents, networks and warehouses infrastructures, and so on.

Critical infrastructures of Navy responsibility for both maritime and fluvial areas

a. Critical infrastructures from Dobrogea region (county, area, etc.):

- bridges over watercourses and/or railways;
- road and rail intersection nodes;
- hydrocarbons and other dangerous materials storage tanks (LPG, chemicals, etc.);
- linkage station to natural gas pipeline crossing Dobrogea (coupling station from Isaccea), and the portion that crosses the national territory (including underwater pipeline on the Danube bottom of in Isaccea);
- linkage station to the high voltage line (750 kV network) crossing Dobrogea (Isaccea linkage station), and the segment that crosses the national territory (including the cable positioned above the Danube near Isaccea);
- communication networks from Dobrogea territories: wired networks, relays/relay points, telephone centrals, post offices, satellite transceivers stations, transport equipment, optical fibre routes, relays, signal modulators;

b. Inland critical infrastructures:

- Cernavoda Nuclear Power Central;

The following bridges with their infrastructure:

- Cernavoda - Fetesti road and rail bridge;
- Vadu Oii - Giurgeni road bridge;

- critical infrastructure elements with a vital role for the Navy responsibility area;
- Danube - Black Sea Canal;
- Romanian platforms and infrastructures for oil extraction from the west of Black Sea;
- Galati Steel Combine;
- Petromidia refinery processing the oil from Navodari.

Other documents regulating the critical infrastructures protection at ministerial level are emergency ordinances and orders.

2. National responsibilities for critical infrastructures defence

According to Government Ordinance no. 47/1944, Central Commissions specialized on types of disasters were created, in the subordination of the Governmental Commission of Defence against Disasters, organized within the competent ministries, as follows:

- a. Central Commission for defence against floods, dangerous meteorological phenomena and hydraulic construction accidents, -Ministry of Waters, Forests and Environmental Protection;
- b. Central Commission for Prevention and Protection against earthquakes and landslides - Ministry of Public Works and Territory Planning;
- c. Central Commission for nuclear accidents and cosmic objects falls - Ministry of Defence;
- d. Central Commission for large explosions, on surface and underground chemical accidents and very serious damages to pipelines - Ministry of Industry and Commerce;
- e. Central Committee for very serious accidents on communication level - Ministry of Transport;
- f. Central Commission for emergency medical assistance in case of disasters and epidemics - Ministry of Health;
- g. Central Commission for epizooties and radioactive, chemical or biological contamination of plant and animal products supervising - Ministry of Agriculture and Food;
- h. Central Commission for mass fires - Ministry of Interior;
- i. Central Commission for Telecommunications - Ministry of Communications.

Aligning critical infrastructures protection at national level to European programs can be achieved in three manners:

- a. harmonization of laws;



b. aligning dependencies and interdependencies of critical infrastructures in Romania to EU;

c. full and responsible involvement of decision-makers and experts, public or private, in elaborating and implementing EU policies and strategies in critical infrastructure protection.

National vital (critical) infrastructure protection enlists, in one way or another, in the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection in at least three ways:

a. adapting the law, action and emergency situations response system to European requirements, in the process of preparing the integration and the integration process;

b. dependencies and interdependencies of Romanian vital infrastructure to the European;

c. participation to the development and implementation of policies and strategies combating terrorism, illegal trafficking, organized crime and asymmetric threats.

Romanian vital infrastructures are almost entirely critical infrastructures from at least a few main reasons:

a. they result from the infrastructure of a giant economy, inflexible and hardly adaptable to market economy, whose traces have not been yet cleared, nor improved;

b. Romanian economy and society as a whole is in a state of chaos, specific to long and repeated periods of transition, in which everything or almost everything is vital, critical and vulnerable;

c. actions without discernment on the environment, massive forest cut, chaotic land cultivation, the disaster in agriculture, lack of a coherent and effective agricultural, ecological and environmental protection policy create and proliferate serious threats for all infrastructures and especially for critical infrastructures;

d. it is expected that Romania's participation to the antiterrorist coalition and to other crisis and conflict management and peacekeeping missions to generate a new kind of threat on citizens and on vital infrastructures of economy, society, information and living conditions.

Of course, dangers and threats are more numerous. They are subject to legislative initiatives, they are included in the national security strategy and other important documents, but are far from being fully monitored, managed, controlled and removed.

3. The ways of constituting maritime and fluvial critical infrastructure security

Maritime security is a very complex issue. Of paramount importance is the application by maritime security institutions of an appropriate legislation in order to achieve stable and secure maritime lines of communication, allowing a continuous flow, vital for the energy network and for the international goods and values exchange.

In order to ensure maritime security the Black Sea there are international, regional or national institutions.

Institutions organized at international level, operating in the Black Sea to ensure maritime security are: International Maritime Bureau - IMB (within IMO, under the UNO auspices) and the European Maritime Safety Agency, EMSA.

Institutions operating at regional level, within which Navy participate in activities to ensure maritime security are: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Black Sea Commission (BSC), Regional Maritime Coordination Centre (MRCC); regional initiatives: CHiefs of European Navies - CHENS, initiative of joint participation Blackseafor - BSF, Operations: Active Endeavour - OAE and Black Sea Harmony - OBSH, document with steps to increase confidence and regional security / Confidence Security Building Measure's - CSBMs signed in 2000, in Vienna, between the Black Sea countries.

On national level, the proposed solutions are in the competence of naval forces, coast guards (border police), civilian operators, state authorities responsible with naval legality. National institutions in Romania for ensuring maritime security are: Romanian Naval Forces, Border Police and Romanian Naval Authority - which includes the Maritime Coordination Centre, SAR -pollution Service (SAR naval group) and VTS Surveillance Service.

Navy is the national institution with a leading role in ensuring maritime security, in defending Romanian interests and sovereign rights at sea and on the Danube.

The Navy, together with the Border Police, are essential to ensure Romanian maritime sovereignty and maritime resources protection, Romanian sea access and the protection of borders, maritime infrastructures and maritime routes of communication. The key of solving risks,



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

threats and challenges within maritime security is cooperation, interoperability, information exchange and preventive action.

The security of critical infrastructures regarding sea and rivers is based on maritime security and on the concept of usage of maritime power.

Rear Admiral (r.) professor Marius HANGANU (mhanganu@unap.ro), PhD, is the Deputy Commandant for Scientific Research (pro-rector) at “Carol I” National Defence University.



CONSIDERATIONS OF THE AIRPOWER IMPORTANCE IN THE FUTURE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Virgil RISTEA

Future operational environment is characterized by substantial transformations that require the adaptation of classical criteria of analyzing Airpower. This environment will be complex, cluttered, contested, connected and constrained.

Future risks, challenges and threats, so numerous and diverse, increase the complexity of Airpower engagement.

Preparation and engagement of Airpower should consider more the adjustment of action means and strategies to the realities of the operational environment.

Although the capabilities and effects that Airpower brings to the battle are not as visible as the land forces', the Airpower remains an invaluable support of these forces. Airpower can serve as a powerful asymmetric capability. It is essential that future Air Force leaders understand the unconventional warfare environment and the immense contribution of Airpower, which will prove that this service continues to adapt to an ever-changing adversary and brings relevant capabilities in an ever-changing struggle.

Key-words: airpower; operational environment; unconventional warfare; asymmetry; capabilities; air operations; precision attack.

"After the Vietnam War we detached from what asymmetric war meant for the reason that it was connected with the way in which we lost the war. Looking back, that was a wrong step".

Gen. Jack Keane, former Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army (Newshour, 2006).

The future operational environment will be one of constant and rapid changes. The economy, demography, resources, climate and other tendencies

will cause local, regional, and global competitions. The global integration, the intense nationalism and the religious movements will exacerbate the tension created by each of these tendencies. The frequent conflicts will be among ethnic, tribal, religious, and political groups. Fragmentation within states, transnational crime, and the globalized movement of capital, the competition for resources, migration and urbanization will create conflicts within this fluid and complex environment.

A special concern is represented by failed and failing states that may lead to many ungoverned areas that will become sanctuaries for terrorists, murderers and groups involved in illegal activities. These areas may be rural, urban, aerial or virtual. Another main concern is represented by rebel states that will use surrogates that will permit to keep a distance from actions and reach simultaneously strategic aims.

1. Predictions on the future operational environment characteristics

Certain environments will be interrelated and permeable especially regarding influence and information. The future operational environment will be complex but certain traits will be obvious such as: congestion, clutter, dispute, connection and constraint¹.

The future operational environment will be **congested**. For instance, the extensively populated urban and littoral regions, especially those that lack an efficient government will provide sanctuaries in which the criminal elements, terrorists and insurgents will hide, organize and operate. Moreover, the instability and the adjustable tactics of the combatants will force certain operations



to be undertaken rather inside than around those regions. The operations within these congested regions will have a high risk of collateral damages and unpredicted side effects.

On land environment, the operations in Baghdad, Basra and Fallujah provided examples in the same way the Israeli invasion in Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in 2009 did. In the littoral area, the congestion is to be noticeable in the form of a large number of ships, many fixed structures above and under the water, the local air activity, navigation corridors, dense adjacent urban and access areas in the harbor with lines of communication heading towards interior. The intense use of air assets, manned or unmanned, will intensify the congestion of the air space especially in the areas where the air control is contested. In the same way, the proliferation of the space assets (more and more actors are developing independent capabilities to launch and use of the military and commercial satellites) will lead to a growing congestion of the orbital space.

Cluttered. Clutter, especially in the crowded environments, will provide opportunities for camouflage. The adversaries will try to mix with the crowd. The indigene actors with detailed local knowledge will be in advantage as the ones that can rapidly gather and share information. The physical targets will often be difficult to spot and track and the dense urban and littoral areas will provide sanctuaries and many attack and retreat possibilities.

On land environment, the enemies will continue to use traditional methods of camouflage such as covering and concealment techniques used by the Serbs in Kosovo. The low signature targets and the small opportunity windows in which the adversaries must be engaged will make the surveillance and attack extremely difficult. Underground facilities will be used as well.

A few places will remain neutral with hospitals, schools and praying places that are part of the operating environment, challenging again the existing fighting norms and regulations, internationally recognized.

In air and naval environments stealth technologies will provide a certain advantage but unable to be a decisive one in a cluttered environment. With the need for precision, critical decision making and separation, we may need the platforms that efficiently combine the locating and

attack functions that compress the decision cycle from sensor-to-shooter².

In cyberspace, the ability to remain camouflaged during distance attack, with enough power of destruction, will provide the small hostile groups the opportunity to accomplish strategic effects.

Contested. The parties will try to use all environments often using original and asymmetric methods. The technological diffusion including the military equipment export and the innovative use of the existing technologies will make these challenges stronger. Especially diminishing the Western technological advantage and the proliferation of the anti-access weapons, such as ground-to-air missiles systems, submarines, offensive cyber capabilities, and precision guided ground-to-ground missiles will make even more difficult the projection and sustainment of the force, challenging the traditional concepts for expeditionary operations.

On land environment, the mobility will be most probably constrained by the use of mines, of the improvised explosive devices or the effects of the air and space operations while additional strategic effects will be easily obtained with bomb cars and the suicide attacks.

In maritime environment, the proliferation of the mines and underwater capabilities will threaten the sea communications.

The air control will be an essential requirement for every operation in the favor of air freedom, surface and undersurface movements³. The air and orbital space will be contested because they will provide information, situation awareness and almost an unrestricted surveillance of the electromagnetic spectrum, they will be, technologically speaking, the elements of an asymmetric advantage against inferior adversaries. Nevertheless, it will be necessary that such a technology to be integrated with other information sources to ensure that different strategic action, the complex tactics and the social environment are correctly conceived and understood⁴. The capabilities to neutralize the space assets, including the breakdown of using the satellites, will probably proliferate and grow in being efficient.

Many aspects of the contested nature of the future operational environment will generate problems related with the existing norms and regulations that rule the fight with ethical and legal dilemmas.



Connected. Both conflict dimension and lack of clarity will be a global phenomenon but probably the most likely in the physical and virtual nodes in the cities, at the seaside and in the cyberspace. Examples of such nodes include strategic locations, such as the governing offices in the urban areas and the maritime choke points⁵.

The activity in all fields will tend to gravitate around these nodes requiring protection. Some will probably be the scene of high intensity conflict episodes connected to the stability and humanitarian operations simultaneously undertaken in all fields. The networks, such as the re-supply logistics routes, the air and naval lines of communications and the electromagnetic spectrum will connect the nodes.

The air and space power will be based on and will probably be vulnerable to network centric operations⁶. All networks, both civilian and military, will be the subject for the intentional and unintentional disconnections and they should be strong enough to adapt.

Constrained. Within the complex context of the future battle space, the Western legal and social norms will impose continuous constraints within the conduct of operations.

The growing difficulty to select the combatants from non-combatants will require an extensive preparation of the target acquisition process as well as the legal and moral necessity to undertake all feasible precautions to avoid or at least reduce the collateral damages⁷ heading to the more and more extensive use of the precision guided munitions. Nevertheless, using these weapons will mean taking risks. Besides, the concern regarding the proportion of using the non-precision guided munitions will probably lead to attempts to reduce their use⁸. Using the non-precision guided munitions or the failure of the precision guided munitions to avoid the collateral damages may generate adverse perceptions that undermine the legitimacy of the operations.

The observation that using the airpower is a lethal reaction or an inaccurate tool will be probably encouraged by adversaries that know the possibilities to reach the objective, the precision and the utility that such a technology represents⁹. Moreover, the legal challenges may arise against using the weapons and systems such as unmanned aircraft, electronic warfare devices, non lethal weapons and network centric operations.

Ethic concerns will come from the political constraints of using these technologies that may lead to international treaties and new constraints¹⁰. Applying the internal laws and obligations that result from the international human rights in case of conflict will continue to be debated and revised and may result in unexpected restrictions. Any legal, moral or ethical constraint that will foster the legitimacy and the lawfulness of the military actions will not restrain the actions of the potential adversaries or will not be taken into account by those.

2. The airpower in the future operational environment

The new risks, challenges and threats, so numerous and diverse, enhance the complexity of using the armed forces in general and also the air force. The unconventional warfare, the numerous spots of regional conflicts, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction are only a few of the challenges that involve perspective approaches both in the transformation process of the forces and in the doctrine field as well regarding the way of their engagement in different situations.

Within this context, the training and use of the Air Force, at the beginning of this millennium, must take into account the adjusting of the means and strategies of action to the realities of the international security environment, the military actions shape, to the interoperability and modernization requirements.

For the reason that the dominance of the air power gained in the traditional wars was never lost, we could logically expect the new actors to change the strategy and tactics and to prefer the unconventional warfare. The Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts reflected the way in which the military power had to adapt and transform in order to adjust to the new challenges offered by the adversaries that respect the conventional domination but have the strength to identify and exploit the weak points in current capabilities.

Although the capabilities and effects that the Airpower brings into battle are not so visible for a common observer as well as the land forces maneuver, the Airpower (including operations in the air, space and cyberspace domains) remains a valuable support for these forces. The Airpower may serve as well as an asymmetrical capability



powered by its right, in the same way as it was done from the very beginning of Enduring Freedom from Afghanistan. Nobody should consider that the unconventional warfare falls strictly within the Land Forces or of Special Forces. It is essential for future Air Force leaders to understand the unconventional warfare environment and the immense contribution of Airpower that will prove this service continue to adapt to an ever-changing adversary and brings relevant capabilities in an ever-changing struggle.

2.1. The Airpower asymmetry and its advantages

In a typical environment of unconventional warfare, the traditionally recognized capacity of Airpower to strike the strategic centre of gravity of the adversary will probably have less meaning due to the diffuse nature and decentralization of the enemy. The amorphous mass of the ideological movements opposed to the Western influence and values generally lacks a distinct command structure which the Airpower can attack with predictable effects.

Still, the Airpower holds a number of asymmetric advantages, capabilities which the enemy neither equal nor counter balance. For instance, the capacity of the Airpower to do precision attacks worldwide may have a crucial role in the counterinsurgency operations. Many other advantages (including information gathering and developing the cyber operations, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance – ISR and global level mobility) proved themselves equally important. These capabilities provide our combatant forces asymmetric advantages in the unconventional warfare environment.

The technology, innovation and adaptation are distinct signs of the Airpower. The bombers from the Cold War time, projected to airlift the nuclear weapons, had the ability to fly for hours above the battlefield and launch individual conventional loads with little deviation from the given coordinates.

The fighters conceived to launch with precision their payloads against the armored targets can disseminate video information obtained with the reconnaissance container directly to a ground controller that can direct the strike either by laser guided or by global positioning system (GPS). The unmanned aerial systems (UAS), such as Predator,

which once was merely a surveillance platform, has now the capacity to efficiently designate a target through laser and hit it with precision. The air platforms offer electronic protection to the land forces, including attacking communications and electronic devices of the insurgents, used to initiate the improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Exploiting the altitude, speed, distance, offer the air platforms the possibility to achieve these effects without restrictions imposed by terrain or separation lines among the different military echelons. The airmen with revolutionary thinking developed these innovations by using adapting tactics, techniques and procedures and equipments to counter attack an enemy that is continuously thinking and adapting.

The unconventional warfare adversaries have their own asymmetric capabilities like suicide attackers, IEDs and the civilian residences, mosques, hospitals as concentration areas for their combat operations. Taking these into account, the lack of equipment can't provide the efficient and free access to advantages as the air, space, and cyberspace superiority does it.

The Airpower, in its various forms of action, presently operates in many theatres achieving a full range of invaluable combat and support effects. The Airpower capabilities were and will continue to be an important part of the military power success in the theatre of operations and in the global warfare against terrorism, a fact which is not always pointed out in the analyses that focus on the visible aspects of warfare. However, when they are integrated in a proper way with other military and civilian effects, all under the unconventional warfare concept, the Airpower provides in a consistent way effects that are critical in gaining the fight by the joined forces and that accomplish the general political and military objectives of the campaign.

Some of the fundamental principles of the Airpower proved extremely valuable to accomplish and use its most powerful asymmetrical forces within the ongoing operations. Perhaps firstly and most importantly among these is applying the Air power by centralized control and decentralized execution. This imperative to centralize the planning and direction and, at the same time, to decentralize tactical engagement decisions has a large applicability in the asymmetric warfare compared to the traditional operations. By subordinating all the forces to a single commander, the Air Forces



and their command can efficiently allocate the limited resources of the Airpower to cover the concurrent requirements from other commanders in the theatre of operation maintaining, at the same time, a focus on the overall objectives. The core of the effects achieved through Airpower operations can be focused where and when necessary in accordance to the priorities established by the Joint Force Commander. Decisions regarding the methods and tactics of forces engagement will be the responsibility of the lower echelon closer to fight and information that are necessary.

Today the Air Component forces provide lethal effects by fighters and unmanned systems (ISR that uses a variety of air assets, space and non-traditional sensors, electronic warfare platforms), as well as airlift capabilities that practically can reach any destination in the world with the condition that they are not subordinated to specific units. The biggest contribution of the Airpower in Iraq focused on the support of the land forces, unique abilities of the air assets allowing it to conduct integrated but also independent operations. In this respect, the Airpower provides a wide spectrum of asymmetric capabilities that we can focus and direct, when necessary, creating effects such as kinetic destruction, continuous ISR gathering (including air and space sensors manned or unmanned), infiltration/extraction of forces and supplies as well as attacks over the computer networks and the support infrastructure. All these effects can be achieved when necessary, almost without considering the geography or the artificial boundaries.

Starting with the operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, the Air Component has flown over a million of combat and support sorties. Impressive as it is, this number is not relevant by itself. Firstly, many of these sorties were of long period of time, ensuring an air presence and an excellent continuity/persistency possible in the end by a combination of air to air refueling and establishment of the forward operating bases. There is nobody who can undermine the critical capacity to be able to choose among a variety of forces and means and to have a rapid response especially in a typical environment of unconventional warfare in which the enemy most often makes his own terms of the moment, place, and nature of the attacks. Secondly and most importantly, the sorties are counting, and the similar measures cannot describe easily many of the effects that the air

force produces during flight. Although impressive, the statistics represent only a part of the Airpower contribution to the present warfare. It must not be ignored the integrated information analysis and the disseminating capabilities of the Airpower that increase the capacity to collect as well as the enabling functions of the communication in the global warfare.

2.2. The engagement of the Airpower capabilities

The space assets are among the least understood and recognized contributions of the air and space forces. The vital capabilities regarding information, communications, weather, navigation, all are based on the access provided to the space. The force multipliers that are in space prove themselves to be extremely valuable within the conflict. For instance the GPS is crucial not only for guiding the precise munitions but also is vital for the accurate position reporting of the own troops, insurgents and civilians. The accurate positioning permits several rapid responses for the close air support, combat search and rescue, casualties' evacuation, as well as the engagements of time sensitive targets. Nevertheless, a capable and determined adversary could challenge the access to the space in the same way in which the Chinese reminded to the whole world with their recent anti-satellite demonstrations.

The intelligence provided by the air and space forces represents a critical factor in the unconventional warfare. In the traditional warfare, the quantity of the weapons may compensate the targets' uncertainty but this truth is not always valid in case of counterinsurgency in which unintentional collateral damages may undermine the support for the government and may become a tool for the population reorientation towards insurgents. At present, over Afghanistan and Iraq, air and space means continuously monitor the situation on the ground, helping to identify the insurgents as well as their organizational networks, supporters and lines of communication and supply. These platforms collect and disseminate a variety of information (signals, communications, images, moving targets video images), all integral part of the fight.

The air and space assets significantly contribute, also, to the emergent domain of forensic analysis



that implies the tracking of the events to determine the sources from which they came (for instance detecting the track of IEDs in order to spot the organizations that produce bombs and facilities that support them). In both countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, the air assets developed their capability to have a rapid response to determine the launching points of mortars or missiles, to identify suspect persons/vehicles and to laser mark them to be captured by the land forces or, in most cases, for their total destruction. As in the case of other Airpower applications, the centralized control of the information platforms (that reduces to the minimum the doubling effects and ensure support for the high priority requirements of the Joint Force Commander) permit the efficient use of the ISR limited assets – the key elements of the coalition advantage in the asymmetric warfare. For instance, the efficient ISR assets allow the Air Component to bring the Airpower in the support of small coalitions or the indigenous land forces units, enhancing their organic capabilities.

Precision strikes, another efficient tool in counterinsurgency, permit the insurgents' exclusion from the immediate vicinity of civilians or own land forces, giving thus the coalition forces an important fire power advantage. Highly precise navigation systems, selected in the cockpit, and the ammunition with different destruction possibilities permit the airmen to achieve the desired effects while they limit the undesired ones. Surely, in some situations, the attack of larger areas may be required by using the entire fire power, task for which the Airpower is well adjusted.

The air mobility offers another advantage in the counterinsurgency operations. The employed forces provide this advantage towards the land adversaries in the unconventional warfare by transporting the personnel and the materials avoiding attacked/disputed communication lines, launching supplies and rapidly evacuating the wounded. In 2006 in the operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, the Air Component flew over 50.000 airlift missions, transporting over 1 million people and 90.000 pallets which would have been in another way transported by other slower and more vulnerable ground means. The advantage of the mobility permits, as well, the infiltration, re-supply, as well as the extraction of some relatively small units of the land forces. By supplying the humanitarian assistance, medical support, as well

as transportation for the government officials in remote areas, the Airpower can promote the government credibility and improve the quality of life for the population that is being governed. These types of operations that affect in a direct way and are rapidly visible by the population may have significant effects in the campaign against the insurgents.

Connected to a relatively small number of coalition and local forces, the Airpower may accomplish a large sum of effects from the humanitarian and electronic ones to the kinetic ones. In some cases, the simple visible or sound presence may demonstrate the commitment towards a certain population and the support of a government as well as the influence of the adversaries' behavior by reducing their freedom of movement and neutralizing their sanctuaries.

Conclusions

In the following 15-20 years, we may watch spectacular progresses in the mode of confrontation in the air domain but we will not witness some sort of „Star War”, the role of the human factor staying on the top of war and warfare determination.

It is necessary to understand the difference between the unconventional and traditional warfare. The understanding of the present operational environment does not require only the strategic context analysis at the time being but also that of past operation effects. The long time approach that the adversaries can use in the unconventional warfare requires a long term strategy to obtain victory. Gaining a long war means gaining the fight for ideas, undermining the legitimacy of the adversaries' ideology and stopping the population support offered to them.

The unconventional warfare requires patience and adaptability. The long term engagement compared to the rapid decisive victory requires for the decision factors in the Air Force to pay a higher attention to the personnel preparation, resources employment, equipment and assets deterioration as well as the impact over the training in the initial process of mission planning/preparation.



BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. BĂDĂLAN, Eugen; FRUNZETI, Teodor, Asimetria și idiosincrasia în acțiunile militare, Centrul Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2004.
2. DEAN, David J., The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1986.
3. Von CLAUSEWITZ, Carl, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 1832; repr., Princeton, NJ, 1976.
4. FRUNZETI, Teodor; ZODIAN, Vladimir (coord.), Lumea 2009. Enciclopedie politică și militară. Studii strategice și de securitate, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2009.
5. LIDDLE HART, Basil Henry, The Strategy of Indirect Approach, Faber and Faber, London, 1942.
6. METZ, Steven, Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2007.
7. MOCKAITIS, Thomas R., The Iraq War: Learning from the Past, Adapting to the Present, and Planning for the Future, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2007.
8. MOȘTOFLEI, Constantin; POPA, Vasile, Întrebuințarea puterii aeriene la începutul secolului XXI. Realități, tendințe, implicații, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare București, 2005.
9. MUREȘAN, Mircea; VĂDUVA, Gheorghe, Războiul viitorului, viitorul războiului, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, București, 2004.

10. ORZEAȚĂ, Mihail, Securitatea și continua transformare în secolul XXI, Editura Militară, București, 2004.

11. ORZEAȚĂ, Mihail, Tendințe de evoluție a mediului internațional de securitate, în Revista Gândirea Militară Românească, nr.3, 4, 5, 6/2008.

12. RÂPAN, Florian, Aviația în războiul modern, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, București, 2001.

13. STRÎMBEANU, Victor, Puterea aeriană în paradigma securității naționale și globale, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2006.

NOTES:

1 Strategic Trends Programme, Global Strategic Trends, ed. IV, pp. 88-90.

2 Future Air and Space Operational Concept (FA&SOC) 2009, pp. 1-8, paragraph 122.

3 Ibidem, pp. 2-3, paragraph 206.

4 Ibidem, pp. 2-4, paragraph 213.

5 Examples of maritime check points are Bab-al-Mendab, Malacca, Suez and Hormuz.

6 FA&SOC 2009, pp. 1-10, paragraph 126.

7 Article 57 – Precautions in Attack – Protocol 1 (1977) of Additional Protocols to Geneva Convention, 12 August 1949.

8 As illustrated in Ottawa Convention (1997) [About denying the use, storage, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and their destruction] and the efforts to limit the cluster munitions.

9 FA&SOC 2009, p. v, paragraph 1.

10 Ibidem, pp. 1-7, paragraph 119.

Major General Virgil RISTEA (virgilristea@yahoo.com) is the Chief Military Representative of the General Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium. He flew supersonic fighters and has been assigned in several leadership positions at Air Force units as well as at the Air Force Staff.



CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURES – ENHANCING ELEMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Cristian BĂHNĂREANU, PhD

Any evaluation or analysis of critical energy infrastructures (CEnI) must proceed from a reality so often demonstrated: the incapacity or destruction of any CEnI may have a major impact on energy and economic security of a country. The negative consequences will be felt not only in the field of economic security, but also in all other dimensions of national security, not only in that state, but also in other interconnected states.

The impairment of any CEnI may have repercussions on the energy, economic and national security with serious effects on economic development, health and public safety. Therefore, the concerns of national, regional and international organizations are focused in recent years on developing specific mechanisms for the identification and designation of ICEn, risk assessment and increased protection.

Key-words: critical energy infrastructure (CEnI); vulnerability; risk; security; CEnI protection.

Defining and identifying the CEnI

Energy sector and related infrastructure is a key component of national economy with distinct characteristics, dynamic growth, markets and issues. The basis of energy industry consists in national and international regulatory organizations, stock-exchanges and parallel markets, large transnational corporations, many public and private energy companies, contractors and subcontractors working under contract with the state, as well as facilities owned by them in the process of exploitation, production, transportation, distribution and consumption of energy resources.

Therefore, the energy industry and critical energy infrastructures are a complex system that moves the transports, food and agriculture, petrochemical, defense industry sectors, etc. Even the effectiveness of the Armed Forces depends on them.

In the early 2000s and especially after the September 2001 terrorist attacks, there were recorded the first serious concerns about the identification, designation and protection of critical infrastructures, including those in the energy field. In this regard, US Congress¹ defined the critical energy infrastructure as a physical and cyber-based system or service for the generation, transmission or distribution of electric energy and the production, refining or storage of petroleum, natural gas or petroleum products. At the EU's level², the main critical infrastructures from energy sector are belonging to the following sectors:

- Electricity sector – infrastructures and facilities for the generation and transmission of electricity in respect of supply electricity;
- Oil sector – oil production, refining, treatment, storage and transmission by pipelines;
- Gas sector – gas production, refining, treatment, storage and transmission by pipelines and liquefied natural gas terminals.

The vulnerability of certain energy nodes located on or near key transmission lines has increased as transportation and distribution of energy resources has become more complex, as follows: in the electricity area – substations and interconnectors, in the gas area – compression stations and main pipelines, in the oil area – ports and main pipelines³. Also, the structuring of energy sector on a more commercial basis rather



than on those related to security has amplified the energy systems' vulnerability to various acts of subversion, especially a deliberate and planned attack.

Adapting the definition of critical infrastructure from the European Directive of December 2008, we consider that CEnI means an asset, system or part thereof located in a state which is essential for the maintenance of society's vital functions, health, safety, security, social or economic well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact as a result of the failure to maintain those functions.

In our opinion, CEnI category should include all assets, systems, and parts whose disruption may directly and indirectly affect national security:

- **electricity** – *generating installations, systems and power plants (dams and hydroelectric, thermoelectric, nuclear, and solar facilities, etc.); control centers and systems; transmission substations; transmission lines; distribution substations; distribution lines; public networks; private microwave networks, etc.* which sustain the operations of generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity;

- **oil** – *extraction wells and installations, terminals, storage tanks and facilities, storage capacities of national strategic oil reserve, pumping stations, refineries, oil/gas separation installations, oil/water separation units, oil/gas dehydration units, oil sweetening units, compression stations; water treatment units, control centers and systems, public and private networks, oil tankers and barges, railroad tanks, trucks, pipelines systems, etc.* which sustain the operations of production, transportation, and storage of crude oil, processing of crude oil in petroleum products, transportation, distribution and storage of petroleum products, and control systems;

- **natural gas** – *gathering wells and installations, separating installations of the various hydrocarbons/fluids and gas, repressuring installations, drying and conditioning units, compression stations, underground storage facilities, distribution systems, etc.* which sustain the operations of production, processing, transportation, distribution, and storage of natural gas and liquefied natural gas, and control systems.

This system of CEnI must be protected by a

series of dangers and threats, which means not only enhancing security and resilience of one CEnI, but of the whole interconnected network.

Dangers and threats to CEnI

As social and economic activities grow, state and society's critical infrastructures, particularly energy ones, become more vulnerable to various dangers and threats. As science and technology progress, the vulnerability and the possibility of an attack or accident that could affect people, property and environment increase.

The range of dangers and threats to CEnI, by which an internal or external actor (individual, organization or nation) is able to exploit the CEnI vulnerabilities with the intention to weaken the economic security, is more diversified and the incidence of asymmetric ones is increasing. A classification of these dangers and threats⁴ could be as follows:

- **Natural dangers/threats:**
 - *Symmetric:* earthquakes, floods, landslides, drought, etc.
 - *Asymmetric:* extreme weather events, fall of meteorites and cosmic objects, global warming, etc.
- **Human dangers/threats:**
 - *Symmetric:*
 - *Physical:* chemical accident, conventional warfare, etc.
 - *Cybernetic:* programming errors, etc.
 - *Asymmetric:*
 - *Physical:* terrorism and organized crime, errors in design, operation and maintenance of systems, etc.
 - *Cybernetic:* informational warfare, network centric war, etc.

We consider that the most important specific vulnerabilities, risks, dangers and threats to CEnI might be as shown in *Figure no. 1*.

The increasing and proliferating CEnI's vulnerabilities require the development of a profound and comprehensive systemic national approach on their protection as an enhancing factor of national security. CEnI are mainly vulnerable to technological accidents and extreme natural events, as well as terrorism and cyber attacks. Certain terrorist acts using unconventional weapons of radiological or electromagnetic type are sufficient to destroy or disrupt a large part of



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

CEnI. Also, cyber attacks on computer systems have the potential to destroy or undermine the capacity of such networks to control the CEnI. It is known that hydrocarbons and derived products usually transit the long distances from place of production to points of distribution and consumption. Under these conditions, the critical infrastructure of energy transportation and

Vulnerabilities	Risks	Dangers and threats
Level of training and qualification of personnel	Existence of untrained and unqualified personnel	Improper operation of CEnI caused by mistakes, failures and human errors
State of degradation	Existence of CEnI with high degree of degradation	Weakening of CEnI structural integrity due to inadequate allocation of resources for repair/maintenance or replacement of physical depreciated and obsolete CEnI
	Existence of CEnI which are intensively exploited	Intensive use of CEnI without technological break necessary for repair/maintenance operations
Design errors and flaws or hidden deficiencies	Existence of design errors and flaws or hidden deficiencies	Abnormal functioning of CEnI
Location in areas exposed to extreme natural events	Existence of extreme natural events	Interruption or stopping of CEnI operation caused by extreme natural events
Level of concentration		
Increased dependence	Existence of CEnI dependence on other critical infrastructures	Interruption or stopping of CEnI operation caused by dependence on other critical infrastructures
Lack of observation, protection and counter-espionage systems	Existence of employees who feel unfairly treated or are instigated/corrupted to perform unauthorized operations	Undermining the CEnI
	Existence of individuals who are interested in earning money by handling financial and credit assets or theft	
	Existence of individuals (hackers) who seek to gain access to CEnI control systems or groups/states that trigger the information warfare	
	Existence of terrorist and terrorist groups who seek to achieve a “cascade” impact, a more severe economic impact	
	Existence of pirate groups who seek to earn money and materials	
	Existence of companies or information services who seek to gather some economic secrets	

Figure no. 1: Vulnerabilities, risks, dangers and threats to CEnI

distribution has become, in recent years, highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks and other kinds of dangers and threats. USA and Western States are largely dependent on Eastern hydrocarbons, particularly oil, and any disruption of energy supplies might cause great damage to their economies. Therefore, terrorists target the CEnI's most vulnerable points that can create maximum impact. For example, if a jetliner would crash into the Ras Tamura facility from Saudi Arabia, about 10 percent of world's oil imports would be compromised⁵.

Also, some political and social unrest in countries that are important in terms of production, export and transit of oil would produce some disturbance on the stock-exchanges and global markets. Popular revolts in the beginning of year in Egypt, the country that controls the transit of oil through the pipeline SUMED and Suez Canal (about 3% of global demand), have reduced the oil supplies to Western consumers and increased the international oil prices.

Consequently, terrorist and pirate attacks on CEnI – fixed installations (pipelines, refineries, tanks), supply chain (oil tankers, terminals, ports) or even parts of electronic and information infrastructure (network control systems) – seek to achieve a more severe economic impact either by interruption or stopping the production and distribution, either by increasing international hydrocarbons prices or transportation and insurance costs.

Moreover, such actions are intended to produce “cascade” effects, which means that any disturbing act in the energy nodes and facilities or along transportation route can severely affect economic activity and can disturb other critical infrastructures.

Specific protection mechanisms of CEnI

CEnI protection includes all the programs, plans, activities, measures, procedures and interactions implemented by public competent authorities, owners, administrators and operators in order to prevent, reduce, and counteract any risk arising from vulnerabilities of such infrastructures that may undermine its existence and operation. It carries an extremely laborious process of analysis, which involves a series of steps, as it can be seen from the *Figure no. 2*.

The process of developing and implementing effective protective measures of CEnI involves three steps: determining needs, developing programs and finding long-term solutions⁷. Determining security needs includes identifying gaps in information, process technology, and training, and developing solutions. Development and implementation of programs are related to prevention and delay, detection, mitigation and response, and recovery actions. Finding long-term solutions consists in identifying the best technological answer for protecting energy assets, facilities and key systems, such as: physical assets, control systems and related cyber systems.

In this algorithm, assessing vulnerabilities, threats and consequences plays a crucial role. The purpose of vulnerability analysis is to identify those characteristics of architecture, implementation and operation of a CEnI and interdependencies through which it is exposed to incapacity or destruction when faced to a threat. The aim of threat analysis is to identify the nature, source and probability of their occurrence and includes the following activities:

- identify known and potential adversaries, where such information is available and accurate;
- recognition and analysis of intent, motivation,




Figure no. 2: The process of continuous improvement of critical infrastructure protection⁶



operating history, methods, weapons, intelligence capabilities of the adversary and its strengths and weaknesses;

- threat assessment against each part of critical infrastructure, taking into account all the above factors related to the adversary, and assigning a certain critical level for each adversary⁸.

The scope of consequences analysis is to determine the impact of a threat on CENI vulnerability, concerning the services supply, society, politics, economy, environment and interdependencies. The threat impact on that CENI can be quality-related and quantity-related, based on three factors: proportions (local, national, regional), magnitude (zero, low, medium, and high) and effects in time.

The purpose of the entire process of protection is to ensure robust and resilient CENI in which the continuity of business and services are maintained through secure and reliable information sharing, effective risk management programs, coordinated response capabilities, and trusted public-private partnership at all levels of government and economy. CENI protection can not be achieved without carrying out operational performance standards, without a clearly defined partnership between the owners of critical infrastructure, operating personnel or competent authorities.

Romania's priority in this field is the rapid development of energy infrastructure networks, efficient and resilient, able to intensify both sustainable development and accelerated modernization of the economy and national security. These infrastructures must be compatible with European and Euro-Atlantic networks.

The 2010 Romanian National Defense Strategy⁹ identifies the deficiencies in the protection and operation of critical infrastructure as one of the key vulnerabilities.

Critical infrastructures, including energy ones, should be protected from two major threats – terrorism and natural hazards –, but also from actions of sabotage or cyber risks.

In this context, Romanian Government has adopted a regulation¹⁰ governing the procedure for the identification, designation and protection of National Critical Infrastructures (NCI) and European Critical Infrastructures (ECI), including those in the energy industry, in accordance with EU Council Directive of December 2008, in order to increase the capacity to provide stability, security

and safety of economic and social systems and protection of the population.

According to this paper, the Prime Minister, by a State Councilor, is responsible for the coordination, at national level, of the activities of identification, designation and protection of critical infrastructure. Also, the Ministry of Administration and Interior (MAI), by the Coordinating Centre for Critical Infrastructures Protection, is responsible for organizing and conducting activities necessary to implement the regulation's provisions and strengthen the cooperation between public competent authorities and non-governmental structures. Public competent authorities and each owner/administrator/operator of NCI/ECI are required to establish a specialized NCI/ECI department within its own structure.

Competent public authorities must identify and designate potential NCI/ECI that matches the sectorial and intersectorial criteria. Also, those authorities must carry out an annual assessment of risks, threats, and need to improve protection of designated NCI/ECI. Within 90 days after designation of an infrastructure as NCI/ECI, the owner/administrator/operator develops "The Operator Security Plan" that identifies critical infrastructure assets of NCI/ECI and security solutions to be implemented for their protection. The process of identification, designation, protection of the NCI/ECI will be reviewed periodically.

Moreover, at MAI level, there was developed a Draft National Strategy on Critical Infrastructures Protection¹¹ that creates an integrated national framework necessary for preparation and adoption of specific measures and actions aimed to reduce at medium and long term the impact of specific risk factors on critical infrastructures, including energy ones, at national and regional level.

The main objective of the strategy is to ensure coordinates of both continued development of Romanian capabilities for critical infrastructure protection and harmonization of national legal framework with the European Union and NATO field regulations. Achieving this goal requires action by national competent authorities and private sector partners for:

- uniformity and integrated application of NCI/ECI identification, designation and protection procedures;
- configuration and operationalization of the



national early warning system by integrating all networks, capabilities and information and organizational existing extensions;

- reduction in the level of critical infrastructures vulnerability;
- development of cooperation at national, regional and international levels.

Also, competent authorities need to work to raise the protection of the critical infrastructure by: assessing all existing and anticipated risks while identifying critical assets and processes; reducing the disturbances which could affect the stability and optimal operation of essential services based on critical infrastructure through pro-active measures in an effective system of risk management; increasing the degree of expertise through continuous updating of risk analysis; compliance with privacy of data and information. Their efforts must be sustainable and focused especially on prevention, reduction and limitation of effects and reaction and intervention.

At the MAI's Coordinating Centre for Critical Infrastructures Protection level, there will be developed an Action Plan for the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the Strategy's objectives, which will be reviewed annually or whenever necessary.

As it can be seen, the national and international decision makers have the will and take concrete measures regarding the integrated management of CEnI protection.

Taken actions are aimed both at defining and identifying them and at establishing specialized structures with adequate legal support able to deal with all aspects of critical infrastructures protection.

Conclusions

The state of security is closely correlated with and determined by the proper functioning of critical energy infrastructure networks. The need for their protection is essential in order to avoid serious disruption of the society functions. Connections between the functionality and viability of CEnI and basic elements of economic and social life and political and military aspects of a State or group of States significantly strengthen the binding element between the security and the role of infrastructure systems in expressing needs and promoting national interests.

Although the decision factors search and implement the most effective protective solutions and measures, it is impossible to achieve complete protection of CEnI. Moreover, there is no single generally valid solution for protecting CEnI. However, we must make each effort to rise the degree of protection and find solutions that can be adapted to cover each category of critical infrastructure.

It is also needed a more active involvement of public competent authorities and owners/administrators/operators of CEnI assets in the legislative and practical efforts. Each of them must be responsible to develop and put in practice programs, plans and procedures to protect the assets, systems or parts of CEnI that they manage, in accordance with specific laws, regulations and rules.

NOTES:

1 USA, Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debated of the 108th Congress, First Session, Senate, 28 July 2003, p. 20749, Google Books extract.

2 The Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection, "Official Journal of European Union", L 345, 23 December 2008, p. 81, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:EN:PDF>.

3 Jonathan PERKS, Jonathan HYDE, Angela FALCONER, Study on Risk Governance of European Critical Infrastructures in the ICT and Energy Sector, Final Report to European Commission, 4 September 2009, p. 10, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/studies/doc/2009_10_risk_governance_report.pdf.

4 Radu ANDRICIUC, Pericole și amenințări la adresa infrastructurii critice, Psihomedica Publishing House, Sibiu, Romania, 2008, p. 59.

5 John C.K. DALY, Saudi Oil Facilities: Al-Qaeda's Next Target?, Terrorism Monitor, Volume 4, Issue 4, 23 February 2006, www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=685.

6 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Partnering to enhance protection and resiliency, 2009, p. 4, www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf.

7 Idem, p. 37.

8 American Petroleum Institute, Security Guidelines for the Petroleum Industry, Third Edition, April 2005, p. 5.

9 Strategia Națională de Apărare, București, 2010,



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

www.presidenty.ro/static/ordine/SNAp/SNAp.pdf.

10 Ordonanța de urgență nr. 98 din 3 noiembrie 2010 a Guvernului României privind identificarea, desemnarea și protecția infrastructurilor critice, "Monitorul Oficial", no. 757, 12 November 2010.

11 Strategia Națională privind protecția infrastructurilor critice (proiect), www.mai.gov.ro/Documente/Transparenta%20decizionala/Anexa_Strategie%20protectia%20infrastructurilor.pdf.

Cristian BĂHNĂREANU (cristibahnareanu@gmail.com), PhD, is Scientific Researcher at the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania.



SYMMETRY AND ASYMMETRY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Florian COLDEA, PhD
Liviu Bogdan VLAD, PhD

International Relations have evolved in close connection with the role of the state in society and with the power distribution within it, having been directly influenced by the evolution of international politics. Despite the fact that relations among states, generally, and diplomacy especially/particularly, entered the political sciences field relatively late, they both come from the beginning of civilization. Sometimes half-dark relations among states started to dominate politicians' and competent forums' preoccupations in the beginning of the 21st century, when profound transformations took place in the international security field. This (re)affirmation of international relations occurred due to the need to minimize human and material loss within emerging crises and conflicts. Under these circumstances, the nation-state plays a secondary role, while non-state actors begin to increasingly affirm themselves, including international non-governmental organizations with role in conflict management and human rights defense.

Key-words: diplomacy; geopolitics; international corporations; intergovernmental organizations; International Relations; state actors; non-state actors; international organizations; international politics; non-governmental organizations; nation-state.

International Relations are considered a transverse field by excellence, almost impossible to study without being equally preoccupied with law, economics, conflicts, geopolitics, history etc. At the same time, it is regarded as a field full of uncertainties, given that many times reality surpasses „fiction” (foresights). Academically

speaking, International Relations are a branch of political sciences based, especially, upon the study of relations between state actors within the international system and their interaction with non-state actors¹. As a field of study, the International Relations discipline doesn't have a very long history², but there have been preoccupations about inter-state relations, the causes that lead to wars and the conditions that bring about peace since ancient times³. Following the profound changes in the security field, International Relations⁴ have known a tumultuous development consisting of major transformations. Apart from the classical risks and threats one must also take into consideration, the challenges posed by globalization⁵ (that limits the causes of conflicts among states⁶), fragmentation and interconnection⁷, whose impact on international system architecture is amplified by the revolutions in technology and communication.

The security concept has spread significantly so that it includes completely different risks than the traditional ones, having acquired an emphasized subjective dimension, having as a background the power influence transferred from the state role to the individual role⁸.

Nowadays, international relations system faces multiple uncertainties – inherent, epistemic or induced and with a high potential of unpredictability related to the evolutions with impact upon the global security environment.

International Relations and world trade also existed – according to some critics of globalization theory⁹ – during modern time of nation states, but with low implications upon the international



relations system. The lower the impact, the more the states were the only acknowledged actors at international level and the global economical and political relations were relying directly on their policy.

The way states behave in the international arena differs from one state to another, their place and role being established according to the power¹⁰ and the role performed within the system. Power can be considered an asymmetric relationship among individuals, groups, organizations or states, and it is exerted in close connection with their needs, values or interests, while being influenced by the (unequal) distribution of resources. This is the reason why one believes that power means resources, strategy and results, and as resources are unequally spread the same goes for power and international pressure. Therefore, „the bigger and more important a country is, the more relevant the strategic position it owns, the more powerful the international constraints are” (Ionel Nicu Sava, 2005).

Although military power – “hard power” – used to be sufficient in order to obtain and maintain global supremacy, the beginning of the 21st century included a substantial change for the concept of power, understood as the capacity of achieving target objectives through available resources¹¹. “Hard power” is not sufficient anymore; economic resources (very important) may not assure – all by themselves – a dominant projection of the power which more and more depends on the valuation of “soft power” resources (diplomacy, economic aid and communication between public and private sector).

Consequently, the success of a state’s efforts to project power and, implicitly, to achieve its objectives depends on its capacity to draw up and to implement “smart power” strategies (concept launched by Joseph Nye, Jr.), that would combine “hard power” and “soft power” resources, within some alliances and cooperation networks, allowing it to manage an increasing scale of present and future challenges.

The definitions for *International Relations* evolved in relation with the increasing (or decreasing) role of the state as an international actor. Therefore, while traditional definitions are centered on state as the only actors in the international system, modern and postmodern definitions take into account international organizations and non-state actors. Through the ages, the latter, though

independent, followed a fluctuant evolution in direct connection with state actors’ interests, becoming more and more powerful and influent. Nowadays, the international political stage is dominated not only by arrangements among states, but also by the fact that „states face the power of other actors, such as intergovernmental actors created by them” (Eduard Kolodziej, 2007). The growth of supra-state entities (i.e., the European Union) represented an inflexion point within international relations, accomplishing the transition from traditional politics, with an obvious separation between a state’s internal and external domain, to postmodern politics, where concepts like sovereignty, governance, policy or diplomacy acquire new meanings¹².

Alongside intergovernmental¹³ organizations, that may influence member states’ interests by restricting or extending their power, an important role in international relations is played by non-governmental organizations that may influence states’ behavior and politics and the activity of intergovernmental organizations too. Modern theories of International Relations tend to present a vision of a polarized world, where nations straighten towards a series of “inter-civilization clashes” (Samuel P. Huntington¹⁴) or towards a democratic and evenly world (Francis Fukuyama¹⁵).

On the other side, the theories of globalization introduce hyper-world scenarios, or state-centered scenarios. Due to non-state actors, more and more influent, coming into sight in the international environment, nation-state faces some pressure it had never met before. Such challenges can be easily noticed if we regard sovereignty as a social construct that implies not only the existence of an identity and a territory, but also the acceptance of a final authority in a number of thematic areas by other states (Thomas J. Biersteker, 2002).

An essential role in the evolution of international relations is played by international politics, as it cannot be treated mechanically, because powers have different qualitative and quantitative features, and „their attraction and influence is not being exactly correlated with the mass and weight” (Martin Wight, 1998). A pertinent analysis of the international relations system could be done only by taking into account the principles, the functions and the distribution of power within the state:



- an hierarchical system that confers roles to its members through force or persuasion;

- an anarchical system where power is divided, taking into account the interaction among actors who are obliged to maximize their power and to increase their military potential in order to survive.

Although power performs an important role in contemporary society, the increase of power and influence at international level is not a main objective for states, as they insist on maintaining security. The stress on security and, implicitly, on maintaining peace is relatively easy to understand if one takes into consideration that, in the last 5,600 years, mankind has faced more than 14500 wars (A. Montague, 1989), and only 286 of the last 3,400 years were peaceful (C. Burke, 1989). In the contemporary period (1945-present), over 165 wars took place, 31 of them in 1994 only (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1995), and, if we count the armed conflicts of small dimensions, the number would be greater.

Classical concepts as “peace” and “war” can no longer be applied to nowadays realities. Asymmetric conflicts between states and non-state actors have been added to classical military collations valuing the advantages of communication and technology, using other states territory to prepare attacks, preferring wars of attrition, referring to any available means or instruments with political, intimidation and pressure purposes etc. The antiterrorist war is the perfect example of unconventional and asymmetric collation that breaks the rules and the traditional logic of territory and geopolitics.

Although there have been numerous conflicts in the contemporary period, society’s reaction to war is visibly different compared to the modern period, a sign that the age of the conventional conflicts and mass armies vanished „in the mist of time”. Today, weapons are gradually overthrown by words, and International Relations have been rapidly developed in order to solve conflicts. The changes that occurred in the sphere of International Relations¹⁶ have also contributed to this development, given that beside the nation-state, other important actors have appeared and that, owing to their means of actions, they interfere with the states in the asymmetrical relations. If, during the Cold War, there was some symmetry¹⁷ in the relations between the two ideological and political blocs, now one can talk about the emergence of multiple forms of asymmetry

in International Relations.¹⁸ This inequality requires taking the most appropriate measures for optimal security management, whether it is about national, regional or global security. In order to prevent the national (internal), regional or international conflicts, it is necessary to permanently be aware of the evolution of human society and its peculiarities at local and regional level, since this is the only way the optimal modalities to solve the conflicts can be chosen and the violent confrontations, whose effects may be some of the most diverse, can be avoided. States and military organizations dedicate more and more attention to finding political solutions for conflict management (discussions and not hostilities, disincentives and not confrontation, negotiations and not war), knowing that dialogue is less expensive than military confrontation and, ultimately, even war has as a finality the concluding of an agreement, too.

Relations among states are even more important as the more history of diplomacy¹⁹ comes from the ancient times, being confused with the beginning of the history of civilization, but one can speak about diplomacy in the true acceptance of the word after the creation of the state. (Nicolae Ciachir, 1998). Defined as *the science or art of negotiations or the science of international relations*, diplomacy gathers together the whole system of interests arising as a result of the relations among nations aimed at maintaining peace and good understanding (Nicolae Ciachir, 1998). The current configuration of the international relations system has firmly modified the binomial interstate diplomacy – politics. The new supra-state political bodies as the European Union, which involve complex interactions between individuals, processes, phenomena, interests, etc. require constant communication and negotiation, the old paradigm of zero sum game becoming inoperative.

With the idea that one can talk about an international politics only after the emergence of the modern sovereign state as a starting point, two structural theories of the world system were launched, one of them belonging to George Modelski, who argues that the world system is based on the existence of five long cycles²⁰ of the Great Powers, and the second to Immanuel Wallerstein, who believes that, *since its beginning, the world system has been divided into three concentric circles*²¹, hence being understood the fact that there is no great power, which in a certain



period of time, dominates the whole system but some links are established and based on the major economic functions, in which the system is controlled by a hegemonic power.²²

The philosophical and political trends that appeared at the mid of the 21st century had an influence on the perceptions about the existing relations in the triad human-state-environment. Nationalism is one of the trends with impact on the concepts regarding the international reality. It is a political doctrine based on rights and national aspirations and on social Darwinism. There were also other trends that influenced the political thought and the sphere of influence (international relations), thus appearing two diametrically opposed schools of political thought: Realism and Liberalism.

Realism, as school of thought that characterizes the world system, has its origin in ancient times, but was developed as a theory around 1950-1960. Realism (and hence Realist theory) focuses on the role of political power in the evolution of international relations, arguing that state actors act as national autonomous entities in the pursuit of their self-interest. Regarding the international relations, Realists support the idea according to which the international relations would be anarchical in the absence of a world government.

Realism is based on a series of theories regarding the international relations that have, as a starting point, the idea that, in the pursuit of their goals, states are motivated more by the power interests/security rather than ideals. The Realist theory focuses on state rationality in the actions that have as a goal the increase of power and security. Taking into consideration such terms as balance of power, anarchy, competition, conflict, hierarchical structure, Realists try to give obvious answers on the evolution of international relations over the course of history. There is another International Relations theory, closely related to Realism, namely, Neo-Realism that has the balance power concept as a common feature with the classical Realism. The Neo-Realists believe that the states want to keep/to increase their power, not because of human nature, but as a result of the system.

Another doctrine that had an impact on International Relations was Liberalism (Idealism), an economic and political doctrine based on the individual freedom, which put on a second level the political ideas based on society, state or nation

interest. The liberalists support the individual freedom and responsibility, equality under the law, and the right to property. Liberalism's greatest achievement is the fact that they succeeded in imposing International Relations as an academic discipline in the 20th century. Other features of Liberalism include the emphasis made on the complexity of international relations that, on the one hand, comprise states that have mutual interactions and, on the other, the international organizations and civil society. Neo-Liberalism developed in close connection with Liberalism and the Neo-Liberalists launched the neoclassical theory that aims to reduce states' influences on economic development.

The identification of state actors and non-state actors' behavior in the world system is based on the premise that the state and its power play a significant role in international relations. Thus, one of the pillars of international policy is represented by power competition, a fact that inevitably leads to tensions, crises and conflicts among the actors on this dynamic stage. There are two trends at the moment:

- on the one hand, some international actors exert their power in some areas, regions or all over the world;

- on the other, game power marked by the efforts of some states to leave the sphere of influence of Great Powers and to reconfigure themselves in new formulas much more acceptable in order to promote and defend in a direct and efficient way their own interest (Cristian Băhnăreanu, 2008).

Given the events that occurred at the beginning of the 20th century, the (re)assessment of international relations must have as a starting point the new features of the global security environment which are inter-dependant, unpredictable, asymmetrical, non-linear, unconventional, etc. Surprise elimination is impossible, but the strategic thinking and forecast have become essential for a country's ability to limit the effects of security risks and the effective promotion of their interests. In order to achieve this, the relevant international actors (state actors and intergovernmental actors) have recently updated their national security strategies, legal frameworks and policies, tracing clear responsibilities to national institutions with competences in substantiating the strategic planning and decision making process, from the intelligence service – the secret frontline of



the national security²³ – to the highest political decision makers.

Global challenges can be tackled only through global efforts that require a constant cooperation among states, with the involvement and support of the non-state entities with decision-making role in the sphere of the international relations: international and non-governmental organizations, international corporations etc.

The margin of error of the international actors was significantly reduced, as they are more able to identify appropriate solutions to reinvent and reduce uncertainty. These are the only ways to provide strategic advantage and to offer appropriate answers to the more and more complex and dynamic evolutions international actors are faced with.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. BĂHNĂREANU, Cristian, Resurse energetice, crize, conflicte, Editura Militară, București, 2008.
2. BIERSTEKER, Thomas J., State, Sovereignty and Territory în: Walter CARLSNAES, Thomas RISSE, Beth A. SIMMONS (editori), Handbook of International Relations, Sage Publication, Londra, 2002.
3. BLOUET, Brian, Globalization and Geopolitics, Reaktion Books, London, 2001.
4. BURKE, C., Aggression in Man, în: SHAW, Paul R, WONG, Yuwa, Genetic Seeds of Warfare: Evolution, Nationalism and Patriotism, London, Unwin Hyman, 1989.
5. BURCHILL, Scott, Teorii ale relațiilor internaționale, Editura Institutul European, Iași, 2008.
6. CIACHIR, Nicolae, Istoria relațiilor internaționale de la pacea westfalică (1648), până în contemporaneitate (1947), Editura Oscar Print, București, 1998.
7. COOPER, Robert, Destrămarea Națiunilor - Ordine și haos în secolul XXI, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 2007.
8. DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste, Istoria relațiilor internaționale (vol. I), Editura Științelor Sociale și Politice, București, 2006.
9. FUKUYAMA, Francis, Sfârșitul istoriei și ultimul om, Editura Paideia, București, 1992.
10. HIRST, Paul & THOMPSON, Grahame, Globalizarea sub semnul întrebării: economiile internaționale și politicile de guvernare (ediția a doua), Editura Trei, București, 2002.
11. HUNTINGTON, Samuel P., Ciocnirea civilizațiilor și refacerea ordinii mondiale, Editura Antet, București, 1997.
12. KOLODZIEJ, Eduard, Securitatea și relațiile internaționale, Editura Polirom, București, 2007.
13. MAIOR, George Cristian, Incertitudine. Gândire strategică și relații internaționale în secolul XXI, Editura Rao, București, 2009
14. MALIȚA, Mircea, Între război și pace, Editura C. H. Beck, București, 2007.
15. MIROIU, Andrei (Coordonatori: Andrei MIROIU și Radu-Sebastian UNGUREANU), Manual de relații internaționale, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2006.
16. MONTAGU, A., The Nature of Human Aggression, în: SHAW, Paul R, WONG, Yuwa, Genetic Seeds of Warfare: Evolution, Nationalism and Patriotism, London, Unwin Hyman, 1989.
17. Di NOLFO, Ennio, Introducere în istoria relațiilor internaționale, Editura BIC ALL, București, 2007.
18. NYE, Joseph S., Jr. Descifrarea conflictelor internaționale, Editura Antet, București, 2005.
19. NYE, Joseph S, jr., The Future of American Power. Dominance and Decline in Perspective în Foreign Affaires, noiembrie-decembrie 2010.
20. OMAND, David, Securing the State, Published by C. Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, London, 2010.
21. SAVA, Nicu Ionel, Studii de securitate, Centrul Român de Studii Regionale, București, 2005.
22. STIGLITZ, Joseph E., Globalizarea. Speranțe și deziluzii, Editura Economică, București, 2003.
23. WIGHT, Martin, Politica de putere, Editura ARC, București, 1998.
24. ***, Dicționarul Explicativ al Limbii Române, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 1998.
25. ***, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1995, Oxford: OUP, 1995.

NOTES:

1 Non-state actors' category includes: non-governmental organizations, international organizations, international corporations etc. The most important non-



state actors performing an essential role within the international system are: United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, in English, or OTAN, in French), European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), organizations that, even if they haven't changed for years, they have known a series of ups and downs across the history, in close connection with the interests of state actors that are part of them. At the same time the terrorist networks and the cross border organized criminality groups have become definitive elements of the nowadays structure of the international relations.

2 The first Chair of International Relations was established at University of Wales, at Aberystwyth, in the second half of 19th century and the first authors who realized the uniqueness and peculiarity of this discipline were Edward Hallett Carr (1892-1982) and Hans Morgenthau (1904-1980), authors who wrote in the years of the Second World War (both before and after the armed conflicts were over).

3 Such preoccupations we find in Thucydides' work (465-395 AC) who, during the 5th century BC, tried to decipher the causes of the war between Spartans and Athenians (the Peloponnesian War) from 431-411 BC, accomplishing the work entitled „*The Peloponnesian War*”, a rigorous description of its phases and moments. Thucydides, due to the analysis he draws up, ascertains history as science, the reason why he is called „*father of history*” (Mircea MALIȚA, 2007).

4 The complexity of the discipline derives from the multiple branches of the International Relations, for example:

- International Relations Theory;
- International Relations History;
- International Law;
- Strategic Studies;
- Foreign Affairs Analysis;
- International Political Economy.

5 Lately, the term globalization has replaced the term Cold War, becoming the most used term in the attempt to find a justification for the oscillatory way (even contradictory) international relations evolve. A very eloquent definition for the concept of globalization has been given by Joseph Eugene Stiglitz, awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 2001. He considers that „(...) globalization – to move away barriers from the free trade and the integration of national economies – might be a factor of welfare and it has got the potential to bring richness to all, especially to the poor ones”. Stiglitz believes in the importance of globalization and he considers it (the globalization) „has reduced the sense of isolation felt in many developing countries” (Joseph Eugene STIGLITZ, 2003). Brian Blouet also has an interesting point of view: he considers globalization as „the opening of the national space for a free movement of goods, money and ideas (...) it eliminates the

obstacles in front of these movements and creates the necessary conditions for the international trade of goods and services to develop” (Brian BLOUET, 2001).

6 The belief that globalization made the interstate conflicts very unlikely is sustained by three main reasons, each with its own merits or limits:

- the economic interdependence among world states drove to the increase of war costs;
- cultural and personal interactions reduced the wrong perceptions that in the past generated conflicts;
- the spread of democracy and the changes in governance types (states' necessity to be part of the international system) will lead to an increased number of open, honest and representative governments, not bent to fight each other.

7 “*The interconnected world of the 21st century exists above the state, below the state and through the state*” - Anne Marie SLAUGHTER, *apud*. George Cristian MAIOR, *Incertitudine. Gândire strategică și relații internaționale în secolul XXI*, Rao Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009.

8 David OMAND, *Securing the State*, Published by C. Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, London, 2010.

9 Among the critics we refer to are Paul HIRST and Graham THOMPSON.

10 The concept of power means, in the context of diplomacy and International Relations, the ability of a state to influence or control other states, and the states that own such a power are called “powers”, “middle powers”, “regional powers”, “great powers”, “superpowers” or “hyper powers”.

11 Joseph S. NYE Jr., *The Future of American Power. Dominance and Decline in Perspective*, in *Foreign Affairs*, November-December 2010.

12 Robert COOPER, *Destrămarea Națiunilor - Ordine și haos în secolul XXI*, Univers Enciclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2007

13 E.g. the United Nations, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the World Trade Organization.

14 A classical work for this vision is *Ciocnirea civilizațiilor și refacerea ordinii mondiale*, original title *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*, Antet Publishing House, Bucharest, 1997.

15 A classical work for this vision is *Sfârșitul istoriei și ultimul om*, Paideia Publishing House, Bucharest, 1992.

16 We refer both to the end of the Cold War and the antagonism between East and West, and the emergence of new states on the world political map.

17 *The Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language* defines symmetry as „property of a whole space to be composed of mutual corresponding elements and to present on this basis certain regularities; proportionality, concordance, harmony between parts of a whole, of the elements of a set; the exact

correspondence (as a form, position, etc) between the opposite parts of a whole”, *The Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language*, 1998, p. 988.

18 The existing asymmetries in the international relations can be grouped into three main categories:

- the asymmetry of the intrastate and interstate relations and the emergence of a post-state world;
- the asymmetry between the means of actions of different international actors;
- the asymmetry of the way to conduct wars.

19 Diplomacy, in the sense of “the system and art communication between powers” (Martin WIGHT, 1998).

20 The five long cycles of the world system in Modelski’s opinion are:

- **the Portuguese cycle** – from 1497 (*Vasco da Gama sails for India*) to conquering of Portugal by Spain in 1580;
- **the Dutch cycle** – starts around 1580 and ends with the Peace of Utrecht (1713);
- **the first British cycle** – starts around 1710 and ends in 1783, after the American War of Independence;
- **the second British cycle** – begins with the Congress of Vienna (1815) and ends after the First World War;
- **the American cycle** – begins in 1918 and it is currently developed (*apud. Andrei MIROIU, 2006*).

21 Wallerstein’s triadic structure has the following parts:

- **centre** – composed by the major powers; these are not only the powers with global interests and capabilities to defend them, but also those powers which have a great influence on creating rules (particularly economic ones) that guide the international system on their observance;
- **semi-periphery** – is principally composed of

three main categories:

- *former Central Powers laid in a descending position – the former Great Powers in decay that still play an important role in the system. Here we can mention Spain in the 17th century or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Interwar years;*
- *powers laid at periphery in an ascending position – it is about ascending Great Powers that try to maximize their power in the world system. It is the case of the United States of America, at the end of the 19th century, of Japan at the beginning of the 20th century or of nowadays China;*
- *regional sub-systemic powers – powers whose interests and capabilities do not exceed the area of their own sub-system of international relations. It is the case of Mexico, Singapore, South Korea, etc.*
- **periphery** – is composed of those states that have neither systemic interests nor significant capabilities, even reported to the sphere of the own sub-system of international relations. There are states with less developed economies, with reduced military capabilities and whose security depends to a great extent on the international arrangements of the Great Powers. Here it is about Portugal, Ireland, South Eastern European countries, African countries etc. (*apud. Andrei MIROIU, 2006*).

22 Hegemonic power means a state that has both the necessary resources and relational institutions with the international investors, thus showing higher credibility through its own development. Hegemonic power has to represent an example for system countries and at the same time it must respond promptly when the system is threatened.

23 Sir John SAWER, Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) in Great Britain, in 2009, in the first speech of this Chief in the 100 years of existence.

Florian COLDEA (coflorin@dcti.ro) graduated from the Faculty of Psycho-Sociology at the National Intelligence Academy and has a PhD in Military Science and Intelligence at the same academy. He is First-Deputy Director of the Romanian Intelligence Service and, in 2008, promoted to the rank of Brigadier General.

Liviu Bogdan VLAD (liviubogdanvlad@biblioteca.ase.ro) has a PhD in Geography at the University of Bucharest and, presently, he is associate professor at the Faculty of International Business and Economics, within the Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, the Director of the Academy of Economic Studies Central Library and National Co-ordinator of the European Documentation Centres.

NEW STRATEGY: HEARTLAND OR ENERGOLAND?

Mihai-Ştefan DINU, PhD

This article proposes an analysis on major international actors' dynamics on the international scene in the context of energy resources competition. We focused on U.S. and China trends in expanding their sphere of influence to gain access and a high degree of control over the regions with high reserve of energetic resources and also over the adjacent areas as they contain land or sea transport routes.

Key-words: strategy; energy resources; U.S.; China; Africa; competition for energy resources.

May you live in interesting times, an old Chinese proverb says. Many people might think that 2011 is the fulfillment of this proverb coming to reality: riots, political turmoil, earthquakes, danger of nuclear contamination. In the early months of this year, we have witnessed a degree of dynamism that already seems to exceed that of the entire precedent year in terms of significant events on the international scene. A careful observation leads us, however, to question if, excluding unwanted natural disasters, the other occurring events are no

less than effects of interactions that internationally have occurred in the past years, a resultant of the great powers grand strategies.

While the main events took and still take place in North Africa and the Middle East regions, we believe that they are part of broader strategic influence expansion of the great powers in order to provide them control over the Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa regions. These regions concentrate most of the world's energetic reserves and, moreover, host the land and sea transport routes to main consumers. We have to notice that, *on a map*, these regions correspond to the strategic area that Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman called it *Heartland/Pivot Area*.

Considering the theories of those mentioned above, we focus on the evolution of the two largest energy consumers on the planet, *the U.S.* and China trying to identify their significant moves on *the grand chessboard* in the attempts to enlarge their influence areas in order to achieve and maintain *the control of the regions with greatest amount of*




Figure 1. Graphical representations of the Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman theories.

planet's *energetic resources*. In our analysis, we called the total area of this region as *Energoland*.

To this end, we will examine the U.S. and China developments in the Energoland adjacent regions, the surrounding areas that was named *the inner crescent* by Mackinder or *the rimland* by Spykman (Figure 1)

Thus, our analysis will focus on U.S and China actions that seek to expand their influence on the African continent, Indian Ocean and Arctic Ocean.

After the end of the Second World War, African continent did not yet constitute a major strategic interest for any of the great powers, being rather considered as a competition ground on the Cold War between the U.S. and USSR, in their trend to expand their areas of influence.

Developments from the last decade led, however, to the reappraisal of the African continent strategic value, based on economic and security arguments:

- the abundance of natural resources: 60% of global amount of diamonds, 40% of the phosphates reserves, 38% of cobalt reserves (Figure 2);
- holds 10% of world oil reserves (2/3 are located in Algeria, Egypt and Nigeria);

- concerns on the proliferation of Islamist-extremist groups (*in the Horn of Africa: Sudan and its neighbors, Somalia, Algeria*);

- the issue of South-North migration (the favorite route was Gibraltar Strait, *but recently traffickers networks* have shifted via Mauritania, Senegal, and Spanish Canary Islands or Tunisia and Libya towards Italy or Malta).

In its race of identifying vast sources of natural resources, *China* has increased trade with African countries, the total value at the 2008 level reaching the amount of 10 billion \$. *This way, China* becomes the second *trade-partner* state after U.S.¹ in African trade relations.

Additionally to the energy and raw materials exploitation contracts, China extends its activities to expanding trade agreements, technical assistance and implementation of critical infrastructure³ such as roads, railways and power plants. Many African governments have begun to perceive China an attractive partner as the Chinese investments grow proportionally.

China's actions have not passed unnoticed and attracted the interest of other major powers like Japan and India or pose the issues of strengthening the relations stance on the African continent,




Figure 2. African continent's natural resources².




Figure 3. Oil companies in Sudan⁸

as U.S. that are seeking to diversify its energy sources and reduce its dependence on Middle East oil. In this respect, a good example may be constituted by the situation in Sudan, where, following a referendum in January 2011, Southern Sudan became an independent state, after the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (signed at the pressure and support of U.S., Britain, Switzerland and the EU⁴) which provided the conduct of this referendum.

Although it may constitute a relevant event for the region dynamics and expansion of the U.S. and China influence areas, it was gone somewhat into the background at a time when the international community's attention was focused on the turmoil from Egypt, in the immediate neighborhood of Sudan.

Before the South Sudan separation, *an amount of 70%-90%*⁵ of the country's GDP was provided by the national oil reserves, *the actual situation*




Figure 4. Ports and military strategic point of US, China and India in the Indian Ocean¹¹

appearing rather complex, since most extraction fields are located in South Sudan, and refineries and approximately 1,500 km routes of pipelines are situated in Sudan. It is expected that the new situation will lead to a reconsideration of the foreign oil companies' strategy. Companies from Saudi Arabia, Belgium, China, Switzerland, France, Malaysia, Pakistan, Spain and Yemen leased the fields of oil exploitation⁶, but Chinese part held a significant stake (Figure no. 3), their 2007 investment amounted to approximately 6 billion \$⁷.

Unlike China, which adopted a noninterference policy regarding the internal affairs of African states, the U.S. cooperate with their governments, not only in economics but also in the military field, cooperation based on stopping the activity of terrorist groups in Africa. Additionally to CJTF - Horn of Africa in Djibouti (1,800 troops), U.S launched a trans-Saharan Africa counter-terrorism initiative by assisting countries in the region in preventing the appearance of terrorists safe heavens locations⁹. U.S. also expanded its naval

presence in the region, to secure trade and oil transportation routes.

By creating a unified command for Africa, AFRICOM¹⁰, operational since October 2008, U.S. indicated a more comprehensive approach to security in Africa, but also led to reactions from China and India, particularly in the Indian Ocean, a greater influence in the Indian Ocean meaning an increased control on regions from Africa, Eurasia and Middle East.

Indian Ocean represents a strategic area due to its strategic access to the sea and straits. Moreover, it is crossed by four major shipping routes of international maritime trade: Suez (Egypt), Babel-Mandeb, Hormuz Strait and Malacca Strait. There are also maritime ports with both military and civilian strategic value: Karachi (Pakistan), Mumbai (India). The Indian Ocean is also crossed by important lines of communication, oil and natural gas towards the maritime ports (Fig. no. 4. and no.5) that connect with major land trade routes: Port of Gawandar and Port of Charbahar. Gawandar Port is the nearest port to Central Asian




Figure 5. Straits and maritime routes of strategic importance for China¹²

region, by the Gawandar-Chaman and Gawandar-Tarkhum routes and to Western China by Gawandar-Khunjab, all these routes facilitating the access to Energoland.

Malacca Strait is the main navigation channel of the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean. The strait has been controlled by the U.S. immediately after the maritime region was declared a dangerous sea area (it came shortly after the attack on the USS Cole destroyer, which took place in the Gulf of Aden). It is a strategic point of economic importance for India, China, Japan and South Korea, and in terms of oil maritime supply lines, has become a major strategic location for China, given that approximately 80% of trade routes that passes through the Malacca Strait on the way to China¹³.

Given the current strategic situation, we consider that U.S. have the strategic dominance in the Indian Ocean area, as possess superior force projection capabilities that allow blocking any commercial, supply routes, or strategic straits. Moreover, excepting Hormuz Strait, the others straits are controlled by the U.S. Navy. Added

to the advantage of disposing of military bases located in Middle East, Central Asia, the Pacific and Atlantic shores (in Japan and the U.S.), this allows a greater sea control over the Energoland, in comparison with China.

Regarding the control over Energoland (Caucasus, Central Asia), China has a favorable position to the ground level, both due primarily to the economic relations developed with the former Soviet states from these regions (Figure no. 6), and to the special cooperation relations with Russia which as the successor of the former USSR, still carries a high degree of control over the former socialist republics.

By controlling the Indian Ocean, Pacific and Atlantic, the U.S. would be able to isolate both China and Russia, which despite their domination over the Eurasian region, would only be able to take limited action in any of the three oceans mentioned above. It is perhaps why the attention of Russia and China has been directed towards the opening of new transport routes in the cold waters of the Arctic Ocean. Favored by global warming, which caused thinning of polar ice cap or partial



wealth-ST-10.jpg.

3 Michael FLESHMAN, Laying Africa's roads to prosperity, in *Africa Renewal*, vol. 22, no. 4, p. 12, www.un.org/Ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol22no4/224-infrastructure.html.

4 Simon J A MASON, Sudan, North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Center for Security Studies (CSS) Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETH Zurich, p. 72.

5 <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Sudan/Full.html>.

6 See www.unsudanig.org/library/mapcatalogue/sudan/data/planning/Map_1177_European_Coalition_on_oil_in_Sudan_ECOS_aug2007.pdf.

7 ***, **China invests 6 billion dollars in Sudan's oil**, in *Dudan Tribune*, 6 november 2007.

8 Giulio ALBANESE, Il Sudan saranno due, forse anche di più, in *Limes* nr. 1/2011, <http://temi.repubblica.it/limes/il-sudan-petrolifero/21233>.

9 <http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-14-2008/volume-14-issue-6/the-africa-partnership-station/>.

10 <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1644>.

11 Commodore R. S. VASAN, Indo Sri Lanka Maritime Issues: Challenges and Responses, in South Asia Analysis Group, 29 Aprilie 2010, <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers38/paper3787.html>.

12 ***, Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2009 – Annual Report to Congress, U.S. Department of Defense, www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/china_critical_sea_lanes_2009.jpg.

13 Zhang XUEGANG, *Southeast Asia and Energy: Gateway to Stability*, China Security Vol 3 No 2 Spring 2007, p.19, http://www.wsichina.org/cs6_2.pdf.

14 Sergei BLAGOV, Russia labors as neighbors do deals, *Asia Times*, 17.12.2009, www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/KL17Ag01.html.

15 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6927395.stm>.

16 <http://www.chinare.gov.cn/en/>.

17 <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/epine/>.

Mihai-Ştefan DINU, PhD (mihaistdinu@yahoo.co.uk), is senior researcher at the Center for Defense and Security Strategic Studies from „Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania.



GLOBALIZATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

*Irina TĂTARU, PhD
Florin JIANU*

Globalization, by its beneficial effects, has the potential to „build” a better world. In addition, proper integration of national economies in a global economy and openness to other cultures, provide the most direct way to achieve security and world peace. On the other hand, for now, some economic policies that have accelerated globalization have led to less desirable consequences: increased unemployment in almost all countries, natural resource consumption and environmental damage, disparities between states, the liquidation of certain industries of some states’ economy.

The fructification of the beneficial effects of globalization and minimizing those that are unfavorable requires concerted efforts of state and non-state actors at national, regional and international levels.

Key-words: globalization; economic war; sustainable development.

1. Preliminary considerations

Economic and financial dimensions seem to exist in almost every human activity. In fact, the evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of an activity or action is made, usually from the perspective of economic efficiency and financial costs contained in the product made, be it a provided material good or a service. Each individual and/or human group is interested to be economically and financially efficient when designing, creating or performing a socially useful and necessary activity. Therefore, interests confront, first of all, in the economic and financial field, while the most concrete, most dynamic,

most firm and, at the same time, the most flexible policy - which is always defined as a synthesis of individual concern group and national level - is the economic and financial one.

In our opinion, the events are running in the same way at the level of different countries and national, regional or international economic organizations. „The battle for natural resources, especially the energy ones, markets and for secure, quick profits takes sometimes the form of what is known as the „economic war „. Economic war policy is marked by the globalization of business and finance, by the acceptance of the economic and cultural intrusion, defying space assets and national borders and states entities recognized by the international community¹.

In one way or another, today, all state and non-state actors with economic and financial vocation are in the middle of an „economic war” with each other, using a wide range of ways of fighting it.

2. Manifestations of globalization’s impact on human society’s evolution

Globalization, as a complex and multidimensional phenomenon, has a significant impact on human society’s evolution. This impact will be achieved through a wide range of practical events with different consequences for national economies, for the economic activity of multinational companies and for various regional economic organizations.

On the other hand, world economy’s globalization is defined as a „very dynamic process of increasing the interdependence of national states as a result of the expansion and



deepening of transnational ties in various spheres of economic, political, social and cultural life, problems become global sooner than national², creating in their turn, a global rather than national settlement⁷. This proves once again how complex and dynamic the globalization becomes with each passing day.

Today, current globalization³ corresponds to the information society, to the knowledge society. In such an era, information, primarily economic information, will have a role not only in communication, dialogue, but also a function of a bridge between different socio-economic actors. It is expected that such a reality would lead to significant improvement of the relationship between political rule and the economic component of society, the political class and the economic policies. At the same time, it seems that the economical info-domination will be the support that will design and implement economic policies and, as a result, their new economic architecture.

It is also expected that, in the current globalization era, the typology of economic policies will be defined by a coherent set of features. Among them, the following appear to be fundamental:

- the economical info-domination;
- the network feature;
- the resurgence of economic policies centers of gravity.

Ensuring a sustainable and lasting economic growth, consistent with the existing potential without affecting the main correlations in the economy are some of the fundamental objectives of the European Commission. The Lisbon Strategy is an appropriate response to this objective. Thus, the Stability and Convergence Programs aim at highlighting those macroeconomic policies that would provide medium and long term sustainability of public finances, as a prerequisite for sustainable economic development. From this perspective, the evaluation of the potential gross domestic product and output gap has become an approach provided in the development methodology of the Convergence Programme⁴.

For Romania, EU integration and competition imposed by globalization have had a direct positive effect in combating underground economy, forcing domestic political system, sometimes inert and lacking in consistency, to adopt policies to stimulate business, due to the awareness that,

today, economic competition among nations held an unprecedented rate, is a veritable economic war which runs very quickly. In this context, it seems that the flat tax was manifested as an opportunity to reduce tax ambiguities in Romania, but it should not be the last. The tax advantage in global competition must be maintained and strengthened through appropriate measures, flexible, creative, effective and tailored to each stage of development of Romanian society.

Globalization has also a negative side in relation to the underground economy, namely, the import of organized crime. Free movement of persons, capital relocation and deregulation and the effects of globalization have helped and will continue to promote economic activities more or less illegal. Typically, organized crime structures are flexible and persuasive, have the money to influence trafficking and corruption of customs officials and others.

We, therefore, consider it is necessary to adopt measures to stimulate society's immunization by increasing the level of morality, of trust in state's institutions and of local taxpayers' equity. On the other hand, we have to implement severe legislative measures in order to combat the phenomenon. These may be supplemented by standard measures of joint working procedures of organs of control (regardless of subordination and control objectives thereof), law enforcement (police) and judicial organ. All this should lead to effective instrumentalization of corruption, influence trafficking, tax evasion, fraud or other serious forms of crime. Basically, the legal sanction of those facts must be completed within reasonable and practical results, highly publicized. To this end, we think it is absolutely necessary to: identify appropriate offenders, confiscate illicitly acquired wealth and whose origin can not be calculated; apply custodial sentences where appropriate, as it will be decided. All this can be applied at a fixed reference, considered the zero point of fight against crime, but we need to make these procedures an integral part of normality: to disregard bad payer and the taxpayer's position and to carry out permanently not by the electoral cycle⁵.

Even though in many developing countries labor is cheap, firms belonging to the world oligopoly (the triad composed of US, EU and Japan – soon China, now the second world power, will enter this brotherhood) have reported everything to the labor



market in developed countries, and globalization is simultaneously trying to integrate the three specific markets and global oligopoly, namely: goods and services market, capital and technology market and the labor market. First, globalization has been included in goods and services market, then entered into the system technologies and the financial market and the labor market was in last place⁶.

In the process of globalization, countries with high economic competitiveness are advantaged: advanced technologies, workforce performance, higher productivity, lower production costs and capital (the main source of competitiveness is represented).

The globalization process has many advantages in developed economies, which focus the overwhelming global capital and where they have their main headquarters of transnational companies. But the gap between the developed and developing countries may increase. These differences may be attenuated by:

- the transfer of resources, especially financial, from developed to developing countries;
- the direct and portfolio investment;
- loans for balance of payments support and infrastructure works.

In these conditions, world countries are required to show flexibility and rationality for cost-benefit equation to become balanced. Frequent meetings at regional and/or international governments and civil society representatives of developing countries on sustainable development show that the benefits from globalization have been distributed within developed countries and the costs within the poor and developing countries.

According to some views, the latest phase of globalization, economic globalization results in increasing the interpenetration of national economies. Globalization's stages are:

- the internationalization, linked to the development of export flows;
- the trans-nationalization of investment flows and foreign implantations;
- the globalization, corresponding to the implementation of global production networks and information („networked economy”)⁷.

The world economy, in the early 1990s, was facing some challenges⁸:

- globalization and its profound effects on the competitiveness of national economies;

- the contradiction of the tough laws of the market (economic logic) and the correctness of distribution (social logic);

- the contradiction between economic logic and the necessity of environmental protection.

The globalization effect refers to the networking of global economic life. Only the network, as communication and development system, takes multiple dimensions and can provide the complex relationships between the micro and macro world economy. Thus, Ph. Kotler believes that „business firms that will succeed will be those who will succeed to develop the most effective global network”⁹.

National economies' overlap is reflected in the increasing role of trade, investment and foreign capital in gross domestic product in each participating country. Hence the lowest defect in one country can lead to blocking the whole gear, because the same operators are present virtually in all world markets. For example, Boeing 767 passenger plane, designed in Seattle (USA) has manufactured components and parts in the U.S., Italy, Canada, Britain and Japan. Under these conditions, the main concern of decision makers and specialists is to limit the effects of „a weakening or breaking the chain links”.

The results of a complex research of the current situation of globalization can be summarized in the following aspects:

- money, technology and world markets are controlled and administered by huge global corporations;

- corporations are free to act in order to obtain profit, man being even despised;

- consumer culture determines people to be in a frantic chase after the ephemeral material goods¹⁰.

Business globalization involves risks of economic security, particularly, in developing countries, amid growing differences between corporate priorities and national governments. Transnational companies' profit orientation ignores the priorities of development, affecting the basis of the domestic economic development and often aiming at reinvesting outside the country where they originated. In turn, in countries where profits is migrating to areas with more attractive investment incentives, at the moment, there are vulnerabilities amid social grievances related to the fact that these transnational companies transfer



jobs and technology abroad.

Under these conditions, transnational companies have acquired the ability to organize production and distribution globally, which gives them an enormous structural power in comparison to national governments and workforce nationwide. National companies that have expanded their activities abroad, have become autonomous entities, which tend to escape any control at the national level, but in their turn, they tend to lose all control over individuals in their dual capacity: the workforce or customers and consumers. Loyalty to a company or individual against a state is inversely proportional to the opening of that state to globalization.

The resettlement fund relationships between individuals, corporations and nation states, so it must be constantly reassessed the role of state control to achieve a minimum of structural effects, institutional and distributional economic globalization on the sovereignty and autonomy of states which have adhered to the principles of market economy¹¹.

Humanity is now faced with multiple problems: economic, socio-political (democracy is very fragile, dictating the economic policies), biotechnology (growth of new biotechnology is done in an accelerated rate), environmental (protection of the environment is a paramount importance for all mankind, and all this mainly due to globalization).

The Market Analysis of Western European countries reveals profound differences between countries, lifestyles, attitudes, behaviors, people etc. Communication technology has developed very quickly that a revolution of how to disseminate information has occurred. Satellites, modems, faxes are the primary means of distributing information and images, which has contributed to knowledge, understanding and creating new needs and better meet both the existing ones, both within national borders and across borders.

Conclusions

Today, globalization is an objective process that takes place at amazing speed, covering almost all countries of the world. It has been determined and favored by high-speed technology advances, notably in the information technology. Globalization takes the form of market

liberalization and deregulation of goods and services, capital and labor.

„The number of people living in poverty continues to grow as globalization - one of the most powerful economic phenomena of the twentieth century - in the constant race inherently asymmetric: the expansion of markets across national borders, increased revenue of a relatively small category, while strangling the lives of those who have not the resources or capacity for investors to benefit from the global culture. Most are women and children, poor before, but now even poorer, while the world economy widens the gap between rich and poor countries, between the rich and the poor (The state of world's children 2000, UNICEF Report).

In these circumstances, countries, especially developing ones, should adopt national programs and measures to support their economies by supporting local companies to develop and invest in the country. They must also retain their national identity, sometimes so threatened in this globalized world, by implementing programs to protect the traditions and customs, to preserve the history of the nation state.

Regional integration seems to be another way to respond effectively to the challenges posed by globalization. This explains the formation and functioning in almost all continents of intergovernmental economic organizations (Central European Free Trade Agreement - CEFTA). East Asia Economic Group - EAEC, Mercosur – Free Trade Area in South America, NAFTA – North America Free Trade Area).

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. BARI, Ioan *Globalizarea și problemele globale*, București, Editura Economică, 2001.
2. CONSTANTINESCU, Petre Ciprian, *Dimensiunea economică a securității naționale în contextul globalizării*, Teză de doctorat, Universitatea Națională de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2009.
3. DUȚU, Petre *Globalizare versus separatism politic*, București, UNAp, 2010.
4. KOTLER, Philip *Managementul marketingului*, București, Editura Teora, 1997.



NOTES:

1 *La guerre économique n'aura pas lieu*, <http://www2.cnrs.fr/presse/thema/204.htm>.

2 I. BARI, *Globalizarea și problemele globale*, București, Editura Economică, 2001, p. 21.

3 I. BARI, *Globalizarea și problemele globale*, București, Editura Economică, 2001, p. 21.

4 Cornelia SCUTARU, *Caietul Seminarului de Modelare Macroeconomică*, nr. 15, <http://www.ipe.ro/CaieteSeminar.htm>.

5 P. C. CONSTANTINESCU, *Dimensiunea economică a securității naționale în contextul globalizării*, Teză de doctorat, Universitatea Națională de Apărare "Carol I", București, 2009.

6 *Globalizarea și efectele sale asupra omenirii*, http://facultate.regielive.ro/referate/economie/globalizarea_si_efectele_sale_asupra_omenirii-195614.html.

7 V. CORNESCU și colectiv, *Management de la teorie la practică. Management și globalizare*, după:

<http://ebooks.unibuc.ro/StiinteADM/cornescu/cap14.htm>.

8 IONAȘCU Veronica, POPESCU Manoela, *Globalizarea – efecte pozitive sau negative*, după http://www.contabilizat.ro/file/cursuri_de_perfectionare/economie_generala/comert_si_globalizare/cap10p1.pdf.

9 Ph. KOTLER, *Managementul marketingului*, București, Editura Teora, 1997, pp. 512-540.

10 IONAȘCU Veronica, POPESCU Manoela, *Globalizarea – efecte pozitive sau negative*, după http://www.contabilizat.ro/file/cursuri_de_perfectionare/economie_generala/comert_si_globalizare/cap10p1.pdf.

11 P. C. CONSTANTINESCU, *Dimensiunea economică a securității naționale în contextul globalizării*, Teză de doctorat, Universitatea Națională de Apărare "Carol I", București, 2009.

Irina TĂTARU (p29irina@gmail.com), PhD, is an expert at the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, from "Carol I" National Defence University.

Colonel Florin JIANU (florinjianul1965@yahoo.com) is head of office within the Finance and Accounting Department; he is also a doctoral candidate in Military Sciences at "Carol I" University of National Defence.



(GEO)POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROMA MINORITIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION. FESEABLE SOLUTION FOR INTEGRATION

Ionel STOICA, PhD

The crisis generated by the expulsion of the Romania's and Bulgaria's Roma from France has showed that there was no strategy related to Roma issue at the European level, although it is extremely necessary¹.

In spite of the numerous and heated debates at the European level on this issue, the European officials are still disagreeing on the concretization and effective implementation of a strategy.

This article underlies that the attempts to solve the issue at the national level represent narrow approaches, that seek to gain benefits on short term and do not analyze the potential benefits on long term of the continental approach, in accordance with the endeavors and exigencies stated by the European Union's officials.

Starting from the premise that the integration of the Roma communities exceed – by its geographical extension, but also by the intellectual and financial resources which it claims – the national background, this paper presents a point of view regarding the directions of action to be followed. In the author's opinion, these directions should encompass two main coordinates: "land binding" of the Roma, respectively, their education in the spirit of the development of better social adaptation/integration. Both coordinates are analyzed and commented in this paper from the perspective of their strong and weak points. At the same time, there are proposed some feasible solutions for integrating Roma communities at the national and European level.



Key-words: Roma; Roma integration;

geopolitics of Roma; Romania; the European Union; European funds.

Currently, in Europe, there are living between 10 and 12 millions of Roma persons, spread in a variable number in each country from the continent (see Fig. 1). Roma in Europe do not form a homogenous community (actually, they do not represent a single community) and do not speak a common language. Mostly, they speak the language of the country they were born into.

During the almost ten centuries since they have arrived in Europe coming from India, the Roma situation has not changed, as they are still socially, culturally, economically and politically marginalized by the dominant groups in society. During their history in Europe, the Roma marginalization has registered variable intensities in different times and in different countries. Sometimes, they were politically marginalized, without being economically marginalized. Other times, things were the other way around. The political regime and the government systems followed one after another in Europe, but the Roma situation has remained, in broad lines, unchanged. The Roma marginalization is the result of some negative attitudes from the socially dominant groups, constantly manifested in the European societies and of the Roma's refusal to comply with the social expectations. European governments have constantly treated Roma as citizens having an inferior social status, which bring damages

Roma in Europe



*estimate

Source: Berlin Institute for Population and Development

Figure 1 – The number of Roma population in Europe

to the societies. The governmental propaganda coming from European states often labeled them as thieves or tramps, whose expulsion do not require the necessary explanations, their simple ethnic belonging being enough in this sense. On the other hand, Roma themselves have contributed to their current situation, proving a strong resilience to the repeated attempts of assimilation and integration coming from the dominant groups in societies, as a means of preserving their distinct identity.

In the past few years, in Europe (especially in the Western part of the continent), we witness a sustained media campaign against the Roma communities. Some European leaders have joined this campaign, trying to create a strong

and sustained negative perception within their societies towards Roma persons and they have also put the Roma issue on the security agenda of their societies and countries. And, in order to make the threat consistent, the rhetoric, sometimes extremely tough, of these political leaders was joined by the proper police actions. In France, after an incident occurred in the west of the country, president Nicolas Sarkozy announced the expulsion of the Roma coming from Romania and Bulgaria, despite of their right for free movement, stated in the European legislation. In 2010, around 13,000 Roma originating from Romania and Bulgaria were expelled from France and, in 2009, around 8,500. In Italy, the governmental



authorities decided, in July 2008, to take the fingerprints of thousands of Roma – adults and children – that lived in camps in this country. The measure was presented as part of a broader governmental initiative aimed at eradicating street criminality.

In the context of these evolutions, an elementary remark imposes itself: in relative terms, Roma are currently as poor as they were in 1919². The World Bank characterized them as the most vulnerable minority in Europe. According to this institution, „Roma are poorer than other ethnic groups, more likely to become poorer and more probably to remain so”³. Consequently, who can think that these poor persons, who are living to the periphery of their society of origin or of those of the destination, represent a danger for the security of these states? We cannot ignore the fact that these countries or their political leaders, who showed an exaggerated attitude regarding the Roma issue, are the same that fail in other issues, much more important for their people. In Italy, for instance, corruption is a much more serious problem for the national security and broader spread than the thief of some insignificant objects or tramps. And the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, who decided to expulse some thousands Roma emigrating from Romania and Bulgaria in France, is facing a declined popularity in the perspective of the in 2012 (he won the presidential election in 2008, using an emphasized anti-immigration rhetoric).

The disagreement coming out at the European Union level around the expulsion of the Roma originating from Romania and Bulgaria emigrating in France illustrates the failure of integrating these communities in the political tensed context regarding immigration. Even some European Union officials acknowledged that: “the current debate upon Roma has clearly proved that both The Union and the member states have failed to apply an efficient politics of integrating these persons”⁴. The last European meeting on this issue, carried out on April 2010, in Cordoba (Spain), under the Spanish mandate, has reflected the importance attributed to this issue: the majority of the European ministers did not participate to the event (however, officials from Spain, France and Finland participated at the event).

The warnings launched few years ago by the European Union officials did not have any effect upon the stereotype approaches from the mass-

media, upon the connivance of the authorities from the Western states in creating the negative perceptions towards Roma minorities, upon abusive raids of the police in the camps where these communities live. Thus, during 2010, there occurred many incidents having as protagonists Roma persons.

Some Western political leaders and part of the European mass-media are placing the disagreement generated by the Roma issue in the broader context of the ascension to power of the extreme-right parties (traditionally anti-immigration), in the last two years⁵. From this perspective, the crisis generated by the expulsion of the Roma emigrating from Romania and Bulgaria, by the French authorities, represents a signal of a strong turn towards the right in the European politics, but also an opportunity to put in practice something really important for these minorities. Up to now, the interest of the Western states regarding this issue has not aimed at integrating these communities or increasing the level of the living standard of these communities, but has reflected only the concerns of these states towards the possible emigration of these communities from the Eastern Europe to the West of the continent and, possibly, preventing such an event. These concerns have become evident since 2001, when the British government sent immigration officers at the Prague Airport in order to identify those passengers who want to apply for asylum in the United Kingdom and to prevent them to reach the British territory. The known data show that the Roma persons registered rates of refusal of 400 times higher than the other citizens. In December 2004, Lord Chamber decided that the British government operated illegally. In spite of these facts, more Western governments adopted a more direct and tougher attitude towards the rights of the Roma people.

Seeming to understand the importance of the issue and considering itself a model in respect of the human and minorities rights, at the same time, calling for other states to follow its example, the European Union, through its institutions, has put at the disposal of the member states important amounts of money, through the European funds, aiming at sustaining Roma integration. However, from the 27 member states, only 12 (Romania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Spain, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia) have created and put into practice programs aiming at



supporting Roma communities (apart from other socially vulnerable groups), paying a total budget of 17.5 billions Euro (from which 13.3 billions from the Social European Found). This sum represents 27% from the total budget designated to the Social European Found. Since May 2010, as a result of the European Commission proposal, member states may use the European founds designated to regional development in order to support the vulnerable population, including Roma.

We have to mention here that a World Bank's study shows that the failure of Roma integration costs Romania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Serbia more than 5.7 billions Euros, annually⁶. The study does not make any reference to the costs that the failure of the Roma integration induces to the Western European states. This is an illustrative example on the real concern of the international institutions (even this example cites The World Bank, it is a quasi-acknowledged fact that this institution represents, preponderantly, the points of view and the interests of the strong states) and, implicitly, on the way these institutions understand (or want) to approach the issue in cause.

Feasible solutions for Roma integration in Europe

On short and medium term, the issue does not have any solution. But, in order to solve de issue of Roma communities on the long term, a new approach is necessary to the European level. The current attitude focused on what Roma do in Europe (that is their deeds) should be replaced by another one focused on seeking some frankly answers to the following question: why do they what they do?

The attitude of the European officials having competences in this field (among others, the European Commissioner for Integration, Laszlo Andor), as well as those of some national political leaders, is both incorrect and hypocrite. The current insistent critics that the Western European states formulate towards the Eastern European states arguing that they do not accomplish enough to integrate Roma communities in their national societies, although they have consistent Roma minorities, are baseless and rather risk to lead to divergent positions and not to a unified strategy of action targeting to solve this complex issue. The attitude of the Western European countries is

incorrect because it ignores a range of efforts and achievements of the Eastern European countries in this issue. For instance, France has frequently critiqued Romania for not accomplishing enough on Roma integration, but it ignores the fact that since 2008, the number of Roma children in the Romanian schools has doubled. And this is just an example of Romanian authorities' involvement in the field.

Even if many things remain to be done for the progress achieved to become visible and sustainable, Romanian authorities' efforts should be acknowledged and appreciated. Romania currently develops projects exceeding 22 millions Euros for education and social inclusion of Roma persons⁷. The majority of these projects was initiated at the end of 2008 and is scheduled to be ended in 2011. Money designated to those six programs developed through The National Agency for Roma is irredeemable. The most successful programs were "The sanitary mediator" and "The school mediator", which seek to improve the living standard of Roma communities. At the central level, some projects were developed aiming at changing the Romanian mentality regarding Roma people. One of the most important project of this kind was S.P.E.R (Stop the Prejudice about the Roma Ethnic, Romanian transcript), also financed through the European founds. At present, a project related to the social and economic integration of Roma craftsmen is in the course, aiming at supporting them to adapt their skills to present times. Although several millions of Euros were spent for these programs, the results are still less visible.

At the same time, these states have also an immoral attitude because they do not acknowledge that they themselves do not accomplish enough for the Roma integration. However, the leaders of these states seem to not notice a simple fact. In other field of activity, the difference between Romania and the European average regarding the European founds attracted is larger. This illustrates a clear fact: when they are interested in something, the Western European states manage to attract consistent European founds.

Part of the blame for this fact can be attributed to Romanian authorities, who – despite that they now have at their disposal a range of concrete data which they can oppose to those presented by their critics coming from the Western Europe – adopt a

passive attitude regarding this subject.

Roma persons do not represent a problem only for the states they were born into. There is a spread perception that the majority of Roma persons are Romanian, Bulgarian, Serbs and Hungarian. Although this perception could be based on the fact that the number of the Roma persons in the countries mentioned above is avowedly superior to that of other European countries – at the moment, Europe accepted to become a single entity, it actually accepted that each individual, regardless of its country of origin. Any Romanian, Bulgarian or citizen of any other nationality is a European citizen. From this point of view, dispatching the Roma issue as being only the problem of some states is not viable, not sustainable and do not comply with the European Union theses. From this reason, all the states that form the Union, and not only those who have significant Roma communities, have an equal interest and obligation to actively involve in the management of Roma issue.

There are at least two arguments that support this idea – one having a practical nature, the other having a morale dimension. The solution consisting in the expulsion of Roma persons towards their countries of origin is joined either by a populist rhetoric or by the demagogy (see the expression „voluntary deportation”, used by the French authorities), is counter-productive because they will return sometime in the future, in the Western countries, where the living conditions are incomparable better that in its eastern part (from where the majority of Roma persons comes). In addition to that, the argument of Roma expulsion towards the countries of origin in the Eastern Europe is not moral because, in this case, a natural question appears: why should they (Roma persons) not be expelled in India, their first country of origin (around 1000 years ago)?

The most natural solution seems to be that of stopping the spreading of Roma persons in the European Union. It is normal for the countries of origin to be interested in finding solutions regarding this issue as much as receiving countries are interested in dispatching the Roma when they fail to integrate these persons into their societies.

Judging the things from the moral point of view, the countries of origin are responsible for the behaviors of their citizens. Receiving countries have the same interest in the effects of

this behavior because they can be socially and economically affected. This is another argument that supports the idea that Roma issue should be debated and its solutions should be identified at the European level. The associated costs to the possible solutions should be shared in the same way as the Southern European countries claim for the North Africa immigrants' living on their territories. Perhaps those countries facing a larger number of Roma persons (as rate of the total population) should benefit of special financial funds aiming at integrating these persons.

The direction of action should encompass two coordinates. The first coordinate would be “land binding” because if these persons are dispersed in more countries, it would be difficult to take unitary and effective measures. The second coordinate would be education of these persons in the spirit of the development of a better social adaptability/integration. The possible measures taken should aim both at the simulation procedures of certain behaviors and at the sanctions applied.

a) “Land binding”. The migratory tendency is a characteristic of the modern era, being one of the economic growth and development means. So, it is normal for the Roma population to be engaged in this migratory wave. In spite of this argument, the rules generally applied to the immigrants are not in place in the case of Roma population. The reason consists especially in the fact that the desirable migration is that of the workforce and not that of the population that does not participate to the economic life of societies.

Another aspect is the clash of the two worlds having extremely different universes regarding the cultural, social, educational and, not least, economic values. These incompatibilities make the integration even more difficult.

Based on these arguments, a first measure that should be taken into consideration would be „land binding”. Those elements that determine the high mobility of Roma population are, at the same time, those that should be counteract. Four rejection factors of Roma persons from their societies of origin can be identified. A first factor is that, structurally, they are a nomad population. A second element is represented by the lack of involvement in trades with a high degree of stability. The third factor consists in the hostile attitude of their co-nationals towards them, which has formed and developed during the centuries,



based on a difficult living together. Fourthly, Roma family is not sufficiently anchored in the society, which makes it to be easily re-locatable.

Keeping the groups consisting of Roma persons close to the areas they were born into facilitates the elaboration of some coherent programs and their anchoring in the social and economic system. In this way, it can be eliminated the differences rose by the language or the adaptation to another behavioral and legislative system.

To realize this endeavor („land binding”), there should be developed programs aiming at encouraging/stimulating the wish to remain in the country of origin. It would be ideal that these programs counteracted the rejection factors mentioned above.

The tendency towards nomadism could be stopped by offering them houses with a higher degree of comfort than that they are used to live at present. Of course, the access to a house like that should be restricted by meeting clear conditions and the rights should be withdrawn in case they do not meet certain preset conventions.

Attracting Roma persons towards trades with a high degree of stability could be realized if the companies would offer a number of jobs for Roma persons, through a program similar to that existing in the Romanian higher schools, which offers a number of seats especially for Roma children.

The third rejection factor – the hostility of the co-national – is perhaps the most difficult to counteract, since it is under the influence of the prejudice and strong mentality rooted upon which only time and a continuous positive pressure can have durable effects. In order to gain real positive results, those involved in the projects related to Roma integration in the society should be familiarized with cultural elements and specific life-style of this population. Knowing what it is important and adding value for a Roma person means finding a common language with him or her, as well as finding the ways through which he or she can be motivated.

Another way to change the negative attitude of the co-nationals would be a concerted and durable mass-media action, whose effects will still be visible only on long term.

As for the anchoring of Roma population in society, apart from encouraging Roma adults integration through work in society, children also should be stimulated to follow the educational

system as long as possible.

b) Related to the second coordinate of the directions of action, it should be started from knowing and understanding the special role that education and motivation of leaders/mentors play in the process of Roma integration in the societies they live. We should not forget that in the case of Roma persons’ education develops especially on informal bases and they are quite resilient to whatever comes from outside (their communities).

At the first sight, it could seem that important steps were made towards integrating Roma persons through education, ensuring special seats in the gymnasium and high school for children and adults belonging to this ethnic. Personally, I believe that the measure was chosen because it was the most facile and not because it also would be efficient. This measure supposes not more than an administrative decision and does not make more than to facilitate the access into school, without assuring the learning process as such. The problem comes from the difference between the two cultures: the Romanian/European one and that of Roma communities.

The language, the interests, the motivations, the final aim of the official learning process are extremely different from that of Roma children who seem themselves living in a completely different framework from all what has a sense for him or her. This campaign of “force education” burns a fundamental stage, namely that of „translating” the Romanian society into his or her understanding. He or she does not possess the mental and value means necessary for adaptation and adaptation the existing educational framework. Consequently, we first consider necessary to fill up the semantic gap between the two cultures. For that to happen, a first step would be the identification within Roma communities of some leaders of opinion that should be the first trained in this sense for a long period of time. Being traditionally a closed society, limited by strict rules, Roma will not accept easily the change unless it comes naturally, from inside. These mentors would have the role of internal catalyst that would progressively induce positive attitudes towards the society.

The second step would consist in moving the school towards society instead of attracting the members of the community towards the classic school. The idea of education in school was so



POINT OF VIEWS

ferently rejected by Roma communities, mainly because of perceiving it as a strange, corruptible element. The reaction could firstly be counteracted by relocating the school inside the communities, then by preparing some Roma teachers and by elaborating a special curriculum that should harmoniously integrate (adjust) Roma values with those of contemporary European societies. To ask a person whose freedom and defiance of the rules imposed from outside the group are structural constants to stay in the classroom for a long time and to obey the rules imposed by school is just from the beginning a wrong step. On the other hand, resorting to his or her native social intelligence or putting into the value the skills for traditional crafts offer better chances for success and the success is motivating by itself. Their traditional professions should be put into value, labeled and encouraged through fairs. Therefore, we consider that establishing a different curriculum, based on specific, practical competences is fundamental.

Conclusions

The crisis generated by the decision of French authorities to expel Roma persons has showed that there is no strategy regarding Roma issue at the European level, also it may prove to be extremely necessary. Creating, in September 2010, the Roma Task Force, operating at the European level, which will encompass specialists from all the relevant departments of this forum (who will be tasked to identify viable strategies on Roma integration), is an encouraging step in this direction, but the success will have little chances to succeed, in case this group will not include specialists from Eastern European countries (and in the proper proportions, according to the Roma population percents living on their territories – a frequently invoked aspect by the Western European countries). The observation of the Czech president, Vaclav Havel, according to which Roma issue represents a “litmus test” for the civil society in Europe, is suggestive in this regard.

An intensified dialog with all Roma communities should be a compulsory element of any such strategy. This dialog is developing at the moment, but its results are seriously affected by a range of prejudices and stereotypes.

The measure regarding Roma communities should be taken in all European states, regardless

that they are member of the European Union or not, and this should be done simultaneously, as much as possible, in order to not determine the migration of this population from one country to another, in search of taking advantages from better social and economic opportunities.

At the same time, it should be understood and accepted that Roma integration is a process, not an event. And, as any process, it needs a period of time, sometimes a long time, until the positive results come out.

It is known that Roma families are more numerous than those of the dominant groups in European societies. This creates the premise to maintain and even emphasize their current marginalization. In the last instance, as it is showed in a commentary from *The Economist*⁸, if the human argument doesn't put things into motion, perhaps that of the demographic nature will be more successfully.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. BARANY, D. Zoltan, Living on the edge: The East European Roma in post-communist politics and societies, in *Slavic Review*, Vol. 53, No. 2, Summer 1994, pp. 321-344.
2. MATRAS, Yaron, The status of Romani in Europe, Report submitted to the Council of Europe's Language Policy Division, October 2005.
3. RINGOLD, Dena; ORENSTEIN, A. Mitchell; WILKENS, Erika, Roma in an expanding Europe, Breaking the poverty cycle, World Bank, 2005.
4. SCICLUNA, Henry, The life and death of Roma and Sinti in Italy: A modern tragedy, 2010.
5. UZUNOVA, Iskra, Roma integration in Europe: Why minority rights are failing, in *Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2010.
6. ***, Romani mobility in Europe: multidisciplinary perspectives, International Conference, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 14-15 January 2010.
7. ***, Challenges to Roma integration policies in the European Union and among candidate countries, Paper submitted by the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) and the European Network against Racism in preparation of the Peer Review Meeting, 23-24 October, 2006.



POINT OF VIEWS

8. ***, Unwanted in France, unloved in Romania, A desperate homecoming for deported Roma, in Der Spiegel, 31 august 2010.

9. ***, Sarkozy finds a scapegoat, France Begins Controversial Roma Deportations, in Der Spiegel, 19 august 2010.

10. ***, The situation of Roma in France and in Europe, Joint Information Note by Vice-President Viviane Reding, Commissioner Laszlo Andor and Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom, 1 September 2010.

NOTES:

1 There was a mouse that lived in a country house. One day, the peasant and his wife brought a parcel and the mouse noticed fearfully that it was actually a mouse trap. Frightened, it run into the yard and told the other animals what he saw. The hen left grumpily, thinking that this has nothing to do with her. The pig looked at him with pity and then he went on his eating. The cow sniffed sulkily and turned her back. Quite upset, the little mouse went back into the house and during the night a noise was heard, as if something had caught in the trap. The peasant's wife went quickly to see what had been caught. As it was dark, she didn't notice that it was actually a poisonous snack which bit her leg. The peasant took her to the hospital and when he returned he butchered the hen and made a good chicken soup. As the woman didn't get better, her neighbors came over to take care of her and the peasant sacrificed the pig too so he could have something to put on the table for them. In the end, the woman died and, since many people came to the funeral, the peasant sacrificed the cow as well. From his hole in the wall, the little mouse was watching sadly.

The morale: when misfortune befalls your neighbor, do not consider that it doesn't regard you.

2 Europe's shame: ethnic cleansing ignored, <http://www.leftfutures.org/2010/08/europes-shame-ethnic-cleansing-ignored/>.

3 Dena REYNGOLD, Mitchell A. ORENSTEIN, Erika WILKENS, Roma in an Expanding Europe - Breaking the Poverty Cycle Roma in an Expanding Europe, The World Bank, Washington, 2005, www.worldbank.org.

4 Mario SEPI, President of Economic and Social European Committee, a consultative organism of the European Commission.

5 Some of these parties have representatives, the European Parliament (EP) included. Thus, in Denmark, the Danish Popular Party won two seats in the EP; in Finland, Perussuomalaiset party send to the EU its first extremist deputies; in Greece, LAOS party, led by the radical journalist Georgios Karatzaferis, has two representatives in the EP; in Italy, North League, an anti-immigrants party, won two seats in the EP (the situation of the extreme right parties from Italy is difficult to assess, taking into account that other two post and neo-fascist parties, led by Gianfranco Fini and Alessandra Mussolini, merged with the North League, in 2009); in The Netherlands, Party of Freedom has four members in the EP; in Austria, the homonym party has four representatives in the EP.

6 Europe's Roma drama exposes integration failure, in EU business, <http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/immigration-france.67k/>, 19 September 2010 edition.

7 Since 2007, Romania has benefited of almost 30 millions Euros from the European funds for projects and programs concerning Roma integration (Source: Evenimentul zilei, 13th October 2010 edition).

8 Hard traveling, The Economist, 2nd September 2010, online edition.

Lieutenant-colonel engineer Ionel STOICA (jstoica2001@yahoo.com), PhD, is analyst on political and military issues within the Romanian General Staff. He is licensed in technical (Military Technical Academy, Bucharest) and economic sciences ("Lucian Blaga" University, Sibiu); he also has a PhD in Geography (University of Bucharest). He is the author of several papers on geopolitics and international security issues, published in Romania and abroad.



THE CYBERSPACE PROTECTION AGAINST TERRORISM

George RĂDUICĂ, PhD

Terrorist war and war against terrorism are the perfect types of asymmetric warfare affecting the entire planet. Each of them - if we accept that they are really wars, and nothing else, for instance, clashes in the area of crime, of revenge, fierce battles for power and influence, etc. - are continuous wars, with unpredictable deployment, from large-scale actions, as, for example, the bombing of Afghanistan, considered a terrorist base, to Iraqi guerrillas or suicide actions of Palestinians and Islamic fundamentalists, with multiple effects on space, the entire space in all its dimensions (geophysical, climate, land, sea, air, cosmic, virtual and cognitive).

Terrorist war and war against terrorism will certainly require, more and more pressingly, new forces, new means and new types of actions, new spaces and new engagement systems. Some will lead inevitably to the fragmentation of large entities and the major strategic actions, others, on the contrary, will amplify and maybe will unify them. Hence, a highly topical question: will the world succeed to protect itself against the attrition war imposed by terrorism, anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism?

Key-words: terrorism; cyber-terrorism; network; cyber-culture; asymmetric warfare.

War against terror and terrorism, both asymmetric wars, are nothing but primitive confrontations (most often unjustified) of the weak against the strong. While the strong party always follows the rules and the principles of war and acts by the rules of law and all international law, being thus bound by those laws (at least so it claims!), the weak party has both the strategic initiative and all the means

to put the strong party in a difficult situation, since it does not respect anything. In other words, the victims of the asymmetrical war would be the technological world powers, the large armies, the civilized world and democracy, the environment and people's normal life. On the other hand, it is argued that the terrorists aren't the ones creating sophisticated weapons that can completely destroy human civilization, the environment and even the biosphere, but the dominant technological powers, which have always been intrusive and aggressive.

The *Revolution in Military Affairs* – understood as large-scale policy and strategy, based on the essential changes of information, technology and doctrine – marks an important step in breaking the symmetry, creating immense disproportions. This new concept, the *Revolution in Military Affairs*, reported after a Shalikhshvili's 1996 paper entitled *Joint Vision 2010*, is very complex, controversial, but as the last decades have proved it, it is feasible and effective. The revolution in technology (the emergence of high-precision weapons systems, non-lethal weapons, weapons based on lasers and amplification of the airwaves, sensor development and applications of nanotechnology and biotechnology) in the military, revolutionary concepts, the occurrence and the experience of the Network Centric War with all its implications – especially on the physical, virtual and cognitive environment – the expansion of operations based on effects, especially on Network Based Operations (Network Centric Operations), have created equally disproportion, since few countries in the world can make it, but also asymmetry and concern, as all countries in the world wish to find and must find an appropriate response to such challenges.



For now, terrorism's aim is not creating cyclonic cores, earthquakes, or heat the ionosphere and create lethal waves for life and vegetation. So far, this is done by the great political economic, financial, informational and military powers, through their research programs in advanced new weapons and protective systems against attacks by land, out of space, direct or indirect, in the context of possible cosmic, geophysical, climate, psychological, informational, etc. wars.

But by its many and varied tactical actions and as possible access to chemical, bacteriological, radiological and nuclear means, terrorism is a potential attacker on the physical, virtual and cognitive environment, and people can not remain indifferent in the face of such possibilities, since terrorism can not be controlled.

If, for example, terrorists would take possession of technologies used in genetic engineering, they could create mutants that could destroy whole species or entire areas on the planet.

So far, terrorists have access neither to nuclear technology, nor to biotechnology and nanotechnologies, and probably will not have in the future, because such access involves not only knowledge, experience and skills, but also a system of infrastructure and vectors enabling the effective use of those discovered through scientific research. It does not follow that there is no danger, but the difficulty of such a transformation into a genuine threat. Moreover, permanent network systems and infrastructure provides significant coverage of cyberspace, thus counteracting possible terrorist activities.

Terrorism is generally defined, accordingly to some political coordinates and not necessarily according to very objective data, after thorough investigations, seeking the deep determinations of this phenomenon, explanations, causal chains, bifurcations, and all sorts of other things and relationships that could lead to even some of the myriad sources of terrorist actions and attitudes.

Also, the difficulty of identifying and defining terrorism is caused by its incarnation in many forms and manifestations.

Jacques Baud limited its analysis to the following types of terrorism¹:

- *common law terrorism*, organized or individual, sometimes with clans type bases;
- *marginal terrorism*, such as Aum sect in Japan;

- different shades of *political terrorism*, extreme right or extreme left, Marxist revolutionary, rural or urban;

- *religious terrorism* with fundamentalist groups in different religions, particularly Islamic and Hinduist;

- *terrorism with unique causes*, the kind found in the radical environmental movement or the protection of animals.

Very rapid onset of the war against terrorism, under the sway of strong emotions produced by the terrorist attacks of 11th September 2001, and Afghanistan's powerful hitting puts seriously into question the results (at least on short term) of the war against terrorism. However, by attacking massively, rapidly and forceful the feud of Osama bin Laden, accused of being the principal author of the September 11th attacks, the United States of America have succeeded in removing significantly the terrorist attacks in its vast territory. The efficiency of the measures was and is also very high.

Although the terrorists from bin Laden's network say out loud that the United States is in their sights as are their primary enemy, and therefore their main target, practically, from 11th September until now, mainland U.S. has never produced any terrorist attack.

The action against terrorism is and must be, in fact, a swamp reclamation action in human society, the restoration of social, political, economic, ethnic and religious "ecosystem". It is needed to adequately respond to the terrorist threat of the civil, educational, economic, social, political and military assets, but also requires patience and wisdom. For now, at least in the first phase of the war against terrorism, it can not be said that it was a waste of sound mind.

The civilian, police and military reply of France gave to the asymmetrical warfare led National Liberation Front between 1958 and 1962, well designed from the tactical point of view, could not prevent a failure, even a defeat. To act in an effective manner, the information must be mastered. In other words, we need to know about what it is all about.

Jacques Baud believes that the mastery of information is part of an overall review process of what he calls the four knights of infocalypse².

These four knights, in the author's conception are:



- mastery of information and how to know (*maître du savoir*);
- camouflage;
- influence;
- cooperation with the media.

All these „knights” can not be really called knights if they use indirect strategies to control a chaotic battlefield, unidentified accurately and clearly defined. Hence, asymmetrical warfare is ultimately a mosaic-war, a war of wars, where each act the way it can and with what it can, also said, a *chaotic war*³.

The Network Effect

The new era after the bipolarity breaking up is characterized, among others, by realities and contradictory effects, even conflicting, with nonlinear and unpredictable changes and developments. The network enables the rapid movement of data and information, but this is not always beneficial. Unfortunately, the network is becoming a more stable and extended support, very effective not only for information but for misinformation as well and for all kinds of data and even information that can intoxicate not only on an unsuspecting, but even a specialist in the information domain.

Once with the development of the networks, there have evolved and multiplied all kinds of abilities, from those pertaining to the establishment and management of the networks by those pursuing their vulnerabilities or its use for various purposes. Networks are not selective, but only serving as a support, including for military operations. Everyone, with minimal training in the use of a computer, in the creation of a website, the introduction of data, obtaining an account and password, but even without them, can join the network and enjoy what it offers. Under these conditions, military operations based on the network may be seriously disrupted, even if they have broadband and complex systems of protection.

It significantly enhances the interaction and induces the full spectrum of operations, regardless of the nature and structure, a special effect, which significantly influences the dynamics of all systems and processes that defines an operation – *the network effect*.

The *Network Effect* expresses the speed of the information circulation and the explosive

enhancement of the information flow. At the same time, this effect is an expression of the act which facilitates the communication, but also network’s capacity to assimilate, to multiply, to influence, to change the social relations’ philosophy, which is the human life and human entities, to discover, to seize, to expand⁴, and at the same time, to hide and be vulnerable. The Network Effect creates and generates an enormous energy, and a huge damage at the same time. The safety of the systems and processes employed in the operation increases in one direction and breaks into another.

Network structure – particularly the computer network – has become essential in the modern society. All economic, social, political relations are dependent on the omnipresent and omnipotent computer network, which becomes ever more at a global scale. The new network – **in fact, new networks**, because there are many networks and not just one - which presents itself as a network of networks, creates around it a specific space, both virtual and real – **the cyberspace**. This space is required to be analyzed, known, shaped and secured. Since its creation, it supports many attacks: fraudulent access to the information; computer attacks (viruses, worms, logic bombs, Trojan horses), spam, email bombs⁵ etc.

Most vulnerable to these attacks are the small businesses and the home users. The time of „I am too small to be attacked” has past.⁶ Today anyone can become a target in the networks’ war or in the war within the network. The large organizations are not exempt from it either. But, unlike the small organizations, for which the acquisition of the computers, software and licenses for each computer is a considerable effort, they do not have adequate security systems strategies or that culture of security that occurs within large corporations, in major international or transnational organizations.

Moreover, against small users and small businesses was triggered a real cyberterrorism, on the one hand, by all sorts of speculators and profiteers and, on the other hand, by certain circles of interest and even by the authorities. Also, in many states, has developed a repressive policy with no nuances and discernment, which strikes, of course, all the weak in security matters across the cyberspace. Among others, there are the telecommunications operators who must keep the connection technical data for a year, otherwise they are punished with imprisonment. But there is



not exactly defined what these data are and what it means to preserve it. There are also concerned the users who, by an error, can access information without the necessary authorization.

Those who use the Internet as a source of documentation may know what that means. The legislation in this area has created a real gap between the “digital world” and the real world. It seems that the laws in one world are not valid in the other one. Therefore, one of the strategic priorities of this era is to achieve integration or, more accurately speaking, the reintegration of both worlds, which are actually one and the same. In this regard, it imposes a mandatory code of conduct for all who enter the network, but also finding ways to detect the “network’s rapists” among those who simply wish to have access to the information, according to their needs, based on the freedom of information and the right to be informed.

Of course, the security measures for cyberspace and the security of the authorized users are absolutely necessary, because at the large networks level (financial, economic, corporate, internet, etc.) without a drastic security system would be created a state of chaos. But sanctioning with imprisonment for ten years a user who has entered the network and, almost without realizing it, accessed or attempted to access, information systems he has not been authorized, should be a long way to. *This path does not exist, since networks are extremely dynamic and, in many cases, very vulnerable. The new entrants into the system, especially those from countries that have been half a century under Communist authority, have not had sufficient time to form a strategic culture necessary for network’s philosophy, ie cyberculture.* For this it has to pass some time and maybe even a generation.

The war against terrorism, which is presented above all as an “information war”, requires electronic integrated means to reduce the time of intervention and conducting of the electronic operations. These means provide special forces a capacity for action and appropriate response, given the complexity of the situations makes their standardization impossible.

According to John Arquilla, the ways United States acted in various conflicts correspond in 90% to the military strategy against the great actors, specific to the cold war or the period preceding

it. The US military bombed and destroyed the stockpiles, the facilities and some of the network elements of bin Laden’s terrorist organization, but not this organization. Therefore, one of the most important challenges is *the creation and realization of a strategy to combat terrorism, based both on high technology, information technology, but also on reconsideration, from modern technological perspective, of the human information agent and the special forces located in a expanded theater of operations, identifying itself virtually with the entire world.* However, so far, this is something very difficult to accomplish.

It is, of course, taken in account the fact that terrorism uses the philosophy and physiognomy of the network, even if it doesn’t have access to the top technology and information technology. The network exists nevertheless – it’s Internet and communications networks, transportation, etc. – and is used in the most efficient way possible by the terrorists as well.

Starting from here, several requirements can be outlined for combating terrorism:

- prohibiting or delimiting at maximum the access to the networks of the terrorist organizations or finding the appropriate means to control and detect them;
- hitting those terrorist network nodes, so that those terrorist networks become ineffective;
- creating some abilities of the sensor grid to facilitate early identification of terrorist organizations and groups and their intentions.

From these requirements results a very important feature, which can become, in the future, a dominant in the war against terrorism, since it is an aggregation of potentials, providing strategic and informational dominance, where combating the terrorism falls within a wider range of actions and is not confined only to the repressive, post-factum ones. This feature requires the aggregation of several types of strategies (economic, political, social, cultural, anti-crime, informational and military) in a broader and more flexible concept allowing the achievement at all levels and maintain the strategic initiative in the war against terrorism.

We recognize that terrorists use the Internet to communicate. Expert opinions about a possible terrorist attack in cyberspace capable to produce casualties are divided. Some argue that such an attack is possible, others that it is not possible. In



POINT OF VIEWS

the European Union and in the United States, it is considered that the world is still not protected against such attacks and, therefore, needs physical security. This level is expressed through new antiterrorist laws and strengthened border control, by implementing biometric passports and the application of a new EU legislation as provided by the *Prüm Treaty* on cross-border crime, terrorism and illegal migration.

Meanwhile, Al Qaeda still prefers attacks that cause material damage and loss of life, psychological and media impact, and not necessarily the effects they can produce by computer or electronic attacks. Terrorists are not interested yet to go to a cyber-war, since, as stressed Antoine Champagne, immediately after September 11th, 2001, “a cyber-war makes only cyber-dead.”

Moreover, as is also considered by Cédric Thévenet in his *Cyberterrorism - myth or reality?*, some experts “estimate that a cyber-attack planning, structured and extended (...), would last between two and four years” and between six to ten years, if you want a massive attack that would lead to discontinuation of the Internet.⁷

For now cyberterrorism remains a virtual threat that may soon become real, as terrorists do not

have the means nor the capability to conduct cyber-attacks. But it is possible, to compensate for their weaknesses in infrastructure, technologies and weapons systems, their organization and training, groups, organizations and terrorist networks to move to the preparation and effective use of cyber-attacks. They always act in the shadow, using the most violent means, and the networks offer unlimited opportunities for such actions if they know how to use them.

NOTES:

1 www.livres-chapitre.com/-W0EF9N/-BAUD-JACQUES/-LA-GUERRE-ASYMETRIQUE-OU-LA-DEFAITE-DU-VAINQUEUR.html

2 *Idem.*

3 Brigadier General (ret.) Gheorghe Văduva, PhD, *Războiul haotic*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, București, 2007, pp. 74-140.

4 Also see <http://www.kinecto.ro/new/Resurse/dictionar-de-termeni/web-communication.shtml> (Network effect)

5 Olivier Itéanu, *Sauver la société de l'information*, www.smsi-territoires.net/article44.html.

6 *Idem.*

7 Cédric Thévenet, *Cyberterrorisme, mythe ou réalité?*, Université de Marne-La-Vallée, 2005, http://www.terrorisme.net/pdf/2006_Thevenet.pdf.

George RĂDUICĂ (georgetr@gmail.com), PhD, is an expert at the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, from “Carol I” National Defence University.



AN ANALYSIS OF RISK FACTORS AGAINST THE URBAN SECURITY

Mirela ATANASIU, PhD

The specialists agree urban security needs an increasing attention under the actual circumstances of more emphasized urbanization. Still, we consider is necessary a thorough analysis of the field to settle very clear which are the risks with the higher potential to become threats against urban security. Nothing should be let randomly in this analysis.

Our demarche should be started from the detailed scientific knowledge of all the natural and artificial elements of the urban environment with accent on the vital critical infrastructure needed to provide the urban security for collectives and individuals over which is projected the human factor with its structures, experiences, religion and history. From this mix, we consider it results an optimal analysis of risk factors and threats against the human security and afterwards can be assigned to resolute or improve some existent conflict in the urban environment or to prevent some emergent risks able to transform into threats that can affect the urban security.

Key-words: urban security; risk; threat; security analysis; urban environment.

World's cities and the metropolitan areas develop very quickly. Nowadays, more than half of world's population lives in urban areas and there are forecasts that, until 2050, almost three quarters of peoples will live in the cities¹. This expansion raises the urban areas vulnerability and complexity and this situation determines the need of effective and coordinated action among the multitude of actors and organizations providing security and protecting these urban areas against the potential threats. Only by common action of multiple security systems from different sources,

the authorities can efficiently focus their action over some specific elements related to the crisis situation awareness and normal flow delivery services².

In order to properly identify and analyze the revealing risks and threats against the urban security, we consider, in the first instance, is needed a thorough analysis of the attributes of intern urban environment as follows: *human-built facilities* (for example, is done a risk analysis comprising all the relevant elements concerning their resistance quantification when occur natural disasters or events provoked by human factor, and the probability for that buildings to be the target of some attacks because of their importance in the respective urban area. Therefore, this analysis comprises the very details, from the materials' composition used for constructions to the buildings' placement, form, functions and size); *critical infrastructure* (regarding the urban transport and distribution: water, roads and highways, railroads, air facilities, etc.), over which is done an analysis of so-called "systemic" risks, situation wherein one of the main phases of the integrated risk' evaluation process is considered to be the development of system's response simulation patterns to a series of disturbing events being able to lead to its malfunction; *economy and commerce*: industries, sources of raw materials, the use of toxic industrial materials and biological agents, quantities and resources of food, banking and investments' institutions, etc.); *administration and services*: police and firemen, public and social assistance; system for providing water, light, hospitals; *energy*: types, facilities and distribution; *communications and information* (newspapers, telephony, police, system of fire extinction, computers and Internet etc.) and



societal characteristics (health, history, leadership, ethnicity and culture, religion, government and politics).

Owed to the fact the urban areas consist of a “system of systems” as one of the affected systems will jeopardize the whole system’s integrity, the considerations regarding the environment’s key-elements overlap along the risk analysis and are available for several subsystems of urban system. Such example can be the urban boundaries, regions or areas with conflict historic, religious, political or social aspects, with multiple facets and requiring careful analysis.

Also, for the correct identification of potential risks and threats against urban security, must be taken into consideration the extern urban factors as: demographical changes, the need of mobility and climate changes³.

In the last phase of the analysis, is fulfilled a ranking of the main discovered factors as being actual risks and with probability to transform into threats against security in the urban areas due to different types of indicators’ fluctuation, which can be triggers of some risk situations or catalysts of balance’s deterioration (the decrease of housing, the diminution of water, energy and food resources from the urban environment in proportion to inhabitants’ number growth etc.). Also, crime and instability in the urban areas can rise from a variety of factors: economic collapse; poor urban planning; the existence of ethnic or ethnic-religious divisions; endemic organized crime; tensions owed to migration etc. Such problems persist in many cities and can amplify due to the existent economic crisis. Later, after the “list of priority threats” has been identified, these problems are needed to be approached to prevent the apparition of undesirable security scenarios.

Urban security – problem of actual interest

The city, by definition, should offer its inhabitants decent and healthy living and work conditions, free access to education and medical care, the possibility to have useful social and adequately paid activity, to benefit of safety at home, on the street, in the transport means and at their workplace, to have the freedom to involve voluntarily and responsibly into community’s life. In other words, the urban environment should be a safe one, wherein the security risks and threats are

known and kept under control, of course, in-between normal limits⁴. Still, the reality is different because the cities, peculiarly the most crowded ones, are damaged by intern security factors specific to the urban environment (cultural diversity and the high number of population, poverty, the existence of so-called neighbourhood gangs, unemployment, sanitary conditions, high pollution, etc.), and also extern (legal and illegal immigrants, organized crime, light weapons proliferation, terrorism etc.).

Consequently, we can’t deny the cities and the urban centres have increasing contribution to the European, national and regional development. Indeed, they constitute centres of economic progress and turntables of citizens’ mobility, goods’ transportation and capitals circulation but also poles of innovation’s development, cultural crucibles and depositories of cultural legacy contributing, in a wide range, to human societies’ development⁵.

The urbanization, in its multiple dimensions, is considered important for all the states. The demographic dimension is the most important and obvious for the urban security and, therefore, the process of demographical transformations represents the starting point for our analysis.

The urbanization comprises small towns with less than 2,000 inhabitants, but also the urban agglomerations by tens of millions of inhabitants or even many. In 2005, the urban population was 3.17 billions from a total of 6.45 billions peoples in the world⁶.

In the last years, it was seen a growing recognition by the international community, the UN member-states and some civil society’s organizations of urbanization’s importance for the economic and social nations’ future⁷.

The recognition of this situation was made based on states, policies, studies and development projects’ experience which were the subject of conferences on human security.

Urban security becomes a priority issue for the majority of cities owed to those evolutions and in conformity to the European Council recommendations⁸. It’s necessary for security to get its recognition as being a defining feature of the city, an element of its identity and of competition among cities and urban projects.

Urban security provides the necessary environment and opportunities for the citizens to develop their productive potential in the urban



context and also to freely approach the main aspects concerning them. The safety in the public places, the infrastructures and services reliability, the economic and social systems' security are critical, peculiarly for the poor population in order to accomplish the contribution for family, community and society. Moreover, the continuous decay and destruction of surrounding systems and resources threat the already fragile communities' security.

The essential urban security goal is to improve the elementary conditions of development in the urban and pre-urban areas: food, water, workplaces and living conditions. In order to improve this urban security's sub-dominium are needed integrated programs oriented to community able to promote the approach by the local administration of local developments. Such programs should address to all the needed sectors to satisfy the elementary citizens' demands: public safety, social wellbeing, economic growth, good administration and public order.

The analysis of urban security/insecurity risk factors

Broadly speaking, as we already know, the risk is reflected in the discrepancy between "the positive expectation" and "the negative event" that may occur, and in its probability of occurring. The risk is caused by individual or society's impossibility to know with certitude that some future events will happen and, at community's level, represents a potential situation of "waiting" for a "negative event", which, under certain conditions, has a high degree of probability to produce if there aren't taken in due time specific measures to reduce substantially or to eliminate the probability of occurring.

So, it's obvious that risk's assessment is fulfilled in compliance to: the probability of event's occurrence, the level of event's consequences and event's environmental and health impact.

We consider risks against urban security as being part of risks against national security and they are, generally, viewed as standing into the interaction between human security and societal security.

If is performed a simplistic analysis over the urban environment, it can be inferred that the main factors degenerating the human security are the

ones related to *the urban environment* and its impact over individuals' health as follows: air quality; water quality; the means of waste collection; noise pollution; the habitat represented in most cases by inadequate housing conditions owed to the congestion from the urban areas and to the lack of individual's financial resources to purchase a proper house and the poor quality of services for the population and also by *intrinsic conditions of human existence* as: smoking, drugs use, lack of healthy diets, physical inactivity, abuse of alcohol, which can damage cities citizens' health.

But, on long term, the records show urban security depends very much on macro factors as: *social factors* concerning the form and the degrees of individuals' freedom, the relation between the political environment and the civil society and the effect of social control; *demographic factors* represented by the population's number, density and mobility; *economic factors* as the development level or *management factors* attained to the level and intensity of prevention and control through law and order. We consider the analysis of risk factors against urban security must be fulfilled into the wide trends of *rapid urban growth, unequal social-economic development and the need of human security*.

Migration and urban security. The international security environment is very affected by the actual emergent trends, as the population growth bringing with it the humans migration from countries with much poorer population toward countries with bigger possibilities to assess honourable living.

Of course, the villages are also affected by this flow, but the cities are peculiarly looked for by the immigrants. Moreover, the sum of risks and threats in the urban areas are increasing. The cultural mix every individual must tolerate, the conflict from the marketplace, the change of habits and scenarios the citizens were used to know and now have disappeared, all these issues are seen as risk factors against the maintenance of balance in the urban areas.

The concentration of population in the cities was very quick overlapping the capacities and plans of local authorities. Social problems were intensified; groups of populations were marginalized without being taken into account their professional and social potential which is nevertheless essential. In the developed countries'



cities, the disadvantaged neighbourhoods are part of the urban landscape as a factor of social exclusion and insecurity growth.

Another threat comes from the type of population that is allowed to circulate in the so-called civilized and free countries because here can arrive well-intentioned people who want to find better life conditions but may also appear some criminals, murderers or even terrorists looking to attack crowded places from the cities where the casualties and damages can be worse than from the village, where homes and peoples are more dissipated.

The economic factors negatively affecting the urban environment are considered to be the income gaps between the different categories of persons from the urban environment caused by the demographical factors, the extern competition, the demand of highly qualified employees and the tax system⁹, the high level of prices for goods and services, overall life's quality, the inflation level, the inexistence of a viable social aid system for the disadvantaged categories of citizens, etc.

Into the economic sector, the deindustrialization and new technologies introduction, especially in the transports field, rapidly devaluated the infrastructures and soil, limited dramatically the local income, destroyed the social network and led the entire neighbourhoods toward financial ruin, wasting the development efforts submitted to the city as a whole.

As regards **the management factors** by law and order, the norms and social control weaknesses increase the risk of violence in the cities and diminish the force of young aspirants from the city toward successful conformist patterns. Under the impact of actual negative phenomena as crisis, unemployment or marginalization, the young persons from poor neighbourhoods live into a mass society wherein the patterns to follow by the middle class are imposing almost entirely. They feel excluded in thousand of manners from a normal social trend: through scholar failure, absence of workplaces, racism, while the consumption and success patterns are at advertisement and television's hand. In this context, the juvenile delinquency appears as a manner to reduce the tension created between the level of aspiration of the respective teenagers and the social reality they live in¹⁰. Therefore, these risks elimination and the assessment of a civic normality, public order and

safety climate permanently represents a priority for the society which by its specialized structures in conformity to the national and international legislation looks over to identify the most efficient forms and means to accomplish this objective. Nevertheless, the statistical data mention that the homicides in the big cities are 4-8 times higher than in the rural areas¹¹.

The general society's evolution, characterized by some criminal acts (endangering some society's services and vital infrastructures, person's life and integrity, public and private property rights and citizens' legitimate interests), needs a reassessment of elements being the basis for a proper function of structures and services empowered to prevent and protect the critical infrastructures and services, the criminal phenomenon combating by improving the methods to provide law enforcement and public safety.

Types of risks against the urban security

The risks against the urban security are many and of different natures. Therefore, the states and the local authorities unite their efforts to diminish or eliminate the specific risks appeared owed to the accentuated globalization. Urbanization, in the developed world or in the least developed one, was accompanied by a concentration of poverty that has become a severe, persistent and broad characteristic of the urban areas while a third from cities population lives to their peripheries in unhealthy conditions. We consider as essential the following issuing depending on:

1. The category of generator phenomena

a) Risks and threats generated by: the spectre and effects of global warming; the economic un-systematized and uncontrolled macro-expansion; a future shortage of energetic resources; the complexity, exploitation and interdependency of infrastructures and critical services vital for citizen's safety and security and for the normal function of modern societies as a whole and, peculiarly, the local human communities; the trend of extension to global scale of some terrorist networks; the weapons of mass destruction proliferation, especially the ones based on the use of nuclear technologies; the disease provoked by viruses with rapid spread to the continental or even global area, etc.

b) Vulnerabilities and threats generated

by: illegal migration phenomenon (that, in the context of distances reduction and some spaces compression owed to globalization, tends to confer to some regional flows a quasi-global character); the activities of some transnational networks of organized crime (that, also, tend to overlap the regional geographical space, by continental or, in some cases, global enlargement).

2. The field affected by the risk

a) Individual security is unilaterally considered as personal safety. Uncertainty, unpredictability, insecurity, fear, lack of useful information and legal framework to guide the mean of action of individual and communities are risk factors damaging the level of personal safety and, by extension, the one of national safety.

Citizen's safety is mainly perceived by the following dimensions: food safety; health safety; person safety; property's safety; investments' safety; locative safety; workplace safety; family's safety; the access to education¹².

The citizen's safety growth is fulfilled by the diminution of risks and vulnerabilities presuming a detailed analysis of possible risks and vulnerabilities against the society as a whole and the individual as peculiar, against critical services and infrastructures vital for modern society's function and a efficient planning of these critical infrastructures and services' protection and resilience taking into consideration their interdependency. Therefore, the other fields considered above are, in fact, derived dimensions of individual's security, the person being considered as main subject of the urban environment.

b) Critical infrastructure's security. At the level of communities and society as a whole, it is necessary to define and apply complex protection measures for some critical infrastructures, providing the citizen's safety, security and comfort in the conduct of social life into the community and state's framework, as follows: facilities and networks from the energetic sector, peculiarly installations to produce, transport and distribute the electricity but also for the production, transportation and distribution of oil and natural gas (from intern production or European transit); communication and informatics technologies (telephony, broadcasting, television, informatics applications for data processing or economic and financial processes control, informatics material, data transmission networks,

inclusively Internet, etc.); the banking-financial sector; the sector for healthcare (hospitals, medical equipment for patients' care, blood banks laboratories, pharmacies and deposits of sanitary materials), emergency, searching and rescuing services (firemen, ambulance, the emergency services, etc.); the food sector (the entire network starting from the production sector to the one of harvesting, processing, storage and distribution); water supply (resources, specific treatment, storage and distribution networks); sewage and garbage disposal and ecological treatment; local, regional and national transports (the urban transport network, airports, maritime and fluvial harbours, the intermodal facilities, the railway infrastructure, transit networks, air, land and sea traffic systems; dangerous products production, storage and transport (storage) (for example: chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear wastes, etc.); the good governance on local – regional – national plan (for example: local administration, police, special services, vital community services and services safeguarding the critical objectives, the permanent network for citizen's information, mass media, etc.).

Those sectors vulnerability increases with the expansion of informatics systems and internet use into society's management being needed a permanent reassessment of the measures settled for information critical infrastructures to the local, national or European operators' level for those infrastructures safety benefit but especially for citizen's safety and security¹³.

c) Environmental security. A whole range of environmental, economic and social factors stopped the cities' "clean" development. By consuming natural resources of an extended surrounding surface, these accumulated serious environmental problems (atmosphere pollution, depletion and pollution of underground and surface waters, soil pollution, etc.) into the territory and also on a wide range around and, in exchange, rarely created sustainable housing conditions (owed to the high concentration of houses, the conflicts related to land use, the limited usage of technical infrastructures and collective services' networks), consequently with the marginalization of important population groups.

The pollution represents a vital issue for the society as a whole and peculiarly for the individuals living in the urban environments and, daily, being



exposed to a series of inerrant disruptive elements of chemical, physical and psychological types intruding them on all their existence's postures.

Therefore, is needed an efficient and effective analysis of the polluter factors with negative impact over the vital elements (water, air and soil) existing in the crowded urban environments and their effects over the crowded urban areas' population's health and sanity. For instance, the object-oriented studies proved that the daily continuous exposure in the middle of atmospheric polluters' concentrations, as exist in the large urban centres, predisposes to the propagation of the acute and chronic diseases as: the endocrine glands deterioration, neural-vegetative dystonia, the psychical dystonia, respiratory injuries (allergies, the bronchia asthma, and emphysema), cardio-vascular pathologies and tumours.

Being aware of the problematic gravity owed to the inerrant respiration of harmful substances as the chemical pollution, the bacteria, the smoke and the smog, the pollen, as well as the increase of the number of persons suffering of allergies, asthma and stress, we consider is extremely important the thorough knowledge of the causes' range spoiling our lives quality in order to identify means: to dispose of the already existent negative effects pressuring over our living and dwelling environment; to prevent the intended or casual provocations of such situations; to promote "clean", successful and cheap technological solutions.

The risks against citizen, vital infrastructures, the natural environment and society as a whole can materialize by attitudes, gesticulations, acts, facts creating or leading to unbalanced and instability phases and generating tensioned and conflict situations. These can be identified in report to their nature (political, economic, military, social, and environmental), their form (attitudes, gesticulations, facts, events, phenomena, human actions), their stage (latent, possible, probable, imminent) or their type (direct, masked, mixed, violent, non-violent).

Urban regeneration – solution to combat the risks and threats occurred in urban crowded areas

Urban regeneration represents a key concept into the big cities development being, consequently, a process for life quality growth and improvement

for the cities' citizens. Big cities from USA (for example: New York, Chicago) or from Europe (London, Berlin, Barcelona, Amsterdam, Tirana, Dublin, Copenhagen, etc.) have developed, in the last three decades, by implementing wide programs of urban regeneration, this contributing permanently to the citizens' life quality improvement, to the revenues growth and to the modernization of public spaces and services. The successful pattern for this cities shows that the urban regeneration process can constitute the best solution for coherent and durable development¹⁴.

Urban regeneration strategies must take into account the multiple factors emerging from the economic crash origin which certain urban areas confront with, the most active being the buildings' decay, the outdated infrastructures and the issues related to accessibility. Many companies leave the cities aiming to obtain lower function costs and more space and many from their employees follow them hoping to live less expensive existence (cheaper rents and more advantageous house properties' prices). In order to answer to those enterprises expectations willing to relocate their business in regenerated areas, the programs of urban regeneration should find innovative ways to use the available space and to improve the level of the services offered by the city thus transforming in advantages the inerrant effects of agglomeration from the central urban areas.

The environmental dimension of urban regeneration should grow to the rank of essential priorities the following three major themes: climate changes, combat of natural resources pollution coming from human activities and, generally, their rentable use and, finally, habitats protection. In this regard, the artificial reconditioning of the chemical, biological, electrical and quantitative balance of the atmospheric air into the very populated buildings from the urban environment (cinemas, terrestrial and subterranean means of transport, stations and airports, etc.), but also into the extern environment using some technological structures specific are solutions to implement for enhancing the urban environment ambient into the crowded areas.

Conclusions

The social, environmental, health and economic consequences of the centrifugal and centripetal

trends of population caused by globalization, but also the increase of population over the globe especially in poor urban areas have a major impact over citizen's security. Without access to adequate services (water supply, sanitary, medical, financial, etc.), individuals' vulnerability, instability and insecurity grow.

In the actual context of the continuous agglomeration and concentration of the population in the cities, these urban systems must respond to the rapid urbanization phenomenon's provocations and to fulfil the new role of key actors on the globe. In this regard, is needed the analysis and the assessment of risks and of oscillator urban factors with their disturbing potential for the urban environment security.

After the effectuation of the risk analysis and the identification of main risks and threats against urban security, is needed the intervention into the natural environment and also in the built one, in food security and food quality politicise in the management of services provided and the emergency situations, in the way civil population is educated to prevent the violent phenomena and to protect the surrounding environment. In this regard, is necessary a common vision of decision factors, a surveillance of modalities to implement and permanent evaluate their results.

We consider a mean of positive intervention over the urban areas with high risk against the individuals and communities' security is represented by the urban renovation presuming different activities to improve the urban population's level of life.

The urban renovation policies of decayed urban agglomeration which cannot confront the high flow of population and traffic must constitute the basis for an adequate pattern with an application field to enrol forms of intervention from the urban spaces' regeneration to the rehabilitation of the existent buildings' patrimony. The new pattern of durable city should be based on an integrated and innovative approach of the urban renovation which, in the Leipzig Chart spirit, must take into consideration the environmental, social and economic aspects. This won't encourage neither the unlimited expansion, nor the construction in the detriment of green areas but, on the contrary, will emphasize on controlled growth of cities, urban extension prevention, reviving the urban housing and social network patrimony, improvement of

ecological efficacy of cities, revaluation of the industrial terrains and the promotion of sustainable transport forms.

Therefore, every process of urban regeneration is concentrated on the implementation of a plan with complementary solutions for cities' social, urban, economic, cultural and environmental issues. This means every plan of urban regeneration acts simultaneously over the physical space where people live (owns, essentially, an urban component) as well as over the public services people need (contains social, economic, environmental, cultural components).

NOTES:

1 Liliana GURAN NICA, Marilena DRAGOMIR, *Geografie umană generală*, Editura Fundației României de Măine, București, 2006, p. 81.

2 *Protecting national security from increasingly complex security challenges and threats*, See: http://www.thalesgroup.com/News_and_events/Countries/Spain/100412_Thales_Spain_Protecting_national_security_from_increasingly_complex_security_challenges_and_threats/, accessed on 07.02.2011.

3 Agenția Europeană de Mediu, *Despre mediul urban*, See: <http://www.eea.europa.eu/ro/themes/urban/about-the-urban-environment>, accessed on 12.02.2011.

4 Petre DUȚU, Cristina BOGZEANU, *Provocări actuale pentru securitatea urbană*, în vol. 1 al Sesiunii de comunicări științifice cu participare internațională „Perspective ale securității și apărării în Europa”, 19-20 November 2009, București, 2009, p. 79.

5 *Proiect de aviz al Comitetului Regiunilor privind rolul regenerării urbane în contextul viitoarei dezvoltări urbane în Europa*, Comitetul Regiunilor, 26 mai 2010.

6 *State's of the World 2006/7*, United Nations Human Settlements Programme, p. 10.

7 *Financing Human Shelter: Global Report of Human Settlements*, United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 2005, p. 54.

8 M. MARCUS, *Sécurité et Démocratie à l'épreuve de la violence*, *Proiectul integrat „Réponses à la violence quotidienne dans un société démocratique”*, Ed. Conseil de l'Europe, Strasbourg, 2003.

9 Magdalena PLATIS, *Economia sectorului public*, Editura Universității din București, 2002, See: <http://ebooks.unibuc.ro/StiinteADM/platis/8.htm>, accessed on 10.02.2011.

10 Petre DUȚU, Cristina BOGZEANU, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

11 Pierre LANDREVILLE, *Violence individuelle et violence étatique*, See: <http://www.cjf.qc.ca/relations/>



POINT OF VIEWS

archives/themes/ textes/ guerre/ guer_land_0011.htm, 28.
accessed on 13.02.2011.


12 Septimiu CACEU, *Siguranța cetățeanului și a comunităților locale*, Revista „Alarma” nr. 4/2009, p.

13 Septimiu CACEU, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

14 *Ce înțelegem prin regenerare urbană?*, See: <http://www.2012sector1.ro/?id2=00010007>, accessed on 14.02.2011.

Dr. Mirela ATANASIU (atanasiu.mirela@yahoo.com) activates into the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the „Carol I” National Defense University.

THE PERCEPTION OF RUSSIA IN ROMANIA, REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE



The volume “The perception of Russia in Romania, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine” was published in 2010, under the aegis of Curtea Veche publishing house, in a bilingual edition (Romanian and English), its authors being Iulian Chifu, Oazu Nantoi and Oleksandr Sushko.

The volume has 395 pages and is the result of a project financed through the East-East Project of Soros Foundation, aiming at illustrating Russia’s perception by Romania, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, which is also reflected in the study’s structure. Thus, it has three parts, each one of them being dedicated to the perception of Russian Federation in one of the three states mentioned above. At the same time, one could note, as a general feature of this paper, the fact that the approach of the three chapters varies because of some obvious peculiarities of the countries which are analyzed. Thus, in the cases of Ukraine and of the Republic of Moldova, it was necessary to take into consideration the fact that they are young democracies to which Russia has had a specific attitude; additionally, an important number of their citizens belong to the Russian minority and reflect Russia’s influence on these countries in various activity areas.

The first part of the study is dedicated to the perception of Russia in Romania, its analysis being founded on the examination of the official documents (first of all, the National Security Strategy – 2007 – and the National Defence Strategy – 2010 – and, then, the programs of government in the areas of foreign and energy policies), being considered a reflection of the image that the Romanian authorities have on the relation with the Russian Federation. Plus, there are also considered some official speeches of the President of Romania. It is also considered the reflection of these programmatic provisions in the real political and diplomatic activity, as well as two diplomatic incidents that have marked the relation between Russia and Romania recently. At the same time, another issue taken into account is represented by the way in which Russia is reflected in mass-media as a series of journals and TV channels are analyzed from this perspective. Moreover, in order to define an exacter image of Romania’s perception on Russia, there were undertaken and analyzed two polls. Thus, the authors build Russia’s image as seen from Romania, having as start point the analysis of a range of factors which can create the clear reflection of the way in which the Russian Federation is perceived in Romania at different levels – the official one, the one of the opinion makers (mass-media) and, last but not least, the one of the population, in general. The conclusions which the authors reach to in the end of this study are apposite and extremely interesting and may be used not only in the elaboration of specialty studies, but also by the competent authorities when elaborating policies and strategies. The merit of this part resides in clearly extracting the characteristics of the way in which the Russian Federation is perceived in Romania, creating an opportunity to discriminate between stereotypes and real features of the two actors’ relations.

The perception of Russia in the Republic of Moldova is outlined, starting from Russia’s



foreign policy toward the Republic of Moldova, underlining the fact that the Federation's long term national interest is to become a global power, the close proximity being considered an exclusive influence area. In this regard, it is also worth noting the change of the instruments of exercising the influence in this area as they have been endowed with a "soft" dimension too, known as "the humanitarian dimension of the Russian foreign policy". Under these circumstances, the Russian mass-media from the states encompassed in the CIS have a very high influence on the population, as it is the main source of information, and act according to Kremlin's political interests. Therefore, the perception of Russia in this country is strongly marked by this phenomenon; for instance, Vladimir Putin is looked upon as the most credible political leader in the world, being followed by Dmitri Medvedev and, then, by Vladimir Voronin; western heads of states and governments have only a marginal place. Moreover, the Russian Federation should be, in the view of the questioned population within a poll, the partner who should support the Republic of Moldova in its way to the European integration. The influence of culture, church and education on the perception is also taken into account. At the same time, this study also takes into consideration other aspects of high importance of the relation Russia-Republic of Moldova which contribute to creating the image of the Federation. Among these, there are the following: the energy dependence of the Republic of Moldova on Russia; the dependence on the Russian market; the relations between the two actors regarded from the perspective of the conflict in Transnistria; the probability for a new conflict to emerge in this region. In conclusion, the chapter dedicated to the way in which Russia is perceived in the Republic of Moldova is characterized by the authors' preoccupation to identify the factors influencing the perception on the Russian Federation of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova.

The approach of the perception of Russia in Ukraine takes into consideration a range of data regarding Russia's official position in Ukraine's political documents and in its public space, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, some aspects of the relation between the two states which determine the perception at the official and public levels. As a consequence, one may reckon that the method of studying this subject is a combination between the methodology applied in the first chapter and the one used in the second one. Overall, the perception of Russia by the Ukrainians is positive as it is considered a country similar to theirs from a cultural point of view. Nonetheless, the merit of this study resides in emphasizing the evolution of Russia's image in Ukraine, by analyzing the relations between these states and the crisis moments. Additionally, it also takes into account other factors determining the perception, factors among which we shall mention: Russia's humanitarian policy; history; language; interests; the evolution and trends of Russia's economic presence in Ukraine. This study's conclusions may also turn out to be extremely useful in understanding the evolution of the regional security environment and of the factors which have to be considered when approaching it.

The present paper may represent for the decision makers of the four approached actors a source of documentation on the perceptions, fears, symbols, stereotypes which govern not only the public spaces in these countries, but also the official, political and institutional organisms' attitudes. Elaborating an overall image of the way in which Russia is perceived by the three South-East European actors, among which one is an EU and NATO member state, may constitute an extremely useful instrument for identifying areas in which things could be improved or in which the lack of trust should be approached directly in order to create solid fundamentals for improving the bilateral relations.

C.B.



THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES

JANUARY - MARCH 2011

The most recent studies published within the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies are: "National interests and the use of the instruments of national power in advancing and defending them. Study case – Romania", "The arms race in the insecurity arch from the European Union's Western proximity: consequences for Romania" and "The role of cultural factors in military actions".

The next trimester is abundant in important activities for Center's researchers. "The Universe of Military Science", international conference STRATEGIES XXI of "Carol I" National Defence University is organized on 11 sections and will take place on 14th-15th of April 2011. At this activity, will participate representatives from: he Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Administration and Interiors, the Romanian Intelligence Service, the Service of Protection and Guard, the Ministry Education, Research, Youth and Sport, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, professors and researchers from civil and military institutions of education and research, of the non-governmental organizations, but also other CDSSS partners, researchers and professors from similar universities and institutes from Romania or from abroad.

Another important activity is the international seminar on "Cross-border Regional Cooperation, an Instrument for the Enhancement of European Security", organized by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, of "Carol I" National Defence University, on 17th of May 2011. At this activity, important figures from Romania and abroad are invited to take the floor.

The most important CDSSS' scientific activity of this year is the annual international scientific session which is scheduled to take place on 17th-18th of November 2011 and its topic will refer to "The Balance of Power and the Security Environment". The information on the conditions of participation at this event will be available in due time on the website <http://cssas.unap.ro>.

Irina TĂTARU



INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

On selecting the articles there are taken into consideration: the area of the subjects presented in the magazine, the actuality of the topic, its novelty and originality, its scientific content and the adequacy to the editorial norms adopted by the magazine. The article should not contain any party political connotations.

The papers' scientific evaluation is done by two scientific experts that are either professors or senior fellow researchers.

The article, written in a foreign language (English, French) may have maximum 10-12 pages (6.000 – 7.000 words) and has to be sent both in print and paper, using Times New Roman font, size 12, one line, and the tables and schemes have to be printed separately. The translation into Romanian will be provided by the editor.

The text has to be preceded by an abstract which is not to exceed 250 words, both in Romanian and English and not more than 10-12 keywords. The papers have to be signed adding the authors's scientific degree, name, first name, the institution he comes from and have to end with a curriculum vitae, which should include the following elements: a short bio, a list of personal papers, birthyear, birthplace, address, city, postal code, country, telephone, fax, e-mail address, photo in jpeg format.

The footnotes are to be included by the end of the article and have to respect the international regulations. Authors can publish only one article by issue.

The text has to present an easy structure, using titles (subtitles). The abbreviations will be marked on the text only at their first mention on the text. It is likely to end the papers with some important conclusions regarding the importance of the research.

The articles will not use classified information.

As the magazine does not have a profitable purpose, the articles cannot be paid.

We accept articles from all the persons interested in publishing articles in STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine. The materials have to comply with the conditions mentioned above and to be of interest for the international scientific community. Thus, it is necessary that the documentation resources used in the elaboration of the articles had in their composition prestigious paperworks or publications widely recognized at national or international level.

Our address is: National Defence University "Carol I", the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, 68-72 Panduri Street, sector 5, Bucharest, Romania, telephone: (021) 319.56.49; Fax: (021) 319.55.93, e-mail: cssas@unap.ro, web address: <http://cssas.unap.ro>, <http://impactstrategic.unap.ro>



After nine years since its first edition, STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine, edited by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University “Carol I” is a quarterly scientific magazine acknowledged locally and internationally for the wide area of topics - the political-military present, security strategy and military security, NATO and EU actions, informational society, strategic synthesis and evaluations, a special column “Strategic Event” that studies the strategic impact of the dynamics of the actions undertaken nationally, regionally and globally.

STRATEGIC IMPACT has as collaborators important researchers and personalities within the scientific research area and from the civilian and military university system, both national and international, from the Ministry of National Defence, General Staff, services’ staffs, the Ministry of Administration and Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, military units and other state’s organizations, NGOs, companies, etc.

The international acknowledgement of the magazine’s quality is confirmed by its editions presented on sites belonging to prestigious foreign institutions (Defence Guide, in collaboration with the Hellenic Institute of Strategic Studies – HEL.I.S.S.), The Institute for Development and Social Initiatives – IDIS from the Republic of Moldova – the virtual library for political and security studies. Also, the magazine is included in international databases: CEEOL - Central and Eastern European Online Library, Germany, IndexCopernicus International, Poland.

The magazine is accredited by the National University Research Council and acknowledged as a B+ magazine that demonstrates the potential to become an international acknowledged magazine.

STRATEGIC IMPACT is a representative forum for reflection and debates on topics related to strategy and security for the scientific, academic, national and international community.

At present, STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine is issued separately in two editions, Romanian and English, and disseminated in the domestic and international scientific environment and also to the main institutions involved in security and defence.



Issue organizer: Cristina BOGZEANU
Designer: George RĂDUICĂ
Masterproof: Cristina BOGZEANU
The National Defence University "Carol I" Printing House
